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EDITOR'S NOTE
So, you may be wondering, what do they mean by "The New Private Law"?
Try as I might over the last year, I have been unable to articulate a simple ex-
planation. Whatever the nature of this Symposium topic, it succeeds in raising
curiosity and sparking lively debate-which is, I believe, its purpose.
Following the November 1994 elections, the new politically conservative
majority in Congress, led by House speaker Newt Gingrich, called for the elimi-
nation of broad government policies in favor of private decisionmaking. The
shift towards privatization seemingly appealed to a majority of the public. How-
ever, it cast a gray cloud on those who consider themselves "progressives," and
who saw it as a step backward.
The Symposium participants posit the theory that a jurisprudential shift
corresponds to the political trend. With regard to labor and employment disputes,
conservation easements, and cohabitation agreements between same-sex couples,
some authors see a progressive potential-the proverbial silver lining-within
the move towards the private. Their intriguing insights confirm that, "Once in
awhile you get shown the light, in the strangest of places if you look at it
right."'
Others .argue that the shift will, as expected, result in fewer protections for
minority interests, and that we need to be careful before we embrace what may
be a wolf in sheep's clothing. Lastly, one author defiantly suggests there is noth-
ing at all "new" about the New Private Law. Nevertheless, the thoughtful treat-
ment given the topic by all the participants demonstrates the success of the Den-
ver University Law Review Symposium format, intended to facilitate a scholarly
discussion of contextual legal phenomena.
I thank the Hughes Research and Development Fund and Dean Dennis
Lynch for their continuing commitment to this important intellectual enterprise. I
thank all the authors for their hard work and patience throughout the editing
process. I thank the University of Denver College of Law faculty who participat-
ed in the weekly reading groups, particularly those who took the time to write an
article or a comment for the issue, and especially the stellar symposium commit-
tee co-chairs Federico Cheever and Martha Ertman.
Thanks to all the editors and staff of the Denver University Law Review
who helped before and during the symposium conference. Thank you to Tanya
Haynes and Lauri Mlinar for helping me coordinate all the conference details. A
big thank you to Tarek Younes, who was indispensable in the production of this
issue. Finally, I thank my friend and colleague, Sue Chrisman, who helped pre-
serve my sanity and sense of humor, and with whom it has been my greatest
pleasure to work.
Tracy S. Craige, Editor
1. JERRY GARCIA & PHiL HuNTER, Scarlet Begonias, on GRATEFUL DEAD FROM THE MARs
HOTEL (Grateful Dead Records, 1974).

THE NEW PRIVATE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
JULIE A. NICE*
This introductory essay provides the backdrop against which the New
Private Law Symposium developed. It briefly explains our unique symposium
model, which informed much of this volume. In addition, it introduces this
year's topic, the New Private Law, an idea so fresh as to resist definition.
Readers can best understand what we mean by the New Private Law by under-
standing how we came to coin the phrase.
OUR MODEL: DENVER'S CONTEXTUALIZED SYMPOSIUM
Each year members of the University of Denver law faculty select a sym-
posium topic from among common themes we encounter in our work. In this
endeavor, we hold a series of meetings and discuss trends emerging in our
teaching, research, and writing. From among common themes, we select as our
symposium topic a pattern which both relates to and transcends our diverse
contextual interests. We focus our group inquiry on developing the pattern in
context, both to investigate its specific contextual impact and as a grounded
means to explore whether a cross-contextual pattern emerges. Next, we search
for willing travelers to participate in a classic symposium, an intimate round-
table exchange requiring full engagement of all who attend. This format stands
in stark contrast to the experience of many of us, who have attended too many
conferences involving talking heads, sterile audiences, and far too little mean-
ingful engagement. We conduct the symposium through contextualized discus-
sions which ground our examination of how the identified pattern plays out
both in context and across contexts. Our symposium process allows us to do
what legal scholars do best, identifying broad patterns in the development of
law in society, analyzing them, and when necessary, giving them names.
OUR TOPIC: EXPLORING THE EMERGENCE OF NEW PRIVATE LAW
As we met to develop a topic for this symposium, one theme repeatedly
emerged: the growing trend toward preferring private ordering over public
governance. The mainstream media had reported about experiments in privatiz-
ing traditionally government institutions such as schools and prisons. Several
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law. B.S., Northwestern University,
1982; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 1986. Thanks to my Denver colleagues whose
devotion to a meaningful scholarly dialogue made this endeavor worthwhile. Thanks also to our
guest participants who contributed their important inquiries and insights. Finally, my special
thanks to Sue Chrisman, Editor-in-Chief, and Tracy Craige, Symposium Editor, for their persever-
ance in committing their extraordinary skills and talents to coordinating and editing this Sympo-
sium issue, and to Tarek Younes for his assistance.
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faculty members identified this pattern within their legal contexts, including
the evolution of private labor dispute resolution systems,' the emergence of
techniques for private environmental preservation,2 and the increasing
contractualization of family structures.3
In my work,4 I had observed privatization take hold even in welfare, one
of the most traditionally "public" arenas. In the recent federal welfare reform
legislation, Congress authorized states to provide services through contracts
with charitable, religious, or private organizations.5 Some states and counties
had been experimenting with private contracts prior to this new round of wel-
fare reform.6 Proponents of welfare privatization claim that it costs less be-
cause of greater flexibility, and provides better services because workers re-
ceive performance-based financial incentives.7 Opponents, including unions,
counter that privatization costs more, reduces the quality of services, elimi-
nates expertise, fosters patronage and corruption, and diminishes public ac-
countability.'
Welfare privatization has taken many forms. For example, some states
have used competitive request-for-proposal bidding processes, while others
have relied on a non-competitive single-bidder method.9 Some states contract
with large corporations, while others rely on smaller, local entities." Some
state agencies compete with private bidders for welfare contracts, while others
simply select among private bids." Texas has entertained bids for its contract
to administer welfare from public-private partnerships consisting of Texas
public agencies working in conjunction with major corporations, as well as
from wholly private competitors. 2 In whatever manner Texas and other states
configure their welfare privatization, many states seem firmly committed to
1. See Roberto L. Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring Gilmer's Impact
and Legacy, 73 DENV, U. L. REv. 1051 (1996).
2. See Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and
Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1077
(1996).
3. See Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven,
but Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1107 (1996).
4. See JULIE A. NICE & LOUISE G. TRUBEK, POVERTY LAW: THEORY AND PRACrICE
(1997).
5. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
6. Contractors Must Learn Intricate, Varying Procurement Rules to Win Bids, 5 WELFARE
TO WORK (MMI) No. 24, at 380-81 (Dec. 16, 1996) [hereinafter Contractors] (describing welfare
privatization efforts in Texas, Michigan, Connecticut, Maryland, Indiana, and Virginia).
7. Privatization Useful but Risky Tool in Welfare Reform, 4 WELFARE TO WORK (MI) No.
14, at 108-09 (July 31, 1995).
8. See, e.g., AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Government for Sale: An Examination of the Contracting
Out of State and Local Government Services (on file with the author).
9. Contractors, supra note 6.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Bidders for the Texas contract include the Texas Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, Texas Workforce Commission, Anderson Consulting, Electronic Data Systems, IBM,
Lockheed Martin, and Unisys. See Nina Bernstein, Companies See Profits in Welfare Law, DAL-
LAS MORN. NEWS, Sept. 15, 1996, at 10A; John Carlin, How to Profit from the Poor, INDEPEN-
DENT (London), Sept 29, 1996, at 12; Contractors, supra note 6; Laura Griffin, Nation's Eyes
Turn to Texas, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, July 22, 1996, at 5B.
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the basic notion that private entities can provide welfare services both more
efficiently and effectively than government. 3 This Symposium explores what
the different forms of, and basic commitment to, privatization mean.
Though our inquiry revealed ubiquitous privatization, we approached
privatization as a symposium topic with some trepidation for two reasons: (1)
none of us was an immediate fan of the trend; and (2) some of us were skepti-
cal about its importance in legal scholarship. Some of us viewed the trend as a
political tool of lawmakers, rather than as an identified movement in legal
scholarship. We wondered, nonetheless, whether this trend toward privatization
might represent something more than a new technique of the political right.
Might it also constitute a legal movement that could be characterized as New
Private Law? If so, what are the movement's attributes? How can it best be
situated within legal discourse?
To capture the gist of our conversations, we coined the phrase "New
Private Law"' 4 and began our attempt to identify what it is. The primary
characteristics of New Private Law include deregulation, decentralization,
privatization, and contractualization. New Private Law reflects a normative
regime which both recognizes a distinction between public and private do-
mains and prefers the ordering of the private market to that of public
decisionmakers. The preference for the "private" seems, at a minimum, to
tolerate inequality and, perhaps, to reify existing power hierarchies.
In a broad-stroke attempt to situate our inquiry within the tradition of
legal discourse, we began to compare New Private Law to recognized jurispru-
dential schools. Initially, we assumed that New Private Law shared the conser-
vative values underlying jurisprudential movements more typically associated
with the political right. We speculated that New Private Law could be an
outgrowth of Formalism and Law and Economics (see Table 1). Specifically,
it seemed to share core values with both Formalism and Law and Economics,
especially a commitment to an individualist, pluralist, liberal ideal. Some of us
were struck, however, by differences between New Private Law and these
existing schools of thought. For example, New Private Law rejects
Formalism's devotion to rules and categories. Unlike Law and Economics, it
13. The confidence in privatization may be premature. In a recent comparison of three states'
private and public child support collection performances, for example, one study concluded that
"because full-service privatization of child support enforcement is relatively new, the extent to
which it offers comparable performance and cost-effectiveness remains an issue for additional
evaluation over the long term." UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, COMMrrEE ON THE BUDGET, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PUB. NO. GAO/HEHS-
97-4, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: EARLY RESULTS ON COMPARABILITY OF PRIVATIZED AND
PUBLIC OFFICES 16 (1996). The study included specific findings of mixed performances:
The relative cost-effectiveness of the privatized versus public offices, however, differed
among the comparisons we made. Specifically, Virginia's and Arizona's privatized offic-
es were more cost-effective---60 percent and 18 percent, respectively---than their public
counterparts. However, in Tennessee, one public office was 52 percent more cost-effec-
tive than the privatized office we reviewed, while the remaining privatized office in
Tennessee was about as cost-effective as its public counterpart.
Id. at 2-3.
14. We were particularly inspired by the Michigan Law Review's Symposium on the New
Public Law. See Symposium, The New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707 (1991).
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seems less concerned with efficiency and more concerned with whether an
activity is conducted by the private sphere (see Table 2).
TABLE I
NEW PRIVATE LAW AS CONSERVATIVE OUTGROWTH
FORMALISM REALISM
LPROCESS
L AW & ECONOMICSO I CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIESII -
NEW
NEW PRIVATE LAW ? PUBLICLAW
TABLE 2: CHARACTERISTICS OF FORMALISM, LAW AND ECONOMICS,
AND NEW PRIVATE LAW
FORMALISM 5
















Efficiency Baseline P Privatization
Baseline
We compared New Private Law with the centrist legal movements which
had attempted to synthesize values from both the political left and right. For
example, in the simplest terms, mid-twentieth century Legal Process thinkers
criticized Formalism as too conservative and Realism as too politicizing. 6
They devoted themselves to process and institutional competence as the solu-
15. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as
a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 717 (1991) (adapted from Table 1: Common
Law Formalism, Legal Realism, and Legal Process and Table 2: From Common Law Formalism
to the New Public Law).
16. See, e.g., Id. at 709-10.
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tion to these faults. More recently, New Public Law scholars similarly criti-
cized Law and Economics as too conservative and Critical Legal Studies as
too politicizing." The New Public Law scholars responded to these perceived
extremes by devoting themselves to normativism and pragmatism as the solu-
tion to these faults. Our comparisons between the New Private Law, Legal
Process, and New Public Law yielded several additional queries. Is the New
Private Law a synthesis between Law and Economics and Critical Legal Stud-
ies? If so, could the New Private Law be the conservative-oriented centrist
response to the polarization between Law and Economics and Critical Legal
Studies, as New Public Law may be the progressive-oriented centrist response
(see Table 3)?
TABLE 3
NEW PRIVATE LAW AS CENTRIST SYNTHESIS
FORMASM REALISM
LEGAL PROCESS -
LAW & ECONOMICS I CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
afw E NEW o
IPRIVATEI PUBLIC
LAW LAW
How do New Private Law and New Public Law compare? Certainly New
Public Law and New Private Law share several characteristics: both seem
simultaneously normative and pragmatic (see Table 4). But they seem commit-
ted to different fundamental values. New Public Law seems more committed
to values of community and equality, while New Private Law seems more
committed to values of individualism and market integrity. Other questions
seem more difficult to call. For example, to what extent do they comparatively
tend to reinforce extant power relations?
17. Id. at 725-26.
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TABLE 4:
CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW PRIVATE LAW AND NEW PUBLIC LAW
NEW PRIVATE LAW NEW PUBLIC LAW"
Deregulation, Decentralization, New Forms of Regulation, or
Privatization, Contractualization Deregulation




• Market Values ' Nonmarket Values
Liberty • Equality
This Symposium issue explores the potential of the New Private Law and
related questions through the contextualized analyses which follow. First, Gary
Peller 9 and Dan Farber20 explore privatization with a focus on public school
administration. In the context of labor law, Katherine Van Wezel Stone2 ex-
plores the danger to employees when labor and employment disputes are pri-
vatized. Roberto Corrada22 and Dennis Lynch23 comment on Professor
Stone's cautionary tale. In the context of environmental law, Federico
Cheever 4 explores the use of land trusts as progressive tools toward conser-
vation, on which Richard Collins25 comments. In the context of sexual regu-
lation, Martha Ertman 6 provides a model for charting privatization as a way
station on the road to progressive protection for those she identifies as sexual
marginorities, followed by a comment from Mary Becker.27 On a broader
level, Clayton Gillette2" explores the potential competition between public and
private provision of goods and services, with a response by Elaine Welle.29
18. See id. at 744 (adapted from Table 2: From Common Law Formalism to the New Public
Law).
19. Gary Peller, Public Imperialism and Private Resistance: Progressive Possibilities of the
New Private Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1001 (1996).
20. Daniel A. Farber, Whither Socialism?, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1011 (1996).
21. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:
The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).
22. Corrada, supra note 1.
23. Dennis 0. Lynch, Conceptualizing Forum Selection as a "Public Good": A Response to
Professor Stone, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1071 (1996).
24. Cheever, supra note 2.
25. Richard B. Collins, Alienation of Conservation Easements, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1103
(1996).
26. Ertman, supra note 3.
27. Mary Becker, Problems with the Privatization of Heterosexuality, 73 DENv. U. L. REv.
1169 (1996).
28. Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1185 (1996).
29. Elaine A. Welle, Opting Out of Public Provision: Constraints and Policy Considerations,
73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1221 (1996).
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Finally, Nancy Ehrenreich3" explores the potential of privatization and Alan
Chen" critiques the existence and potential of New Private Law.
This Symposium accomplishes several objectives. It addresses an
overarching topic and captures it in context. It considers whether a New Pri-
vate Law exists, and if so, what characteristics define it. Finally, it examines
who benefits from a New Private Law: suggesting that while privatization may
generally benefit powerful parties, it may benefit less powerful actors as well.
If the legal and social developments that led us to name the New Private Law
continue, we hope the provocative ideas in this Symposium will provide a
foundation for further exploration of its significance.
30. Nancy Ehrenreich, The Progressive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1235
(1996).
31. Alan K. Chen, "Meet the New Boss...", 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1253 (1996).
1996]

PUBLIC IMPERIALISM AND PRIVATE RESISTANCE:
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES OF THE
NEW PRIVATE LAW
GARY PELLER"
In hosting this Symposium on "The New Private Law," the Denver Uni-
versity Law Review is to be commended for providing an occasion to reflect
on a clearly recognizable but insufficiently conceptualized development in the
contemporary legal/political arena. If I understand the topic, the New Private
Law is meant to connect various trends in law and social policy as part of a
single phenomenon; examples include school voucher programs, privatization
of prisons, contracting out traditional municipal functions, the movement from
public trial to private mediation and arbitration, curtailment of the state action
doctrine and thus limitations on the application of constitutional norms with
respect to a range of institutions, and the various ways of delegating lawmak-
ing power to formally private groups. The markers of this transformation are
generally: (a) distrust of centralized public administration, (b) commitment to
increased choice for individuals, and (c) new faith in the social responsiveness
of institutional arrangements based on the profit motive.
Several years ago, my colleague William Eskridge and I described a con-
temporary jurisprudential phenomenon that we dubbed the New Public Law.'
Our basic idea was that a cadre of contemporary mainstream legal scholars
had coalesced around a "centrist" approach to law in response to the polariz-
ing and ideologically charged character of the legal academy in the 1970s and
1980s. Paralleling in many ways the postwar "legal process' '2 response to the
radical possibilities of legal realism, we saw the New Public Law as an
implicit attempt to incorporate the intellectual sophistication and general politi-
cal direction of the Left's critical scholarship (embodied primarily in the work
of critical legal studies, radical feminist, and critical race intellectual move-
ments), while nevertheless defending a decidedly centrist, de-radicalized nor-
mative vision of an apolitical rule of law. We associated the New Public Law
with a pragmatic, republican-oriented, and vaguely reformist attitude toward
legal institutions, within which "public" type values of inclusion, participation,
and cultural respect were taken as emblematic of a "new normativity."3
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A., Emory University, 1977; J.D., Har-
vard University Law School, 1980.
1. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Modera-
tion as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 U. MICH. L. REv. 707 (1991).
2. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994); Gary Peller, "Neutral Principles" in the 1950's, 21 MICH. J.L. REFORM 561 (1988).
3. See Eskridge & Pellet, supra note 1, at 708-09.
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In Eskridge's evaluation, this development was to be applauded as a pro-
gressive articulation of the legal discursive tradition rooted in Brown v. Board
of Education' and Warren Court activism more generally. In my evaluation,
New Public Law scholarship-like the legal process school of the
1950s-represented an attempt to domesticate and defang the critical work that
it appropriated, primarily by ignoring the overall point that legal discourse
worked to constitute and legitimate status quo power relations. While Eskridge
celebrated the emergence of a sophisticated view of law as legitimately resolv-
ing social conflict in a just way, by paying proper respect to various view-
points held by the multiple groups making up American society, I saw a bland
form of "post-modem moderation" where the very social conflicts that leftists
had argued mainstream legal discourse suppressed were now to be "processed"
through an inclusive "good-guyism" blind to its own cultural ethnocentrism.
The New Private Law might be taken to be the polar opposite of the New
Public Law-here the emphasis is on "private" values of individual choice and
decentralized decisionmaking where the New Public Law emphasized social
inclusion and public deliberation. But the image of opposition misses more
important similarities in the two tendencies. The New Private Law represents a
slightly conservative correlate to the New Public Law. Both are located near
the center of legal ideology, rather than at the poles (whatever might constitute
the poles these days: perhaps Chicago-style law and economics on the one
hand and post-modem cultural critique on the other). While there is a general
sense that the New Private Law is slightly right of center (the domestication of
law and economics), and New Public Law scholarship appears slightly left of
center (the domestication of critical legal scholarship), the fact of the matter is
that they both have the feel of being, more simply, depoliticized.
This essay reflects upon the transformation implicit in the emergence of
the New Private Law on the contemporary legal scene. My main point is to
note the end of the tradition, dating back at least to the the mid-nineteenth
century, of delineating political ideologies according to the public/private dis-
tinction. The association of advocates of the public arena with progressive
social reform and advocates of the private realm with conservative social
ideology is clearly over; the distinction between public and private administra-
tive alternatives has been, for the most part, drained of its ideological signifi-
cance. Given this development, I conclude that there is, in fact, no reason for
progressives reflexively to oppose many of the various privatization trends that
mark the contemporary policy scene.
In the remainder of this essay, I situate the emergence of the New Private
Law phenomenon in terms of limitations in the ways that progressives have
usually understood the public/private distinction. The highly general frame-
work I sketch is intended to be suggestive and evocative rather than definitive;
I will simplify what are actually much more complex terms of intellectual and
ideological development.
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
[Vol. 73:41002
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I begin by distinguishing the New Private Law from traditional market
ideology. I next consider how many of the ways that progressives understood
what "public" and "private" politically meant were intellectually and ideologi-
cally impoverished. Our association of the public sphere with justice and
equity was blind to the ways that the very conception of a universal, nondis-
criminatory equal opportunity could serve to produce colonized institutions
from which virtually everyone is alienated. Conversely, our association of the
movement from public to private with parochialism or oppression ignored the
ways that such social change could signify empowerment and a recovery of
liberatory democratic values. I will use the example of public school reform to
provide a context within which to evaluate these possibilities.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that the New Private Law phenom-
enon does not represent a resurgent laissez-faire market ideology. While con-
temporary privatization reforms do often constitute recognizably conservative
or right-wing social interventions, it would mistake the New Private Law sim-
ply to associate it with capitalist or libertarian ideology. Instead, the recent
privatization interventions should be seen as more centrist, ideologically dilut-
ed institutional developments. Defenders use a discourse that is pragmatic and
situational, not ideal and universal. Champions of the private realm traditional-
ly sought to defend the market as a truly private, unregulated realm of ex-
change. Their defense was principled: the market represented the realm of
individual free choice and accordingly state intervention threatened not only
economic distortion but a form of tyranny. But the ideology of recent social
reforms such as school voucher programs or contracted prison administration
is not premised on the idea that a truly private realm is being protected from
the coercive power of the State. Rather, privatization is presented as simply
one in an array of possible, and concededly regulative, social interventions,
bearing no a priori claim to legitimacy but instead depending on historical and
contextualized justification: the New Private Law might see centralized admin-
istration of schools, for example, as having produced dysfunctional and often
corrupt urban institutions, leading to the impetus for alternative institutional
arrangements. From this perspective, then, the New Private Law should be
distinguished from neo-conservative revivals of the theories of private property
and free exchange.5
In addition to the transformed idea of what the private realm represents
for contemporary privatization advocates, the identification of recent reforms
as evidencing a general movement from public and private should not be
exaggerated. Since the realist critique, it has been clear that as an analytic
matter, the categories of "public" and "private" do not signify something out-
side of legal and political discourse itself. The so-called free market, the para-
digm of the private realm, is, properly understood, inseparable from the social
power implicit in the so-called framework rules defining the boundaries of
5. The most notable champion of the principled justifications for such a regime in legal
academe is Richard Epstein. See RICHARD EPSTiEN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POW-
ER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). For an extended analysis of the distinction between what is char-
acterized here as the New Private Law and traditional market ideology, see Paul Starr, The Mean-
ing of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 6 (1988).
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"private property" and the permissible pressure that could be brought to bear
in "free exchange." Since terms like "consent," "private property," and "coer-
cion" are not self-defining, any particular choice of their boundaries manifests
a political decision and State "intervention"-with distributive consequences
for the "market" that is supposed to stand outside governmental power. Thus,
for example, the refusal to recognize sexual harassment as a tort does not
leave such behavior to an unregulated "private" realm, but instead bears the
mark of State intervention in the form of a privilege granted to men. Were
women to use "natural" responses of physical force to defend themselves
against the injury that sexual harassment causes, the harassers could call on
the State to defend them. That is, harassed women are not entitled to self-help
in the form of a privilege to engage in self-defense because they are not pro-
tecting an interest that is officially recognized by the State, and thus they may
not use force to prevent its invasion. The resulting form of regulation is a
privilege on the part of men to harass and legal exposure on the part of their
victims. And there are distributive consequences from these inevitable "frame-
work" decisions: were such harassment to be officially recognized, harassers
would be worse off and their victims better off-there is simply no way for
the State to stay out of a "private" market because either way it is affecting
the distribution of market wealth and power.
Since the terms of the "private" realm are socially created by the very
legal and political judgments that are supposed to follow from the "private" or
"public" nature of a social encounter, they are, as the realists taught, simply
conclusions attached to judgments reached on other bases. Proponents of the
New Public Law as well as the New Private Law understand this at some
level, and accordingly both approach the market, as did the legal process
school, as simply one administrative alternative to centralized public regulation
rather than as principled and normatively dictated. But taking seriously the
realist critique suggests that it may be ultimately impossible to delineate
administrative options by these labels at all-they are not only relative to a
particular baseline, but also arguably analytically incoherent once they have
lost their grounding as part of an ideology through which power was translated
as choice.
Furthermore, not only is the purportedly private realm arguably public, but
the converse may be true as well. The so-called public realm arguably repre-
sents simply another form of private power. Think, for example, of the
workers' compensation system-perhaps the very paradigm of "publicization"
as disputes over workplace injuries were transposed from the former "private"
law of torts to a publicly administered, regulated, and rationalized system. The
lynchpin of a worker's right to recover under most workers' compensation
systems is a disability--ordinarily one that must be identified and documented
as such by a medical doctor. Doctors are, in the conventional typography,
private actors. The "public" character of workers' compensation schemes
depends on taking medical judgment as an objective fact rather than the prod-
uct of a complex of private power exercised by the medical profession.
Given that the terms "public" and "private" may have no meaning except
relative to a pre-conceived baseline, it is nevertheless true that we do
1004 [Vol. 73:4
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recognize the New Private Law as a phenomenon-and also recognize its
slightly more liberal correlate in the New Public Law. I now change focus to
consider how the traditional associations that progressives have made-public
as liberal and private as conservative-may have suppressed from view the
manner in which the public sphere was repressive and alienating, and the
move to the relatively private realm arguably a move to a relatively more
liberatory form of social relations.
My sense of the contemporary environment is that there is no reason to
assume that privatization reforms will necessarily represent conservative rather
than progressive social change. The valance provided by the grand debate
between capitalism as the ideology of the private sphere and socialism as the
ideology of the public sphere now provides only a faint echo in the back-
ground of policy debate. Whether a particular form of privatization will be
liberatory or repressive depends on the context and the circumstances; it can
only be evaluated institution by institution and reform by reform. Consider, for
example, the context of public school reform.
Public schools represent a paradigm of publicly administered institutions.
Having their genesis in noble aims of egalitarianism, one might expect that
they would exist as model institutions of democratic and social progressivism.
Moreover, they are administered for the most part by the most local, close-to-
the-people of democratic institutions, school boards. And public education is
arguably the institutional context in which the republican values of inclusion
and social tolerance have had their greatest vitality-the Warren Court activ-
ism that New Public Law adherents champion was most visibly directed at
reforming public education by ending racial segregation and school prayer.
To my mind, the public education context reveals the deep problems in
the traditional liberal ideology regarding the public and the private and associ-
ating universalism and objectivity with equity and equal opportunity. Argu-
ments against various privatization reforms of school management and atten-
dance decisions typically center on the risks that private choice will reproduce
social stratification. But the "public" character of schools that is defended
against the evils of privatization is more or less a total fantasy. Despite the
formally decentralized and localized structure of administration by county or
municipal governmental units-and thus the expectation of popular sovereignty
at its height-American public schools by and large represent the paradigm of
alienating, unresponsive, often corrupt, inefficient, and culturally repressive
social institutions. Despite their public and democratic character, my guess is
that most people who have had occasion to encounter schools boards share my
experience of them as arrogant, unresponsive, technocratic entities presenting
themselves as educational "experts" concerned with professionalism and dis-
daining parents and students as constituting the threat of "political pressure"
which might interfere with the "educational mission." To the extent that there
are exceptions to this image, they are more often than not occasions when
cultural right-wingers or religious fundamentalists have managed to take over
and inscribe their own value system on their children's education. But progres-
sives have found themselves pitted against such groups, trying to defend pub-
lic schools against such "parochialism" and "narrowmindedness." What has
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been defended is a professional culture that rather blatantly attempts to man-
age the community they are supposed to serve by channeling community con-
cerns into technocratically understood "inputs"; thus the need for "parental
input" is understood as a component of appropriate process and management,
but that's it. The ruling ideology is that community intervention represents the
threat of local parochialism invading the province of impersonal professional-
ism.
The elitism of the school board is part and parcel of a wider progressive
ideology about public education that, ironically, connects this form of elitism
with egalitarianism. The culture of public education today actually represents
the victory of progressive forces against repressive ones-the direction of
reform over the last three or four decades has been away from the private and
local and toward the public and universal, understood to be part of instituting
public values of inclusion, equal opportunity and respect, and deliberative
procedure. From this perspective, it is no simple litigation accident that school
prayer was banned at roughly the same time as racial segregation. Both were
understood as part of a single project to transform public schools into truly
democratic institutions open to all and free of local parochialism and preju-
dice. Hence the links between ideas of universalism, centralism, and the public
realm in contemporary liberal ideology. As schools come to be managed cen-
trally, in the sense that they institute national standards for curriculum and
teacher training and methodology, the reigning ideology sees each child being
given an equal opportunity to compete in American life and to develop them-
selves as individuals. The more aloof from local prejudice and influence, the
more "federal" and "public" the day-to-day administration of the schools, the
more egalitarian they are supposed to be. The overarching symbol of these
links between universalism, centralism, and egalitarianism is the number two
pencil marking totally impersonal, anonymous, standardized test answers.
The actual governing structure of public schools is, in terms of the day-to-
day life of teachers and students, a mockery of democratic self-determination.
Schools across the country are in fact amazingly similar: they are all by and
large governed by distant ideological and cultural assumptions that stand op-
posed to the "distortion" of local community control. As teachers across the
country mouth scripts they learned in graduate schools and administrators
institute uniform national management techniques, it is no wonder that stu-
dents and parents experience teachers and administrators as "not there," as
ruled by distant forces that are never themselves visible but always "out there"
somewhere, maybe located wherever the standardized tests are devised. In
other words, as public education has been made ever more public, objective,
and impersonal, it has become ever more alienating and disempowering-like
a form of colonization or podification by the pseudo-scientific standardized
test regime with its own bases for sorting students in hierarchies of worth.
And, of course, this alienating otherness is not from nowhere-it is located in
a specific ideology of what the right-wing calls secular humanism or pointy-
headed elitism, a culture emanating vaguely from the northeast, white, protes-
tant, upper-middle class.
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From the perspective of alienation, I find it difficult to disdain even right
wing cultural interventions-like school prayer movements or advocacy of the
teaching of creationism or values education. They strike me as liberatory mo-
ments of disalienating energy seemingly struggling to subvert the hold of un-
seen colonizers over their local schools.
And, as I see it, it's not that the attempt to make schools truly "public"
was just done incorrectly. In retrospect, the whole idea that animated liberal
public school reform during the past several decades of making schools cultur-
ally neutral and thus open to all was seriously misguided, as is the wider at-
tempt to neutralize the public sphere more generally by banning religion, for
example. The connection between the "public" and the "universal" as a means
for achieving social justice in institutional form is a recipe for the alienation of
all of us who live, work, and study in such institutions.
Against this backdrop, various school privatization reforms can be evalu-
ated for their potential to break the hold of the "public" culture of profession-
al, scientific expertise over public schools. And, to the extent they contribute
to the recovery of real democratic empowerment, they may reveal that there is
no essential connection between privatization and conservative regression.
Various school reform proposals constitute a range of privatization
options. The leading reform to date, the hiring of a private corporation to
administer schools, hardly seems like a qualitative transformation at all. To the
extent the school board retains ultimate control over the schools and sets the
terms of the contract with the private corporate entity, there is no particular
reason to think that such an administrative form is much different from the
school board hiring particular principals, superintendents, and other administra-
tors to run the schools. In fact, such an alternative highlights a dimension in
which "full" public control is always to a certain degree management by pri-
vate entities, since school policies depend for their implementation day-to-day
on individuals-the personnel of the school system-who are "private" people,
just like everyone else, except for the formal status of their employer. Con-
tracting out management may be good or bad from the viewpoint of a progres-
sive approach to education; it depends on the specific context. A private com-
pany may be fairer and more evenhanded in administration, fearing that stu-
dent or parent discontent will endanger its contract. The result may be, oddly
enough, that the arrogance and unresponsiveness of current public school ad-
ministration in most places would be replaced by a caring, loving, and respon-
sive staff. If "pleasing the consumer" would mean not acting as if parents and
students represent impediments to the smooth running of schools, this form of
privatization might be a progressive improvement in the day to day school life.
School voucher programs, in which schools competed for students in a
market atmosphere, similarly might result in more democratic and responsive
schools. There is little doubt that school diversity would be increased; the risk
of particular schools failing to accomplish what everyone might consider a
minimum might be real and call for supervision and regulation-but given the
current state of schools in many urban settings, it hardly seems that the current
system avoids the possibility of failure to educate many at a bare minimum
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either. And given the possibility that vouchers might include private schools,
the scope of public regulation might actually increase in such a regime.6
At the opposite pole of merely contracting out management of schools as
currently constituted might be a more radical form of privatization: the auc-
tioning off of public schools to the highest bidder. Thinking through how such
radical privatization might be accomplished reveals the "public" nature of any
private market, and the manner in which, at some analytic point, the terms
public and private seem to lose virtually all their evocative and descriptive
power.
To be sure, various measures would have to be taken to ensure against
simple looting of physical resources. One can imagine an auction proceeding
on the basis of the school commodity being defined in holistic terms-as each
school more or less in its current physical state. Moreover, to the extent that a
tuition-based school commodity would unfairly allocate educational resources
on the simple basis of family wealth, one could imagine the school commodity
structured so that it would include the power to raise funds by assessments on
the surrounding community-a municipal rather than private sort of power to
be sure, but one that could be justified within the discourse of privatization as
necessary for the schools to be able to recoup external benefits that a function-
ing school would provide to the local area.
The point of this thought experiment, as unrealistic as it might seem, is
that there is no essential character to how privatization might proceed. In con-
trast to the image of turning schools over to the greed of the profit motive and
a market in which only those able to pay the highest tuition would be truly
served (ironically, the result of public financing as currently practiced in most
places), the auction model might result in neighborhoods coming together and
pooling resources in syndicates to buy and then manage their local schools. By
decentralizing administration to the school level, a true community control
over schools, and a living connection between the school and the community,
might arise. Poorer communities might be able to trade less desirable neigh-
borhood living conditions-the location of industrial and business areas within
the school zone-for a higher tax base from which to raise money for superior
schools. Privatization thus, ironically, could lead to a more authentic form of
"local control" than the supposedly local, democratic character of the school
board governing structure.'
There are all kinds of problems with this kind of approach to school man-
agement, and all kinds of complexities that are beyond the scope of this essay.
My point is that as one imagines even extreme forms of privatization, it is
apparent that the results do not follow any a priori logic; such a plan might be
a disaster for egalitarian values, or it might finally allow poor people a degree
of control over their own destinies that would be successful and empowering.
Additionally, as one imagines in this context a way to structure a private mar-
ket to permit recoupment of external benefits by the private enterprise, it is
6. See Starr, supra note 5, at 14 n.16.
7. See Frank 1. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Com-
peting Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 148-59 (1977).
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striking that we seem to come full circle: private schools serving neighbor-
hoods and assessing costs based on benefits provided are a form of radically
decentralized, reconceived municipalities with the sovereign power to tax, just
as profit in traditional capitalist markets were seen, by realist and progressive
thinkers, as a form of taxation over a social product. A radical democracy, the
goal of "public" oriented values-might be achieved by the most radical forms
of "privatization."
I believe that this paradoxical result is possible because, in contrast to the
traditional ways that progressives have understood the political direction of the
"private" and "public" character of social institutions, we have tended, incor-
rectly, to associate justice with centralization, universalism, and neutrality. To
the extent that the movement toward the private represents a move toward
decentralization, it is not surprising that it also holds possibilities for radical
forms of democratic and popular control. The reason is that the private sphere
need not be composed of serial individuals competing in an impersonal mar-
ket, but instead might consist of organic community units striving to determine
their own destinies.
Despite the above thought experiment, the school context nevertheless
seems to reveal the intractability of institutional reform in the context of
severe wealth disparity-the possibility of school privatization simply increas-
ing the extent to which the wealthy are favored in the distribution of educa-
tional resources is just far more plausible than the utopian images I have sug-
gested. It seems piecemeal socialist reform has always faced the flight of capi-
tal problem-so long as wealth could move to a more favorable climate.
Reform in any particular place has the inevitable potential to backfire and just
make things worse. The only conclusion that seems to me to follow is that,
whether the reform goes in the public or the private direction, a massive re-
distribution of wealth is a precondition to truly just institutional arrangements.





Whither Socialism' is the title of a recent book by Joseph Stiglitz, a Stan-
ford economics professor who is a member of the President's Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors. His book considers the lessons to be learned from the failure
of the planned economies and assesses options for the new transition econo-
mies. He argues that the issue of public versus private ownership is relatively
unimportant to economic success. If markets functioned as perfectly as some
economists believe, the government could have used "market socialism" to
mimic the free market.2 On the other hand, most of the problems caused by
government ownership are quite capable of occurring in a badly structured or
poorly regulated private sector.3 Socialism failed as an overall system, but this
failure does not mean that privatization is always an improvement. Although
some of the economic theory does not make for light reading, his conclusion
is quite simple: "We cannot, in general, be assured that private production is
necessarily 'better' than public production. Privatization involves costs and
benefits, which, as always, must be weighted against each other."4
Stiglitz's pragmatism finds strong-and perhaps unexpected-support in
Gary Peller's thoughtful contribution to this Symposium, Public Imperialism
and Private Resistance: Progressive Possibilities of the New Private Law.5
Professor Peller begins by describing, perhaps somewhat ruefully, how leftist
insights regarding public law have been appropriated by legal centrists. He
views the New Private Law as a similar phenomenon, domesticating conserva-
tive views such as law and economics into a more palatable centrist form.6
Peller concludes, however, "that there is, in fact, no reason for progressives
reflexively to oppose many of the various privatization trends that mark the
contemporary policy scene."7
In Peller's view, the New Private Law "is not premised on the idea that a
truly private realm is being protected from the coercive power of the State."8
Rather, "privatization is presented as simply one in an array of possible, and
concededly regulative, social interventions, bearing no a priori claim to legiti-
* Associate Dean for Faculty and Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Min-
nesota. B.A., University of Illinois, 1971; M.A., University of Illinois, 1972; J.D., University of
Illinois College of Law, 1975.
1. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, WHITHER SocIALISM? (1994).
2. Id. at 66.
3. Id. at 172.
4. id. at 194.
5. Gary Peller, Public Imperialism and Private Resistance: Progressive Possibilities of the
New Private Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1001 (1996).
6. Id. at 1002.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1003.
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macy but instead depending on historical and contextualized justification."9
Peller applauds this reconceptualization of the issue and argues that progres-
sives should seriously consider privatization as a technique for advancing their
agenda. Thus, like Stiglitz, he views the choice between public and private as
purely pragmatic rather than ideological.
I too, endorse this pragmatic approach, perhaps not surprisingly."0 In this
brief comment on Professor Peller's article, I will suggest two extensions of
his argument. First, in my view, not merely progressives and centrists, but also
conservatives, should take a pragmatic view of privatization. Hence, they
should resist any reflexive tendency to favor the private over the public sector.
Perhaps this might be considered the "big tent" vision of the New Private
Law, since it invites scholars across the political spectrum to enter into a com-
mon intellectual enterprise. Second, the most important issue is probably not
whether an activity is "public" or "private," but instead how to tailor the best
mix of regulations and incentives. As Stiglitz puts it, "[T]he question is not
just 'how large a role' the government should undertake, but what specific
roles? . .. What forms should government intervention take?"" As the New
Private Law matures, the focus will increasingly turn to these questions.
I.
In the flush of the global victory of capitalism, conservatives are under-
standably tempted to rush headlong into privatizing formerly public institu-
tions. But this would be a mistake. Conservatives should not, I would argue,
adopt a reflexive attitude--"private good, public bad"--but instead should
engage in the context-specific analysis that Professor Peller advocates. Al-
though they may well disagree with Professor Peller about assessing specific
situations, they should utilize the same kind of pragmatic analysis. For conser-
vatives of all stripes, whether social conservatives or libertarians, privatization
should be seen as a not-unmixed blessing.
There are several reasons why social conservatives should think twice
about plunging into privatization. First, privatization can direct public resourc-
es toward activities that social conservatives find disturbing. Consider a few
examples. A privatized version of the National Endowment for the Arts might
enjoy some kind of public funding, if only in the form of favorable tax treat-
ment, and might well devote resources to works which social conservatives
find abhorrent. School vouchers might well support Afrocentric or other pro-
grams which conservatives dislike. Conservation easements create tax benefits
for anti-development land use decisions.
A related issue is that privatization may weaken the central systems of our
society for socializing and expressing values. Indeed, this effect seems to be
one of the attractions of privatization for Professor Peller. But for social
9. Id.
10. See Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the 21st Century,
1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 163.
11. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 231.
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conservatives this effect should be troubling. Privatizing means more diversity
and less homogeneity, and thus a less coherent set of social values. Moreover,
social conservatives may be concerned about the corrosive effect of markets
on the kind of organic social structure they admire. Privatization further in-
creases the strength of the market and thus may frustrate the desire to rein-
force organic social relations.
Libertarian conservatives should have a different set of concerns. First, at
least for some libertarians such as Richard Epstein, there are limits on the
proper scope of privatization. Epstein is a firm believer in the Public Trust
Doctrine, which restricts the ability of government to give away certain kinds
of public resources like rivers and lakes.' He would find the idea of auction-
ing off the Mississippi River, for example, to be just as bad as the social regu-
lations that he opposes, and for just the same reasons, because it is economi-
cally inefficient and an invitation to "rent seeking" by interest groups.
For libertarians, partial privatization may sometimes be worse than leaving
an activity fully public. For example, from a libertarian point of view, when
the taxing power or the condemnation power is granted to private groups, the
result is at least as bad as having those powers exercised by the public, be-
cause we still have an entity with the power to invade property rights and
even the check of the ballot box is absent. From a libertarian perspective, this
is no improvement and may be worse. Also, libertarians whose concerns focus
on economic efficiency should closely scrutinize particular privatization
schemes, which may well involve subsidies or tax incentives with distortionary
effects. So, a half-government/half-market solution may be less efficient than a
purely governmental approach.
Similar concerns arise about giving private groups monopoly power. Reg-
ulatory schemes have sometimes been privatized. Under the guise of "rate
bureaus," railroads used to get together and agree on rates. Similarly, in a
sense, unions serve to privatize government wage controls, which is not ap-
pealing to libertarians either.
Libertarians should also be concerned that the form of privatization may
be strongly influenced by special interest group pressures. Privatization, after
all, is another form of regulation. It involves government legislation affecting
private interests, and therefore is potentially subject to all of the kinds of dis-
tortions that people like Epstein worry about. As with any government action,
privatization could be designed to redistribute wealth, perhaps in directions
that cannot be defended. The lesson, in short, is that conservatives need to
view privatization through the same pragmatic lens used by centrists and pro-
gressives.
II.
I would also like to briefly discuss the question of what happens after
privatization. When "going private" does turn out to be the appropriate
12. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 70-74, 217-18 (1993).
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decision, what should be the legal regime for these newly privatized institu-
tions? As Stiglitz explains, the real question is not whether to privatize but
instead is defining the role of the state. There is obviously a continuum of
answers, ranging from central planning to the "watchdog" state which merely
protects property and personal safety. 3 As we move past the decision to pri-
vatize, new issues will arise.
The first set of issues is posed by Professor Peller's imaginative proposal
about public schools. Privatization is an experiment. Many seemingly good
ideas don't actually work in practice. That is certainly true of policy reform.
It's true in life in general. And the more interesting and innovative the idea,
the higher the risk. Regarding Peller's proposal, there are any number of ways
that things could go sour. 4 On the other hand the Peller scheme might be a
wonderful success. What we need to remember is that these are experiments,
and we need to plan on that basis.
Consequently, we need to do something that we do poorly even in public
law (and that we hardly do at all in private law), which is to monitor the out-
comes in some systematic way. It's actually rather shocking how badly we do
that in public law. For example, there are huge gaps in what we know about
environmental quality that make it very hard to assess programs. 5 This is
even more true with monitoring of private law rules. We need to design some
mechanisms to monitor what is going on. That may be all the more important
with private law because when we privatize things, we make them less visible.
We also need to consider whether we can reverse these privatization ex-
periments if they fail. There may be constitutional problems in reversing some
experiments, such as takings and contract clause issues. There may also be
political issues. Given the political culture of American society, it may be
easier to move from public to private than it is to move back again. If changes
are difficult to reverse, we may want to do them anyway, but we probably
need to have a stronger case. That is, in the cost-benefit analysis, the benefits
had better be substantially greater than the costs for irreversible decisions. In
fact, there is some economic theory to that effect. 6 There are some situa-
tions-and perhaps inner-city schools may be one-where the situation just
couldn't get much worse, so there is little downside risk. But that's not always
going to be true. Indeed, it may turn out that as bad as our inner-city schools
are today, that they could get worse if we privatize badly. We want to leave
ourselves in a position to unravel the situation. Privatization is an experiment,
let's watch it closely, and let's be prepared to pull the plug. And where we
can't pull the plug, let's be very careful about starting the experiment.
Another issue is what legal regime will govern for privatized ventures.
Once we say something has been "privatized," a certain vision of the private
13. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 231.
14. Localized control seems to have been a resounding failure in the New York City schools.
See James Dao, Albany in Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1996, at B10.
15. See Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 LOYOLA
L.A. L. REv. 791, 892 (1994).
16. Id. at 803-04 (discussing economic theory of hysteresis effects).
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sector clicks into place. We tend to assume as a very strong baseline that the
new private entity will be treated like IBM or like the owner of Blackacre or
whatever, and we therefore may rather unthinkingly apply Old Private Law to
new areas. The risk is that we won't end up with a New Private Law but
merely with a bigger Old Private Law. That would be a serious mistake. Not
only intellectual inertia but broader cultural norms may exert a pressure in that
direction, and we need to be very much aware of this temptation to assimilate
new institutions into old legal regimes.
One obvious question is the extent to which constitutional norms apply to
these privatized ventures. If, for example, we spin off these schools and they
have the taxing power, will they be state actors? 7 Even if the Court would
hold that they are not state actors, should courts or legislatures impose similar
norms on these privatized enterprises? This question requires us to move
beyond the technicalities of the state action doctrine. Instead, we need to con-
sider why some norms apply to government institutions but not to traditional
firms, and to analyze how these reasons apply to these new forms of privat-
ized enterprise. Until now, most discussion of the state action issue has been
very doctrinal, with little thought about whether (for example) there are special
reasons for requiring due process hearings in public institutions as opposed to
privatized ones.
A related question is what kinds of governance norms should apply to
these institutions. For example, how would boundaries be set for schools in
Peller's scheme? Who selects the management? Should we worry about the
kind of districting issues that have been so important in voting rights law? We
have already encountered governance issues in the private sector in corporate
law, but we have worried about them to a much greater degree in the public
sector. It's not clear that the corporate model of shareholder control is best for
these different kinds of ventures."
What about the need for government regulation of the privatized sector?
One might ask, for example, how conservation easements will connect with
other kinds of environmental regulation and zoning, or what procedures will
be mandated in arbitration as we privatize litigation. As we move past the
initial decision of what to privatize and toward the issue of how to privatize,
these questions are going to come to the forefront.
The New Private Law raises the same question posed on a much larger
scale in transition economies: what is the proper role of public institutions
versus private ones? As Stiglitz says, we now know that at least one answer
(traditional socialism) is plainly wrong. In that sense, socialism is as dead as
any movement can be. But socialism, he explains, also had a broader message:
The answer that socialism provided to the age-old question of the
proper balance between the public and the private can now, from our
17. See Rendell v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (holding that a private school was not a state
actor, even though almost all of its students were referred by public institutions, it was heavily
regulated by public authorities, and virtually all of its budget came from public funds).
18. For a discussion of some of these issues of control and accountability, see A. Michael
Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 543.
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current historical perspective, be seen to have been wrong. But if it
was based on wrong, or at least incomplete economic theories, theo-
ries that are quickly passing into history, it was also based on ideals
and values many of which are eternal. It represented a quest for a
more humane and a more egalitarian society. 9
Indeed, these egalitarian and humanist ideals are not limited to "progressives,"
though others may conceptualize them differently.
The lesson of the New Private Law is that these idealistic goals can be
pursued in many guises, not just through the traditional public sector. In that
sense, as Professor Peller's essay reminds us, the spirit of socialism is very
much alive.
19. STIGLrrZ, supra note 1, at 279. Perhaps he would have done better to say that "at its
best" socialism reflected these ideals; at its worst, it had quite another face.
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MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS:
THE YELLOW DOG CONTRACT OF THE 1990S
KATHERINE VAN WEZEL STONE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a. salesperson who lost her job six months ago. You
apply for an opening at a large retail chain store. While waiting for an inter-
view, you are given a booklet labeled "Employee Handbook." Too distracted
to read, you fill out an application form, provide references, and take a simple
test. After a pro forma interview, you are offered the job. You accept, still
without opening the Handbook. Later at home, you read the Handbook. It sets
out various company rules and policies regarding tardiness, absenteeism, park-
ing spaces, holidays, overtime, dress code, obscene behavior, and so forth. On
page nine, at the end of the booklet, it says, "All disputes which arise during
the course of your employment shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to
arbitration rules maintained by the employer at its corporate headquarters."
Imagine further that after working eight months, you suffer an on-the-job
accident and have a back injury. You are out for two weeks. Before returning,
you ask for a transfer to a light work assignment. The company refuses your
request and then informs you that your old position has been eliminated and
that you are therefore dismissed.
You believe you have suffered discrimination on the basis of your handi-
cap, and so you bring a lawsuit alleging a violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The employer moves to dismiss your claim on the
ground that you failed to arbitrate your ADA claim as required by the Hand-
book. You have not seen the arbitration procedures until now, but you get
them upon request. They say that all disputes between employees and the
employer shall be decided at arbitration before an arbitrator selected from a
panel of retired industry executives. You do not believe that the industry
panel, made up of individuals who are beholden to the industry and too old to
have much sympathy with the ADA, will render a fair decision in your case.
* © 1996 by Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School and
Cornell School of Industrial and Labor Relations. B.A., Harvard University, 1970; J.D., Harvard
University Law School, 1979. The author would like to thank participants at the Symposium on
The New Private Law at the University of Denver Law School, the Law and Economics
Roundtable at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and the Cornell-NLRB Conference on
the Sixtieth Anniversary of the NLRA in Washington, D.C., for their helpful comments and sug-
gestions. She would also like to thank Philip Hostak and Alex Colvin for their exceptional re-
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And you learn from your lawyer that whatever the arbitrator decides, you have
effectively no right to appeal to a court. A court will only set aside an arbitral
award for "manifest disregard of the law."
Do you have to submit your case to the panel? That is, does your employ-
er succeed in getting your case dismissed? The answer is almost certainly yes.
The court will treat the Employee Handbook as a waiver of your rights to sue
in court under most federal and state employment laws. Thus the employer, by
giving you the booklet and unilaterally establishing an arbitration procedure,
has relieved herself of numerous burdensome employment regulations. This
hypothetical describes the state of labor and employment "law" today. Note
that what we think of as "law" has become "nonlaw" at least insofar as your
legal rights have been rendered unenforceable in a judicial tribunal. Your
rights are only enforceable in a system of private justice, in a forum crafted by
your employer and foisted upon you without any real bargaining or choice.
The question is, how did we get there, and does this change from "law" to
"nonlaw" make any difference? These questions will be addressed below.
In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or
Wagner Act),' the most extensive worker rights statute ever enacted in this
country. Prior to its passage, American workers enjoyed very few statutory
rights of any type. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
Supreme Court struck down most state and federal laws that had been passed
for the protection of workers as violative of substantive due process.2 Even in
the 1930s, many judges, legal scholars, and congressmen continued to express
serious doubts about the constitutional power of the federal government to
enact legislation about private-sector labor relations.' Of course, prior to the
1930s, some workers had contractual rights that were contained in the collec-
tive agreements negotiated by their unions, but even those rights were of
dubious value given the ambiguous legal status of collective bargaining agree-
ments in the state courts.4 Thus in 1935, when the Wagner Act was passed,
1. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Wagner Act), §§ 1-16, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1994).
2. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding unconstitutional law
establishing board to set minimum wage); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (holding uncon-
stitutional state law that made yellow dog contracts unlawful); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (holding unconstitutional law limiting hours of work in bakeries). But see Muller v. Ore-
gon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding maximum-hour law for women workers on ground that
women need special protection); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (upholding maximum-
hour law for coal miners on ground that the hazardous nature of the work merited special protec-
tion for such workers).
3. See, e.g., PETER IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LABOR LAWYERS 3-4 (1982); see also West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1930) (Van Deventer, J., dissenting, joined by
McReynolds & Butler, JJ.). There was an exception for labor relations in the railroad industry,
where Congress had exercised regulatory power since the 1880s. See generally Leifur Magnusson
& Marguerite A. Gadsby, Federal Intervention in Railroad Disputes, II MONTHLY LAB. REV. 26
(1920) (discussing history of federal railroad labor legislation).
4. In most states in the early decades of this century, employees could only enforce a right
they had under a collective agreement if they could show that they either incorporated the term
into their individual contract of hire or that the union had acted expressly as their agent in negoti-
ating the term. See William G. Rice, Jr., Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 572, 581-93 (1931). Thus, collective bargaining agreements were enforced, if at all, as
part of individual employment contracts; unions were not permitted to enforce them at all. In the
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American workers obtained for the first time the right to organize, the right to
engage in collective action, and the right to bargain collectively.5 These were
contained in section 7 of the statute.6
The state of workers' rights today is entirely different. There are a myriad
of federal and state laws that give employees substantive rights and
protections-protections for whistle-blowers, protection against racial and
gender discrimination, rights to be free of lie-detector tests, rights to be free of
sexual harassment, rights to a safe and healthy workplace, and protection
against unjust dismissal through various modifications of the at-will rule, and
so forth.7 In addition, the rights guaranteed by section 7 of the NLRA have
been given meaning over the course of sixty years as the National Labor Rela-
tions Board has interpreted and applied the sparse, broad words of the NLRA.
So one might conclude that today's workers reap the benefits of labor's strug-
gles in the nineteenth and early twentieth century-they have government
protection for unions, a statutory framework to ensure them rights to bargain
collectively and to strike, and legislative guarantees of job security, safe work-
ing conditions, pension protection, and dignity on the job.
In recent years, however, a new trend has emerged that threatens to turn
back the clock on workers' rights. This trend is found in legal doctrines and
judicial opinions that require workers to assert their statutory rights in the
forum of private arbitration. These developments prevent workers from vindi-
cating their statutory rights in a public tribunal. At the same time, employers
are using arbitration clauses as a new-found weapon to escape burdensome
employment regulations.
The trend toward mandatory arbitration of statutory rights is evident in
two areas of law, affecting unionized and nonunion employees respectively.
First, by means of an expansive interpretation of section 301 preemption,
courts generally dismiss suits brought by unionized workers under state
employment laws on the grounds that they must take such claims to arbitra-
tion. Second, in the wake of the 1991 Supreme Court decision Gilmer v.
1920s, this began to change. In Schlesinger v. Quinto, 194 N.Y.S. 401 (Sup. Ct. 1922), the New
York Appellate Division held that a union was entitled to an injunction against an employers'
association to prevent a breach of its collective agreement. Over the next ten years, some states
followed the New York rule. See, e.g., Weber v. Nasser, 292 P. 637 (Cal. 1930); Mississippi The-
aters Corp. v. Hattiesburg Local Union, 164 So. 887 (Miss. 1936); Harper v. Local Union No.
520, 48 S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Postwar Paradigm
in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1518-21 (1981).
5. Three years earlier, Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (cod-
ified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1995)), which declared it to be the public policy of the United
States to support collective bargaining. However, the Norris-LaGuardia Act only gave rhetorical
support to worker organizing and collective action; it did not create a general right to organize.
The Act's substantive provisions prevented courts from issuing injunctions in labor disputes and
rendered yellow dog contracts unenforceable.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1995), as initially enacted in 1935, states: "Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection."
7. See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Ten-
sion Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59
U. Cm. L. REv. 575, 591-93 (1992) (citing examples).
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Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,8 courts are requiring nonunion workers to sub-
mit claims based on federal and state employment laws to private arbitration
rather than to a court. Further, some courts are beginning to merge these two
doctrinal areas, thereby requiring unionized and nonunion workers to arbitrate
state and federal statutory rights under the FAA.
In this article, I describe and analyze the trend toward mandatory arbitra-
tion of statutory employment rights. I demonstrate that the trend threatens to
deprive workers of their statutory rights altogether. Further, in the nonunion
setting, I show that mandatory arbitration is often imposed as a condition of
employment, without any consent or bargaining. Thus, mandatory arbitration
agreements operate as the new yellow dog contracts of the 1990s. I argue that
courts should not permit workers to waive their rights under state or federal
employment statutes. That is, courts should not force parties to arbitrate statu-
tory claims, should not presume that promises to arbitrate include promises to
arbitrate statutory claims, and should not give arbitral rulings on statutory
issues preclusive effect. To do otherwise threatens to nullify the past sixty
years' development of workers' rights and will make it difficult to legislate
effective worker protection in the future.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF-THE ROLE OF ARBITRATION UNDER THE
. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SYSTEM
Today, arbitration and collective bargaining are usually assumed to be
coterminous, if not synonymous, institutions. It is usually assumed that all
collective agreements contain arbitration procedures and that all disputes aris-
ing under the agreements are amenable to arbitration. However, arbitration has
not always been such a prominent feature of our collective bargaining system.
From the 1900s until the 1930s, enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ments was generally left to the vicissitudes of moral suasion and economic
power.9 Beginning in the 1920s, a few state courts permitted workers or
unions to enforce collective bargaining agreements as ordinary contracts. 0 At
that time, it was not common for collective agreements to contain provisions
for arbitration. Where such arbitration provisions existed, parties could easily
avoid them, given the historical disinclination of common law courts to en-
force executory agreements to arbitrate."
During World War II, the attitude of courts and unions toward arbitration
began to change. The War Labor Board (WLB) regarded arbitration as a sub-
stitute for industrial warfare and thus they found it to be a helpful system for
securing wartime no-strike pledges. To this end, the WLB made arbitration the
preferred method for resolving workplace disputes. It encouraged parties to
8. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
9. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rethinking Labor Voluntarism: Legal Personality, the
Enforcement of Trade Agreements, and the AFL's Attitude Toward the State in the Progressive
Era 26-29 (Oct. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
10. See Stone, supra note 4, at 1519-21.
11. See Kulukundis Shipping v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942); Julius
H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitratiorz Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265 (1926).
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engage in collective bargaining and to include arbitration clauses in their
agreements, and it accorded arbitration promises substantial deference.2
After the War, Congress enacted section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA), which said that "suits for violation of contracts be-
tween an employer and a labor organization ... may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the par-
ties."" On its face, this provision appeared to give federal courts jurisdiction
to hear and decide labor disputes. In the next ten years, some scholars and
practitioners in the labor field urged the courts to interpret section 301 in a
manner that respected the special role of arbitration in resolving contractual
disputes. 4 Justice Douglas adopted this position in 1957 in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills,5 where he called upon federal courts to develop a
"federal common law of collective bargaining," the centerpiece of which was
support for and deference to private arbitration.
Since Lincoln Mills, private arbitration has become the central feature of
our collective bargaining system. In 1960, in three cases known as the
Steelworkers' Trilogy, the Supreme Court adopted a set of legal doctrines that
have defined a privileged role for arbitration within our collective bargaining
system. First, the Supreme Court held that courts should grant specific en-
forcement of promises to arbitrate without regard to the merits of the underly-
ing dispute. Thus it held that parties who agree to arbitration provisions can be
required to arbitrate meritless, or even frivolous, claims.' 6 It further held that
agreements to arbitrate were not only judicially enforceable but were enforce-
able on the basis of a presumption of arbitrability. 7 And finally, the Court
held that arbitral awards are enforceable with a minimum amount of judicial
review. 8
In 1964, the Court further defined the privileged status of arbitration by
holding that in cases involving rights arising both under the National Labor
Relations Act and from a collective bargaining agreement, it was appropriate
for the Labor Board to give deference to arbitration over judicial or
administrative mechanisms for resolving the disputes. 9 And in 1970, the Su-
preme Court approved the use of labor injunctions against strikes over issues
that are subject to arbitration agreements,' thereby making a wide exception
12. See James Atleson, Labor and the Wartime State: The Continuing Impact of Labor Rela-
tions During World War II 97-103 (Oct. 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1995).
14. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30
ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 247 (1958) [hereinafter Cox, Problems); Archibald Cox, The Legal Nature
of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MicH. L. REV. 1 (1958) [hereinafter Cox, Legal Nature];
Archibald Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1959) [hereinafter
Cox, Reflections]; Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 999 (1955).
15. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
16. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
17. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
18. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
19. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
20. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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to the venerable Norris-LaGuardia Act.2' The cases that proclaimed these la-
bor law rules are well-known fixtures of our collective bargaining system.
Together they make private arbitration the central and distinctive feature of
our collective bargaining system.
In the past two decades, in two different but parallel developments, courts
have expanded the use of labor arbitration even further. While the previous
Supreme Court cases supported broad deference to arbitration to resolve
unionized workers' contractual disputes-i.e., disputes concerning the interpre-
tation and enforcement of collective agreements---courts are now insisting that
arbitration be used to resolve statutory disputes-alleged violations of work-
ers' statutory rights. These developments are found in the section 301 preemp-
tion doctrine for unionized workers, and in the post-Gilmer deferral doctrine
for nonunionized workers.2 Both developments threaten to nullify present
and future legislative efforts to protect workers.
III. MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF UNIONIZED WORKERS' STATUTORY
CLAIMS
In the past fifteen years, courts have given section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act a broad application and an expansive, preemptive
scope. The section 301 preemption doctrine says that a unionized worker must
utilize her grievance procedure to resolve all disputes that involve enforcement
of her collective bargaining agreement. 3 Even if the case is brought solely as
a state law action, it is converted into a section 301 case if it is found to be a
de facto effort to enforce a collective bargaining agreement. Today, section
301 preemption has become so extensive that most unionized workers' law-
suits to enforce state law employment rights are automatically dismissed.
The exceptional breadth of section 301 preemption has its origins in a
1968 case, Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735.4 There the Supreme Court
held that a lawsuit which a plaintiff brought solely on the basis of a state-
created entitlement was a section 301 action because the defendant raised a
contractual issue in its defense.2" Avco established an exception to the well-
pleaded complaint rule which "makes the plaintiff the master of the claim" by
allowing the plaintiff to avoid federal jurisdiction by relying exclusively on
state law.26 The Avco Court refused to apply the general rule to labor cases
and instead created the "complete preemption corollary to the well-pleaded
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1995).
22. In addition, the scope of arbitration has been expanded under the Board's own deferral
rules. In Hammontree v. NLRB, 894 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the Board applied its pre-arbitral
deferral doctrine to an 8(a)(3) case even though the plaintiff only alleged violations of the NLRA,
not contractual violations. Id. A D.C. Circuit panel ruled that deferral was inappropriate, but on
rehearing, the Circuit sided with the Board, holding that the Board's expansion of deferral was a
reasonable construction of the NLRA. Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en
banc).
23. Stone, supra note 7, at 594-96.
24. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
25. Avco Corp., 390 U.S. at 557.
26. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
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complaint rule."" This corollary means that an action that asserts a state law
right but which arguably involves enforcement of a collective bargaining
agreement, is converted into a section 301 claim and may therefore be
removed to a federal court where federal law will apply.2 The jurisdictional
transformation attaches even if the plaintiff deliberately fails to rely on any
rights she might have under her collective bargaining agreement.' As the
Court explained: "[Tihe preemptive force of section 301 is so powerful as to
displace entirely any state cause of action 'for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization.' Any such suit is purely a creature of
federal laws .... 30 Further, even where a plaintiff's case-in-chief rests on
adequate state law grounds and does not rely on a collective bargaining
agreement, the court will permit removal to a federal court, apply federal law
under section 301, and hold that the claim is preempted if the defendant-
employer raises an issue involving the collective bargaining agreement in
defense. 3'
In 1985, the Supreme Court began to define when it will find a suit
brought under state law to be "federalized," and thus preempted. In Allis-
Chalmers v. Leuck,12 the Court held that a state law employment claim whose
disposition is "substantially dependent upon" or "inextricably intertwined with"
a collective bargaining agreement is preempted. 3  Further, the Court held that
section 301 preemption applies to suits in tort as well as those alleging con-
tractual violations.3 ' By extension, complete preemption under section 301 is
also applied in suits arising under state statutory law.35 Thus, as the Supreme
Court recently recognized, section 301 has been "accorded unusual preemptive
power.
36
When a suit is preempted under section 301, there are two practical con-
sequences. First, once a state employment law claim is converted into a sec-
tion 301 claim, it must be resolved through private arbitration. This follows
from the logic of the Steelworkers' Trilogy cases discussed above, in which
the Supreme Court adopted the position that all claims for breach of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement should be decided in private arbitration rather than
by a court.37 And in arbitration, there is virtually no right of judicial re-
27. Id. at 393.
28. Avco Corp., 390 U.S. at 559-60.
29. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394-95.
30. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983).
31. See Stone, supra note 7, at 596-604.
32. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
33. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 212, 220.
34. Id. at 210.
35. See, e.g., Atchley v. Heritage Cable Vision Assocs., 904 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Ind. 1995)
(claims under state wage payment statute preempted by § 301); see also Burgos v. Executive Air
Inc., 914 F. Supp. 792 (D.P.R. 1996) (claims under Puerto Rico's wage and hour law preempted
by the RLA).
36. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122 n.16 (1994).
37. Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163 (1983); Clayton v.
UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 681 (1981); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965) ("As
a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor policy requires that individual
employees wishing to assert contractual grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance
procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress.").
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view.38 Thus, once a claim is preempted under section 301, the worker's only
and final recourse is to private arbitration.39 As a result, unionized workers
find that by virtue of the section 301 preemption rules, they do not have ac-
cess to any court to assert their state law claims.
Second, and perhaps more significantly, when a claim is preempted under
section 301, the worker's state law rights are extinguished. In arbitration, the
arbitrator must apply the law of the collective bargaining agreement, not the
external state law which was the basis of the original lawsuit. Thus the union-
ized worker whose state law claim is preempted receives neither the benefit of
a judicial forum nor the benefit of the substantive provisions of the state law.
Section 301 preemption has become a central feature of employment liti-
gation in recent years. Since the mid-1970s, when state courts and legislatures
began to create extensive rights for individual employees, there have been
thousands of cases in which unionized workers tried to take advantage of the
new employment rights. Their fate in the state courts depends on the federal
courts' approach to section 301 preemption.
Under the Allis-Chalmers standard, a state law claim is preempted when it
is "substantially dependent" upon an interpretation of a collective agree-
ment.' Lower courts have differed as to when they will find a state law
claim to be "substantially dependent" on a collective agreement.4 In 1988, in
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,"' the Supreme Court reiterated,
and slightly revised, the Allis-Chalmers contract-dependency standard. It said
that a suit is preempted "if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon
the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement." '43 The Lingle Court held
that an employee's state law action alleging that she had been fired in retalia-
tion for filing a workers' compensation claim was not preempted, even though
the employee could have brought a grievance under the "just cause" clause in
her collective agreement." In so doing, the Court rejected the argument that a
38. The grounds for vacating an arbitral award under § 301 are extremely narrow. An award
may only be vacated when it fails to "draw[] its essence" from the collective agreement. United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). And because there is no
obligation for an arbitrator to give a written opinion, a reviewing court attempting to determine
from whence an award "draws its essence" must enforce an award if it could have drawn its es-
sence from the collective agreement. "Mere ambiguity" is not grounds to refuse enforcement. Id.
at 598.
39. The only exception is if the union fails to bring a case to arbitration, or handles a case
ineptly at arbitration, as a result of a breach of its duty of fair representation. Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187-88 (1967). This
is a narrow exception because a union only breaches its duty if its action or inaction is "arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith." Id. at 190. Mere negligence by a union does not constitute a
breach of its duty of fair representation. United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372-73
(1990).
40. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220.
41. See generally Laura W. Stein, Preserving Unionized Employees' Individual Employment
Rights: An Argument Against Section 301 Preemption, 17 BERKELEY J. EMPtoYMENT & LAB. L.
1, 11-17 (1996) (discussing several tests lower courts have used to define the scope of § 301 pre-
emption under Allis-Chalmers).
42. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
43. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 405-06.
44. Id. at 407.
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suit is preempted if the state law claim involves the same operative facts as a
claim arising under the collective agreement.45
After Lingle, many federal courts developed a free-wheeling approach to
section 301 preemption. In 1991, the Ninth Circuit described the state of
section 301 preemption law as a "thicket... [a] tangled and confusing inter-
play between federal and state law,"' and "one of the most confused areas of
federal court litigation."47 As of 1992, the result of this "thicket" was that
lower courts were finding preemption in the vast majority of employment
cases brought by unionized workers.
In 1992, this author surveyed hundreds of section 301 preemption cases
and found an astonishingly simple pattern: when unionized workers attempted
to exercise state employment rights, they were not able to do so.' Rather, by
virtue of the preemption rules, the courthouse door was closed. For example,
courts routinely dismissed, on 'preemption grounds, suits for wrongful
dismissal or breach of a promise of job security.49 In addition, courts routine-
ly dismissed claims of unlawful drug testing, claims of defamation by an
employer's derogatory remarks, claims that an employer conducted an unlaw-
ful search of a person or automobile, claims concerning the mishandling of
health insurance, medical leave, or other medical obligations, and claims that
an employer breached a promise to an employee who was in a bargaining
unit.5" Indeed, very few cases brought by unionized workers survived dis-
missal for preemption, and those that did fell into a small number of narrowly-
honed exceptions.5
An example of a typical section 301 preemption case is Jackson v. Liquid
Carbonic Corp.52 The plaintiff, a union member, was dismissed for failure to
pass an employer-administered drug test. He sued on the basis of a state statu-
tory and constitutional right to privacy. 3 The employer removed the case to
federal court and won a dismissal on preemption grounds.54 Affirming this
ruling, the First Circuit reasoned that in order to decide if the employee's
privacy had been violated, it had to determine whether the employer's drug
testing program was "reasonable."55 Further, it said, reasonableness had to be
assessed in light of the right management had, under the collective agreement,
to post reasonable rules and regulations.56 Thus the court concluded that the
suit involved interpretation of the collective agreement, and was therefore pre-
empted.57
45. See Stone, supra note 7, at 603.
46. Galvez v. Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir. 1991).
47. Id. at 776.
48. These results, with supporting authority, are discussed more fully in The Legacy of In-
dustrial Pluralism, Stone, supra note 7, at 605-20.
49. Id. at 607.
50. Id. at 607-08.
51. Id. at 608-10.
52. 863 F.2d !11 (lst Cir. 1988).
53. Jackson, 863 F.2d at 113.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 118.
56. Id. at 119.
57. Id. at 113.
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In a similar fashion, the great majority of union members' cases alleging
violations of state law brought in the 1980s and early 1990s were found to be
preempted by section 301. In that period, federal courts applied section 301
preemption with extraordinary reach, finding all kinds of lawsuits to be de
facto efforts to enforce collective bargaining agreements. Indeed, some courts
in the 1980s and early 1990s developed a de facto presumption to preempt all
cases in which a unionized worker attempted to assert a state employment
right. For example, in a 1991 decision, the Ninth Circuit stated that in a
unionized workplace, claims about any working conditions that were within
the scope of collective bargaining would be preempted."8 Similarly, the Sixth
Circuit found an employee's claim preempted because, while not entailing in-
terpretation of a collective agreement, it "address[ed] relationships that have
been created through the collective bargaining process."'5 9
In 1994, in two cases decided one week apart, the Supreme Court
revisited the issue of the scope of section 301 preemption. In doing so, it
reined in some of the more expansive approaches that the courts of appeals
had been taking. The first case was Livadas v. Bradshaw,' which concerned
a California law that requires employers to pay all wages due a discharged
employee immediately upon discharge.6 The California Commissioner of La-
bor had a policy of pursuing late wage payment claims of nonunion workers
while refusing to pursue such claims of unionized workers. Livadas, a dis-
charged worker who was not promptly paid her wage claim, challenged the
Commissioner's policy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a violation of her federal
right to engage in collective bargaining. She alleged that the policy "placed a
penalty on the exercise of her statutory right to bargain collectively with her
employer."62 The Commissioner defended the policy on the grounds that it
was compelled by section 301 preemption because disposition of the plaintiff's
wage penalty claim would require determining the amount she was owed, and
this in turn would involve interpreting her collective bargaining agreement. 3
The district court agreed with the plaintiff and enjoined the Commissioner's
policy of refusing to enforce wage-and-hour regulations for unionized work-
ers.'4 A divided Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that
whether or not the plaintiff's claims were actually preempted, state officials
should err on the side of avoiding interference with contractual grievance and
arbitration procedures.6'
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, rejected the
Commissioner's defense, and found him in violation of the plaintiff's federal
rights. In doing so, it stated that there was not even a "colorable argument"
58. Schlacter-Jones v. General Tel., 936 F.2d 435, 441 (9th Cir. 1991).
59. Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 382 (6th Cir. 1991).
60. 512 U.S. 107 (1994).
61. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 110. The law imposes financial penalties, enforceable by the Com-
missioner, on employers who fail to comply. Id.
62. Id. at 113-14.
63. Id. at 118-20.
64. Id. at 114-15.
65. Livadas v. Aubry, 987 F.2d 552, 570 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nor. Livadas v.
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994).
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that Livadas's claim for late wages was preempted under section 301. The
Court reasoned:
[Tihe primary text for deciding whether Livadas was entitled to a
[late payment] penalty was not the Food Store contract, but a calen-
dar. The only issue raised by Livadas's claim, whether Safeway
"willfully failed to pay" her wages promptly upon severance ... was
a question of state law, entirely independent of any understanding
embodied in the collective-bargaining agreement between the union
and the employer.'
While the Livadas Court found the plaintiff's claim not preempted, it
declined the opportunity to articulate a test for defining the scope of section
301 preemption. Instead, in a footnote, the Court noted that there was a con-
flict between the circuit courts as to the proper breadth of section 301 preemp-
tion. But, the Court said, because the non-preempted status of the plaintiff's
claim was "clear beyond peradventure," this case was "not a fit occasion for
us to resolve disagreements that have arisen over the proper scope of our earli-
er [section 301 preemption] decisions.' 7
Exactly a week later, the Supreme Court did revisit its preemption deci-
sions, but in the context of the Railway Labor Act (RLA) rather than section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. In Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v.
Norris,' an airline mechanic was fired for refusing to certify a repair as sat-
isfactorily completed on an airplane maintenance record.' The employee
brought suit in the Hawaii state court on state common law and statutory
wrongful discharge theories." The airline claimed that the suit was in reality
a grievance under the "just cause" provision of the collective agreement, and it




The Court rejected the airlines' preemption argument. It stated that the
standard for preemption under the RLA was "virtually identical" to the stan-
dard under section 301.72 It then noted that the facts of the case were
"remarkably similar" to those in Lingle, where the plaintiff alleged she was
fired in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim.73 Here the em-
ployee alleged he was fired for refusing to sign off on the maintenance record
that violated airline safety and health regulations. The Court said that in both
cases, the state law retaliatory discharge claim turned on a "purely factual
question: whether the employee was discharged . . . , and, if so, whether the
employer's motive in discharging him was to deter or interfere with his exer-
cise of [state law] rights." '74 The Court said that this question could be re-
66. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124-25.
67. Id. at 124 & n.18.
68. 512 U.S. 246 (1994).
69. Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 247.
70. Id. at 248.
71. Id. at 265.
72. Id. at 260.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 262.
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solved without reference to the collective agreement. 75 Reiterating the Lingle
standard, the Hawaiian Airlines Court held that preemption was required when
the employee's state-law claim "is dependent on the interpretation of a CBA
[collective-bargaining agreement]" and that here the plaintiff's claims were not
preempted.76
The 1994 Supreme Court decisions restricted some of the more free-
wheeling approaches to preemption taken by the courts of appeals. No longer
do courts preempt simply on the grounds that an employee is covered by a
collective bargaining agreement." However, since Livadas and Hawaiian
Airines, the lower federal courts continue to preempt most unionized workers'
claims of unjust dismissal,78 promissory estoppel, 79 and breach of contract
concerning employment issues.8" But certain claims are less likely to be pre-
empted since the 1994 decisions. In particular, claims of defamation,8 inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress,82 fraud,83 and battery84 are no longer
routinely preempted. And, as before the 1994 cases, employees' claims of
discrimination or workers' compensation retaliation are generally not
preempted. 5
Despite some constriction of the lower courts' use of preemption since the
Livadas and Hawaiian Airlines decisions, courts nonetheless stretch to find
unionized workers' state law claims preempted. This is especially true for
cases in which a worker challenges her dismissal. For example, in Thomas v.
LTV Corp.,8 6 a case decided after Livadas and Hawaiian Airlines, a unionized
employee negotiated an individual attendance agreement with his employer.87
When he was fired for absenteeism that resulted from an on-the-job injury, he
sued for breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrong-
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Cf Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 382 (6th Cir. 1991); Schlacter-Jones v.
General Tel., 936 F.2d 435, 441 (9th Cir. 1991).
78. See, e.g., Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 621 (5th Cir. 1994); Cullen v. E.H.
Friedrich Co., 910 F. Supp. 815, 823 (D. Mass. 1995); Sirois v. Business Express, Inc., 906 F.
Supp. 722, 728-29 (D.N.H. 1995) (RLA preemption).
79. See, e.g., Thomas, 39 F.3d at 619; Cullen, 910 F. Supp. at 824.
80. See, e.g., Thomas, 39 F.3d at 619; Sirois, 906 F. Supp. at 729; Atchley v. Heritage Cable
Vision Assocs., 904 F. Supp. 870, 876 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Knox v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, 899
F. Supp. 1529, 1534 (N.D. W. Va. 1995); Gregory v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 896 F.
Supp. 78, 83 (D. Conn. 1994).
81. See, e.g., Luecke v. Schnucks Mkts. Inc., 85 F.3d 356 (8th Cit. 1996) (holding defama-
tion claims not preempted under § 301); Gay v. Carlson, 60 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cit. 1995) (holding
libel, slander, and prima facie tort claims not preempted under RLA).
82. See, e.g., Trans-Penn Wax v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 1995); Gregory,
896 F. Supp. at 84.
83. See Trans-Penn Wax, 50 F.3d at 232.
84. See, e.g., Gregory, 896 F. Supp. at 83; Mack v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 878 F.
Supp. 673, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
85. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d
1392, 1402 (4th Cir. 1994) (state handicap discrimination claims not preempted under § 301);
Westbrook v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 35 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1994) (workers' compensation retalia-
tion claim not preempted under RLA).
86. 39 F.3d 611 (5th Cir. 1994).
87. Thomas, 39 F.3d at 614.
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ful dismissal, and retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim."8 The
Fifth Circuit said that even assuming the individual agreement was indepen-
dent of the collective bargaining agreement, all the claims were nonetheless
preempted. It noted that the employee's individual agreement sought to limit
or condition his terms of employment, terms which were also addressed by the
collective agreement. On this basis, it found that the individual agreement was
subject to preemption. 9
So long as courts continue to find most unionized workers' state unlawful
dismissal claims preempted, organized workers will have, in some respects,
less employment rights than their unionized counterparts. One might ask, how-
ever, what's wrong with a broad section 301 preemption doctrine that leaves
unionized workers with their right to private arbitration? The answer is that
when a case is preempted under section 301, the law converts the unionized
worker's statutory claim into a claim arising under her collective bargaining
agreement. The arbitrator's task is to apply the collective agreement, not the
relevant statute. Thus, in section 301 arbitration, unionized workers lose their
statutory rights. This would not be a problem if unions were able to secure
strong contractual protections for their members. However, after years of con-
cession bargaining, judicial restrictions on the scope of mandatory bargaining,
and employer use of striker replacements, unions have seen their bargaining
strength erode.' As a result, their collective bargaining agreements have be-
come weaker and weaker. In fact, it is precisely because employment law
statutes seem to provide workers with stronger protections and better remedies
than those contained in their collective bargaining agreements that unionized
workers frequently bring legal actions on the basis of their statutory rights
rather than rely on grievances to assert their contractual rights. Yet the law of
section 301 preemption says that in such cases, the unionized worker is out of
luck.91
In addition to using an expansive section 301 preemption doctrine to
deprive unionized workers of their state law employment rights, some courts
have developed another approach that similarly prevents workers from chal-
lenging dismissals on state law grounds. The First Circuit has concluded that
state common law modifications of the at-will rule do not apply to unionized
workers. As it was explained by Federal District Court Judge Ponsor of
Massachusetts:
88. Id. at 615.
89. Id. at 618. In dicta, the court stated that it believed that the individual agreement "techni-
cally qualifies as a CBA" because the union played a role in helping the employee negotiate it and
because it resulted from disciplinary action. Id.
90. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 73,
74-76, 86-96 (1988).
91. Judge Alex Kosinski, in his dissent in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in the Livadas case,
decried the court's expansive interpretation of § 301 preemption, calling it the "novel doctrine of
quasi-preemption." Livadas, 987 F.2d at 561 (Kosinski, J., dissenting). He pointed out that the
doctrine has the effect of depriving unionized workers of the benefits of state law employment
rights and placing them at a disadvantage vis-A-vis nonunion workers. Id. at 563. He even hypo-
thesized that the courts' expansion of § 301 preemption and the consequent application of labor
arbitration to unionized workers' statutory claims has contributed to union decline. Id. at 563 n.2;
see also Stone, supra note 7, at 578-84.
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The Massachusetts cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy is a judicially created exception to the "employment
at will doctrine." This doctrine holds that an employee, who works
without the benefit of an employment contract, may be discharged for
almost any reason with or without cause. The cause of action,
however, is only available to "at-will" employees. Allowing employ-
ees governed by a CBA [collective bargaining agreement] to assert an
independent, common law claim of wrongful discharge would not be
"a commendable practice. It would deprive employer and union of the
ability to establish a uniform and exclusive method for orderly settle-
ment of employee grievances.'92
Several courts in Rhode Island and New Hampshire have utilized this same
reasoning.93 By limiting application of judicially created exceptions to the at-
will rule to nonunion workers, these courts preclude claims of unjust dismissal
brought by unionized workers, notwithstanding which the standard of section
301 preemption would otherwise be applied. Thus courts are developing a
variety of techniques to keep unjust dismissal claims out of court and restrict
unionized workers to their contractual grievance procedures.
IV. THE GROWTH OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION IN THE NONUNION SECTOR
A. The Gilmer Decision
The second legal development that has expanded arbitration into the realm
of statutory employment rights addresses the use of arbitration by nonunion
employers. In 1991, the Supreme Court decided the case of Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,94 which held that an employee of a stock bro-
kerage firm, who alleged he was fired in violation of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA), had to arbitrate his claim. At the time of hire,
the employee had signed an arbitration clause in a standard stock exchange
registration form, which he was required to file in order to begin work.95 The
Gilmer Court held that the arbitration agreement was enforceable under the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),96 an Act which makes arbitration promises in
contracts involving commerce "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.
97
The Gilmer Court's reasoning was based on a series of recent Supreme
Court cases about commercial arbitration under the FAA. For example, it
quoted its decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Con-
struction Corp.,9" in which it had stated that the FAA evidences a "'liberal
92. Cullen, 910 F. Supp. at 821 (citations omitted).
93. See Sirois, 906 F. Supp. at 728; see also Bertrand v. Quincy Mkt. Cold Storage & Ware-
house Co., 728 F.2d 568, 571 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that under Massachusetts law, implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not apply to unionized employees).
94. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
95. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
96. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
97. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
98. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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federal policy favoring arbitration."' In addition, the Gilmer Court referred
to its holdings in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc."'° and Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,'"' noting that "statu-
tory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursu-
ant to the FAA."" 2 It rejected the plaintiff's arguments that requiring plain-
tiffs to arbitrate ADEA claims was inconsistent with the statutory framework.
In response to the plaintiff's argument that the ADEA embodies important
social policies which should not be determined in private tribunals, the Court
recounted recent cases where it had found that claims arising under the anti-
trust act, the securities act, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO) are amenable to arbitration under the FAA. °3 The Court
then quoted Mitsubishi to the effect that "so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent func-
tion., o'
The Gilmer Court also rejected, without much discussion, the plaintiff's
arguments that arbitration procedures were inherently inadequate to protect
statutory rights.' 5 Rather, it discussed with approval the particular arbitration
rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). For example, the Court noted
that the NYSE Rules required arbitration panel members to disclose their em-
ployment histories and permitted parties to make further inquiries into the
backgrounds of potential arbitrators to discern bias. The NYSE Rules also give
parties one peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause.'" The
Court also noted that the NYSE Rules permit limited discovery, including
document production and depositions.' 7 And the Rules require that arbitral
awards be in writing, specifying the names of the parties, a summary of the
issues, and a description of the award.'" These features of the NYSE arbitra-
tion led the Court to conclude that the arbitration procedures adequately safe-
guarded Gilmer's substantive rights.
Justice Stevens, in dissent, raised what is perhaps the most troublesome
aspect of the Gilmer opinion. Section 1 of the FAA has an exclusion for con-
tracts of employment."° The FAA states that "nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."'0 Stevens
argued that the brokerage agreement the plaintiff signed in Gilmer was part of
99. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24).
100. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
101. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
102. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
103. Id. at 27-28.
104. Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637).
105. Id. at 30-32.
106. Id. at 30.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 31-32.
109. Id. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. 9 U.S.C. § I (emphasis added).
19961 1031
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
a contract of employment. ' Because the employer in Gilmer sought to
compel arbitration under the FAA, Stevens maintained that the exclusion for
contracts of employment governed and the Act could not be applied."2
The majority gave short-shrift to Stevens's argument about the contract-
of-employment exclusion. It stated that because the arbitration clause originat-
ed in a contract between the plaintiff and the stock exchange and not in a con-
tract between the plaintiff and his immediate employer, it was not a "contract
of employment" for purposes of the FAA exclusion."3 In addition, the Court
said that because the issue of the section 1 exclusion had not been raised by
the litigants below, nor developed in the record, it was not obliged to address
it in detail. Instead, the Court said, it would leave that issue "for another
day."
14
The Gilmer dissent also took issue with the majority's interpretation of the
FAA exclusion for employment contracts. Stevens argued that Congress had
excluded employment contracts from the FAA out of its concern that arbitra-
tion promises contained in employment contracts were not truly voluntary but
might arise out of excessive inequality of bargaining power."5 These con-
cerns, he argued, should be implemented by giving an expansive interpretation
to the "contract of employment" exclusion and by refusing to apply the FAA
to arbitration of ADEA or other employment-related statutory claims." 6
Stevens also argued that the Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver.7 precluded arbitration of employment discrimination claims. In
Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court held that an employee who had arbitrated
his discrimination claim under his collective bargaining agreement may, none-
theless, obtain a de novo judicial determination of his Title VII claim. The
Gardner-Denver Court reasoned that a union's collective bargaining agreement
may not waive an employee's individual rights:
Title VII ... concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's
right to equal employment opportunities .... Of necessity, the rights
conferred can form no part of the collective bargaining process since
waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional pur-
pose behind Title VII. In these circumstances, an employee's rights
under Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver."8
Stevens, in his Gilmer dissent, maintained that Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver Co. established the principle that compulsory arbitration conflicts with the
congressional purpose behind anti-discrimination legislation. He quoted Chief
Justice Burger on the issue:
111. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 51-52 & n.2.
114. Id.
115. Id. at39.
116. Id. at 39-43.
117. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
118. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 59-60.
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Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional objectives be-
hind a statute seeking to enforce civil rights protected by Title VII to
allow the very forces that had practiced discrimination to contract
away the right to enforce civil rights in the courts. For federal courts
to defer to arbitral decisions reached by the same combination of
forces that had long perpetuated invidious discrimination would have
made the foxes guardians of the chickens."'
The Gilmer majority distinguished Gardner-Denver on the ground that the
latter involved a unionized worker's claim and an arbitration promise con-
tained in a collective bargaining agreement, thus posing issues about the rela-
tionship between a collective representative and an individual employee's
rights which were not present in Gilmer.
B. Application of Gilmer to Non-Union Workers
Since 1991, most lower federal courts have interpreted Gilmer
expansively. Several federal courts have applied Gilmer to find employees'
discrimination claims arbitrable in cases in which an arbitration promise arose
directly from an employment contract between an employer and an employee,
rather than the third-party arbitration promise involved in Gilmer.' These
cases read the "contracts of employment" exclusion in section I of the FAA
narrowly to apply only to employees involved in the physical movement of
goods across state lines.'2' Some go even further and maintain that the exclu-
sion only applies to transportation workers.' They justify these narrow
readings of the statutory language by saying that the contract-of-employment
exclusion refers explicitly to contracts of employment involving "seamen and
railroad employees," and hence these enumerated categories should limit the
type of employees included in the phrase "any other class of workers."'
23
119. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
120. See, e.g., Metz v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir.
1994) (applying Gilmer in employee's Title VII suit alleging pregnancy discrimination); Albert v.
NCR, 874 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (applying Gilmer in an employee's Title VII suit alleg-
ing religious and national origin discrimination); Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp.
76 (D. Mass, 1993) (applying Gilmer to an employee's suit for sex discrimination under Title
VII); DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guaranty Bank, 807 F. Supp. 947 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying Gilmer to
an employee's Title VII suit alleging sexual harassment); see also Crawford v. West Jersey Health
Sys., 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 853 (D.N.J. 1994) (applying Gilmer to suit by medical
director against employer for violations of ADEA, Title VII, antidiscrimination statutes, and trade
libel); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying Gilmer to deny
injunction against arbitration of contract dispute between employee and employer).
121. The leading case which interpreted the "contracts of employment" exclusion narrowly to
apply only to movement of goods across state lines was Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Elec.
Radio & Machine Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953). While Tenney pre-dated Gilmer, it re-
mains good law in many circuits. See, e.g., Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 76
(D. Mass. 1993); Dancu v. Coopers & Lybrand, 778 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (following
Tenney).
122. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local 9, 739 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir.
1984); Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. Ill. 1993); DiCrisci v.
Lyndon Guarantee Bank, 807 F. Supp. 947 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
123. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 453. The Tenney court relied on the principle of "'ejusdem generis"
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A few courts, however, have held that the contract-of-employment exclu-
sion applies to all workers engaged in interstate commerce.'24 These courts
argue that the mention of seamen and railroad employees only illustrates the
limited reach of the Commerce Clause in 1925, when the FAA was enacted.
By including the language "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce," they reason, Congress indicated its intent to except all
workers that were within the reach of the commerce power. While the
lower courts are currently split on this issue, most federal circuit courts are
adopting the former, narrow reading of the contracts-of-employment exclusion.
In addition to applying Gilmer to conventional employment contracts,
many courts have utilized Gilmer's reasoning to mandate arbitration of non-
union employees' claims involving employment-related statutes other than the
ADEA statute that was involved in Gilmer itself. Thus, courts have required
arbitration of claims based on laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
race,126  sex,127  religion,"' and national origin,"' as well as claims
arising under ERISA 30 and the federal Employee Polygraph Protection
Act.'
3'
C. Application of the FAA to Unionized Workers After Gilmer
Since Gilmer, some courts have questioned whether the holding in
Gardner-Denver-that unionized workers had a right to judicial determination
of discrimination claims despite arbitration provisions in their collective agree-
ments-is still good law. 32 Indeed, some lower courts' decisions effectively
overrule Gardner-Denver. For example, in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Container, Inc.,33 the Fourth Circuit dismissed a gender and handicap dis-
crimination claim brought by a worker who was covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement, holding that the employee was required to arbitrate, rather
to conclude that the "any other class" language was limited to the narrow categories that preceded
it. Compare Note, The Federal Arbitration Act and Individual Employment Contracts: A Better
Means to an Equally Just End, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2171 (1995) (advocating narrow interpretation
of the exclusion) with Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in
Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary's Failure of Statutory Vision,
1991 J. DisP. REsOL. 259, 292-93 (recounting history and reasoning of Tenney interpretation of
"contracts of employment" exclusion and refuting the "ejusdem generis" argument).
124. See Arce v. Cotton Club of Greenville, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Miss. 1995);
Mittendorf v. Stone Lumber Co., 874 F. Supp. 292 (D. Or. 1994).
125. See also Matthew Finkin, 'Workers Contracts' Under the United States Arbitration Act:
An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 282 (1996).
126. Maye v. Smith, Barney, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
127. Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 76 (D. Mass. 1993) (pregnancy dis-
crimination).
128. Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (race, sex, and
religious discrimination).
129. Albert v. NCR Co., 874 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (sex, race, and national origin
discrimination).
130. Pritzker v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cit. 1993).
131. Saari v. Smith, Barney, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 155 (D.N.J. 1992).
132. See, e.g., Ngheim v. NEC Elec., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994); Willis v. Dean-
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 308 (6th Cir. 1991).
133. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
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than litigate, her claims.'34 It based its reasoning on Gilmer, concluding that
the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement barred judicial
determination of the employee's individual discrimination claims. The court
stated that it assumed that unionized workers were not subject to the FAA, but
it nonetheless held that Gilmer mandated its conclusion. 35 The court also
stated that Gilmer had effectively overruled Gardner-Denver.
36
Despite Fourth Circuit's dicta in Austin to the effect that the FAA does
not apply to unionized workers, its holding that the unionized employee must
arbitrate her federal statutory claims necessarily rests sub silentio on applica-
tion of the FAA. That is because the FAA would provide the only possible
basis for compelling arbitration of a unionized worker's federal statutory
claims. Section 301 preemption is only available to require arbitration of
unionized workers' state law claims.
The circuit courts have been long split on the question whether the FAA
applies to unionized workers.'37 Some hold that the FAA does not apply be-
cause collective bargaining agreements are "contracts of employment" subject
to the section 1 exclusion. As more and more courts reject that view in favor
of the narrow interpretation of the section 1 employment exclusion, they will
also be inclined to apply Gilmer to the unionized sector as the court in Austin
did. Thus the line between FAA arbitration and section 301 preemption is
likely to become blurred.
A recent New Jersey decision similarly blurs the distinction between
FAA-compelled arbitration for nonunion workers and section 301 preemption-
compelled arbitration for union workers. In In re Prudential Insurance Co. of
America Sales Practices Litigation,3 ' New Jersey District Judge Wolin con-
sidered the application of the FAA to a group of employees of an insurance
company who were fired allegedly for refusing to engage in illegal insurance
practices.'39 The employees had been required by their employer to sign the
securities industry standard arbitration clause ("U-4 agreement"). The court
analyzed the case under Gilmer despite the fact that the employees were repre-
sented by a union and covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The court
ultimately decided that the agents were subject to the U-4 arbitration clause,
but rejected the company's motion to compel arbitration on the ground that the
U-4 agreement had an exclusion for disputes involving the insurance busi-
134. Austin, 78 F.3d at 880.
135. Id. at 880-81.
136. Id. at 882.
137. The First, Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the FAA does not apply to
collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Asociacion de
Empleados de Casino, 873 F 2d 479 (1st Cir. 1989); Domino Sugar v. Sugar Workers Local 392,
10 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1993); United Food and Commercial Workers v. Safeway, 889 F.2d 940
(10th Cir. 1989); American Postal Workers Union v. USPS, 823 F.2d 466 (11th Cir. 1987). The
Second, Third, and Seventh, on the other hand, have held that it does. See, e.g., I.A.M. v. General
Electric, 406 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969); Newark Stereotypers Union v. Newark Morning News,
397 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1968); Pietro Sclazitti Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 351
F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1965).
138. 924 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.J. 1996).
139. In re Prudential, 924 F. Supp. at 633.
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ness.'" But by entertaining the company's FAA arguments, the court decid-
ed sub silentio that the FAA applies to employees covered by collective bar-
gaining agreements, at least if the employees are subject to an independent
promise to arbitrate disputes other than one contained in their collective agree-
ment.
As more and more courts apply the FAA to unionized workers' federal
statutory claims, unionized workers will be required to arbitrate not only their
state law employment rights, as they are presently under section 301 preemp-
tion, but also their federal employment claims through such expansive inter-
pretation of Gilmer. Such a move would overrule Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver, a position that some management-side labor lawyers have been advocating
for years. 4' It would also make unionized workers' legal claims similar to
those of nonunion workers who, as discussed above, are required to arbitrate
both state and federal employment-related statutory claims. Together these
developments would transform the Supreme Court's commitment to labor
arbitration beyond recognition.
The original justification for judicial deference to arbitration was that
labor arbitrators have a special expertise in applying the "law of the shop,"
which they can bring to bear in the resolution of disputes. 42 It was never
posited that arbitrators have special expertise in interpreting the law of the
land. As Justice Brennan, an avid supporter of labor arbitration for deciding
contractual disputes, warned in 1980, "[B]ecause the specialized competence
of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the
land .... many arbitrators may not be conversant with the public law consid-
erations underlying [statutory claims].'
43
V. THE YELLOW DOG CONTRACTS OF THE 1990S
A. Due Process Deficiencies
While mandatory arbitration of statutory rights is troublesome in any
context, in the nonunion setting it is particularly problematic. Many pre-hire
arbitral agreements are blatant contracts of adhesion. In 1994, the New York
Times reported that more and more employers are requiring their nonunion
employees to agree to boilerplate arbitration agreements as a condition of
employment.'" At the moment of hire, employees lack bargaining power and
are needful of employment, so they frequently agree to such terms without
giving them much thought. In these agreements, employees are typically re-
140. Id. at 641-42.
141. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Center for Public Resources, Inc., in support of Re-
spondent in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., in the Supreme Court of the United States,
filed Dec. 19, 1990, at 14-16 (arguing that Gardner-Denver is based on out-moded views of arbi-
tration, and urging the Court to overrule it). The Center for Public Resources is a non-profit cor-
poration made up of 200 major corporations and 100 law firms engaged in employer-side labor
and employment law. Id. at 1.
142. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
143. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981).
144. Steven A. Holmes, Some Workers Lost Right to File Suit for Bias at Work, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 1994, at Al, B-6.
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quired to pay their own legal fees and one-half of the arbitrator's fees, a sum
that could easily exceed $1,000.45 Thus, these Gilmer pre-hire arbitration
agreements discourage workers from asserting statutory rights. They operate
like the early nineteenth century "yellow dog contracts"-contracts in which
employees had to promise not to join a union in order to get a job."
Today's "yellow dog contracts" require employees to waive their statutory
rights in order to obtain employment.'47
Like the yellow dog contracts of the past, the new mandatory arbitration
provisions are often imposed on workers without even the illusion of bargain-
ing or consent. They are designed by employers unilaterally, and given to
employees at the time of hire or inserted in employee handbooks, without
mention of their existence and without discussion as to their terms. A typical
case is Lang v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 4 in which an employer
unilaterally adopted an arbitration policy in 1991, and notified incumbent
employees of its existence by mail. When the plaintiff attempted to bring a
legal action for wrongful termination, the employer moved to dismiss on the
grounds that the dispute must be arbitrated under the company's arbitration
policy. The Court agreed with the employer, holding that by sending employ-
ees the arbitration policy in the mail, the employer had created a binding uni-
lateral contract. It said, "[The plaintiff's] continued employment, with
knowledge of the changed condition, constituted acceptance of the offer and
provided the necessary consideration to bind the parties."'49
The Lang case is not atypical."5 As the U.S. Government's Commission
on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, reported in its May, 1994
Fact-Finding Report:
[Tihe type of pre-dispute arbitration arrangement seen in Gilmer is
devised by employers or their associates and presented to newly-hired
employees on a "take it or leave it" basis. While the labor market
does permit some negotiation and variation in salaries and benefits, it
is hardly likely to let employees insist on litigating, rather than arbi-
trating, future legal disputes with their prospective employers.''
145. Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute Resolution or Coercive
Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 131, 136-37 & n.26 (1995).
146. "Yellow dog contracts" are employment contracts in which workers promise not to join a
union in order to obtain employment. They were prevalent in the early decades of the twentieth
century and were approved by the Supreme Court in the Hitchman Coal and Coppage cases. See
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 299 (1917); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915). After decades of agitation by organized labor, in 1932 Congress declared yellow dog
contracts unenforceable in § 3 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
147. See Margaret Jacobs, Woman Claims Arbiters of Bias Are Biased, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19,
1994, at BI (reporting that more than 100 major companies have made it a condition of being
hired that an applicant agree to a mandatory arbitration provision of his/her statutory employment
rights).
148. 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993).
149. Lang, 835 F. Supp. at 1106.
150. See also Kinnebrew v. Gulf Ins. Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 189 (N.D. Tex.
1994) (upholding arbitration policy unilaterally adopted by employer and mailed to incumbent
employees).
151. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF
THE WORKER-EMPLOYER RELATIONSHIP, FACT-FINDING REPORT 118 (May 1994).
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The problem of lack of consent by nonunion employees to employer-
initiated arbitration systems has been much noted by commentators but little
heeded by courts. In one unusual case, the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce an
arbitration agreement in the securities industry because the agents were not
given an opportunity to read it and it was not explained to them.'52 However,
that decision has been repudiated by most other courts.'53 Indeed, one district
court recently acknowledged that the lack of consent is typical of arbitration
agreements in the securities industry and it found that fact no bar to its en-
forcement. It said:
Even if Smith Barney had explained the scope of the arbitration
clause to the plaintiff, the end result would have been the same; the
execution of a Form U-4 is not unique to Smith Barney employees
and it is not optional. It is an SEC industry-wide requirement, a pre-
requisite to registration with any securities firm.'
5 4
The Center for Public Resources (CPR), an organization devoted to pro-
moting alternative dispute resolution in employment relations, acknowledges
that some courts might find that some arbitration clauses do not give employ-
ees adequate notice of the fact that by signing them, they are waiving some or
all of their statutory employment rights. To cure this potential problem of lack
of knowing waiver and consent, the CPR has proposed language for employers
to use in the introductory paragraph to their written ADR procedures. They
propose the following:
Statement of Consideration and Joint Agreement
IN CONSIDERATION AND AS A MATERIAL CONDITION OF
THE EMPLOYMENT AND CONTINUATION OF EMPLOYMENT
OF THE EMPLOYEE AS OF THE DATE OF THIS EMPLOY-
MENT DISPUTE ARBITRATION PROCEDURE ("Employment Dis-
pute Arbitration Procedure") BECOMES EFFECTIVE, THE EM-
PLOYEE AND THE EMPLOYER (as this term is defined below)
(collectively, the "Parties") AGREE TO SUBMIT FOR RESOLU-
TION PURSUANT TO THIS Employment Dispute Arbitration Proce-
dure ANY EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE (as this term is defined be-
low), AND FURTHER AGREE THAT ARBITRATION PURSUANT
TO THIS Employment Dispute Arbitration Procedure IS THE EX-
CLUSIVE MEANS FOR RESOLUTION OF SUCH DISPUTE AND
THAT BOTH THE EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE HEREBY
WAIVE THEIR RESPECTIVE RIGHTS, IF ANY, TO RESOLVE
ANY DISPUTE THROUGH ANY OTHER MEANS, INCLUDING
A JURY TRIAL OR A COURT TRIAL IN A LAWSUIT, EXCEPT
AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED IN THIS Employment Dispute Arbi-
tration Procedure.'
152. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
153. See e.g., In re Prudential, 924 F. Supp. 627, 642 (D.N.J. 1996).
154. Id. at 642 (quoting Bender v. Smith Barney Upham & Co., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 155, 159
(D.N.J. 1992)).
155. See Jay W. Waks & John Roberti, Challenges to Employment ADR: Processes, Rather
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The virtue of this language, observes the CPR, is that it explains "in a single
sentence that 'All Disputes are subject to this Employment Dispute Arbitra-
tion.""116 The CPR goes on to propose additional language, which:
[Diefines this term broadly with certain limited and clearly stated ex-
ceptions: the term "Dispute," whether in the singular or plural, means
(a) all claims, disputes or issues of which the Employee (including
former Employee) is or should be aware during the employment rela-
tionship or after termination thereof, and which relate to or arise out
of the employment of the Employee by the Employer (including with-
out limitation any claim of constructive termination, any benefits-
related claim or any related claim against an individual employee),
and (b) all Employer counterclaims against that Employee. The term
"Dispute" includes, without limitation, contractual, statutory and com-
mon law claims and excludes statutory claims for workers' compensa-
tion or unemployment insurance, other claims that are expressly ex-
cluded by statute and claims that are expressly required to be
arbitrated under a different procedure pursuant to the terms of an em-
ployee benefit plan. In addition, the term "Dispute" expressly ex-
cludes any claim which relates to or arises out of confidentiality or
noncompetition conditions of employment, trade secrets, intellectual
property or unfair competition.57
The CPR recommendation concludes by saying, "An explication of this nature
should ordinarily provide sufficient protection."'58
The CPR language is about as "sufficient" as the back of a parking lot
ticket stub for conveying knowledge of a waiver of liability. After trying to
imagine a worker without legal training and extraordinary patience reading this
language, one is left to wonder who is getting the protection out of this?
In addition to resting on dubious consent, many nonunion arbitration
agreements require employees to waive their rights to punitive damages, con-
sequential damages, attorneys' fees, injunctive relief, reinstatement, or other
remedies that might be available in court. These are almost always upheld.'59
For example, in Pony Express Courier Corp. v. Morris,"6° an applicant for
employment was given an arbitration agreement to sign, which provided that
all claims relating to her employment shall be arbitrated without discovery and
that any award shall be limited to actual lost wages or six months wages,




159. See, e.g., DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, No. 94-CIV-1613, 1996 WL 44226 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (compelling arbitration of Title VII even though arbitration agreement did not permit
awards of injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, or punitive damages); Kinnebrew v. Gulf Ins., 67 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 189 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (enforcing arbitration agreement that limited dam-
ages to compensation for "direct injury," excluding punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and equita-
ble relief, and placing severe restrictions on possibility of reinstatement).
160. 921 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
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whichever is less. The agreement also said that "you will not be offered em-
ployment until it [the arbitration agreement] is signed without modifica-
tion."'' The Texas appeals court upheld this agreement against a challenge
that it was unconscionable.
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of nonunion arbitration agreements
stems not from the fact that they are contracts of adhesion or that they limit
employees' remedies, but that they often have a systematic pro-employer ef-
fect on the outcomes of disputes. While there is no comprehensive survey data
on the subject (and indeed there cannot be due to the privatized nature of the
tribunals), there is some anecdotal data that suggests that nonunion arbitration
schemes tend to generate pro-employer outcomes. 62 For example, a congres-
sional study found that the overwhelming majority of securities industry arbi-
trators who hear sexual harassment complaints as well as other employment
matters are white males in their sixties who do not have significant experience
or training in labor and employment law. In this setting, women plaintiffs are
not likely to win.'63
In the wake of Gilmer, several organizations have developed model arbi-
tration procedures for nonunion workplaces. One, the "Model Employment
Termination Dispute Resolution Procedure" which was promulgated by the
Center for Public Resources, demonstrates how particular ADR procedures can
have a systematic effect on the outcome of disputes." In the CPR model
ADR procedure, an employee promises to arbitrate all disputes related to or
arising out of the termination of her employment, and it expressly precludes
bringing any such claims in a court. The employee has a short time period,
180 days, to initiate the procedure. 65 All disputes are heard by an Adjudica-
tor. If the parties cannot agree on who the Adjudicator shall be, it is to be
chosen from the commercial arbitration panel of the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), not the labor arbitration panel. The CPR's Official Com-
mentary does not explain why they call for selecting an arbitrator from the
AAA's commercial arbitration panel rather than from the AAA's labor arbitra-
tion panel, yet commercial arbitrators tend not to be lawyers and, unlike the
labor arbitrators, have no familiarity with employee rights or concerns.
The CPR procedure states that for an employee to prevail, she must "dem-
onstrate that the termination was not based on any legitimate business rea-
161. Pony Express, 921 S.W.2d at 819.
162. One survey concludes that employers are more likely to win discrimination cases before
an arbitrator than before a jury, and that those employees who do win, generally receive smaller
awards in arbitration than in jury trials. Stuart Bompey & Michael Pappas, Compulsory Arbitra-
tion in Employment Discrimination Claims: The Impact of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 1993 A.B.A. SEC. ON EMPLOYMENT & LAB. LAW EEO COMM. PAPERS.
163. Steven A. Holmes, Arbitrators of Bias in Securities Industry Have Slight Experience in
Labor Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1994, at B4.
164. CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION PROCEDURE, in Jay W. Waks & Linda M. Gadsby, Arbitration and ADR in the Employ-
ment Area, C879 ALI-ABA MEDIATION AND OTHER ADR METHODS 439 app. at 461 (Nov. 18,
1993) [hereinafter CPR PROCEDURESi.
165. Id. at 470. In contrast, under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, in some circum-
stances employees have 300 days to file suit. 42 U.S.C. § 706 (e)(1).
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son.' " As the CPR's Official Commentary acknowledges, this phrase is an
express waiver of other burdens of proof which might otherwise apply.67
Specifically, this burden of proof makes it more difficult for employees to
prevail in CPR arbitrations than they would under the usual burden in labor
arbitrations, in which the employer typically has the burden of demonstrating
"just cause" for a dismissal. The CPR's burden of proof is also a more oner-
ous burden than the burden of proof under some employment statutes, in
which an employee can win in a mixed motive situation."6 In the CPR pro-
cedures, by contrast, if there is any scintilla of legitimate business reason in-
volved in a dismissed decision, the employer will prevail.
Under the CPR procedures, should an employee win her case, she will
find she has a very limited range of remedies. The rules provide that the Adju-
dicator may grant the remedy of lost wages, less interim income from unem-
ployment benefits, other earnings etc., the expenses of bringing the case to
arbitration, and reinstatement. If reinstatement is not practical "under the cir-
cumstances," the Adjudicator may grant up to two years "front pay" in its
stead. Also, the Adjudicator may grant up to one year's wages in lieu of puni-
tive or other special damages that the employee may be entitled to in a judi-
cial proceeding.'69 No recovery for items such as pain and suffering, conse-
quential damages, or punitive damages are permitted. Thus, a worker who
might otherwise have received a generous award of damages for unjust dis-
missal, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, assault,
defamation, or some other tort in a state court, is limited in CPR to reinstate-
ment, interim lost earnings, and one or two year's wages. 70
B. Agreements to Capitulate
Some federal agencies and courts are beginning to recognize that by en-
forcing mandatory arbitration of statutory rights, they are effectively depriving
employees of their rights altogether. For example, in EEOC v. River Oaks
Imaging & Diagnostic,"' an employer insisted its employees agree to arbi-
tration clauses under which they promised to arbitrate all disputes with the
employer and to pay one-half of the cost of any ADR proceedings.' Two
female employees who refused to sign the employer's arbitration agreement
were fired. The EEOC sought a preliminary injunction against the company's
enforcement of its ADR policy, arguing that the agreement was a violation of
the Civil Rights Act because it required employees, as a condition of employ-
166. CPR PROCEDURES, supra note 164, at 473.
167. Id. at 483.
168. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (on method for determining
mixed motive questions in Title VII disparate treatment case).
169. CPR PROCEDURES, supra note 164, at 475-76.
170. These arbitral monetary remedies are not nearly as generous as some jury awards in
unjust dismissal litigation in state courts, which often reach six figures. See Stone, supra note 7, at
630 & n.225.
171. No. CIV.A.H-95-755, 1995 WL 264003 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
172. For a detailed discussion of the facts of River Oaks Imaging, see Hoffman, supra note
145, at 136-40.
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ment, to promise to refrain from exercising their rights to bring employment
discrimination charges to the EEOC. On April 19, 1995, a district court issued
a preliminary injunction against River Oaks prohibiting the employer from
requiring its employees to submit to "any ADR policy which would cause an
employee to pay the costs of ADR proceedings preclud[ing] or interfer[ing]
with any employee's right to file complaints with the EEOC or to promptly
file suit in a court of law when the employee has complied with the require-
ments of Title VII.""' The case was ultimately settled with a consent order
which voided the River Oaks ADR policy.'74
Another recent case which demonstrates the potential for pre-hire arbitra-
tion agreements to operate as mandatory waivers of statutory rights is
Bentley's Luggage Corp.' There, employees were asked to sign a form stat-
ing that by remaining a Bentley's Luggage employee, they agreed to submit
all employment-related disputes to arbitration before bringing any legal action.
One employee who refused to sign the agreement was fired. The NLRB Gen-
eral Counsel's office issued an unfair labor practice complaint on the theory
that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to fire a worker for refusing
to waive his right to bring an unfair labor practice charge to the Board.'76
Bentley's Luggage was eventually settled, with the employer reinstating
the employee-complainant and posting a notice that it would not require em-
ployees to arbitrate issues that involved rights protected by the NLRA. 77
However, a similar case is still pending at the NLRB. In Great Western Fi-
nancial Corp., an employee who signed a pre-hire arbitration agreement was
fired when she filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB.' In
these cases, the Labor Board, like the EEOC in River Oaks Imaging, has be-
gun to recognize that reliance upon, and deferral to, arbitration has gone too
far.
We can expect cases like these to proliferate. Indeed, Gilmer suggests a
modem revival of the old yellow dog contract. In many states, employers can
get the benefit of Gilmer merely by inserting arbitration clauses into their
employment manuals or by sending incumbent employees a postcard. Thus
even without signing anything, workers can be forced to waive their statutory
rights-rights to be free of employment discrimination, rights to a safe
workplace, rights to form a union-just to get a job.
C. Curtailing Legislative Capacity and Reinventing Substantive Due Process
The increased judicial deference to arbitration to resolve the statutory
claims of nonunion workers and to preclude the statutory claims of unionized
workers makes it exceedingly difficult for legislatures to enact meaningful
173. River Oaks Imaging, 1995 WL 264003, at *1.
174. Hoffman, supra note 145, at 140 & n.48.
175. NLRB Case No. 12-CA-16658, 1995 DAILY LAB. REP. 95 d4 (BNA) (Sept. 25, 1995).
176. Arbitration: Accord Reached on Unfair Labor Practice Case Involving Mandatory Ar-
bitration Pledge, 1996 DAILY LAB. REP. 96 d15 (BNA) (May 17, 1996).
177. Id.
178. NLRB Case No. 12-CA-166886, DAILY LAB. REP. 105 d4 (BNA) (Sept. 25, 1995).
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statutes that give employees protection. Imagine, for example, that courts were
to hold that workers' complaints under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (OSHA) are subject to mandatory arbitration provisions. Such a
result, which is possible under an expansive interpretation of Gilmer, would
vitiate Congress's intent in enacting OSHA in the first place. Congress enacted
OSHA in order to provide uniform standards for employee health and safety.
To subject its provisions to mandatory arbitration would subject unionized as
well as nonunion workers to the variable, unpredictable, and invisible out-
comes of private arbitration.' Further, such a requirement would make it
difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to monitor the effectiveness of its
legislative efforts, or to revise legislation to better address pressing social
problems. In a similar fashion, compelled arbitration of statutory claims threat-
ens to nullify all employee protection legislation. It also makes it impossible
for Congress to enact effective legislation for worker protection because what-
ever is stipulated by statute can be compromised away by employer-designated
arbitrators. In addition, by removing labor cases to private arbitral tribunals,
courts are taking employment concerns out of the public arena, away from
public scrutiny and political accountability. Because the arbitral tribunal is
invisible, no one knows to what extent arbitration enforces these publicly con-
ferred employment rights, if at all.
A related problem with mandatory arbitration of statutory rights is that
statutory disputes are being decided in private tribunals which generate no
publicly available norms to guide actors or decisionmakers in the future. Over
the next five years, we can expect a gradual diminution of litigation in the
discrimination area as employers channel more and more employees' discrimi-
nation complaints into arbitration. This will mean that arbitrators who want to
interpret the statutes correctly will have no authoritative statutory interpreta-
tions to look to for guidance.'80 It 'also means that the law cannot play an
educational role of shaping parties' norms and sense of right and wrong, and
therefore it cannot shape behavior in its shadow.
Furthermore, statutory employment rights are enacted when a legislature
believes that workers cannot adequately protect themselves simply by bargain-
ing with their employers. That is, they reflect a legislature's view of market
failure in the contracting process. Legislatures act to ensure healthy and safe
workplaces, protect privacy on the job, or to provide other protections when
they believe that there is a public policy concern so compelling that it war-
rants intervening in the wage bargain. To then relegate enforcement or inter-
pretation of these employment rights to a privatized tribunal-a tribunal whose
composition and internal rules reflect and instantiate the very power imbal-
ances that gave rise to the need for legislation in the first place-permits,
indeed invites, de facto nullification.
179. See also Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of
Gilmer, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 77, 100 (1996) (employment statutes represent Congress's desire to
enact uniform labor statutes).
180. Arbitrators frequently have no training in the legal issues they are called upon to decide.
See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 163, at B4.
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VI. DUE PROCESS OR COWBOY ARBITRATIONS?
A. Efforts to Reconstruct Due Process in the Private Realm
One could read the Gilmer decision as imposing minimal due process
norms on employment arbitration and thus precluding the spread of lawless,
one-sided "cowboy" arbitration procedures of the sort described above. The
majority opinion in the Gilmer Court noted with approval the due process
protections in effect in the New York Stock Exchange arbitration rules that
were involved in Gilmer's case. The NYSE rules include procedures for
employees to detect and challenge bias in arbitration panels, provisions for
limited discovery by employees, requirements that arbitrators issue written
opinions, and approval for a broad range of remedies, including equitable
relief.' One commentator has argued that Gilmer thus establishes a minimal
set of due process standards by which employment arbitration must be mea-
sured.' Professor Robert Gorman reads Gilmer to say that "Arbitral systems
without the procedural safeguards found in the New York Stock Exchange
would apparently so undermine the enforcement of statutory claims as to be,
in the Court's view, intolerable."'83
Unfortunately, none of the lower courts since Gilmer have read the
Supreme Court opinion in this way. To date, no post-Gilmer lower court has
treated the procedural aspects of the NYSE arbitration rules as a precondition
to enforcing an employment law arbitration. Rather, courts almost universally
uphold mandatory pre-dispute arbitration for statutory claims without any dis-
cussion about the procedures to be utilized in the arbitration itself.
Since Gilmer, some members of the labor-management bar have attempted
to draft their own minimal due process norms for nonunion employment arbi-
tration proceedings. Most notably, a task force composed of representatives of
the Labor & Employment Section of the American Bar Association, the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association, the National Academy of Arbitrators, the Nation-
al Employment Lawyers Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, and
the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution met over a period of
months to develop a set of fair arbitration procedures. Out of this effort came
a document called "A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of
Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship." The Proto-
col, which was signed in May, 1995, addresses issues such as arbitral bias,
representation of parties, costs of arbitration, discovery, and the form of ar-
bitral awards." 4 The organizations that endorsed the Protocol have taken the
position that they will not participate in any employment arbitrations that do
not satisfy its terms.
181. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-32.
182. Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law
Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 635, 644-45.
183. Id. at 645.
184. Arnold M. Zack, The Evolution of the Employment Protocol, 50 J. DIsP. RESOL. 36, 37-
38 (Oct.-Dec. 1995).
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The Due Process Protocol thus appears to represent a consensus within the
labor-management community about fair procedures for employment arbitra-
tions. However, its protections are extremely limited. The task force did not
achieve consensus on the most important issues concerning nonunion arbitra-
tion: whether to permit pre-dispute arbitration at all, and whether to permit
employers to make agreement to arbitration a condition of employment.'85
Some task force members believed that employees should never be permitted
to waive their right to judicial relief of statutory claims, some believed that
employees should be permitted to waive their right to a judicial forum once a
dispute arises but not ex ante, and some believed that employers should be
able to insist on a pre-dispute agreement to utilize an arbitration proce-
dure.'86 Thus the most controversial aspect of Gilmer arbitrations is not ad-
dressed by the Protocol.'87
To the extent that the Protocol sought to develop "standards of exemplary
due process" for such arbitrations as do occur, it presents at best a bare mini-
mum. It contains few, if any, significant process rights for employees. One
due process protection it does contain is to state that employees should have
the right to be represented by a spokesperson of their own choosing. Another
is that it calls for "limited pretrial discovery" to give employees access to "all
information reasonably relevant to ... arbitration of their claims."'88 Howev-
er, beyond these two specific safeguards, the Protocol gives employees little.
For example, the Protocol calls for the selection of "impartial arbitrators" and
insists arbitrators must be "independent of bias."'89 These are worthy
goals-goals that no one would dispute. But the Protocol may just as well say,
"arbitration procedures should be fair." That too would be beyond reproach
but equally devoid of any guidance about how fairness could be achieved or
what fairness comprises. Without more detail, exhortations for impartiality and
freedom from bias are empty aspirations rather than meaningful protections.
The Protocol says nothing about how to ensure impartiality and lack of
bias." The FAA itself states that "evident partiality" is grounds for a court
to vacate an arbitral award, 9' so the Protocol's language endorsing the idea
of impartiality for arbitrators gives employees no better protection than they
already had.
The Protocol's main achievement is to delegate the most important issues
that arise in arbitration to the arbitrator. For example, it says that the arbitrator
should have the authority to determine the scope of discovery, to rule on evi-
185. Id. at 37.
186. Id.
187. In contrast, the Dunlop Commission took a position on this issue in its Final Report, and
concluded that courts or Congress should "Forbid Making Agreement to Arbitrate Public law
Claims a Condition of Employment at This Time." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMMISSION ON THE
FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 33 (Dec. 1994)
[hereinafter DuNLoP COMMISSION FINAL REPORTI.
188. Zack, supra note 184, at 38.
189. Id. at 38-39.
190. The Protocol does call for the disclosure of conflicts of interest by an arbitrator, but that
too has been a feature of the federal arbitration act for a long time. See Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
191. 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (Supp. 1996).
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deritiary matters, to determine whether post-hearing submissions should be
considered, and decide arbitrability questions.'92 On the issue of expense, the
Protocol is ambiguous. It recommends that employers reimburse employees for
a portion of the employee's attorneys' fees if the employee is low paid, yet it
also calls for employer and employee to share in the costs of the arbitrator, if
at all possible. It leaves the actual allocation of fees, including attorneys' fee
reimbursement, to the arbitrator. 93
The Protocol also devotes considerable attention to the issue of ensuring
arbitrators are knowledgeable about employment statutes. While the existence
of knowledgeable arbitrators would ultimately enure to the benefit of employ-
ees, the Protocol's proposal is extremely weak. The Protocol does not take the
position that only lawyers should conduct arbitrations about statutory
claims-it merely recommends that arbitrators receive training in "substantive,
procedural, and remedial issues to be confronted."'
' 94
Overall, the Protocol proposals will not cure most of the due process
defects in the nonunion arbitrations. Even with the right to representation and
minimum discovery that the Protocol calls for, nonunion employment arbitra-
tions are still designed by employers, heard by whichever arbitrator the em-
ployer selects, and conducted under whatever procedural rules, burdens of
proof, presumptions, limitations periods, and the like that the employer writes
into the procedure.
B. Critical Voices from the Bar, the Labor Movement and the Supreme
Court
There is a significant and growing sentiment in the legal community that
arbitration is an inadequate enforcement mechanism for employees' statutory
rights. Some focus on the procedural deficiencies in the arbitral process, stres-
sing that arbitration is a privately created, do-it-yourself tribunal, which rarely
provides rights to discovery, compulsory process, cross examination, or other
due process protections common to civil trials.'95 Thus, some claim, arbitra-
tion relegates workers to second-class justice.
Other critics focus on the privatization of disputes in arbitration. These
critics argue that arbitral decisions are invisible documents-they do not re-
ceive media attention or public scrutiny and therefore engender no public
debate. Arbitrators are not public officials, not accountable to a larger public,
nor required to apply public law.'96 And there is no legislative arena in
192. Zack, supra note 184, at 39.
193. Id. at 38-39.
194. Id.
195. Stone, supra note 9; see Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 659 (1965)
(Black, J., dissenting).
196. While arbitrators are not accountable to the public, they may be accountable to the repeat
players in the arbitral world-those who pick arbitrators on a regular basis. See Marc Galanter,
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 1974 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 95 (on the advantages of repeat players). In the nonunion context, the repeat players
are inevitably the employers.
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which unpopular decisional trends can be challenged. Arbitration is a privat-
ized forum, designed by the parties, and out of the public eye.'97
Some of the voices critical of arbitration of statutory rights come from the
labor movement and the labor relations bar.' For example, in a joint state-
ment to the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations,
several organizations representing working women, including 9 to 5, the
National Association of Working Women, the American Nurses Association,
and the Coalition of Labor Union Women, decried the "alarming trend toward
using mandatory arbitration to reduce employment-related litigation."'"
These groups feared in particular that Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
was being used "as a means of eroding the hard-fought legal protections wom-
en have against inequitable treatment in the workplace ... [especially] in the
area of sexual harassment." 2" They argued that "employers should not be
able to coerce individual workers, particularly women workers who are not
protected by a union, at the onset of an employment relationship or at any
time thereafter, to choose between their statutory rights to be free of discrimi-
nation and their jobs."' '
Marsha Berzon, an attorney who represents the AFL-CIO, pointed out to
the Commission that mandatory ADR to resolve statutory disputes would cir-
cumvent the deterrent effects of litigation-large verdicts and unfavorable
publicity-which are so important in enforcing employment legislation. 2
Berzon also argued that ADR systems are inherently biased without a union.
Even if ADR systems are designed to provide neutral decisionmakers and a
level playing field, they still give the employer an advantage because the em-
ployer is a repeat player in the world of ADR professionals." 3 Berzon also
opines that by relegating important employment issues to private tribunals,
employment law will remain unelaborated, misunderstood, and diminished in
its effectiveness.
0 4
On many occasions, members of the Supreme Court have also recognized
the shortcomings of arbitration of statutory rights. The Court has repeatedly
197. Stone, supra note 4. In addition to its due process failings, arbitration also does not pro-
vide remedies as effective or as generous as those in a judicial forum. For example, most arbi-
trators believe that they do not have the power to award damages for intangible harms, or to
award punitive or consequential damages. In addition, arbitrators almost never grant interest on
back pay awards, even when it is issued months or years after an unjust dismissal. It is common
practice for an arbitrator to award reinstatement but no back pay at all to a worker fired without
just cause. In contrast, prevailing parties in unjust dismissal litigation receive jury awards in the
mid-to-high six figures. Furthermore, most arbitrators do not believe that they have the power to
order provisional relief. Thus many contract violations, such as improper job assignments or safety
matters, can neither be prevented nor remedied after the fact. Stone, supra note 7.
198. See Committee on Labor and Employment Law, Final Report on Model Rules for the
Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 50 RECORD OF THE AssOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK 629, 629-30 (1995).
199. Fact Finding Report, 1994: Hearing Before the Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations, 102d Cong. 24-26 (1994) (statement of 9 to 5).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 5 (statement of Marsha Berzon).
203. Id. at 6-7.
204. Id. at 9-10.
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warned that the second-class procedures of arbitration can lead to second-class
outcomes. For example, the Court stated in 1956, in Bernhardt v. Polygraph
Co. of America:'°S
The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an important part of
the parcel of rights behind a cause of action. The change from a court
of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ulti-
mate result. Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury.... Arbitra-
tors do not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they
need not give their reasons for their results; the record of their pro-
ceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial re-
view of an award is more limited than judicial review of a trial.2' 6
Bernhardt was a nonlabor case arising under the FAA. Justice Douglas, who
wrote these words, spearheaded the Supreme Court's adoption of broad sup-
port for arbitration in labor cases. Douglas wrote the Bernhardt opinion in
1956, one year before he wrote the path-breaking Lincoln Mills opinion calling
upon courts to expand the role of labor arbitration.
Justice Douglas repeated these sentiments in 1974 in another nonlabor
case, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,2" where he criticized judicial deference
to arbitration of statutory claims. He wrote in dissent:
An arbitral award can be made without explication of reasons and
without development of a record, so that the arbitrator's conception of
our statutory requirement may be absolutely incorrect yet functionally
unreviewable.... The loss of the proper judicial forum carries with
it the loss of substantial rights. 2°8
Similar arguments about the lack of due process in arbitration and the
consequences for the outcomes of disputes have been raised by many Supreme
Court Justices over the past four decades. Justice Black, in his dissent in Re-
public Steel Corp. v. Maddox,2"9 observed:
For the individual, whether his case is settled by a professional arbi-
trator or tried by a jury can make a crucial difference. Arbitration...
carries no right to a jury trial... ; arbitrators need not be instructed
in the law; they are not bound by rules of evidence; they need not
give reasons for their awards; witnesses need not be sworn; the re-
cord of proceedings need not be complete; and judicial review, it has
been held, is extremely limited.1
Justice Reed in his majority opinion in Wilko v. Swan,"' stated that, for
securities cases, it is unlikely that arbitrators will be sufficiently versed in the
law, or have an adequate understanding of statutory requirements such as
"'burden of proof,' 'reasonable care' or 'material fact."' 22 Similarly, Justice
205. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
206. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203.
207. 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
208. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 532.
209. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
210. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 669 (Black, J., dissenting).
211. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
212. Wilko,'346 U.S. at 436 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1995)). Justice Reed also criticized
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Brennan wrote for the majority in McDonald v. City of West Branch"3 that
"an arbitrator's expertise 'pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the
law of the land.""'2 4 Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.,2 5 said:
[W]e have long recognized that "the choice of forums inevitably af-
fects the scope of the substantive right to be vindicated. .. ."
Respondent's deferral rule is necessarily premised on the assumption
that arbitral processes are commensurate with judicial processes and
that Congress impliedly intended federal courts to defer to arbitral
decisions on Title VII issues. We deem this supposition unlikely.2 6
Similar sentiments have been expressed by Justice Blackmun dissenting in
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,"' by Justice Stevens dissent-
ing in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,"'s and by
Justice Harlan concurring in U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles.2"9 Indeed,
even Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
v. Byrd22 -a decision in which the Court approved an expansive interpreta-
tion of the FAA-acknowledged that "arbitration cannot provide an adequate
substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal statutory and
constitutional rights that section 1983 is designed to safeguard.
'22
1
Thus for over four decades, many Supreme Court Justices have recog-
nized the procedural shortcomings of arbitration and have questioned the wis-
dom and justice of permitting private arbitration to substitute for judicial or
administrative tribunals for resolving statutory disputes. I hope that we could
return to this wisdom now, and reverse the trend toward compulsory arbitra-
tion of statutory employment rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
The state of labor and employment law today stands as a distorted reflec-
tion of that which existed one hundred years ago. In the past, workers had few
workplace rights other than those they could secure and enforce through col-
lective muscle and labor market power. Today, workers have many de jure
rights, but often these rights cannot be enforced due to mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration systems. Further, in many respects, workers have less ability to use
direct action to enforce rights than they once did. Today, labor's use of
the FAA for not providing for "judicial determination of legal issues such as is found in the Eng-
lish law." Id. at 437.
213. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
214. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 288-93 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
57 (1974)).
215. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
216. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56 (quoting United States Bulk Carriers v. Arguelles, 400
U.S. 351, 359-60 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
217. 482 U.S. 220, 257-60 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that
procedural defects in arbitration render it inadequate to protect investor's rights).
218. 473 U.S. 614, 647 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. 400 U.S. 351, 365 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
220. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
221. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 222 (discussing McDonald, 466 U.S. at 284).
10491996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
economic weapons is governed by a Byzantine labyrinth of complex and con-
tradictory legal rules, rules which channel disputes into a legalistic maze of
public and private tribunals, at the end of which the worker, exhausted, demor-
alized, and dispirited, finds she has lost whatever rights she once believed
were worth seeking. The result is a bitter irony for the worker-she has more
rights and less protection than ever.
To avoid this descent into labor-management absurdity, we need to con-
sider legislative proposals that would reverse the trend toward privatizing
employment rights. Congress could take action to reverse this trend of exces-
sive use of labor arbitration to resolve disputes over workers' statutory rights.
Specifically, Congress could enact legislation that would:
(1) state clearly that section 301 is not intended to preempt state or
federal employment law statutes; and
(2) reaffirm a broad interpretation of the FAA's employment exclu-
sion and/or expressly repudiate the result of the Gilmer case.
Further, courts need to reevaluate their knee-jerk pro-arbitration approach to
cases involving statutory employment rights. They should narrow their
approach to section 301 preemption, interpret worker protection statutes to be
non-waivable, and adopt a broad interpretation of the contract-of-employment
exclusion in the FAA, so that employment contracts of all workers engaged in
interstate commerce are excluded from the Act. In addition, the courts and
Congress should adopt two recommendations of the Dunlop Commission: they
should ensure that binding arbitration agreements are not made a condition of
employment, and they should provide for judicial review of statutory issues
decided on arbitration.222
None of these changes will occur until employees, the labor movement,
Congress, and the general public recognize that while labor arbitration may
play a valuable role in resolving disputes concerning interpretation of collec-
tive bargaining agreements, extending arbitration to disputes over statutory
rights-especially for nonunion workers-is inappropriate. Expanding arbitra-
tion in this way may seem expedient in terms of reducing court congestion,
but it is a trend that will, in the long run, prove very costly. By subjecting
employment rights to a regime of private justice and cowboy arbitrations, we
are eliminating most employment rights for most American workers.
222. DuNLOP COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 187, at 32.
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EXPLORING GILMER's IMPACT AND LEGACY
ROBERTO L. CORRADA*
I agree with most of the comments and arguments posited by Katherine
Stone in her essay in this Symposium issue.' I agree, for example, that the
trend in labor law to foreclose union members' common law suits under an
expansive view of section 301 preemption has the effect of forcing their
claims to be judged in a private, not public, hearing. The trend in employment
law to shift civil rights claims from public courts to private arbitrations is
certainly a similar phenomenon. I also agree that these trends are somewhat
insidious in that they mean there is, by virtue of fewer procedural safeguards,
a lesser chance on the whole that workers will prevail in their claims. As a
result, I also conclude that the trend toward privatization in labor and employ-
ment law tends to greatly benefit management, and hence, not surprisingly, is
a trend embraced by the conservative right in this country.
Perhaps if there is any strong point of disagreement between Katherine
Stone and me it relates to the approach each of us recommends given the
current state of affairs. Katherine Stone urges the enactment of a law that
would both nullify the current expansive view of section 301 preemption and
reaffirm or broaden the Federal Arbitration Act's exclusion of employment
contracts.2 Her decidedly public/legislative approach would purportedly allow
all workers to vindicate their civil rights and common law claims in a court of
law.
Stone's proposed reform would possibly allow more court access to some
unionized and white collar workers than would be the case in the present sys-
tem, but is it true that most workers will be better off as a result? I do not be-
lieve so, and thus advocate a different approach that embraces the privatization
of worker rights and legal claims. The fact that I advocate privatization does
not place me in the conservative camp, however. I believe that the left can lay
* Associate Professor, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., George Washington
University, 1982; J.D., Catholic University School of Law, 1985. 1 would like to thank all of the
participants in the New Private Law Symposium. In particular, I would like to thank Katherine
Stone for her continuing outstanding contributions to a better understanding of dispute resolution
in the labor and employment arena, and Dennis Lynch for the depth of his insights regarding the
impact of process on the quality of justice. In addition, I would like to thank Alan Chen, Ed
Dauer, Nancy Ehrenreich, and Martha Ertman for taking the extra time to read drafts of this par-
ticular essay. Thanks also to the Hughes Research Fund for its continuing support of these sympo-
sia and to Sue Chrisman, Tracy Craige, and Tarek Younes, without whose tireless efforts on be-
half of the Law Review this Symposium would not have been possible.
1. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:
The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).
2. Id. at 1049-50.
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claim to the private sphere with a progressive agenda and transform that
sphere for the betterment of workers. To demonstrate my point, let us recon-
sider Katherine Stone's hypothetical case. The hypothetical highlights the
unsavory prospect of private arbitration for a retail store salesperson who is
injured on the job and is compelled to take her Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) claim to a presumably biased panel composed of retired industry
executives. Stone concludes that if the employee proceeds to court, her claim
will be dismissed.'
An unstated but implied assumption made by Professor Stone is that the
retail salesperson could proceed to court on her ADA claim. This may not, in
fact, be the case. Whether the salesperson will actually be able to bring a law-
suit will depend on a variety of other facts not mentioned in the hypothetical.
The salesperson may have difficulty finding a lawyer to represent her unless
she lives in an area with an active plaintiff's employment bar. Law has be-
come increasingly specialized, and in many areas of the country there is still a
decided lack of skilled plaintiff's side employment law practitioners. Next, a
lawyer may not take her case unless the remedy she stands to receive is at
least somewhat substantial. This would be true even if the attorney would be
entitled to attorneys' fees, because the opportunity cost of foregoing another
case with larger backpay potential may simply be too great. Since the hypo-
thetical plaintiff is a retail salesperson who has been out of her job for only a
short time, it is probably true that her backpay damages are not significant.
Representation would thus probably rest on her ability to claim compensatory
and punitive damages. There are not enough' facts in the hypothetical case to
determine whether there are any compensatory damages (emotional distress,
physical injury, etc.). Punitive damages are rarely assessed, and, of course,
they are capped. Moreover, given the vagaries of the jury trial system,
plaintiff's attorneys rarely decide to take cases based solely on the potential
availability of punitive damages.
Even if the salesperson succeeds in finding legal representation, she will
probably be asked to come up with a retainer of some $5,000.00 or upwards
to be used against costs incurred in litigation, for which she is ultimately re-
sponsible. If her case is exceptional, she may be able to convince her attorney
to advance the costs of litigation, but she will bear the risk with respect to a
loss of those monies in case she does not prevail. Even then, the attorney may
not advance the costs unless she enters into a much less attractive contingent
fee arrangement. All of this, of course, assumes that the salesperson acts rela-
tively quickly in speaking with an attorney within 300 days of the adverse
action by her employer. If she waits too long, her case will be barred by the
relevant statute of limitations. The truth is that the mere availability of a legal
3. Id. at 1018. It should be noted here that although federal courts seem to be reading
Gilmer expansively, it is not at all clear that the Supreme Court would apply the case's holding to
Professor Stone's hypothetical salesperson since it has been suggested that what the Court was
willing to hold with respect to a relatively sophisticated worker, like the broker before the Court
in Gilmer, it may not be willing to extend to someone like a retail store salesperson. See generally
Robert L. Duston, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: A Major Step Forward for Alternative
Dispute Resolution, or a Meaningless Decision?, 7 LAB. L.J. 823 (1991).
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cause of action does not necessarily result in an ultimate vindication of the
claim in court.
The hypothetical salesperson may ultimately be better off in a private
system that provides specific notice to her about any possible claim and time
limitations along with affording her the choice of bringing her case with or
without an attorney as a representative. Moreover, many of the due process
problems highlighted by'Stone and characterized by current employer arbitral
processes are not inherent features of those systems. And even though I also
admit that the employer has considerable leverage over employees with respect
to employment contracts, making them contracts of adhesion, I believe there
are other institutional actors (such as the American Bar Association) who can
affect that relationship and temper employer inclinations toward one-sided
accords. This essay will argue, then, that more justice might be achieved for
more people if the left decides to work with privatization in a progressive way
rather than fight it in favor of public processes that may be less efficient vehi-
cles for the delivery of legal services.
The Supreme Court's Decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.'
The Gilmer case holding and its facts have been rehashed countless times,
so let me recount here only the essentials. In Gilmer, a stockbroker was re-
quired by his employer to register as a securities representative with the New
York Stock Exchange.5 His registration application included an agreement to
arbitrate any dispute arising out of his employment or termination of employ-
ment.6 When Gilmer's employment was terminated, he sued under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).' The district court denied the
employer's motion to compel arbitration, but was reversed by the court of
appeals whose decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.
Fundamentally at odds in the Gilmer case were an earlier Supreme Court
decision securing the right of plaintiffs in statutory civil rights suits to go to
court regardless of a contractual agreement to arbitrate' and a string of other
Supreme Court decisions upholding contractual agreements to arbitrate under
the mantle of public policy surrounding the Federal Arbitration Act.9 Both
parties had good arguments, and it seems that Gilmer is one of those cases
that could have been decided either way. Gilmer himself should have felt
secure in his argument that the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Gardner-
Denver was well on point. In that case, the Supreme Court had held that an
employee could proceed to court on a statutory civil rights claim (Title VII)
despite an agreement between an employer and his union requiring arbitration
4. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
5. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
9. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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of such claims. If anything, Gilmer's case was more compelling since the em-
ployee in Gardner-Denver had his rights waived by his union, an institutional
actor not easily cowed by an employer. Moreover, the Federal Arbitration Act
contains an express statutory exemption for contracts of employment.'"
On the other side, the employer, Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., may well
have found the Supreme Court's trend in favor of arbitration quite compelling.
After all, the Supreme Court had favored arbitration in cases involving statuto-
ry rights under laws as imbued with public policy concerns as the Sherman
Act, the Securities Acts, and even the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act (RICO)." The employer may also have felt that its case, in-
volving the securities industry and a relatively sophisticated employee, present-
ed the ideal facts for Supreme Court extension of its arbitration precedents
into the employment law arena.
The Supreme Court agreed that arbitration should have been compelled in
Gilmer's case, and it did so on the basis of the Federal Arbitration Act's liber-
al policy in favor of arbitration. In doing so, the Court distinguished the
Gardner-Denver case primarily by maintaining that it had not presented the
issue regarding arbitration of statutory rights. Rather, the Court held that
Gardner-Denver involved whether the consideration of contract rights parallel-
ing statutory rights (since the plaintiff's claim of discrimination was primarily
based on anti-discrimination language in the collective bargaining agreement)
can serve as a basis for precluding judicial vindication of statutory rights.'
2
With respect to the Federal Arbitration Act's exclusion for employment con-
tracts, the Supreme Court expressly avoided the issue by refusing to find that
Gilmer's agreement with the New York Stock Exchange was an employment
agreement, leaving the issue "for another day."'3
The Gilmer decision poses two interesting questions regarding what we
might call the New Private Law. First, can we say that the decision represents
some sort of shift to private law that stands as a bellwether for the private law
movement? Second, if it does, is this shift a conservative one that stands to
have a strong impact on public law and the political left generally? With re-
spect to the first question, I believe it does signal a substantial shift to the pri-
vate sphere which may be indicative of a new movement. With respect to the
second question, I do not believe that the shift necessarily means that the right
has scored a victory. The New Private Law, in my mind, does not inherently
10. Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that "nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). For a discussion of the legisla-
tive history of the employment contract exemption, see Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts"
Under the United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Classification, 17 BERKELEY J.
EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 282 (1996).
11. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
12. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35. The Court also distinguished Gardner-Denver on the grounds
that it involved a collective bargaining agreement, raising the tension between individual and
collective rights, and that the case had not been decided under the Federal Arbitration Act (sug-
gesting Gardner-Denver might be decided differently today). Id. at 35.
13. Id. at 25 n.2.
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carry with it some sort of political valence--either right or left. I will suggest,
in fact, that the time is ripe for this shift to be captured and occupied by the
progressive left.
Gilmer's Impact: Signalling a Shift to Private Law in the Employment Arena
It is my contention that there is evidence of a New Private Law shift in
the employment and labor law arena. I believe that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Gilmer and its later opinion in Lechmere signal such a shift, not mere-
ly by their substantive pronouncements in favor of that which is private, but
also by the analytical mode within which the substantive decisionmaking un-
folds. A useful framework for determining whether in fact there is something
that could be characterized as New Private Law is suggested by the comments
made some years ago by Peter Shane in a Symposium on the New Public
Law. 4 Shane posited an approach that requires a parsing of the phrase "New
Private Law." We should ask first whether we can say that it is, in fact,
"new," then whether it is "private," and finally whether it is "law."
To decide whether New Private Law is "new," "we must identify some
past moment in time as an appropriate baseline for comparison, and somehow
construct a portrait of [private] law as it then existed."'5 Our "private" law,
however, would only be new if its features reveal a "theory of the state differ-
ent from the theory of the state most plausibly attributed to the [private] law
of our baseline time.' 6 "Theory of the state" is taken to mean "a widespread
understanding of the relationship of the state to its citizens, of official institu-
tions to one another, or of the core purposes of government activity."' 7 Final-
ly, newness must be understood on a relatively broad level, incorporating
different perspectives. If what is purportedly new is only new through a very
particularized or contextualized perspective, then it should not necessarily be
proclaimed as new on a grander scale. 8
Let me dispense with the final requirement quickly. I do not, in this essay,
purport to be saying that there is an entire legal shift to a private regime (al-
though some of my arguments do indeed support this). Rather, I am merely
making the claim in the context of employment and labor law. With respect to
a baseline, to the extent that it is generally agreed that the rise of the regulato-
ry state has ushered in a regime of public law, 9 then such a regime could be
the baseline that we would use in noting any shift to private law. If indeed
there is a shift to private law, which would contain features substantially dif-
ferent from what we know as public law, then we can conclude that this is
14. See generally Symposium, The New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1991); see also
Peter M. Shane, Structure, Relationship, Ideology, or, How Would We Know a "New Public Law"
If We Saw It?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 837, 838-42 (1991).
15. See Shane, supra note 14, at 838.
16. Id. at 840.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 840-41.
19. See generally Symposium, The New Public Law, supra note 14; see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular Ref-
erence to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 596-604 (1990).
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"new." Hence, because I am arguing that what is new is "private" and the
current regime is public, I have less work to do than the authors in the "New
Public Law" who were attempting to show (at least according to Shane's char-
acterization) that there was something new about "public" law, the then-exist-
ing regime. If all this is correct then I will have revealed a "new" private law
if I only show that there is a private shift from public law.
Some might maintain, however, that if a regime of "private" law was ever
prevalent in some past era, I have not shown newness unless I distinguish this
current private law from that which existed before. To these, I would say that
even a mere return to private law is necessarily new because it must be under-
stood in the context of its public law predecessor. However, I believe that the
New Private Law has a facet that makes it different from the old private law,
and will therefore argue newness on the merits.
If there was an "old" private law regime in the United States, it would be
the one safeguarded by common law formalists who regarded the private
sphere as primary and who distinctly favored private property rights."0 This
regime was characterized by a suspicion toward government regulation, but at
the same time relied upon a decidedly public institution-the court of law-to
ensure the protection of property rights and the enforcement of "private"
agreements.' It is with respect to this characteristic that the "new" private
law differs. The New Private Law, as evidenced by the decision in Gilmer, ex-
pressly mistrusts public fora and seeks to enforce private law in private ven-
ues. Although it retains an inherent characteristic of the old private law-a
fondness for private property rights and for enforcement of private consensual
arrangements-it also seeks to have those rights and contracts enforced by
private means. Indeed, vis A vis this new movement, the old private law might
be considered only a milder form of public law.2" This same analysis reveals
20. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Modera-
tion as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707, 711-12 (1991).
21. Id. at 712.
22. Cf. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Com-
mon Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 875, 884-88 (1991). Of course,
one could find a baseline for "private" law that might argue against the newness of the latest pri-
vate law shift. For example, there was a time, before English common law courts became inter-
ested in enforcing private contracts, when contracts were created and enforced by parties other
than the state. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CorrRACTS 12-20 (2d ed. 1990) (describing the
rise of contract through the ecclesiastical and merchant courts and the ultimate wresting away of
contract law jurisdiction by the King's common law courts). As one writer has noted, in language
eerily similar to some of the language contained in Gilmer, "It is not the custom of the court of
the lord king to protect private agreements, nor does it even concern itself with such contracts as
can be considered to be like private agreements." Id. at 13 (citing R. de Glanville, Treatise on the
Laws and Customs of the Realm of England, bk. 10, ch. 18 (G. Hall ed., 1965)).
The current shift to private law, however, would be new vis A vis this baseline as well. The
law being applied in private fora today is decidedly public law enacted by the legislature. Gilmer
expressly allows private decisionmakers to decide issues involving public rights, but only if the
private parties have consensually agreed to such an arrangement in advance. By contrast, private
law enforced in ecclesiastical or commercial courts was developed in those courts by church offi-
cials and merchants. In addition, there is certainly something new in the state's giving up jurisdic-
tion (as is the case in a Gilmer regime) versus its acquisition of jurisdiction (as was the case when
the King's common law courts encroached on the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical and commercial
courts).
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a "theory of the state" that is different from prior baseline theories of the state.
Certainly any emphasis on private rights, and especially on private dispute
resolution mechanisms, necessarily suggests a less republican view of the state
versus the individual. Whereas a regime of public law emphasizes public dis-
course (whether it be in the courts or in the legislature) and public policy,
private law seeks to leave matters to be decided by private parties and within
private institutions, preferably with no public discussion and devoid of public
influence. This new private theory of the state differs also from common law
formalism ("the old private law") in that it sees no role for the state in enforc-
ing private agreements: it is not that these are matters for common law courts
rather than legislatures, it is simply that the state shall not be involved in these
matters at all. Therefore, the shift indeed seems to be "new."
Next, consider whether this shift can be called "private." Many have writ-
ten about the public/private distinction in law.23 Most of these have found the
problem of what is public and what is private to be quite intractable. Consider,
for example, in labor law literature, Karl Klare's article, The Public/Private
Distinction in Labor Law.24 Klare demonstrates the incoherence of the pub-
lic/private distinction in labor law by showing the inconsistency of the use of
public and private designations to describe similar phenomena, how
policymakers use public and private labels to arrive at sharply contrasting or
even contradictory legal conclusions, and how the borderline between public
and private is constantly being altered and redefined despite the absence of
significant changes in the underlying phenomena or social forces that are de-
scribed by public and private labels.2" As a result, Klare concludes that the
public/private distinction poses as an analytical tool, but "functions more as a
form of political rhetoric used to justify particular results."26 In this Sympo-
sium, Alan Chen also strongly maintains that there is virtually no real distinc-
tion between the public and the private given that the private realm's jurisdic-
tion depends exclusively on the whim of the public sphere.27 Moreover,
according to Chen, even a descriptive shift that we might label "private" has
no jurisprudential significance since it is likely to be subsumed, defined, and
explained by jurisprudential movements that already exist and carry their own
truly independent weight.28
Indeed, much of what has been written regarding the incoherence of the
public/private distinction has questioned the notion that "private law" is truly
private. For example, Karl Klare questions the labeling of an employment
contract as a private agreement given the growing number of states forbidding
23. Legal Realists, Critical Legal Scholars, and Neo-Republicans have successfully attacked
the prior line of distinction between private law and public law. See Farber & Frickey, supra note
22, at 886 (collecting authority).
24. Karl E. Klare, The PubliclPrivate Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1358
(1982).
25. Id. at 1360.
26. Id. at 1361.
27. See Alan K. Chen, "Meet the New Boss...", 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1253, 1257-65
(1996).
28. Id. at 1253-55, 1259-67.
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the discharge of an employee for a reason that contravenes public policy.29
He points out that "[plublic law norms are implied into the relationship as
restrictions upon the employer's power to discharge."3 The same might be
said of the "private" collective bargaining agreement. The original Wagner Act
embodied the notion that labor law problems would be resolved by a private
process of negotiation.3 Although this private process was created and main-
tained by the enactment of public law, "the mission of public law was narrow-
ly limited to the task of establishing and maintaining an effective private bar-
gaining system."32 Despite this, however, postwar interpretation of labor law
provisions governing collective bargaining agreements has been characterized
by a "pronounced drift toward public expansionism."33 This public drift is
seen in increased legal regulation of collective bargaining negotiations, the
expanded judicial role in administering the labor contract, and increased statu-
tory regulation of the employment relationship.34 The collective bargaining
agreement today is indeed controlled as much (if not more) by the state as it is
by the private parties who breathe life into it in the first instance. It is fair to
conclude that the so-called "private" labor contract is part of an integral web
of state control over the bargaining relationship.
The longstanding critique of the public/private distinction has been suc-
cessful because what has occurred with respect to the distinction in labor and
employment law development has been replicated in the development of other
areas of law. And that critique has shown that to date, the "private law" label
has been misapplied to common law. As a result, the "public law" sphere is
dominant and in fact encompasses all governmental institutions-the legisla-
ture, the courts, and the executive. Those scholars writing about the "New
Public Law" in 1991 by and large sought to describe the trend away from the
exclusive study of courts and court decisions in law to the study also of the
legislature and the executive and their role in making law through the enact-
ment and enforcement of statutes.33 Even Peller and Eskridge in their article
about New Public Law concede that the New Public Law occupies much
broader ground than initially suggested by the Legal Realists or even Legal
Process Theorists. In describing the New Public Law as: (1) normative, (2)
formative, destructive, and transformative, and (3) dialogical practical reason-
ing,36 Peller and Eskridge define a dynamic system of interaction that we
might call "law" today. Describing "law" so broadly allows Peller and
Eskridge to sweep all legal movements in this century into their "New Public
Law" schema, but at the expense, perhaps, of defining any "private" sphere
entirely out of existence.
29. Klare, supra note 24, at 1362.
30. Id. at 1363.
31. Id. at 1390; see Archibald Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND.
L.J. 319, 322 (1951).
32. Klare, supra note 24, at 1391.
33. Id. at 1395.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, supra note 22, at 888-905.
36.' See Eskridge & Peller, supra note 20, at 746.
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However, an analysis of the "New Public Law" scholarship does reveal
that despite the apparent breadth of public law today, there may exist a funda-
mental limiting principle that gives credence to the view that the Gilmer deci-
sion represents a true "private" law shift. It would appear that public law, and
even the "New Public Law," is somehow situated within what we would call
the public sphere. "Public sphere," however, should be viewed very broadly
today based on the critique of the public/private distinction: it includes not just
the judiciary, but also the legislature and the executive. Beyond the formal
branches of government, the public sphere might also include institutions that
have an impact on these branches-i.e., lobbyists, the media, and even private
institutions somehow involved with the public trust. Today, the Internet, be-
cause of its easy public accessibility, might be a mechanism that we would
include in an expanded and fluid definition of the public sphere.
The argument can be made that the New Private Law seeks to exist
outside of the public sphere. If so, the Gilmer decision, extended in all the
horrible ways suggested by Katherine Stone, could establish an entirely differ-
ent paradigm of employment law: a paradigm we would be hard-pressed to
call "public." This may be true even if New Private Law fails to exist entirely
outside the public sphere. If, in fact, private companies take it upon them-
selves to enter into contracts with employees requiring private arbitration of
public law claims and with no hope for judicial review, then the Gilmer deci-
sion will have welcomed an extraction from the public sphere. Especially if
one feature of these private arbitrations is the lack of written opinions, law
will be created and re-created without, in any tangible way, affecting the
public discourse. Although the public sphere may act upon the private
decisionmaking process, there will be no popular mechanism to ensure that the
private process acts endogenously upon the public.
It seems to me that a vision of law which seeks to divest itself from the
state in particular and the public sphere in general is something new and also
something uniquely "private." Moreover, the fact that the state could recapture
this jurisdiction at any time does not necessarily mean that the law created in
individual private institutions for individual consumption and influence is a
creature of the state. Thus, what Gilmer portends-an infinite number and
kind of individual justice mechanisms within private institutions--cannot be
said to fall within the generalized rubric of the "New Public Law" because it
does not intend to be a player in public discourse. Individual systems of
private justice, whatever they may be, are not systems that generally contribute
to political dialogue or public deliberation.37 They do not, by virtue of their
decisions or results, have "a major impact on the implementation of public
policy or collective interests."3 Nor do they, on a day-to-day basis, require
37. Id. at 732-37, 744-45, 750, 752-55, 758-61. Peller and Eskridge implicitly support this
idea as well in that, in seeking to define "New Public Law," they necessarily choose two judicial
decisions in order to contextualize their discussion. In this sense, they have chosen the quintessen-
tial vehicle of public law (the published judicial decision) to make their point-the very vehicle
that is circumvented in the Gilmer-led private law regime.
38. See Shane, supra note 14, at 842 (defining "public" law).
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an understanding of political institutions or the framing of issues relating to
the proper role of government.
39
Perhaps a more interesting question than whether New Private Law is new
or private is whether it is law at all. If New Private Law lives in hiding, seeks
no public identity, and has no public essence, then, quite possibly, it may not
be law. Peter Shane has defined law broadly as "webs of institutions and prac-
tices through which a society represents to itself its shared understandings of
right or wrong . . . . .. o In the New Private Law of employment, each indi-
vidual justice system will ultimately develop its own code of right and wrong
through a series of self-contained, institutional arbitral decisions. One might
argue that these ultimately will not constitute a "shared understanding" of right
and wrong. However, there are certain inherent features of the New Private
Law in the employment arena that raise it to the level of "shared understand-
ing" without converting it into "public" law. First, these individual systems of
justice will be interpreting public law texts. The Gilmer case will, if viewed
expansively, allow private arbitral tribunals to decide statutory rights. Although
these rights will necessarily be transformed into different sets of understand-
ings by isolated fora, they nevertheless must begin with the same textual lan-
guage, and, to some extent, will be guided by public law decisions relating to
such texts. Moreover, appeals to "public" courts of fringe arbitral decisions
reaching absurd results should ensure that some general "shared" boundary
will be maintained regarding private interpretation of public law. Next, at least
in terms of impact, some private arbitral systems will serve communities much
larger than many small towns served currently by public courts. For example,
a private justice system implemented by General Motors or Exxon will typi-
cally yield a "shared understanding" of employment law that is more widely
held than that yielded by a local trial court decision from Basalt, Colorado.
We can conclude that New Private Law is indeed law, though it may stretch
the definition.
To lend further support to the emergence of New Private Law, Gilmer's
style of analysis strongly suggests such a trend. Although the Gilmer decision
opens substantive and procedural doors to the New Private Law, it is not
merely these opened doors that make the decision noteworthy. The decision
may also close a door. The analytical mode of the opinion (the way in which
the Supreme Court actually goes about announcing and rendering its substan-
tive decision on the merits) suggests a possible Supreme Court inclination
toward ignoring-maybe even erasing-what was so comforting for the left
about past civil rights decisions involving discrimination laws. If this is true,
39. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 22, at 887. Farber and Frickey do, however, consider
that the New Public Law might be implicated when "the interpretation of a governmental act is at
stake." Id. To the extent that private arbitration systems within companies will be seeking to apply
public law, the argument may be made that these systems fall within public law and certainly the
public sphere. But that is true in only the most formalistic sense of public law. Without judicial
review (or some other mechanism of public discourse), the public text of a statute can easily lose
its "public" character. By interpretation, the text is easily rendered a creature of the private pro-
cess. Thus, "interpretation of a governmental act" is to the private arbitration process what
"sound" is to the tree that falls in the woods with nobody around to hear it.
40. See Shane, supra note 14, at 841.
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then those like Professor Stone who would argue for a legislative reversal of
Gilmer should be more careful about what they ask.
As I will show below, the analytical mode of the Gilmer opinion striking-
ly deviates from prior Court analysis of civil rights decisions that invoke pub-
lic law principles. In general, the decision favors a formalistic, superficial
analysis that typifies the manner in which a court might interpret a contract
between two parties rather than the more in-depth, less formal analysis the
Court has employed when invoking public law concerns surrounding civil
fights laws.4 Although this may at first seem appropriate given that a con-
tract, after all, was at the heart of Gilmer, the Court has in the past rejected
the easy contract-type analysis when a matter of public law was also involved.
The best example of this contrast is seen in a comparison of Gilmer and the
Court's 1974 decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 2 The fundamen-
tal issue in Gardner-Denver, as in Gilmer, was whether a "private" contract
providing for arbitration of a civil rights dispute could be used to prevent a
plaintiff from having the dispute heard by a court.43
Relying heavily upon legislative history, the Gardner-Denver decision
begins by focusing on the procedures of Title VII and the public policy behind
the statutory enactment. The Court cites to Congress's statement that the poli-
cy against discrimination is the "highest priority" in discussing the importance
of alternative fora for bringing discrimination claims' and emphasizes legis-
lative history manifesting an intent to allow individuals to independently pur-
sue claims under Title VII and other applicable federal and state laws.45
Finally, in justifying its decision that individuals may go to court despite arbi-
tration over the same issue, the Court relies on the difference between arbitra-
tion and the judicial forum, critically highlighting public policy and meaning-
ful differences between the two processes. For example, the Court states, "The
purpose and procedures of Title VII indicate that Congress intended federal
courts to exercise final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII; deferral to
arbitral decisions would be inconsistent with that goal."'
41. Martha Ertman argues that courts' general and superficial approach to contracts (as op-
posed to statutory cases) has benefitted marginalized minorities in our society, and thus she views
any trend toward contract-type analysis as positive. See generally Martha M. Ertman, Contractual
Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1107
(1996). 1 would simply note that whether the trend is normatively good or bad depends upon
whether one is in a statutorily protected class. Those whose civil rights are protected by public
law would probably prefer continuation of that protection in the public arena. Ertman shockingly
points out that a trend toward contract and away from legislative protection may lead ultimately to
outright prohibition-and perhaps the affi-mative action debate is an early indicator that anti-dis-
crimination protections are indeed headed in a direction toward prohibition and away from legisla-
tive protection.
42. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
43. Certainly there are notable differences between the two cases: Gardner-Denver involved
a labor contract which did not require the arbitrator to apply public law (the contract had language
mirroring Title VII), while Gilmer involved a commercial agreement requiring an arbitrator to
actually interpret ADEA statutory language. These differences, however, do not negate the similar-
ity of the fundamental issue in both disputes-to what extent can private arbitration of a civil
rights dispute substitute for a judicial hearing and determination of the same issue?
44. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 47.
45. Id. at 48 & n.9.
46. Id. at 56.
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The Court expressly recognizes the marked differences between private
and public processes. According to the Court, the role of the arbitrator, to
effectuate the intent of the parties, may be inconsistent with the goals of the
statute. Moreover, while arbitrators are expected to know the particular parties
and make decisions with that in mind, "the resolution of statutory or constitu-
tional issues is a primary responsibility of courts, and judicial construction has
proved especially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose broad language
frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public law concepts."'47
The Court goes on to explain other incongruities, including differences in the
way proceedings are recorded, the rules of evidence, and differences in proce-
dural rights like discovery, compulsory process, cross examination, and testi-
mony under oath.' The Court states that "it is the informality of arbitral pro-
cedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious
means for dispute resolution. This same characteristic, however, makes arbitra-
tion a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the
federal courts."'49
The Court finally suggests that courts may nonetheless give weight to
arbitral decisions in deciding Title VII claims, and the Court acknowledges
that the weight accorded might even be substantial if the arbitral process re-
flects procedures used in court.50 The Court concludes, however, that "courts
should be ever mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought it neces-
sary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory
employment claims. It is the duty of the courts to assure the full availability of
this forum."'"
By contrast, the Gilmer Court not only reaches a different result, but does
so by perfunctorily comparing and dismissing any differences between arbitral
and judicial fora. 2 In Gilmer, the Court begins with an exposition lasting
several pages on case law involving the Federal Arbitration Act. 3 After intro-
ducing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in only one gen-
eral paragraph, the Court, with no analysis, concludes that broader social pol-
icies can be pursued through both arbitral and judicial resolution mecha-
nisms. " The Court sloughs off a concern that encouraging arbitration will
undermine the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) role in
enforcing the ADEA by maintaining merely that nothing in the ADEA pre-
cludes arbitration.5 Rather than compare arbitral and judicial structures vis A
vis the ADEA, the Court states simply that because the EEOC may receive
47. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 57-58.
49. Id. at 58.
50. Id. at 60 n.21.
51. Id.
52. 1 am not the first to point out the superficial nature of the Court's comparisons in
Gilmer. See Christine G. Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer?-Some Ruminations on the
Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 203 (1992); Martin H. Malin,
Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 77
(1996).
53. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-27.
54. Id. at 27-28.
55. Id. at 28-29.
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information from "any source" and because the agency is itself directed to
pursue "informal methods of conciliation," arbitration is consistent with the
ADEA's statutory scheme. 6
Regarding the adequacy of arbitral procedures compared to judicial safe-
guards, the Court states that general attacks on arbitration are "far out of step
with our current strong endorsement" of arbitration. 7 As a result, the Court,
almost apologetically, reveals that it intends to "address these arguments only
briefly." 8 And, indeed, the Court's dismissal of the procedural arguments is
brief. Noting the possibility of biased arbitration panels, the Court quickly
states that the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules allow the parties to
receive information on the arbitrators and that courts may overturn decisions
in which there was "evident partiality or corruption."59 While the Court con-
cedes that there are more ample discovery rules in a judicial forum, it states
that limited discovery in arbitration is the tradeoff for the "simplicity, infor-
mality, and expedition of arbitration."'  The Court makes this point as if
ADEA plaintiffs would somehow desire these as much as the employers who
institute the procedures. More disturbing, however, is the Court's cite to a
decision involving an arbitration agreement between two commercial entities.
The Court implicitly suggests that it sees no difference between individuals
filing civil rights suits and commercial entities pursuing contract or antitrust
claims. With respect to the fact that arbitrators need not file written opinions,
the Court refuses to recognize a distinction between judicial opinions and
arbitrators' pronouncements by stating that the NYSE rules require an arbitral
writing that includes the name of the parties, a summary of issues, and a
description of the award.6
Finally, with respect to the most important argument in Gilmer, that there
is often unequal bargaining power between employers and employees, the
Court stated that mere inequality is not sufficient to hold that arbitration agree-
ments are per se unenforceable in the employment context. Here, the Court
suggests a limiting rule for its decision that harkens back to the days of the
Gardner-Denver case, but it then undermines this by comparing the employ-
ee/employer relationship to that of securities dealer/investor. The Court reveals
its unwillingness to entertain inequality arguments when it concludes that there
was no indication in the case that Gilmer was "coerced or defrauded" into
agreeing to arbitration.62
56. Id.
57. Id. at 30.
58. Id. It is interesting to note how the Court dismisses as general attacks on arbitration, the
very same attacks that it not only entertained, but substantially endorsed, in the Gardner-Denver
decision.
59. Id. The Court concludes, as if recognizing that its arguments are specious, that "[t]here
has been no showing in this case that [the NYSE] provisions are inadequate to guard against po-
tential bias." Id. at 31.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 32. Again, the Court seems to sheepishly recognize the lack of force behind its ar-
gument by adding that despite its decision, ADEA claims will continue to be filed in courts of
law. Id.
62. Id. at 33.
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The Gilmer Court's unwillingness to entertain arguments about the defi-
ciencies of arbitration compared to judicial resolution of civil rights claims
cannot bode well for those who would seek merely to reverse Gilmer in the
hopes that the Court (and federal courts in general) will decide civil rights
cases as it did in the past, in a manner imbued with the public trust and en-
crusted with concerns about public policy. The starkest evidence that the Court
is unlikely to decide civil rights cases the same way, however, is revealed by
two more important indicators: first, the Court's radically different view of the
public forum in Gilmer as compared to its view in Gardner-Denver; and sec-
ond, and most importantly, the Court's abject refusal to view employees as a
class as somehow different from investors or car dealers when it comes to
negotiation of contracts. The Court's myopia with respect to a distinction that
cuts to the very raison d'etre of civil rights statutes is a strong indicator that
the times they are a changin'.
A slightly weaker trend toward a New Private Law can also be seen in
labor relations law (the law of union and management relations). This trend is
manifested in two ways, one procedural and one substantive: first, the expan-
sion of the doctrine of preemption in the 1980s and 1990s (procedural), and,
second, the Supreme Court's decision in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,63 involving
union access rights to employer private property (substantive). Katherine Stone
does an excellent job of explaining the expansion of section 301 preemption
and its implications for unionized workers' common law employment
claims.' This expansion, which forces unionized workers to take common
law claims to labor arbitrators and by and large prevents judicial resolution of
those claims, reflects a Supreme Court preference for private arbitration sys-
tems over public fora. It is a weaker private law trend than the one represent-
ed by Gilmer, however, because the labor contract has become a creature of
the state, and there has been a drift toward importing public ideals and con-
trols into the labor arbitration process. Still, the labor arbitration process is
much less public than judicial resolution of claims in court. Thus, the Supreme
Court's increasing preference for private ordering in the unionized context
(measured by the expansion of section 301 preemption) reflects a trend toward
private law that is at least equal to the private ordering preferences of old
common law formalism with some features of the New Private Law (requiring
resolution of "public law" claims in private fora).
The other indicator of a trend toward private law in the labor arena is the
Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lechmere, which, incidentally was issued
only some eight months after Gilmer. In Lechmere, the Court was asked to
determine whether it was an unfair labor practice for a private employer to bar
nonemployee union organizers from its property. In holding that it was not an
unfair labor practice, the Court tilted substantially in favor of private property
rights over public law guarantees of employee access to information about
organizing.65 In deciding Lechmere, the Court expressly rejected the highly
63. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
64. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1022-30.
65. See, e.g., Robert A. Gorman, Union Access to Private Property: A Critical Assessment of
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nuanced, decidedly New Public Law approach that the NLRB had taken to the
issue of nonemployee union access to private property.' The Board's ap-
proach had been developed over a course of decades with guidance from the
Supreme Court in three union access cases. 67 The approach relied on the
weighing of a multiplicity of variables that would help the NLRB to determine
a "locus of accommodation" between employers' private property rights and
employees' NLRA section 7 rights. The Board's own description of the analy-
sis used reflected its "New Public Law" grounding. According to the Board,
"As with other legal questions involving multiple factors, the 'nature of the
problem, as revealed by unfolding variant situations, inevitably involves an
evolutionary process for its rational response, not a quick, definitive formula
as a comprehensive answer."' In rejecting the Board's complicated approach
that attempted to equate private law and public law rights, the Court stated:
To say that our cases require accommodation between employees'
and employers' rights is a true but incomplete statement, for the cases
also go far in establishing the locus of that accommodation where
nonemployee organizing is at issue. So long as nonemployee union
organizers have reasonable access to employees outside an
employer's property, the requisite accommodation has taken place. It
is only where such access is infeasible that it becomes necessary and
proper to take the accommodation inquiry to a second level.'
The Court's application of its understanding that private property rights should
be ascendant to employee section 7 rights was revealed in its discussion of the
actual case. The Court explained that despite insurmountable access problems
encountered by the union in Lechmere, "[aiccess to employees, not success in
winning them over, is the critical issue," and "the union in this case failed to
establish the existence of any 'unique obstacles' ... that frustrated access to
Lechmere's employees. 70
The Court's decision in Lechmere certainly seems to be a throwback to
old common law formalism due to its enhanced view of private property inter-
ests. To the extent that the decision also rejects the NLRB's "New Public
Law" approach to the question of nonemployee access to private property, it
also represents a closing door similar to the one in Gilmer.
Gilmer's Legacy: The Seeds of Co-Optation by the Left
Whether or not Gilmer signals some sort of New Private Law movement,
its legacy-shifting public law civil rights cases into private dispute mecha-
nisms-will have a profound impact on employment law. Certainly what
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1991).
66. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 538; see also Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988).
67. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539
(1972); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
68. Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 14 (quoting Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667
(1961)).
69. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 538 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 540-41.
19961 1065
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Gilmer may allow should be of large concern to the left-in general and to the
civil rights community in particular. In the past, there has been a marked dif-
ference in the quality of justice meted out in public courts and private arbi-
trations. Katherine Stone does a good job of quantifying these differences.7'
As a result of these differences, Stone maintains that legislators should act to
ensure that all public statutory rights claims be decided in courts.7
I maintain, however, that, despite these historical differences between
private and public processes, civil rights advocates should not opt for the old
public law route so quickly. The analysis of Lechmere and Gilmer in the prior
section reveals the Court's growing inclination against interpreting civil rights
laws broadly in the public interest as it once did. And this should come as no
real surprise given the absence from the Court of noted civil rights champions
such as Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan. But this shift in Court anal-
ysis and approach is not as important an argument for proceeding with caution
as is the fact that Gilmer, despite its shortcomings, has served as an impetus
of sorts for the transformation of private processes by various private-actors to
erase some of the meaningful differences that have separated public from pri-
vate fora for so long. If this transformation continues, the prospects for equal
justice in private arbitration processes is improved with a corresponding in-
crease in the possibility of justice.
Before discussing transformative efforts, a brief recap of the traditional
problems with private arbitration in the employment setting is in order.
Katherine Stone rightfully points out the primary hazard of allowing employ-
ment agreements in the nonunion setting.73 These agreements are often bla-
tant "contracts of adhesion" which have been required of new employees on a
"take it or leave it" basis without affording employees proper notice regarding
waiver of a public venue for their claims.74 Moreover, these arbitration pro-
cesses have been characterized by systematic deficiencies that tend to favor
employers, not the least of which is a biased decisionmaker who generally
tends to be a retired industry executive.75
Since the Gilmer decision, however, a number of private organizations
have attempted to draft and implement procedures that address a number of
concerns regarding arbitration of employment disputes. Moreover, these groups
have by and large attempted to incorporate due process requirements from
public dispute resolution mechanisms in an attempt to make private arbitra-
tions fairer. For example, the Center for Public Resources (CPR) has drafted a
process that requires an arbitrator selected from an arbitration panel of the
American Arbitration Association.76 In addition, the CPR process provides for
71. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1036-43; see also Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57-60.
72. Stone, supra note 1, at 1046-50.
73. See generally id. at 1036-41, 1046-49.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 1040-41; see also CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, MODEL EMPLOYMENT TER-
MINATION DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE, in Jay W. Waks & Linda M. Gadsby, Arbitration
and ADR in the Employment Area, C879 ALI-ABA, MEDIATION AND OTHER ADR METHODS, 439
app. at 461 (Nov. 18, 1993) [hereinafter CPR PROCEDURES].
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backpay, attorneys' fees and costs, and reinstatement.77 If reinstatement is not
practicable, then an employee may be awarded "front pay. 7' Although puni-
tive and special damages are not allowed, an arbitrator may award up to one
year of wages in lieu of such an award.79
The American Arbitration Association (AAA) has also released its Nation-
al Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes.0 The AAA's rules fol-
low the Due Process Protocol developed by a task force comprised of man-
agement, union, and arbitration representatives formed in response to an
American Bar Association (ABA) resolution to address employment arbitration
involving nonunion workers.8" Along with its rules, the AAA also announced
that it has assembled a roster of experienced employment arbitrators and medi-
ators to decide disputes and has instituted a national training program focusing
on substantive and procedural issues.8 2 The AAA rules provide that arbitra-
tors have the authority to order whatever discovery is necessary for "a full and
fair exploration of the disputed issues" and that they may grant any relief that
would be available in court, including attorneys' fees. 3 Important systematic
safeguards are also required by the rules, including: the right to representation,
the same burdens of proof as in court, and various requirements regarding
arbitrators to ensure neutrality. 4 The rules took effect on June 1, 1996 and
will be applied to "any arbitration agreement that provides for arbitration by
AAA or proceedings under its rules." 5 In addition, JAMS/Endispute, another
provider of ADR services, adopted similar fairness rules in January of 1995.6
Katherine Stone levels a substantial criticism at these processes that de-
spite their attempts to provide disclaimers to employees informing them of
their decision to elect a private forum for any disputes, employers' continuing
inclination to minimize any disclaimers by hiding them or placing them in fine
print will hopelessly serve to undermine the process. 7 Stone emphasizes
post-Gilmer case law that supports her point.8 8 However, Stone also discusses
cases in which courts of law or the parties themselves have refused to be
bound by mandatory arbitration agreements because of procedural irregularities
surrounding the formation of the contract.8 9 Moreover, courts have shown a
77. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1041; see also CPR PROCEDURES, supra note 76, at 475-76.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Arbitration: Revised AAA Arbitration Procedures Reflect Due Process Task Force




84. Id. Arbitrators must be mutually acceptable to both parties and drawn from a diverse and
nondiscriminatorily composed pool. Moreover, arbitrators must be experienced in employment
law, have no conflicts of interest, and must disclose all information affecting neutrality. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1037-39.
88. Id.; see, e.g., De Gaetano v. Smith Barney Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1613 (DLC), 1996 WL
44226 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996); Kinnebrew v. Gulf Ins. Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 189
(N.D. Tex. 1994); Lang v. Burlington Northern R.R., 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993); Pony
Express Courier Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
89. Stone, supra note 1, at 1041-42; see EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic, 67 Fair
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willingness to void arbitration agreements that drastically depart from the
substantive requirements of civil rights laws or the procedural rights afforded
in courts of law.' In fact, the courts' overall willingness to review the fair-
ness of private arbitral systems in the context of statutory civil rights claims
has led private ADR service companies to change their procedures. For exam-
ple, after the River Oaks Imaging case discussed by Stone,9' CPR upgraded
its disclaimer to provide better and more meaningful information to employees
in a "model memorandum to employees."'92 Moreover, the new policy ensures
that arbitration agreements do "not truncate statutes of limitation available
under statutory or common law."'93
Despite continuing concerns about private resolution of statutory civil
rights claims, it appears that a unique combination of the courts and the pri-
vate marketplace is working to ensure fairer procedures and more just results.
The adoption by AAA and JAMS/Endispute of policies that follow the Due
Process Protocol endorsed by the ABA indicates that private institutions can
work within themselves to ensure fair application of civil rights statutes in
private processes. Also, the willingness of CPR to respond to the market for
ADR services by making its procedures more fair means that employers will
not be able to institute arbitral processes with the help of expert ADR provid-
ers without incorporating notions of procedural and substantive fairness into
their systems. While these developments may seem precarious in the sense
that these private groups might change their approach, the fact that some of
these developments occurred roughly simultaneously with a threatened boycott
of ADR processes by the National Employment Law Association (plaintiffs'
employment lawyers) strongly suggests the developments may well be endur-
ing ones.94 Ultimately, too, as employers and ADR providers become more
knowledgeable about what courts will generally allow with respect to private
arbitration in this area, the courts will become much less relevant. If the trend
continues, it will become more efficient and direct for those who would seek
to change these processes to approach private institutions like -the ABA and
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1243 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Bentley's Luggage Corp., NLRB Case No. 12-
CA-16658 (Sept. 25, 1995); see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
90. See, e.g., Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prod. Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
unenforceable an arbitration agreement limiting the authority of the arbitrator to award exemplary
damages or attorneys' fees as allowed by statute); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal.
1981); Ditto v. RE/MAX Preferred Properties, Inc., 861 P.2d 1004 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993) (voiding
an arbitration agreement allowing the employer alone to appoint the arbitration panel). Cf
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995) (upholding a punitive
damages award in arbitration, although partly because of the parties' contractual agreement to
provide for them). For a more complete discussion of these cases, see George W. Bohlander et al.,
Alternative Dispute Resolution Policies: Current Procedural and Administrative Issues, 1996 LAB.
L.J. 619.
91. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1041; see also supra note 89.
92. See Alternative Dispute Resolution: Center for Public Resources to Issue Model ADR
Policy for Employment Disputes, 1995 DAILY LAB. REP. 114 d1 I (BNA) (June 14, 1995).
93. Id. ("Although the change [regarding statutes of limitation] takes into account such re-
cent case law as EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic .... the committee's concern over
the model policy's varying substantive rules of law predated that decision .... ).
94. EDWARD A. DAUER, 2 MANUAL OF DisPurE RESOLUTION § 26.04, at 2S-58 (Supp.
1996); Thorn Weidlich, Storm Brews over ADR, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 6, 1995, at A6.
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private ADR companies like AAA and JAMS/Endispute. In the future, then,
the state may well be effectively divorced from this new private system of
law.
One might react to the above argument by asking whether it would simply
be better to seek to have statutory civil rights disputes remain in the courts
since the courts are more adept at instituting and enforcing the due process
notions that are so important in this area of law. In other words, if private
arbitration systems can at best hope to be pale imitations of the court system,
why not simply try to retain judicial handling of civil rights complaints? Of
course, the answer must be that transforming private arbitral systems has some
additional bonus for the progressive left that the court system cannot provide.
I can think of two substantial benefits to working for change in private arbitral
systems. The first harkens back to Katherine Stone's hypothetical involving
the retail salesperson plaintiff and my reaction to that hypothetical at the be-
ginning of this essay. Under the public law system, a potential plaintiff must
find a lawyer to represent him or her, typically for a fee. Plaintiffs who appear
to be poor witnesses, who have very little backpay damages because of low
paying jobs or mitigation efforts, or who simply cannot afford to pay consulta-
tion fees and retainers are effectively denied justice for lack of legal represen-
tation. Most private arbitral processes allow the option of proceeding without
representation. For those who cannot find representation, this facet of private
arbitration offers some hope, especially if these processes are ultimately engi-
neered to be fair to the employee.
The second benefit of taking the private route relates to a point that
Katherine Stone makes with respect to section 301 preemption in the labor law
setting. She maintains that one of the problems with requiring unionized em-
ployees to take their common law wrongful discharge and tort claims to a
labor arbitrator is that arbitrators do not typically award the same kind of
relief that can be procured in a court of law.95 It seems to me that all the
changes taking place in arbitration processes for nonunion employees must
ultimately inure to the benefit of unionized workers. One reason is that the
charge to change arbitration to ensure its integrity on the nonunion front is
being led by labor arbitrators, among others." In addition, many of the arbi-
trators who currently preside over disputes regarding union employees and
labor contracts will be the very ones who are called to deal with public statu-
tory questions in private nonunion processes. It should be only a matter of
time, if the culture indeed changes, before these same arbitrators are comfort-
able and knowledgeable about awarding punitive and compensatory damages
for common law claims of unionized workers brought in labor arbitration.
Finally, one should not underestimate the ability of the progressive left to
react to change that at first may seem contrary to its goals or agenda. This has
been true, for example, in the case of the Gilmer decision where the left has
acted, with others, to transform private arbitral processes. It is also true in the
case of the Lechmere decision, where the progressive left (in this case, labor
95. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1029.
96. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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unions) also reacted in a uniquely private way. Rather than attempt to reverse
Lechmere, unions responded to a general ban on access to employer property
for organizing purposes by having union organizers apply for jobs in the
workplaces they sought to unionize (a process known as "salting" the
workplace).9 7 The genius of this approach is that it is difficult for employers
to react to it by protesting the means by which such unionization is achieved
without conceding that the government should be more involved in regulating
the hiring process. And although employers did attempt to argue, within the
labor laws, that they should be able to reject job applicants who would have
divided loyalties, the Supreme Court, relying upon master/servant principles
ironically forged during the era of common law formalism, rejected the
employers' pleas.98 As a result, unions have increasingly come to use em-
ployee organizers, a more effective tool for organizing workers than mere
access. 9
I have maintained in this essay that the left should not be so quick to
condemn private arbitration of statutory rights for two primary reasons. First,
although these processes have historically been seized by employers as an
efficient, less costly alternative to litigation devoid of due process safeguards,
there is nothing inherent in private arbitration to prevent making the process
fairer for employees. Second, there is a substantial payoff that justifies the
work required by those on the left to transform these processes for the better-
ment of employees. That payoff is greater access to justice. Private arbitration
holds the potential to eliminate institutional barriers that block access to public
courts by some employees. In conclusion, although there is much work to be
done, the seeds of co-optation of the private realm by the progressive left in
labor and employment law already seem to have been planted.
97. See generally Note, Organizing Worth Its Salt: The Protected Status of Paid Union Or-
ganizers, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1341 (1995) (arguing that the Lechmere decision creates a powerful
incentive for increased use of "salting," compelling union organizers to become statutory employ-
ees).
98. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995). Town & Country,
which reflects a Supreme Court tilt in favor of old common law formalist protection of the private
master/servant relationship, provides more evidence of the New Private Law in the labor and
employment arena.
99. Cf generally Jeffrey A. Mello, The Enemy Within: When Paid Union Organizers Be-
come Employees, 1996 LAB. L.J. 677.
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CONCEPTUALIZING FORUM SELECTION
AS A "PUBLIC GOOD":
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR STONE
DENNIS 0. LYNCH*
First, I want to remind everyone about the powerful conceptual imagery
that informs the underlying structure of legal norms governing the unionized
work setting. Scholarly work and case law have glorified the imagery of a
"democratic" work place where unions and employers jointly shape the rules
that determine the rights of labor and management through the administration
of a grievance and arbitration procedure to resolve their disputes.' The collec-
tive agreement or "private law of the workplace" is also enhanced by the con-
sensual "contractarian imagery" that supports the presumption of workers bar-
gaining away their statutory right to strike in exchange for final and binding
arbitration with very limited judicial review.2
In her earlier scholarship, Professor Stone has demonstrated the problem-
atic character of this "imagery" of American labor law.3 In her article in this
Symposium issue,' she extended the logic of her argument to an expanding
preemption doctrine under section 301.' I have made similar arguments in an
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., Oregon, 1965;
J.D., Harvard University Law School, 1969; L.L.M., Harvard University Law School 1973; J.S.D.,
Yale Law School, 1979.
1. Archibald Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1482 (1959);
Archibald Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. LJ. 319 (1951); see also
Note, Arbitration After Communications Workers: A Diminished Role?, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1307,
1309 (1987).
The Court placed arbitration at the heart of collective agreements in the Steelworkers Trilo-
gy of 1960. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (holding
that an arbitration award should be enforced when it draws its essence from the collective bargain-
ing agreement); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960)
("[T]he grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the very heart of a
system of industrial self-government."); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960) (holding that when a dispute falls within an arbitration clause, its merits are irrelevant to
enforcement).
2. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83 (when the scope of an agreement to
arbitrate is ambiguous, courts should resolve doubts in favor of coverage and order the parties to
arbitrate); see Dennis 0. Lynch, Defense, Waiver, and Arbitration Under the NRLA: From Status
to Contract and Back Again, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 241 & n.18 (1989).
3. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension
Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 575 (1992); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Postwar Paradigm in American Labor
Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981).
4. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1017, 1049-50 (1996).
5. Id.
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earlier article regarding the deferral to arbitration of the resolution of
employees' statutory rights under the National Labor Relations Act.6
I will devote my brief comments to a distinct set of questions as a way of
forcing us to think about our assumptions regarding the differences between
public and private ordering. Are there characteristics that are necessarily inher-
ent in the differences between public and private fora that cause us to oppose
trends toward increased reliance on the New Private Law in the labor field or
are we primarily reacting to our empirical observations of labor arbitration as
a forum for resolving statutory rights? Would we be as concerned if employ-
ees had the option of taking their statutory claims to a public or private fo-
rum?
Focusing on these questions forces us to consider the importance of the
process for resolving claims and the doctrine governing that process as a "pub-
lic good." The legal doctrine governing a statutory right benefits all parties
similarly situated by making the resolution of their respective rights more
predictable and easier to resolve without litigation. The value of legal doctrine
as a "public good" may, in some circumstances, be in tension with an
employee's access to a cost effective and fair procedure for resolving a statu-
tory claim. What we may regard as an appropriate balance between these two
interests may turn on how we think about the following: (1) the methods
available for the selection of arbitrators and their knowledge of legal doctrines
governing statutory rights; (2) the procedures available through arbitration for
obtaining information prior to a hearing; (3) employees' perceptions of the
opportunities to have a voice and to be heard in a non-intimidating setting; (4)
the effectiveness of the remedies available to the parties in arbitration; (5)
arbitrators' views of the relative importance in resolving conflicts of the cul-
ture and specific context of a particular work setting as balanced against the
public policies underlying the statutory right at issue; and (6) the potential to
realize a "public good" from the private forum of arbitration. I will touch
briefly on each of these considerations and then end with the question of what
really bothers us about the New Private Law of statutory rights in the
workplace.
The process for selecting arbitrators has a major impact on the perceived
legitimacy of the arbitration forum.7 One can argue that the type of "industry
panel" that would hear Gilmer's age discrimination claim would be more
sensitive to the culture and needs of stock brokerage firms than to the public
policy underlying the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.8 In addition
Gilmer would not be a "repeat player" in arbitration with a long run interest in
6. Lynch, supra note 2.
7. See G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When Is Commer-
cial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute" for the Courts? 69 TEX. L. REV. 509, 534-40 (1990);
Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 ("[A]rbitration clauses are crucial in that they not
only bar judicial review but also may allow companies to select the arbitrators .... ").
8. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-31 (1991) (finding that
plaintiffs had failed to show that existing protections against bias in NYSE arbitration panel se-
lection were insufficient).
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making sure there was no inherent bias in the selection of industrial panels to
hear disputes arising through a brokers' work and governed by the arbitration
clause in the standard stock exchange registration form.9 In the case of arbi-
tration under collective agreements, the union is a "repeat player" just as is the
employer. Both parties to the arbitration agreement are in a position to main-
tain information on the backgrounds, opinions, open-mindedness, and basic
fairness of the arbitrators they jointly select. The union and the employer will
have information on the way the arbitrators they select handle discovery re-
quests, conduct hearings, and reason to a final decision. They can also re-
search the way the arbitrator deals with statutory issues when they come up in
the context of resolving the rights of parties under the collective agreement.
The real problem with the arbitration of a statutory right under the arbitration
clause of a collective agreement may be whether the union and the individual
employee actually have a shared interest in the way the arbitrator resolves the
statutory claim. As has been clear in some Title VII disputes in unionized
work settings, the union may have a stronger interest in maintaining a good
working relationship in the workplace than protecting individual statutory
rights.' °
In the non-union setting, the individual employee will not have to worry
about a partial conflict of interest with the union over the precedent an arbitra-
tor may establish under a collective agreement, but the employee will not be
in as strong a position to invest in maintaining information on the biases and
approaches of different arbitrators. As a "one-time player" in arbitration, the
employee will not have access to the same quality of information. The
employee will be forced to rely on the incentives for a specialized bar han-
dling individual employee claims in arbitration to maintain the information
they need to protect the interests of their clients in the selection of arbitrators.
In addition, the arbitrator will know the individual employee is not likely to be
involved in the selection of an arbitrator in the future so there is less incentive
for the arbitrator to worry about the employee's reaction to the arbitrator's
opinion. Again the employee must rely on the arbitrator's concern over the
reaction of the employee's attorney to the arbitrator's opinion. It is clear that a
specialized bar that regularly represents employees in the protection of
statutory rights is critical to the fairness of a New Private Law in the labor
field.
The second major criticism of arbitration involves its procedural charac-
teristics in terms of the lack of discovery, less formal rules of evidence, and
no judicial review of the arbitrator's interpretation and application of legal
9. Id. at 23 (noting that Gilmer was a 62-year-old individual ADEA plaintiff).
10. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62
(1974) ("Congress sought to secure to all members of the unit the benefits of their collective
strength and bargaining power, in full awareness that the superior strength of some individuals or
groups might be subordinated to the interest of the majority."); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974) (noting that "a further concern is the union's exclusive control over
the manner and extent to which an individual grievance is presented"); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 182 (1966) (characterizing subordination of individual interests under collective bargaining
system as a necessity); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965) ("If a griev-
ance procedure cannot be made exclusive, it loses much of its desirability as a settlement.").
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doctrine." At the same time arbitration is what we could call a very "plastic"
forum. It can become what the parties want it to be. They can shape its char-
acteristics by contract and by mutual instructions to the arbitrator they select.
The range can be anywhere from replicating the characteristics of a public
court to a very relaxed and informal process. A union and employer can bar-
gain over the procedural characteristics they prefer in arbitration with the pos-
sible exception of the degree of judicial review they prefer.'2 The individual
employee signing an arbitration clause with an employer is not in the same
position to bargain over the procedural issues. Once a dispute arises, the
employee's attorney may not be able to negotiate over the characteristics of
the arbitration forum unless the law gives the employee an election of forum
option that the attorney can use as leverage in negotiation with the employer.
The election of forum would give the employer an incentive to craft a cost
effective and fair forum that would be attractive to the specialized plaintiff's
bar as an alternative to adjudication.
An additional procedural concern is the lack of discovery in arbitration. 3
We all know that the burdens and costs of discovery can make it a negative as
well as positive procedural device. A threat to drive up the costs of litigation
by excessive discovery can make it impractical to litigate many employee
claims for lesser amounts. We can not provide a definite answer as to whether
a public or private forum will offer an employee better access to a fair disput-
ing process at reasonable cost without knowing a good deal more about the
specifics of the employee's statutory claim.
There is also the question of how the employee will relate to the structural
characteristics of a court as compared to arbitration. Employees want a legiti-
mate opportunity to tell their story, to voice the problems they have encoun-
tered as well as obtain a remedy. From an anthropological perspective, courts
are a very formal and intimidating atmosphere with the judge in a robe, the
raised dais, jury venire, and evidentiary constraints on the presentation of
evidence. A skilled arbitrator can make the setting for the employee's testimo-
ny more relaxed and less formal with everyone at a table together and fewer
objections interrupting the presentation of testimony. An arbitrator's skill and
knowledge of the law will depend on training and experience, but the point is
we can not assume an arbitrator selected by the parties after a review of the
arbitrator's background will be less skilled and knowledgeable than a judge.
As university professors, we may be more effective by focusing on how to
11. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims: A Practical
Guide to Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 591 (1995).
12. 1 have never seen a collective bargaining agreement that defines the scope of judicial
review more broadly than the Steelworkers Trilogy. Federal courts, however, have developed a
limited public policy exception to judicial deference to arbitration. See United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987) (limiting a court's ability to refuse to enforce an
arbitrator's interpretation of a collective agreement "to situations where the contract as interpreted
would violate 'some explicit public policy' that is 'well-defined and dominant, and is to be ascer-
tained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of sup-
posed public interests"') (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766
(1983)).
13. See Bales, supra note 11.
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educate better arbitrators regarding the issues surrounding employees' statutory
rights than to assume that judges selected through a political process are pref-
erable.
The remedies available in arbitration are an enormous problem. 4 As Pro-
fessor Stone noted, arbitrators feel very constrained regarding remedies.
They lack the contempt power of the courts making provisional remedies and
certain other forms of equitable relief difficult to administer. Indeed the con-
fused body of law surrounding the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue an
order to maintain the status quo pending arbitration of a dispute aptly illus-
trates this problem. 6 The real question is whether there is a creative way to
address the problem of remedies while maintaining the integrity of arbitration.
For example, expedited arbitration with court enforcement of the arbitrator's
award if needed could be used in some circumstances.
The mindset of arbitrators can also present an issue. An arbitrator who
works regularly in a specific type of industry will become schooled in the cul-
ture of the workplace in that industry. That can be a plus or a minus depend-
ing on the nature of the dispute. Of course, the alternative may be the adjudi-
cation of an employee's rights before a judge who has no knowledge of the
workplace in question. I mentioned earlier, the possible negative aspects of the
mindset of an arbitrator who was selected by the parties and who knows that
the parties may not select her again if they are not satisfied with the handling
of the case and the arbitrator's opinion. An arbitrator does look at a case
through different lenses than a judge who is selected through a process totally
independent of the case in question and who may or may not stand for reten-
tion through a political process. My point is that the judicial mindset may not
always be the preferred one. We ought to at least ask questions about differ-
ences in the mindset of the adjudicators in the two fora in a thoughtful man-
ner, informed by more empirical observation.
I started with the value of judicial opinions as a "public good." The visi-
bility of judicial opinions and the public debate surrounding legislative correc-
14. See id.; see also Stone, supra note 4, at 1039-41.
15. Stone, supra note 4, at 1047 n.197.
16. See, e.g., Niagra Hooker Employees Union v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 935 F.2d 1370
(2d Cir. 1991); IBEW Local 733 v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., 906 F.2d 149 (5th Cit. 1990) (both
holding that an employer's prior agreement to maintain status quo pending arbitration as sufficient
but not necessary for a grant of injunctive relief); United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Mfg., 598
F.2d 1273, 1278-79 (3d Cir. 1979) (endorsing three elements to consider in determining NLA
preclusion of injunction: (1) whether the dispute is subject to arbitration, (2) whether the party is
interfering or frustrating arbitral process, and (3) the propriety of an injunction over "ordinary
principles of equity"); Lever Bros. Co. v. Chemical Wkrs. Local 217, 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cit.
1976) (stating that the purpose of the anti-injunction exception was to ensure that arbitration
would not be merely a "hollow formality"); see also International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of American, UAW v. Textron Lycoming Recip-
rocating Engine Div., 919 F. Supp. 783 (D. Pa. 1996) (applying "irreparable harm" test). But cf
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 847 F. Supp. 1294
(E.D. Pa. 1994); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and Helpers Local Union
No. 414, 839 F. Supp 1339 (N.D. Ind. 1993); Teamsters Assoc. v. Japanese Edu. Inst., 724 F.
Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Newspaper
Publishers Ass'n, 620 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1980) (defining Seventh Circuit test as whether arbitral
remedies would be "wholly inadequate" to redress a contractual violation).
1996] 1075
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tions to unpopular judicial opinions is an important element of our democratic
process. Whether similar debate can be generated by the repetitive arbitration
of similar disputes is an open issue. Since the concept of precedent is deeply
embedded in our jurisprudence, we can expect private services to develop and
to reduce the cost of obtaining arbitrators' opinions. New technologies should
make this even easier. Parties specializing in employment law will read and
evaluate the opinions and will pursue ways to change an evolving doctrine in
arbitration that they do not like. In collective bargaining, unions and employers
regularly bargain around the opinions of arbitrators. They also use public
policy arguments to increase the scope of judicial review of arbitrators'
opinions." The relationship between arbitrators and courts need not be
viewed as fixed in stone. It can be adjusted to make both work together to
better serve the ends of justice.
In reality I am much more skeptical of the use of arbitration to resolve
statutory claims than these comments suggest. I do believe, however, that we
would benefit from a much more serious comparative examination of institu-
tional fora for settling disputes. Each will have their own particular character-
istics that yield benefits and detriments. Their positive and negative qualities
may vary depending on the nature of the claim underlying the dispute. One
way to learn more is to encourage doctrines that leave parties with a choice of
fora and to study the conflicts they encounter over the choice of forum.
We are worried because we see employers beginning to force a choice on
employees through mandatory arbitration clauses. Before these mandatory
clauses, employees could have voluntarily agreed to arbitrate in lieu of going
to court, but there was not much incentive for the parties to invest in the de-
velopment of specialized arbitration panels for statutory disputes. Can we
develop an improved arbitration option while maintaining the right of
employees to elect their preferred forum? We would certainly learn more
about the comparative qualities of different fora for resolving similar conflicts.
17. Misco, 484 U.S. at 43.
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PUBLIC GOOD AND PRIVATE MAGIC IN THE LAW OF
LAND TRUSTS AND CONSERVATION EASEMENTS:
A HAPPY PRESENT AND A TROUBLED FUTURE
FEDERICO CHEEVER*
I. INTRODUCION
In October 1995, I joined about a thousand other people-predominately
young and professional, in shorts and pile jackets-in an ornate auditorium on
the California coast.' We listened politely as politicians-aging, in suits and
ties, identifying themselves with "the radical middle"-praised the
achievements of the "land trust movement." The numbers, enthusiasm, and
experience of my companions provided much better evidence of the achieve-
ments of that movement than the politicians could. It is, currently, the most
active and forward-looking element in the national effort for environmental
preservation. The laws that provide the framework for the national environ-
mental regulatory structure remain in a perilous and apparently perpetual
reauthorization holding pattern in Congress.2 State legislatures appear unwill-
ing to undertake environmental protection where the federal government no
longer will. But someone establishes a new "private" land trust, committed to
scenic, historic, or ecological preservation on an average of once a week.3
The land trust movement furthers the public good4 in ways that other
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., M.A., Stanford
University, 1981; J.D., University of California at Los Angeles School of Law, 1986. Copyright
Federico Cheever, 1996. I would like to thank the organizers and participants in the Denver Uni-
versity Law Review Symposium on the New Private Law, particularly Sue Chrisman and Tracy
Craige, without whom this essay would have been impossible, my three able research assistants
Timothy Gordon, Dirk Holt, and Greg Johnson, William Silberstein and his colleagues at Isaacson,
Rosenbaum & Levy, P.C. (Colorado's preeminent land tust lawyers), Jake Barnes, Alan Chen,
Roberto Corrada, Nancy Ehrenreich, Martha Ertman, Cecilia Espenoza, Julie Nice, Rob Smith,
Celia Taylor, Richard Collins, Daniel Farber, Clayton Gillette, Gary Peller, Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Annette Stroud, the participants in my environmental law seminar in the fall of 1995,
many, many others, and of course, Mary McNeil Cheever and Elizabeth Oakley Cheever.
I. Land Trust Alliance National Rally '95, Asilomar Conference Center, Pacific Grove
California, Oct. 15-18, 1995.
2. 25 ENvTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10104 (discussing Congress's attempt to reauthorize
the Endangered Species Act); 25 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10089 (discussing Congress's
failure to reauthorize the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 24 ENVrTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10262 (discussing Congress's attempt to reauthorize CERCLA); 24 ENVrTL. L. REP. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10489 (discussing Congress's failure to reauthorize the Clean Water Act).
3. LAND TRUST ALUANCE, 1995 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF LAND TRUSTS at vi (1995)
[hereinafter DIRECTORY] (Land Trust Alliance 1994 Land Trust Survey results).
4. For purposes of this essay, I assume that piecemeal preservation of open space by private
transaction is in the public interest. Some reviewers of this essay questioned the public value of
land trusts because the land trust preservation model does not require comprehensive planning. In
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more "public" aspects of the environmental protection movement cannot be-
cause it possesses a "private magic." I use the word "magic" for its two mean-
ings: "the art of producing illusions.., by the use of sleight of hand" and
"the art of producing a desired effect or result through... techniques that pre-
sumably assure human control over supernatural agencies. ' I leave to the
reader whether the "private magic" of land trusts and conservation easements
is simply legal sleight of hand or the "operation of some occult controlling
principle of nature."
The magic of the land trust movement has something to do with its appar-
ent contradictions. The movement is "radical" because it regularly endeavors
to do what traditional environmental protection rarely dares to do--"lock-up"
private land. Through donation and purchase, land trusts transform the proper-
ty rights associated with the land they protect, prohibiting or severely limiting,
in perpetuity, the possibility of environmentally damaging development. Many
of my companions in California had experience in more traditional and "pub-
lic" elements of the environmental movement. In land trusts and conservation
easements, they have found powerful tools to pursue goals they have pursued
before in other ways. At the same time, the movement achieves its goals pri-
marily through private, voluntary land transactions, among the most ancient
and settled of all means of legal interaction and among the least "public" or
controversial. This draws to its ranks activists distrustful of government,' and
politicians fond of words like "middle."
At present, the land trust movement seems a successful combination of
public and private. Its apparent success provides a useful model for achieving
legislated goals in a privatized world. However, some dark omens cloud the
future of the movement and, absent some changes in the legal structures that
support it, time may erode the happy congruity between public and private at
the cost of the environment and the public good. The legal community associ-
ated with the land trust movement should address these potential problems.
However, in doing so, we must be careful to avoid destroying the private
magic that gives the movement its special power.
Land trusts do many things: they purchase land outright; they purchase
land for sale to government agencies; they participate in the development and
application of every conceivable manner of land use restriction, public or pri-
vate. I will focus my attention on one specific type of transaction which, I
believe, embodies more than any other the movement's happy present and
potentially troubled future: acquisition and maintenance of conservation ease-
ments by private land trusts. First, I will describe some general legal aspects
fact, land trust land purchases can compliment comprehensive land use planning. The Internal
Revenue Code governing the income tax deductibility of donations to land trusts require that "the
preservation of open space be pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, state or local governmental
conservation policy." I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii) (1994). The regulations interpreting that provision
explicitly govern designations of scenic areas. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d) (1994).
5. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1155 (2d ed. 1983).
6. 6 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 24 (1933).
7. Telephone Interview with Reeves Brown, Colorado Cattleman's Land Trust (May 24,
1996).
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of both conservation easements and the land trusts which employ them.' I will
then use a single hypothetical conservation easement transaction to demon-
strate the complex and productive interrelationship between public goals and
private.9 I will use the same hypothetical transaction to identify some of the
dangers the future may hold." Finally, I will ponder briefly possible respons-
es to these dangers and how they might affect the private magic of the land
trust movement."
I should say, at the outset, that I do not believe that the legal problems the
future holds for land trusts are insurmountable. My companions in California
are not wasting their time. However, the positive politics of the movement
serve to obscure problems, which, if left unaddressed, may lead to dire results.
Those who have ruminated about the legal ramifications of the land trust
movement in the past have been concerned about the movement's place in the
law of property, 2 the tax benefits it can provide, 3 and its potential positive
effects on American farmers. 4 I am an environmental lawyer concerned
about biological diversity. I want land trusts and conservation easements to
function and to preserve environmental values for "biologically significant"'5
periods of time. Perversely, this may make my characterizations of the prob-
lems they face more alarming than others have been.
II. THE LAND TRUST/CONSERVATION EASEMENT BOOM
A. What Is a Conservation Easement?
The land trusts represented at the California conference sometimes pre-
serve land by buying it or receiving it as a donation, transforming property
relations only by transferring the "bundle of rights" we understand as land
ownership 6 into the hands of an organization committed to biological or aes-
thetic preservation." However, their favored tool is not acquisition of the fee,
but instead, the "conservation easement."
By granting a conservation easement, the owner of land splits that bundle
of rights, reserving the rights to engage in certain activities (for example:
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part 11.
10. See infra Part IV.
1I. See infra Part V.
12. See, e.g., Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common
Law, 8 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 2 (1989); Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A
Policy Analysis in the Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433
(1984).
13. See, e.g., Mathew J. Keifer, Creating Additional Tax Benefits from Qualified Conserva-
tion Easements, 15 REAL EST. LJ. 136 (1986).
14. See, e.g., Vivian Quinn, Preserving Farmland with Conservation Easements: Public Ben-
efit or Burden?, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 235 (1994).
15. See generally KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLI-
TICS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1993).
16. For an excellent and recent treatment of this concept, see J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of
Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bun-
dle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1994).
17. See infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
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hunting, farming, building a cabin) to the grantor-holder of the underlying
possessory interest-and ceding the right to prevent the grantor or anyone else
from engaging in another range of activities (for example: building casinos,
housing developments, clearcutting timber, or filling swamps) to another party,
the grantee. A conservation easement may prohibit all ground disturbing activ-
ity on a piece of wild land or prohibit only activities that will interfere with
particular things (e.g., elk calving). Conservation easements may preserve land
as farmland or preserve a "working forest" by allowing only certain types and
a certain frequency of logging. The terms of the restrictions are usually set out
in detail in the conservation easement itself.'"
1. Not an Easement at All
Conservation easements are statutory creations. They do not fit easily into
any common law category for real property interests. They are creatures of
legislation and recent legislation at that. The Colorado Conservation Easement
Statute was adopted in 1976, "' five years before the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the current Uniform Conser-
vation Easement Act. Although almost all states now have some form of con-
servation easement or restriction legislation, the oldest identifiable "conser-
vation easement" statutes were adopted in Massachusetts in 19560 and Cali-
fomia in 1959.2" Significantly, both statutes originally only authorized gov-
ernment entities to hold the created interests.2 Modem conservation easement
statutes allow private land trusts and other organizations to hold the ease-
ments. 3
A conservation easement is not an "easement" in the traditional sense.24
Before the statutory coming of conservation easements, the common law sys-
tem of servitudes tolerated both negative easements and easements in gross,
but under limited circumstances.' These circumstances did not include what
18. The Land Trust Alliance Model Conservation Easement uses a tripartite structure identi-
fying overarching "conservation values" the easement should protect, specific reserved rights iden-
tifying what activities the holder of the underlying fee interest may engage in, and specific "pro-
hibited uses" identifying activities that the fee holder may not engage in. JANET DmHL & THOMAS
BARRETT, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK 147-65 (1988). Iowa requires that the con-
servation easement "clearly state its extent and purpose." IOWA CODE § 457A.4 (1993).
19. Act approved May 13, 1976, 1976 Colo. Sess. Laws 750-752 (codified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-30.5-101 to -111 (1994)); see Comment, Open Space Procurement Un-
der Colorado's Scenic Easement Law, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 383 (1989).
20. 1956 Mass. Acts, ch. 631; see Comment, Preservation of Open Spaces Through Scenic
Easements and Greenbelt Zoning, 12 STAN. L. REV. 638, 642 (1960) [hereinafter Preservation].
21. The Scenic Easement Deed Act of 1959, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6950-6954 (1959). Some
argue that California passed the first open space easement legislation in the United States. THOM-
AS S. BARRETT & PuTNAM LIVERMORE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 34
(1983).
22. See Preservation, supra note 20, at 638.
23. See infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
24. Korngold, supra note 12, at 477-78.
25. The common law preferred neither easements in gross nor negative easements. See Weil
v. Hill, 69 So. 438, 440 (Ala. 1915) ("[T]he court will not presume that [the easement] was in-
tended to be in gross, or personal to the grantor, if it can fairly be construed as appurtenant to his
land ...."); Wing v. Forest Lawn Cemetery Ass'n, 101 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Cal. 1940) ("[Alny pro-
visions of an instrument creating or claimed to create [a negative easement] will be strictly con-
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we now call conservation easements. Traditionally, negative easements in the
United States were limited to easements for light, air, support, or the flow of
artificial streams.26 A negative easement protected the interests of one proper-
ty owner by restricting the owner of nearby property from exercising an other-
wise valid property right. 7 On the other hand, by definition, an easement in
gross creates a personal right in an individual, a right unassociated with own-
ership of land.28 Easements in gross were generally restricted to commercial
affirmative functions like the right to erect billboards or to maintain sewer
lines and railway corridors.29 Negative easements were by their nature appur-
tenant. 30 Easements in gross were by their nature affirmative. Negative ease-
ments in gross were beyond the contemplation of the traditional easement
categories.3
strued, any doubt being resolved in favor of the free use of the land."); Atlantic Mills v. New
York Cent. R. Co., 223 N.Y.S. 206, 211 (App. Div. 1927) ("It is a well-established principle of
law that an easement in gross will not be presumed, where it can fairly be construed to be appur-
tenant to land."); McWhorter v. City of Jacksonville, 694 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)
("It is the rule that an easement in gross is not favored, and an easement is never presumed to be
in gross, or a personal right, when it can be fairly construed to be appurtenant or attached to some
other estate."); Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co. v. Seattle Constr. & Dry Dock Co., 173 P. 508, 511
(Wash. 1918) ("It is well settled in law that easements in gross are not favored; and a very strong
presumption exists in favor of construing easements as appurtenant.").
26. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 851 (3d ed. 1993).
27. Clements v. Taylor, 184 S.W.2d 485, 487-88 (Tex. Ct. App. 1944). Accord Uihlein v.
Matthews, 64 N.E. 792, 793 (N.Y. 1902).
28. See Ratino v. Hart, 424 S.E.2d 753, 756 (W.Va. 1992) ("An easement in gross is not
appurtenant to any estate in land or does not belong to any person by virtue of ownership of estate
in other land but is mere personal interest in or right to use land of another, it is purely person-
al ...."); see also Stiefel v. Lindermann, 638 A.2d 642, 647 n.4 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994) ("An
easement in gross belongs to the owner of it apart from his ownership or possession of any specif-
ic land and, in contrast to an easement appurtenant, its ownership is personal to its owners.").
29. Alan D. Hegi, The Easement in Gross Revisited: Transferability and Divisibility Since
1945, 39 VAND. L. REV. 109 (1986); Korngold, supra note 12.
30. See Miller v. Babb, 263 S.W. 253, 254 (Tex. Ct. App. 1924).
31. The comments accompanying the Uniform Conservation Easement Act contain a justifi-
cation for the use of the term "conservation easement":
The interests protected by the Act are termed "easements." The terminology reflects a
rejection of two alternatives suggested in existing state acts dealing with non-possessory
conservation and preservation interests. The first removes the common law disabilities
associated with covenants, real and equitable servitudes in addition to those associated
with easements.... The second approach seeks to create a novel additional interest
which, although unknown to the common law, is, in some ill-defined sense, a statutorily
modified amalgam of the three traditional common law interests.
The easement alternative is favored in the Act for three reasons. First, lawyers
and courts are most comfortable with easements and easement doctrine, less so with
restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes, and can be expected to experience severe
confusion if the Act opts for a hybrid fourth interest. Second, the easement is the basic
less-than-fee interest at common law; the restrictive covenant and the equitable servitude
appeared only because of then-current, but now outdated, limitations of easement doc-
trine.
UNIF. CONSERv. EASEMENT AcT § I cmt. (1981). While defensible in practical terms, this justi-
fication does not make much doctrinal sense. In an era in which the majority of newly constructed
housing is subject to restrictive covenants, it is hard to assert that "an easement is the basic [one
size fits all] less-than-fee interest." A conservation easement is in fact the "novel additional inter-
est" which the drafters of the Uniform law fear will create "severe confusion." See Komgold,
supra note 12, at 439.
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2. Use Restrictions on a Land Use Restriction
State conservation easement statutes generally limit the purposes for
which such novel interests may be created. The Uniform Conservation Ease-
ment Act, approved in 1981 and adopted in sixteen states32 and the District of
Columbia,33 provides an example in its definition of "conservation easement":
A nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limita-
tions or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include retain-
ing or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real proper-
ty, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or
open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhanc-
ing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural,
archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.34
The "purposes of which include" phrasing in the Uniform Act is a rela-
tively modest restriction on the intent of the parties at the time of the transac-
tion. California law provides that a "'conservation easement' means any limi-
tation in a deed, will or other instrument in the form of an easement... bind-
ing upon successive owners ... the purpose of which is to retain land pre-
dominantly in its natural, scenic, historic, agricultural, forested, or open space
condition."35 The laws of Delaware, Hawaii, and New York contain similar
unqualified "purpose" requirements. 6 On the other hand, the laws of Colora-
do, Massachusetts, and New Jersey require only that the restriction be "appro-
priate" for maintaining a legislative purpose."
In addition to purpose restrictions, some states list specific acts that the
grantor may prohibit. Delaware not only enumerates what may be prohibit-
ed, it specifically provides what may not be prohibited: the easement cannot
prohibit the fee holder from allowing hunting, fishing, or other recreational
activities on the land.39 The Kentucky statute includes language forbidding
certain restrictions affecting mining operations.'
32. ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.17.010-.060 (1989); AiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-271 to -276
(1985); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-10-1 to -8 (Michie 1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 55-2101 to -2109
(1988); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-5-2.6-1 to -7 (West 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3810 to -3817
(1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 382.800-.860 (Baldwin 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§
476 to 479-B (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 84C.01-.05 (West 1985); MISS. CODE ANN. §§
89-19-1 to -15 (1986); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 111.390-.400 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-12-1 to
-6 (Michie 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-8-10 to -80 (Law. Co-op. 1991); TEx. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. §§ 183.001-.005 (West 1983); VA. CODE ANN. 1950, §§ 10.1-1009 to -1016 (Michie 1988);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.40 (West 1981).
33. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2601 to -2605 (1986).
34. UNIF. CONSERV. EASEMENT Acr § l(l) (1981) (emphasis added).
35. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.1 (1988) (emphasis added).
36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6901(a) (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 198-1 (1989); N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0303(1) (McKinney 1989).
37. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-102 (West 1990); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 184, § 31 (1995); NJ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:8B-2(b) (West 1991).
38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6901(a) (1991) (providing a non-exclusive list). Accord FLA.
STAT. ch. 704.06 (1988) (providing an exclusive list); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-203 (1995) (pro-
viding an exclusive list).
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6901(c).
40. Specifically, the Kentucky statute prohibits the transfer of a conservation easement on
property in which there are outstanding subsurface rights, unless written consent is acquired from
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To take advantage of federal legislation allowing a charitable income tax
deduction for "qualified conservation contributions,"' discussed below,42
most conservation easements are created "in perpetuity." Some states require
perpetual conservation easements. 3 Most state conservation easement statutes
provide that conservation easements are to be unlimited in duration unless
otherwise stated in the instrument itself.' Kansas, on the other hand, requires
that a conservation easement be limited to the lifetime of the grantor unless
otherwise stated in the conservation easement.45 Many statutes specifically
provide that conservation easements can be released or modified like any other
easement. 6
B. What Is a Land Trust?
A land trust is either a governmental entity or a private non-profit corpo-
ration, association, or trust committed to biological, historical, or aesthetic
preservation. Not all private land trusts hold conservation easements, but most
the owners of the subsurface rights first. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382.850(1) (Baldwin 1988).
Furthermore, the easement cannot interfere with coal mining operations on adjacent or surrounding
properties. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382.850(2).
41. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) (1994).
42. See infra notes 68-86 and accompanying text.
43. California and Hawaii both require that conservation easements be perpetual. CAL. Civ.
CODE § 815.2(b) (West 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 198-2(b).
44. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.17.010(c); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-272(C); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 15-20-406 (Michie 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-103(3); IDAHO CODE § 55-
2102(3); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 183.002(c).
45. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3811(d). Apparently, the only way Kansans could get a conserva-
tion easement bill passed was to include this concession supported by various interests groups.
However, Kansas Land Trust, the lone listed land trust operating in Kansas, will only accept con-
servation easements if they are perpetual. Telephone Interview with Joyce A. Wolf, Executive
Director, Kansas Land Trust (Apr. 19, 1996).
46. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-20-404; GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-3(a); IDAHO CODE §
55-2102(1); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-5.6-2(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3811(b); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 477(1); MINN. STAT. § 84C.02(a); NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.420(1); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 47-12-3; S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-8-30; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-19B-57; TEX. NAT.
RES. CODE ANN. § 183.002(a); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1014; W. VA. CODE § 20-12-4(a) (1995);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.40(2). In addition to release, Colorado allows a conservation easement to
be terminated, extinguished, or abandoned by merger with the fee interest. COLO. REv. STAT. §
38-30.5-107. In Iowa, a conservation easement may be released by the holder or changed circum-
stances can render an easement no longer beneficial to the public. IOWA CODE § 457A.2(l)
(1996). In Kansas, the grantor is permitted to have the easement revoked at her request. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 58-3811(d). In Maine, a change in circumstances may justify a termination of the
conservation easement. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 477(3)(B). Montana allows open-space
land to be converted under certain circumstances, but requires that it be replaced with other prop-
erty.*MoNr. CODE ANN. § 76-6-107 (1995). Nebraska allows release of a conservation easement
with the approval of the governing body that originally approved the conservation easement. NEaB.
REV. STAT. § 76-2,113 (1990). In New Jersey, the holder may release a conservation easement, if
allowed by the terms of the easement, only after a public hearing. NJ. REV. STAT. § 13:8B-5.
New York allows conservation easements to be released if allowed by the instrument creating the
easement and extinguished if a court finds it to be of no actual benefit to the person seeking en-
forcement. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 49-0307 (McKinney 1989); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS.
LAW § 1951. In Rhode Island, a holder may release a conservation easement subject to the terms
of the easement itself. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-39-5 (1995). Utah also allows for termination by re-
lease, abandonment, merger, nonrenewal, specific conditions set out in the easement, or any other
lawful manner. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-18-5 (1994). Mississippi, on the other hand, specifies that
merger does not occur if the fee holder is also the easement holder. MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-19-5.
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do.4' Accordingly, most private land trusts must conform to the requirements
for easement holders imposed by the conservation easement statutes in the
states in which they operate. Two sets of legal rules, one state and one federal,
define the characteristics to which private land trusts conform.
First, state conservation easement statutes, discussed above, generally
allow only two types of entities to hold development rights for someone else's
land for purposes of preservation. Again, the Uniform Conservation Easement
Act provides an example:
(2) "Holder" [of a Conservation Easement] means:
(i) a governmental body empowered to hold an interest in real proper-
ty under the laws of this State or the United States; or
(ii) a charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable
trust, the purposes or powers of which include retaining or protecting
the natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property. . .
The states that have adopted versions of this uniform law all contain some
similar limitation on potential private "holders" of conservation easements.
Alaska and Virginia explicitly require that private "holders" be non-profit
entities for purposes of federal taxation.49
California, although not a Uniform Act state, places similar limitations on
potential easement holders." Colorado, also not a Uniform Act state, requires
"a charitable organization" exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the "Internal
Revenue Code of 1954."'" Massachusetts is more restrictive still, requiring
the purposes of the "charitable corporation or trust" to conform with the spe-
cific purposes of the type of restriction: conservation, agricultural preservation,
watershed preservation, or affordable housing. 2
Federal regulations provide the remaining characteristics of private land
trusts. Because much of the grantors' impetus for land trust preservation
comes from the charitable federal income tax deductions allowed for "quali-
fied conservation contributions" to "qualified organizations," '53 private land
trusts must generally be "qualified organizations." Internal Revenue Service
Code § 170(h)(3) defines qualified organizations to include most § 501(c)(3)
charitable organizations that receive substantial public support and almost any
governmental entity.54 Private land trusts must satisfy the requirements for
private "qualified" organizations. Establishing necessary tax-exempt status re-
quires some specific structure, filing, and reporting.55 To maintain tax-exempt
47. DIRECTORY, supra note 3, at vii (1995) (Land Trust Alliance 1994 survey indicated that
54% of land trusts use donated conservation easements and 13% purchase easements).
48. UNIF. CONSERV. EASEMENT ACT § 1(2) (1981) (emphasis added).
49. ARK. CODE ANN. § 34.17.060(2)(3); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1009.
50. CAL. CIv. CODE § 815.3(a),
51. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-104(2).
52. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 184 § 31-32.
53. I.R.C. § 170(h) (1995).
54. I.R.C. § 170(h)(3) (1995). The regulations interpreting this provision also require that a
"qualified organization" have "a commitment to protect the conservation purposes of the donation
and have the resources to enforce the restriction." Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (1994).
55. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, THE STANDARDS AND PRACTICES GUIDEBOOK, AN OPERATING
MANUAL FOR LAND TRUSTS, Standard 4.
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status, private land trusts must avoid any action which inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual, avoid political campaign activity, not en-
gage in "substantial" lobbying, and meet the "public support test" (which
requires that a substantial part of the organization's support comes from the
general public).56
While significant, these two sets of rules do not dictate the specific char-
acter of individual private land trusts. Land trusts range in size from the rela-
tively vast Nature Conservancy57 and Trust for Public Lands,5" to extremely
small organizations with minimal budgets and no paid staff. Land trusts may
operate on a national scale or be entirely local. They may endeavor to protect
a range of land types and uses, or they may be interest-specific, like the Colo-
rado Cattlemen's Agricultural Land Trust.
Private land trusts are older than conservation easements, but not much
older. Founded in 1891, Massachusetts' Trustees of Reservations is probably
the oldest private land trust in the United States.59 Before 1950 there were
less than forty land trusts in the United States.' There are now 1,095 private
land trusts in the country.6
C. The Boom
1. Advantages of Land Trust/Conservation Easement Preservation
The enthusiasm for the land trust movement extends beyond the politi-
cians at the California conference. With the exception of a few dissenting
voices,' it is almost universal. Environmental preservation by land trust of-
fers significant advantages over environmental protection through direct public
regulation.
First, environmental preservation by land trusts encourages the creation of
a more site-specific environmental protection regime. While regulation lends
itself to categorical protection of all wetlands (however defined) from all
56. Id. at 4-8, 4-9.
57. The Nature Conservancy has offices in every state and some foreign countries. For a
map of locations, see http://www:tnc.orglinfield/map.html.
58. Twenty-two offices at last count; see http://www.igc.apc.orgtpl.
59. Randee G. Fenner, Land Trusts: An Alternative Method of Preserving Open Space, 33
VAND. L. REv. 1039, 1042 (1980).
60. Dana & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 5.
61. DIRECTORY, supra note 3, at vi.
62. Some critics charge that larger land trusts, such as The Nature Conservancy, "exist to
remove land or land fights from the ordinary marketplace." Tom Holt, Q: Are Nonprofit Land
Trusts Taking Advantage of the Public's Trust?, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at 22. Taking land
from the marketplace "removes the land from local tax roles and limits job growth." Malcolm
Howard, U.S.-Environment: Land Trusts Protect, Threaten Country Lifestyles, Inter Press Service,
Feb. 8, 1996, available in LEXIS, News library, Current file. Groups such as The Nature
Conservancy are also able to stop larger housing and industrial development by acquiring develop-
ment rights in strategic areas. Holt, supra, at 22. Property rights advocates also criticize The Na-
ture Conservancy for buying land or land rights and immediately selling them to government
agencies for a profit. Aside from being labeled as "profit-motivated," The Nature Conservancy is
also chastised for avoiding accountability. Id. The stated purpose for this practice is that the gov-
ernment cannot operate as freely as a land trust can, so the government uses the land trust as a
"middleman." Id.
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significant disturbance (however defined), conservation easements and land
trust acquisition lend themselves to protection of particular wetlands with
particular boundaries in particular places. Because every wetland-like every
other piece of land-is different, a more site-specific regulatory regime can, in
theory, do a better job of protection.
Second, and more intriguing, for a law professor at least, is the capacity
of conservation easements to alter the nature of land tenure itself. During the
1970s and 1980s, protection of the environment affected the nature of land
tenure through public regulation. The rights associated with uses of land re-
mained conceptually unchanged, but were increasingly subject to "burdens"
imposed by local, state, and federal regulation for environmental protection. A
land owner remained sole owner of her land, but could not fill wetlands upon
the land, destroy endangered species' nesting habitat, emit large quantities of
noxious air pollutants, or build more than a certain number of houses per acre.
The various elements of this process of land regulation have been discussed at
length elsewhere.
The conceptual structure of burdensome regulation upon property rights
has contributed to the current backlash against environmental protection be-
cause it fosters a sense of injury among landowners. Accustomed to our con-
ceptual structure of legal rights, they perceive that they have "rights" that they
cannot exercise.
Conservation easements avoid this by creating property rights in conserva-
tion. The holders of conservation easements possess, to a greater or lesser
degree, the right to prevent development on the land subject to the easement.
They may prevent, just as a regulator might, such environmentally harmful
activities as: the filling of wetlands, destruction of species' nesting habitat,
construction of factories that might emit noxious air pollutants, and construc-
tion of additional structures. Legally, however, we do not perceive this protec-
tion as an imposition but rather an exercise of rights. The fee holder does not
have rights she cannot exercise; those rights have been granted away with the
conservation easement.
Property... includes a normative "deep structure" that may be of
use in an environmental ethic. The norms that lurk in property go
beyond the wonderous power of exclusion that so awed Blackstone in
the case of individual property. They include as well the qualities of
restraint and responsibility that characterize common or shared prop-
erty.
63
The express mutual interests in the same land created by severing the rights
associated with a conservation easement from the rights associated with the
underlying possessory interest crystalize these often hidden norms of responsi-
bility and restraint in our property system.
63. Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics,
24 ENVTL. L. 1, 28 (1994).
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2. Growth in Land Trust/Conservation Easement Preservation
According to a 1994 survey conducted by the Land Trust Alliance (LTA),
there are now more than 1,095 private land trusts in the United States, an
increase of 23% over four years.'4 These trusts have protected roughly
4,029,000 acres of land. Of that acreage, 990,000 acres were acquired and
then transferred to a third party (generally a government agency), 535,000
acres are owned outright by land trusts, and 740,000 acres are protected by
conservation easements held by land trusts. The rest of the four million acres
are protected in ways unidentified by the LTA survey.65
These numbers may seem small compared to, say, the 187 million acres
of the National Forest System,' until one realizes that this is all land some-
one felt was worth protecting from development and made the effort to pro-
tect. Therefore, unlike the National Forests, National Parks, and National
Wildlife Refuges, it includes little or no land above 9,000 feet, north of the
60th parallel, under glaciers or rock slides, or with slopes that cannot be nego-
tiated without ropes. Private land trusts also tend to be concentrated in the
more populous parts of the country: New England (36%), the Mid-Atlantic
region (18%), and the West Coast (16%).' Most significantly, the rapid
growth of land trusts suggests that the acreage of protected land will multiply
in years to come.
III. A "PRIVATE" TRANSACTION
The mixture of public and private in a land trust conservation easement
transaction stands out more clearly when presented in a factual context. While
I could make the points below using a variety of specific transactions which
have taken place in Colorado in recent years, it is simpler to use a hypotheti-
cal transaction that draws together the elements of many transactions in a sim-
plified form.
A. The First Generation
Laura Deadlock wakes up one morning and realizes that she is not as
young as she used to be. Seventy years of raising cattle on the Deadlock ranch
and fighting with the federal government about public land grazing have taken
their toll. She loves her family and hopes they will stay in the ranching busi-
ness. She loves her Colorado mountain ranch and the idea of seeing it carpeted
with condominiums fills her with dismay. She owns a thousand acres, worth
$1 million' in a real estate market inflated by developers and perhaps half
64. DIRECTORY, supra note 3, at vi.
65. Id.
66. FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, LAND AREAS OF THE NATIONAL FOREST
SYSTEM 1 (1996).
67. Id.
68. This figure is probably unrealistically low. Telephone Interview with William Silberstein,
Isaacson, Rosenbaum & Levy, P.C. (June 27, 1996).
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that much ($500,000) as a going concern. On a clear night, and there are
many, she can see the lights of the nearby ski area.
Laura has an honest son, Martin, who works at a university a few hours
drive away. She would be happy to leave him the ranch and he would be
happy to have it. However, Laura is aware of the federal estate tax and knows
that if she leaves Martin the ranch in her will there may be more estate tax to
pay than he can afford on his university salary. Federal estate tax applies to
estates valued at $600,000 or more.69 Effective rates start at 37% and escalate
quickly. 7 ' Assuming Laura had no other property, her estate would incur
roughly $153,000 in tax payable within nine months of her death.7 1 Martin's
only option would be to sell at least a part of the ranch in a market dominated
by ski condominium developers.72
In a recent issue of High Country News," Laura read an article about
ranchers in another part of the state "preserving" their ranch land by granting
conservation easements to public interest land trusts. 74 She understood from
the article that granting such an "easement" might technically reduce the value
of the land, thereby limiting or eliminating the estate tax burden. Laura calls
someone she knows in town who puts her in touch with the president of the
Local Area Land Trust. A few days later the land trust president drives out
and gives Laura the good news.
First, if she grants the land trust an easement the land will be preserved as
in the easement document. Any restrictions created in the easement document
will "run with the land"--bind future owners. Although not a traditional ease-
ment, the conservation easement does share the single most important charac-
teristic of all common law servitudes-it burdens future holders of the "servi-
ent estate." If Laura wishes, the easement can be "perpetual," protecting the
land forever.
Second, by donating the easement to the land trust Laura loses nothing
she values (just development rights) and gains a potentially large charitable tax
deduction. Section 170(h), mentioned above, permits an income tax deduction
for a "qualified conservation contribution" to a "qualified organization." The
qualified contribution can include a "qualified real property interest" if the
contribution is made for "conservation purposes."" A qualified real property
69. I.R.C. §§ 2001(c), 2010 (1994).
70. I.R.C. § 2001(e) (1994).
71. Id. Although there is Colorado estate tax due also, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-23.5102
(1990), it would not increase the total estate tax burden because the Colorado payment would be
credited against the federal estate tax. I.R.C. § 2011 (1995).
72. I.R.C. § 2032 may permit "a special use valuation" of land like Laura's at its current use
value under some circumstances. The maximum permitted reduction is $750,000. It might argu-
ably apply in this case, but would not significantly affect other similar cases involving higher, but
still realistic, values.
73. Saving the Ranch, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Nov. 27, 1995.
74. Hal Clifford, Can Private Conservation Stave Off Ski-Town Sprawl, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, Nov. 27, 1995, at 1, 10.
75. Conservation purposes include: (1) "the preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation
by, or the education of, the general public"; (2) "the protection of a relatively natural habitat of
fish, wildlife or plants, or similar ecosystem"; (3) "the preservation of certain open space (includ-
ing farmland and forest land)"; and (4) "the preservation of an historically important land area or
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interest can contain "a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may
be made of the real property. 76 Such restrictions include conservation ease-
ments. The value of the charitable deduction will be the "value" of the restric-
tion. The value of the restriction is generally the difference between the value
of the land unburdened by the restriction and its value subject to the restric-
tion."
In Laura's case, her land is worth $500,000 as a cattle ranch and $1 mil-
lion for development. If she grants away all development rights not associated
with maintaining her ranching operation, she can assert that she has reduced
the value of her land by one-half ($500,000). Under the federal tax code, she
may deduct the lesser of the value of the easement or 30% of her adjusted
gross income each year for a total of six years until the value of the gift is
depleted.78 Unless Laura has lots of income from other sources, she is unlike-
ly to be able to deduct the entire value of the donated easement, even over six
years. Nonetheless, if she meets all the requirements, the deduction is likely to
save her a great deal of money.
If Laura needs cash, the land trust may be able to find some and enter
into a "bargain sale" whereby Laura sells the easement to the trust at a price
below its "fair market value." She gets a charitable income tax deduction for
the difference between fair market value and the sale price, and some money.
The availability of money to purchase Laura's easement may not be a function
of the wealth of the land trust's backers but rather a function of the fact that a
government agency (federal, state, or local) may be a potential future
purchaser. Many land trusts engage in what they call "preacquisition"
-purchasing development rights from private parties and then turning them
over to the government for money."9 This enhances their financial prospects
and decreases the amount of time and money they must expend monitoring
and enforcing easements.
Laura's feelings about government may prevent her from entering into any
transaction through which a government entity will eventually get an interest
in her land."° Even so, she may still be the beneficiary of another form of
government market participation. State funding organizations-the State Board
of the Great Outdoors Colorado Trust Fund in Colorado--may directly provide
the Local Area Land Trust with funds to purchase an easement on the Dead-
a certified historic structure." Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d) (as amended in 1994). Each of these
four purposes is discussed at greater length in § 1.170A-14(d).
76. The Internal Revenue Service regulations define "perpetual conservation restriction" as
"a restriction granted in perpetuity on the use which may be made of real property-including, an
easement or other interest in real property .... " Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(b)(2) (emphasis added).
77. Keifer, supra note 13, at 136.
78. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(B), (D) (1995) and I.R.C. § 58 (1994) (if Laura dies before the end of
the six years, the deduction dies with her, but most of us are optimists about such things).
79. EvE ENDICOTr, LAND CONSERVATION THROUGH PUBIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 17-27
(1993).
80. Id. at 39-40 ("It should be said, however, that some landowners will never accept gov-
ernment ownership of their land.").
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lock Ranch. As of 1993, at least thirteen states had such direct funding mecha-
nisms in place."'
Third, by donating the easement, Laura effectively reduces the value of
her land, thereby sheltering her estate from federal estate tax and, perhaps,
local property tax. Colorado's conservation easement statute specifically pro-
vides:
Conservation easements in gross shall be subject to assessment,
taxation, or exemption from taxation in accordance with general laws
applicable to the assessment and taxation of interests in real
property.... Conservation easements in gross shall be assessed,
however, with due regard to the restricted uses to which the property
may be devoted.82
Fourth, the arrangement will be a private transaction between Laura and
the Local Area Land Trust: no "red tape" or government approval required.83
While the absence of the potential delay and expense often associated with
government participation is relatively obvious and objective, there are other
more subtle and subjective benefits associated with a private transaction.
Laura, as a rancher, familiar and unhappy with federal range control, may
place a premium on the absence of government from her preservation deal.
Having lived most of her life in the area, she may also place an additional
premium on the local nature of the transaction. Chances are good that the
Local Area Land Trust is a small organization concerned only with a small
area of the state and that its president is a volunteer. The 1994 Land Trust
Alliance survey reveals that approximately one-half of the 1,000 odd land
trusts in the United States have a budget of $10,000 a year or less, that 54%
of the nation's land trusts have no paid staff, and that 21% have a part-time
staff only.84
There is other news too. But it is probably not going to be bad news to
Laura. As discussed above, the easement must be created for specific purposes
81. Id. at 258-313.
82. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-109 (1990). In Village of Ridgewood v. The Bolger
Found., 517 A.2d 135 (N.J. 1986), the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the principle that a
taxpayer may reduce the value of her land and her property tax assessment by granting a conser-
vation easement to a conservation organization.
83. A few states do require approval of conservation easements by local governments or
government officials. Both Massachusetts and Nebraska require prior approval for any conserva-
tion easement. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 184, § 32 (1996); NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-2,112(3) (1995). The
Nebraska approval requirement ensures the sanction of local planning commissions. The Lower
Platte South Natural Resources District (NRD), which has undergone the Nebraska approval pro-
cess on three occasions, has not encountered any problems with the approval process. Telephone
Conversation with Dan Schulz, Lower Platte South Natural Resources Director (Apr. 24, 1996).
This may be due to the fact that the properties on which the NRD holds conservation easements
are not near any developed land. In Montana, the intended holder must present the proposed con-
veyance to the local planning authority for review, but their comments are not binding, merely
advisory. MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-206 (1995). For land to be placed in the Save Illinois Topsoil
Program, the land must have a management plan approved by the soil and water conservation
district of the county in which the land is located. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 505, para. 35/1-3(f), 35/2-1
(1996). Oregon requires any public entity considering obtaining a conservation easement to hold a
public hearing. OR. REv. STAT. § 271.735 (1987).
84. DIRECTORY, supra note 3, at vii.
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or uses.85 Technically, Laura cannot create the easement just to preserve the
ranch for her son, Martin, or save herself taxes. However, because the side
effects of preserving the ranch for natural or agricultural purposes will be to
preserve the ranch for her son and save both income and estate taxes, she is
unlikely to complain. If Laura wants her charitable income tax deduction, she
must donate to either a government entity or qualified conservation organiza-
tion as discussed above. She assumes the Local Area Land Trust qualifies. If
she wants her deduction, she must grant the easement "in perpetuity."
Despite the constraints on the potential transaction, Laura has choices. She
may drop the idea, give up the ranch, find some other way of paying estate
tax, or find another tax shelter mechanism. She may give up the idea of the
charitable deduction and grant a less-than-perpetual easement. She may grant a
perpetual easement and get all the benefits. If she takes this third option, she
presides over the happy marriage of public goals, as expressed in the legisla-
tion, and her private desires.
B. What Governments Did
If Laura grants an easement to the Local Area Land Trust, she will do so
at her kitchen table or in the modest land trust office with no government
representative present. The transaction will have the trappings, and "magic," of
a private deal. Yet, governments have acted at three levels to make that deal
both possible and attractive.
First, the state legislature fashioned the novel, negative, in gross, conser-
vation easement-a real property right which Laura may grant-and
authorized the land trust to hold it. In doing so, it delegated a traditional
sovereign regulatory function to a private entity. The "negative easement in
gross" created by the Deadlock transaction means no more or less than a right
for the holder of the easement, private or public, to regulate activities on the
servient estate. The holder of the conservation easement operates as a
regulatory authority charged with enforcing the mandate set forth in the
conservation easement document, just as a public agency operates as an
authority charged with enforcing the mandate generated by the municipal
zoning code or state wildlife law.
Second, the federal tax code provides Laura with both positive and
negative incentives. Potential estate tax liability on the unburdened ranch
creates a financial incentive to do something to shelter its value before she
dies. The charitable income tax deduction provides motivation to convey
85. Laura lives in Colorado where the law only requires a "Conservation easement in gross"
to be:
appropriate to the retaining or maintaining ... land, water, or airspace, including im-
provements, predominantly in a natural, scenic, or open condition, or for wildlife habitat,
or for agricultural, horticultural, recreational, forest, or other use or condition consistent
with the protection of open land having wholesome environmental quality or life-sustain-
ing ecological diversity, or appropriate to the conservation and preservation of buildings,
sites, or structures having historical, architectural, or cultural interest or value.
See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text; see infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
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development rights in the form of a conservation easement. Potential local
property tax and state income tax savings sweeten the pot.
Third, governments-federal, state, and local-have acted as market
participants in the "open space" market. Their interest in open space
significantly increases Laura's chances of getting cash compensation for her
easement both by creating a secondary market in which the Local Area Land
Trust may resell her easement and by providing direct funding to private
entities to buy easements like Laura's. Government market participation also
influences the cash value of Laura's easement by supporting the novel notion
that the right to regulate someone else's land, nowhere near your own, has a
significant value and the not-much-older idea that open space has value.
All this government influence does not taint the private transaction with
the negatives associated with government. It does not destroy the private
magic. Why not? From Laura's point of view the answer is relatively simple.
While governments shape her motivations and offer her tools with which to
achieve her goals-with a few exceptions-they neither make decisions for
her nor do they review the decision she makes. The easement will be executed
and recorded as a normal "private" land transaction, unquestioned unless chal-
lenged in court. Laura (or her accountant) will calculate the tax benefits she
receives. While she may run a significant risk of an audit, the issues in the
audit will probably be limited to quantitative matters, like the value of the
easement conveyed. 6
IV. THE LONG RUN
Unfortunately, after Laura dies and the ranch passes down to the next
generation or the one after, perceptions of the nature of the transaction may
change. Although government influence will diminish, the nature of the
arrangement will seem more and more like the most despised aspect of
government: regulation. The fact that the original transaction vested regulatory
power in the Local Area Land Trust was unimportant to Laura because her
wishes and the requirements of the regulatory regime were identical. However,
as the ranch passes into other hands that regulatory power may take on much
greater significance. The congruity of public good and private desire may
disappear.
A. The Third Generation
Laura grants the easement to the Local Area Land Trust and leaves the
burdened possessory estate-the Deadlock Ranch-to her son, Martin. During
his tenure he respects her wishes as to the ranch's maintenance and, as a re-
sult, gets along well with the people from the Local Area Land Trust. Three
decades pass. Martin dies and his daughter, Nora, receives the ranch through
his will. By now, the potential economics of the ranch have changed. As a
86. See, e.g., McLennan v. United States, 994 F.2d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Schwab v. Com-
missioner, No. 5297-90, 1994 WL 223175 (U.S. Tax Ct. May 25, 1994).
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result of continued declines in the price of beef, the ranch is still worth
$500,000 for the uses allowed by the easement. Ranching is now less common
in the area and a buyer who intends to ranch might be hard to find. However,
if the easement did not exist, the ranch would be worth $15 million for devel-
opment.
Nora is a moral person, but, like most of us, grew up in town. She has no
interest in ranching and barely remembers her grandmother Deadlock. She
cannot imagine any reasonable grandmother would have wanted to deprive her
of a life of cultural enrichment and leisure just to preserve a thousand acres of
scrubby ranchland. She goes to a lawyer and tells the lawyer that something
has gone terribly wrong. The lawyer tells her the bad news. The easement that
her grandmother granted to the Local Area Land Trust "runs with the land"
and binds all future owners, regardless of their feelings on the subject. The
restrictions are perpetual, and, therefore, neither Nora nor her heirs have any
hope of outlasting them. While Laura had choices, Nora apparently has none.
In Nora's eyes the easement is privatized regulation. The voluntariness of
the transaction, so important to her grandmother, is insignificant to Nora. The
private nature of the transaction is cold comfort. The people who run the
Local Area Land Trust, strangers to Nora, value "her" ranch as open space
and wildlife habitat and can summon the government's assistance in the form
of court action to ensure that Nora preserves the ranch for those purposes.
More than anything else, it is the "public" law, in the form of legislation and
courts, which separates Nora from her millions. The only quirk in the
otherwise common regulatory situation is that the job of regulating the Dead-
lock Ranch has been delegated to a private entity.
B. What Nora May Argue
At this point, Nora may decide, however unwillingly, to abide by her
grandmother's wishes. Or, she may decide to cast the dice, venturing a signif-
icant sum in litigation fees in an attempt to "break" the easement in the hope
of recouping a much greater sum by selling or developing the unburdened
ranch. Assume the die is cast, Nora returns to her lawyer and, suddenly, many
of the elements which made the original transaction such a happy marriage of
public and private now may aid in the frustration of the public goal.
1. Attacking the Holder
State conservation easement statutes require that a land trust be a "charita-
ble" organization committed to the preservation of land. Nora may assert that
the Local Area Land Trust is or was not. The Colorado statute and others like
it explicitly define "charitable" status in terms of the federal tax code. As
discussed above, the tax code requires that an organization pass a series of
tests to qualify as a "charitable organization.""7 Thirty years have passed. The
Local Area Land Trust has never had an adequate staff. Papers attesting to the
87. Supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
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minimum requirements for charitable, non-profit organization status may be
hard to come by.
The fact that the Internal Revenue Service accepted the land trust as a
"qualified organization" at the time of the transaction creates a presumption as
to its status "as long as there are no substantial changes in its character, pur-
poses or methods of operation.""8 However, in referencing the federal tax
code in its conservation easement statute, Colorado and states like it, have
placed no time limits on the requirement. Further, reference to the federal tax
law in the Colorado statute gives Nora an opportunity to make her challenge
to this federally formulated status in a state court.
A tax-exempt charitable organization must be organized exclusively for
exempt purposes. 9 The presence of a single [nonexempt] ... purpose, if sub-
stantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or im-
portance of truly [exempt] ... purposes."' By asserting that the land trust
engages in significant non-charitable activities, Nora can attack the land trust's
charitable status and the capacity of the land trust to qualify as a holder of
conservation easements under state law.
A particularly troubling line of cases for land trusts hold that otherwise
charitable organizations, whose activities benefit for-profit organizations with
which they maintain a business relationship, are ineligible for tax-exempt
status.9 Land trust operations often involve arrangements with local for-profit
organizations and land trust preservation acquisitions can enrich private
holders of nearby land by guaranteeing their scenic vistas or open space
access.92 In McLennan v. United States,93 the Internal Revenue Service
challenged the tax-exempt status of the Western Pennsylvania Conservancy,
asserting that the land trust had forfeited that status by engaging in "private
inurement.' 94
Imagine, for example, that Nora files a subdivision plan with the
appropriate local authorities. The Local Area Land Trust gets wind of the plan
and, after getting no satisfaction from Nora, files an action in the Colorado
88. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 36.1 (6th ed. 1992).
89. The income tax regulations provide that "[aln organization will be regarded as 'operated
exclusively' for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which
accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3)." Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-(1)(c) (as amended in 1990).
90. Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945), quoted in Tax. CL
Mem. Dec.
91. Housing Pioneers v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (C.C.H.) 2191 (1993) (holding ineligible
for 501(c)(3) status a charitable low income housing organization whose activities benefitted asso-
ciated commercial entities).
92. A number of parties challenging tax-exempt status in federal court have found their
claims barred on standing grounds. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26 (1976); Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Standing might be less of a problem
for parties challenging the tax-exempt status of a specific land trust holding a specific easement
that directly affected the plaintiff's financial status. This is particularly true when the removal of
tax-exempt status might directly prevent the organization under attack from enforcing that ease-
ment as a result of conditions imposed by state conservation easement law.
93. 23 Cl, Ct. 99, 103 (1991).
94. The United States Claims Court dismissed the claim on the ground that it was not
redressable by that court. McLennan, 23 Cl. Ct. at 103.
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District Court for the county in which the Deadlock Ranch is located, seeking
an injunction to prohibit the sale of any subdivision lot, arguing that the
conservation easement Laura signed prohibits subdivision. Nora's lawyer
answers the Land Trust's complaint by admitting the existence of the
prohibition against subdivision, but asserting that the Land Trust is not entitled
to enforce it because the Land Trust cannot be a conservation easement holder
under Colorado law. Nora's lawyer's papers paint a picture of the Local Area
Land Trust as a clique of local landowners who have manipulated the state
conservation easement statute and federal tax law for their own personal ends
and financial gain-private land use control to achieve private ends. As a
result, Nora's lawyer argues, the Land Trust is not a "charitable" organization.
In the face of this argument, the local district judge must decide whether or
not to enforce the terms of the easement as written thirty years before, terms
that reduce the value of the land Nora owns to a small part of its potential.
Many conservation easements provide the easement holder with the power
to transfer the easement to another charitable organization, a "back-up
grantee."'95 If Nora can establish, however, that the Local Area Land Trust is
not a valid easement holder, she can argue that it lacks the power to transfer
the easement to another.96
2. Attacking the Circumstances
The state statutes authorizing conservation easements require that they be
created in ways that further preservation. Nora may assert that the easement
under which she suffers was not. While we know that Laura Deadlock granted
the easement for a "conservation purpose," the incentive structure imposed by
federal tax law almost assures that she had other reasons to grant the
easement. If Nora asserts that the transaction was no more than a tax shelter
masquerading as preservation, she may question the validity of the property
right created by state law.97
In states like California, which have specific purpose requirements for the
existence of conservation easements," Nora may make arguments based on
motives now thirty years in the past. Laura's correspondence with Martin is
likely to contain more about the tax benefits of the easement than the beauty
and preservation-worthiness of the ranch they both knew well.
95. JANET DEIL. & THOMAS S. BARRETT, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK:
MANAGING LAND CONSERVATION AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION EASEMENT PROGRAMS 111-16
(1988).
96. If the terms of the easement give the back-up grantee a perpetual option to take the
easement from the Local Area Land Trust or an executory interest transferring the easement to the
back-up grantee upon the failure of the Local Area Land Trust, the interest may violate the Rule
Against Perpetuities, common law or statutory. Although under the Uniform Statutory Rule, adopt-
ed in Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-1101 to -1107 (1990), the option could last only for
90 years.
97. Compare McLennan v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 99, 103 (1991) (rejecting an IRS attack
on a conservation easement transaction).
98. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
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In states like Colorado, in which the restrictions need be "appropriate" for
the enumerated statutory purposes," Nora's arguments will be different but
equally dangerous. Thirty years will have brought unexpected changes. Nora
will argue that the easement is no longer "appropriate" for a conservation
purpose. Traditionally, the equitable doctrine of changed conditions allows a
court to alter or terminate a real covenant or equitable servitude when changed
conditions in or around the burdened land frustrate the original purpose of the
restriction." The doctrine of changed conditions is probably applicable to
conservation easements."° The combination of the doctrine of changed con-
ditions and the preservation-appropriate requirements in conservation easement
statutes may provide fertile ground for arguments to invalidate easements
when plaintiffs like Nora can convince a court that the easement no longer
serves a purpose the legislature contemplated.
Imagine, for example, that during Martin's ownership of the Deadlock
Ranch, the Hypothetical Power Authority condemned a right-of-way for a
high-tension power line across the ranch. 2 Assume the power line, hanging
eighty feet in the air from large steel poles, affects the scenic nature of the
ranch but does not prevent its operation as a ranch. Nora files her subdivision
plan. The Land Trust sues. Nora's lawyer can argue that the existence of the
power line frustrates Laura's original intent and renders the easement "inap-
propriate" for protection of the purposes set forth in the Colorado statute, and
thereby challenge the enforceability of the easement.
Statute-based arguments like those discussed above, if successful, would
likely result in the invalidation of the conservation easement. The limited,
novel, and statutory nature of conservation easements suggests that any pur-
ported conservation restriction that fails to meet the requirements of the state
statute that authorizes it is invalid, supported by neither legislative action nor
common law tradition. The prefatory note accompanying the 1995 pocket part
to the Uniform Conservation Easement Act states:
The Act enables durable restrictions and affirmative obligations to be
attached to real property to protect natural and historic resources.
The Act thus makes it possible for Owner to transfer a restriction
upon the use of Blackacre to Conservation, Inc., which will be en-
forceable by Conservation and its successors ...
99. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
100. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES §§ 4.10, 9.39 (A. James Casner ed., 1952).
101. Jeffrey A. Blackie, Conservation Easements and the Doctrine of Changed Conditions, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1989); Korngold, supra note 12, at 484-86.
102. Condemnation is a serious issue in the long-term preservation of conservation easements.
See Town of Libertyville v. Bank of Waukegan, 504 N.E.2d 1305 (IIl. App. Ct. 1987) (under
Illinois' Township Open Space Act, town lacked authority to condemn conservation easement on
qualified agricultural land); BRENDA LIND, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT STEWARDSHIP GUIDE
78-80 (1991).
103. UNIF. CONSERV. EASEMENT ACT, comment to 1995 pocket part (emphasis added). The
lists of explicit immunizations from common law property doctrines common in authorization
statutes further highlight the statute-dependent nature of conservation easements. The Uniform law
provides seven:
A conservation easement is valid even though:
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In 1985, in Parkinson v. Board of Assessors,"° the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts struck down a conservation restriction covering three
tracts of land totaling 82.17 acres because, in the court's opinion, the restric-
tion was ambiguous about the extent of the grantors' reserved right to main-
tain a single family residence "with usual appurtenant outbuildings and struc-
tures." °t In the following year, in response to a motion for rehearing, the
court reversed itself, holding that the restriction met all the requirements of the
state's conservation restriction law."° Although a victory for the validity of
conservation easements and restrictions, the Parkinson case highlights the
statutory dependence of these novel conservation property rights.
3. The Statute of Limitations
Rather than force a court challenge of the Local Area Land Trust's right
to enforce the terms of the easement, Nora may simply violate its provisions
and hope the Local Area Land Trust takes no action until the statute of limita-
tions has run. Many states have extremely short statutes of limitations for
property or contractual claims. Arguably, the statute of limitations, for conser-
vation easement enforcement claims in Colorado is one year. 7
Assume the Local Area Land Trust has received two easements a year for
each year since Laura transferred her original easement. The land trust has at
least sixty easements to monitor. The overburdened land trust staff try to ade-
quately monitor each easement once a year as the Land Trust Alliance's Land
Trust Standards suggest,"°m but to do so they must monitor more than one
easement a week. If the Land Trust limits easement monitoring to the season
during which its inspector has a good chance of seeing the Deadlock Ranch
under less than six inches of snow, the available part of the year will shrink to
six months and the number of easements to be monitored per week multiply to
(1) it is not appurtenant to an interest in real property;
(2) it can be or has been assigned to another holder,
(3) it is not of a character that has been recognized traditionally at com-
mon law;
(4) it imposes a negative burden;
(5) it imposes affirmative obligations upon the owner of an interest in the
burdened property or upon the holder,
(6) the benefit does not touch or concern real property; or
(7) there is no privity of estate or of contract.
UNIF. CONSERV. EASEMErrr Acr § 4. A servitude that fails to satisfy the statutory definition of
"conservation easement" cannot benefit from these and similar statutory protections.
104. 481 N.E.2d 491 (Mass. 1985).
105. Parkinson, 481 N.E.2d at 492-93.
106. Parkinson v. Board of Assessors, 495 N.E.2d 294, 296 (Mass. 1986).
107. Conservation easements typically contain building restrictions concerning real property.
Two Colorado cases have determined that set-back requirements are building restrictions concern-
ing real property. McDowell v. United States, 870 P.2d 656, 658 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Styers v.
Mara, 631 P.2d 1138, 1139-40 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). In Colorado, the statute of limitations for
actions involving "any building restriction concerning real property" is one year. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 38-41-119 (1990).
108. LIND, supra note 102, at 28.
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three or more. A single monitoring omission might foreclose any meaningful
remedy for a major violation of the easement restrictions.
Imagine, for example, in April of year 30 the Local Area Land Trust does
its annual inspection of the Deadlock Ranch. Nothing is amiss. In May of year
30, Nora starts construction of the Deadlock Spa and Resort. By the end of the
summer, the foundations of the garish buildings have been put in place, the
ranch roads have been paved, and miles of new plumbing installed. In April of
year 31 the land trust returns to do its inspection. To avoid trouble, Nora has
taken the opportunity to vacation elsewhere. Four inches of late snow hide the
ground level improvements. The Land Trust representative walks the property
boundaries and visually surveys the entire thousand-acre property in the fading
evening light, but fails to notice the new foundations and roads. In April of
year 32 the land trust returns again to find the completed resort. The land trust
calls its lawyers to take immediate action. Nora argues that the land trust
should have discovered the construction when it began almost two years be-
fore and the statute of limitations bars any enforcement action." 9
4. The Problem of Perpetuity
The perpetual nature of conservation easements makes them precarious.
The real property system favors alienability, relying on market transfer to
provide the highest and best use for land."' Under some circumstances,
courts have invalidated interests which effectively restrain alienability."'
Generally, courts' willingness to accept restrictions that limit alienability has
been inversely proportional to the duration of the restriction."2 Accordingly,
perpetual restrictions should be subject to a high level of scrutiny."'
When a property interest is held for preservation we are inclined to accept
preservation as the highest and best use of that property. When a property
interest is held for other purposes, however, and somehow restricted for pres-
109. This analysis does not change the "discovery rule" tolling statutes of limitations until the
plaintiff knew or should have known about the condition giving rise to her claim. Tolling applies
to violations of COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-41-119. The statute makes no reference to discovery and
its applicability may be an open question. See McDowell, 870 P.2d at 658. Whether or not the dis-
covery rule applies, the statute should run from the initial groundbreaking.
110. For an excellent discussion of this aspect of the conservation easement issue, see Dana &
Ramsey, supra note 12, at 2, 21-31.
111. Cast v. National Bank of Commerce, 183 N.W.2d 485 (Neb. 1971) (invalidating the con-
dition on a defeasible fee as a de facto restraint on alienability).
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERvrruDES) § 3.4 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1991)
[hereinafter PROPERTY (SERvrruoEs)](addressing direct restraints on alienation) ("In determining
the injurious consequences likely to flow from enforcement of a restraint on alienation, the nature,
extent, and duration of the restraint are important considerations.... Another important factor is
the nature of the property interest and the type of land or development involved. Generally, great-
er restraints are justified on estates of lesser duration than on estates of longer duration .... ").
113. Dana and Ramsey point out that the common law is more inclined to accept long-term
restraints on alienation when those restraints are created on behalf of a charitable organization,
like a land trust, because we assume that a property right created in favor of a charitable organiza-
tion does the public some good and should not be struck down. Dana & Ramsey, supra note 12,
at 28-29. However, the inflexibility of a conservation easement once granted and the length of
time for which it may last, make a variety of attacks on this presumption of public good very easy
as, I hope, the rest of this section illustrates.
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ervation, the analysis becomes more complicated. The conservation ease-
ment-with its restrictions tailor-made to achieve the wishes of the original
landowner, the land trusts, and the government-has the potential to severely
restrict the alienability of the underlying possessory interest-Nora's interest
in the ranch. If, under the terms of the easement, the ranch can only be used
to raise cattle, then only cattle ranchers will buy it. If people stop raising cattle
in the mountains of Colorado, then no one will buy it. The specificity and
durability of the restrictions the easement imposes are among its greatest vir-
tues, but, from Nora's point of view, they may also provide a persuasive argu-
ment for invalidating it.
The Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes)
draws a distinction between "direct" and "indirect" restraints on alien-
ation-subjecting the former sort to invalidation if they are "unreasonable"' 4
and the latter sort to invalidation only if they are without "rational justifica-
tion." '  Conservation restrictions are "indirect" restraints on alienation and
are therefore subject to the rational justification standard."6 This indi-
rect/direct distinction, however, is new in the Restatement Third 7 and the
reported cases still suggest that any restraint may be struck down if "unreason-
able."" 8
In his article, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis
in the Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, Professor Gerald
Korngold, no great fan of perpetual conservation servitudes, provides a variety
of doctrine- and policy-based arguments to challenge perpetual conservation
easements." 9 Korngold asserts that courts might imply a "reasonable dura-
tion" to terminate conservation easements. This approach allows a court to
impose "reasonable" limitations on land use restrictions when no express point
of termination exists.'20 Korngold also asserts that the relative hardship doc-
trine provides a basis for terminating conservation easements. The doctrine
gives a court authority to deny injunctive relief for violation of a covenant or
servitude if issuing the injunction would do more harm than it would
prevent.2' While application of this doctrine would not prevent land trusts
from collecting damages for violations of easements they held, damages would
not preserve the land and would be extremely difficult to prove.
Korngold fears that these doctrines will be inadequate to make land sub-
ject to conservation servitudes as alienable as he would like. Proponents of
preservation should scrutinize these doctrines, however, because they give
114. PROPERTY (SERVITUDES), supra note 112, § 3.4.
115. Id. § 3.5.
116. Id. § 3.5 cmt.
117. Id. § 3.5 reporter's note.
118. Turner v. Clutts, 565 So. 2d 92 (Ala. 1990) (suggesting that restrictions that amount to a
prohibition of all use of the servient estate are void); Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Kerr, No. I 1-
017, 1986 WL 7307 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 1986) (modifying restriction limiting use of site to
corporate headquarters on ground that it was unduly restrictive).
119. Korngold, supra note 12, at 480-95 (these include reasonable duration doctrine, changed
conditions doctrine, and relative hardship doctrine).
120. Id. at 479-80.
121. Id. at 486-89.
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courts the power to weigh the values protected by a conservation easement
against the value of the alienability of the land in which those values are em-
bodied. For example, in our hypothetical case, the district court judge might be
inclined to balance the $14.5 million the easement costs Nora against the
values (say, 980 acres of open space, 150 acres of elk winter range, five bea-
ver ponds and lodges, one golden eagle nest, etc.) protected by the Deadlock
conservation easement.
5. The Problem of Resources
The responsibility of enforcing the private regulation embodied in a con-
servation easement falls on the land trust rather than on the state. The land
trust may have a small fraction of the financial resources Nora is willing to
spend in litigation and much less incentive to protect a thirty-year-old transac-
tion than Nora has to achieve her personal enrichment. The treasury regula-
tions governing the tax deductibility of easement gifts provide little incentive
for funding enforcement of easements.'22 How can a land trust with an annu-
al budget of $10,000 a year and no paid staff members hope to defend its
rights created by a conservation easement from an attack by a landowner who
may have tens of millions of dollars to gain by developing the servient land?
The scales tilt even more when the land trust may find itself challenged by
more than one such landowner.
In contemplating these arguments, one must start by accepting that some
conservation easements certainly should be struck down. Humans' capacity to
predict the future is spotty at best and limitations on land use created in perpe-
tuity will inevitably generate problems. If, in fifty years, the Deadlock Ranch
is an urban waste surrounded by a mountain city of five million peo-
ple-absurd for ranching, unavailable as a park under the terms of the ease-
ment, a dump and breeding ground for all manner of urban ills, and loved
only by the open-space crazed principals of the anachronistic land trust-then
the easement should go. Once we accept this, the issue becomes how do we
tell the easements that really no longer serve a significant public purpose from
those for which someone is merely motivated to argue a lack of public pur-
pose for personal financial reasons. This sometimes difficult and often factual
sifting will be left to the courts. In many cases, the complex and financially
exhausting task of defense will fall on private land trusts.
In sum, the limitations that governments placed on Laura's original trans-
action-to shape it to further a public purpose-provide ammunition for her
granddaughter in her attempt to frustrate that public purpose. The private, local
nature of the transaction, so congenial to the first generation, now provides the
third generation with a relatively smaller and weaker adversary in her attempt
to overturn her grandmother's wishes.
122. David Farrier, Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for Management or
Compensation for Lost Expectations, 19 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 303, 349 (1995).
1100 [Vol. 73:4
PUBLIC GOOD AND PRIVATE MAGIC
V. CONCLUSION: FACING OUR PROBLEMS
As I noted earlier, these problems are not insurmountable. Solutions
abound, some traditionally private, others traditionally public. Indeed, the few
reported court cases involving the enforcement of conservation easements
suggest the willingness of courts to enforce conservation restrictions and
respect the policy behind them.'23 It is the contemplation of the potential
side-effects of these solutions that is, perhaps, most intriguing, and draws us
back to the New Private Law. What can be done to protect the public good
associated with transactions like Laura's from Nora's private desires without
destroying the "private magic" which allows the conservation easement
transaction to do more for the public good than traditional public regulation?
"Private" solutions seem the obvious place to start because they are least
likely to dissipate the private magic. Careful easement drafting, the inclusion
of attorneys' fee-shifting provisions (allowing prevailing easement holders to
recover their fees) in easement documents, and the careful creation and main-
tenance of extrinsic evidence of the intent of parties to the transaction will
help. Careful maintenance of land trust records and scrupulous observance of
the requirements of non-profit organization status are also important. For the
conciliatory, arbitration clauses concerning changed conditions will seem a
wise inclusion.'24 For the more bloody-minded, "poison-pill" arrangements
whereby the underlying possessory interest in the ranch is rendered defeasible
upon the frustration of the conservation purpose (to Laura Deadlock so long as
used as a ranch... ) may seem attractive. But will these be sufficient? They
may deprive Nora of many of her arguments, but they will not remove her
financial incentive, nor will they remove the insecurity of any perpetual land
use limitation.
The obvious "public" solution to the remaining problems is creation of a
government right, and duty, to third-party enforcement of easement condi-
tions. ' If state governments can enforce the terms of the easement against
123. Madden v. The Nature Conservancy, 823 F. Supp. 815 (D. Mont. 1992) (holding that a
conservation servitude could be created by reservation); Bennett v. Commissioner of Food &
Agriculture, 576 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. 1991) (holding enforceable a conservation restriction on the
location of a dwelling even though the state conservation restriction statute did not specifically
reference dwelling location restrictions); Goldmuntz v. Town of Chilmark, 651 N.E.2d 864 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1995) (holding that construction of in-ground swimming pool was not improvement of
existing dwelling subject on property subject to conservation restriction).
124. LIND, supra note 102, at 59-61.
125. The Uniform Conservation Easement Statute takes a significant step in this direction by
including a "third-party right of enforcement" to be held by a party other than the easement
holder. The comment accompanying the statute states:
Recognition of a "third-party right of enforcement" enables the parties to structure into
the transaction a party that is not an easement "holder," but which, nonetheless, has the
right to enforce the terms of the easement .... But the possessor of the third-party
enforcement right must be a governmental body or a charitable corporation, association,
or trust. Thus, if Owner transfers a conservation easement on Blackacre to Conservation,
Inc., he could grant to Preservation, Inc., a charitable corporation, the right to enforce
the terms of the easement, even though Preservation was not the holder, and Preserva-
tion would be free of the common law impediments eliminated by the Act (Section 4).
Under this Act, however, Owner could not grant a similar right to Neighbor, a private
person.
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Nora or defend in any action she brings to break the easement, then the finan-
cial power of the state more than matches her multi-million dollar incentive.
Of greater value, the state may speak in court, for the people, about the public
value of the easement. But if we create such a public right, will future Laura
Deadlocks grant easements? Will they come to see the whole land trust move-
ment as a disguised public land grab? Will the private magic disappear?
As we wandered out of the auditorium into the misty California sunshine,
it occurred to me that the pile-clad activists around me-few of whom were
lawyers-had put their trust in the complex and sometimes contradictory bal-
ance of public and private law that undergirds the land trust movement. The
validity of the work they did and the future of the places they loved best de-
pended upon it. We lawyers may smile secretly at "private magic" and the
idea of legal limitations in perpetuity, but they take these ideas at face value
and sell them to landowners across the country. We owe them our best think-
ing and best efforts in preserving the balance and the magic.
UNIF. CONSERV. EASEMENT ACT § 3.5 cmt. (1981).
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RICHARD B. COLLINS'
A few weeks ago I was listening to my car radio during the Paul Harvey
talk show. I have an imperfect knowledge of radio talk shows because I listen
to them only in the car, and I don't drive much. But my general impression
had been that Mr. Harvey had mellowed in recent years and was not nearly as
ardent as the new wave of hard-righters, such as Rush Limbaugh. Harvey had
seemed related to Limbaugh the way that Barry Goldwater is to Phil Gramm.
On the subject of land trusts, I was wrong. Harvey delivered a jeremiad
against the Nature Conservancy worthy of anything one might hear from Rush.
The evil moguls of the Nature Conservancy, flush with cash, sneak up on
unsuspecting land owners and (horrors) buy their land on the open market!
Since then, Pat Buchanan has assumed the national mantle of anti-market
political guru. So maybe Mr. Harvey will be backing Pat for Commander-in-
Chief. That used to be a military post, but in the New World Order, Pat would
switch the position to mercantilism. There is a cheery sort of nostalgia for
Japan as the enemy.
It is useful to have markets in mind as we evaluate conservation ease-
ments and land trusts. As Professor Cheever has shown, there are various
public interest arguments against enforcement of some conservation easements
after the passage of a generation or two.'
The danger in judicialized America is to avoid turning judges loose to do
whatever they wish according to their view of the public interest, or to make
conservation easements into one more version of litigation lotto. The hypothet-
ical case of Deadlock Ranch is a fine example. We are told that Nora will
make over $14 million if her lawyers can break the land trust created by her
grandmother and paid for by tax deductions. This is another variation on $4
million for a repainted BMW.2 We need to leave such inducements to Las
Vegas.
Historically, the courts have done a pretty good job of addressing obsoles-
cent land restrictions. The problem they have tried to address is maintaining
the alienability of land-that is, freeing land markets from private efforts to
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado. B.A., Yale University, 1960; L.L.B., Harvard
University School of Law, 1966.
1. See Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and
Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077
(1996).
2. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1589
(1995) (overturning jury award of $4 million for failing to disclose that a new BMW had been
repainted).
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gum them up and from the unintended effects of private arrangements made
long ago under very different conditions.
The proper solution, which courts have followed, is to make sure that
there are owners in the present generation who can bargain about whether
dead-hand restrictions should be maintained. Courts have used various devices
to achieve this, such as the Rule Against Perpetuities,3 the rule against unrea-
sonable restraints on alienation,4 the doctrine of changed conditions for cove-
nants,5 and the courts' power to interpret ambiguous conveyances and statutes
in favor of alienability.6 Some courts have gone further under the rubric of
relative hardship!
Even when there are persons in the present generation who can bargain
over land restrictions, transaction costs can block effective bargaining. When
subdivision covenants benefit many owners and no provision for majority rule
is in place, it is unlikely that one can obtain unanimous consent for modifica-
tion or release. To meet this problem, courts have developed the doctrine of
changed conditions, and, in its proper use, the doctrine of relative hardship.!
A related problem occurs when future interests are retained by creators of
defeasible fee interests and come to be owned by many scattered heirs of the
original owners. Common law courts have failed to find a generally satisfacto-
ry solution to this problem. Various strategies, however, have overcome some
barriers. The situation is not common and is diminishing as defeasible fees are
less often created.9
Conservation easements present none of these problems because owner-
ship cannot be divided. The easement is created in a unitary organization,
either a government or private corporation. The common law rule against
division of ownership of the benefit of an easement in gross ought to apply
(the "one-stock" rule),"0 so there should always be one owner in the present
generation who can bargain about modification or release of a restriction.
This is not to say that conservation easements cannot become obsolete.
But when they do, barriers to alienation do not arise from multiple ownership.
Rather, any barriers must derive from the terms of the easement itself or from
governing legislation.
Deadlock Ranch is an example. Laura did not like government and pre-
ferred a land trust because it was private. So the terms of the easement may
3. See 3 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY ch. 28 (Thomas ed. 1994) [hereinafter THOMP-
SON].
4. See id. ch. 29.
5. See 7 id. § 62.15.
6. The previous rules were created by English judges. Ambiguities are construed against
other barriers to alienation, such as defeasible fee interests. See 2 id. § 20.07.
7. E.g., Lange v. Schofield, 567 So. 2d 1299, 1302 (Ala. 1990).
8. See 7 THOMPSON, supra note 3, § 62.15. The doctrine of changed conditions is recog-
nized by § 3 of the Uniform Act and its comments, but the comments acknowledge that its appli-
cation to interests called "easements" may be "problematic" under the law of some states. UNIF.
CONSERV. EASEMENT Acr § 3, 12 U.L.A. 68, 77 (Supp. 1995); see infra notes 13-15 and accom-
panying text.
9. See 2 THOMPSON, supra note 3, ch. 20.
10. See Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass'n, 200 A. 646, 651-52 (Pa. 1938).
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bar conveyance to a government. Other contractual barriers to alienation can
appear in the terms of a conservation easement. When these become serious
barriers to alienability, however, they should be subject to the common law
rule barring unreasonable restraints on alienation." This would free a mori-
bund or broke land trust to convey either to government or to a robust land
trust.
Turn now to governing legislation. Common law easements may be re-
united with the fee by voluntary, private action. What of statutory conservation
easements? May private land trusts reconvey to the fee owner? Is the rule
otherwise when an easement is owned by government?
Governing state legislation might prohibit a conveyance to the fee owner.
For example, the Colorado statute that would govern Deadlock Ranch pro-
vides: "A conservation easement in gross is an interest in real property freely
transferable in whole or in part for the purposes stated in [this article] and
transferable by any lawful method for the transfer of interests in real property
in this state."' 2 One can argue that this bans transfers to the fee owner be-
cause such would not be for the purposes stated in the statute. If so, this is
contrary to the common law. It is a permanent restraint on alienation of the
development rights in the land. And it can, over time, create a barrier to alien-
ability of the burdened fee interest, when allowed uses become obsolete. How-
ever, the Colorado statute is not clear, and courts concerned with alienability
should read it otherwise. A land trust holding an obsolete restriction could sell
it to the fee owner and reinvest the proceeds in other easements or land, thus
serving the statutory purposes. Government-held easements could be sold yet
more freely.
The Uniform Conservation Easement Act 3 is friendlier still to
alienability. Section 2(a) states: "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, a
conservation easement may be . . . assigned, released, modified, terminated, or
otherwise altered or affected in the same manner as other easements."'' 4 The
comments expressly recite:
The state's requirements concerning release of conventional ease-
ments apply as well to conservation easements because nothing in the
Act provides otherwise. On the other hand, if the state's existing law
does not permit easements in gross to be assigned, it will not be ap-
plicable to conservation easements because Section 4(2) effectively
authorizes their assignment.'"
If land trusts can reconvey to fee owners, one may argue that the trusts
will not behave like rational market actors, so the bilateral monopoly prob-
lem 6 is heightened, and intervention by judges is justified. I would not
11. See supra note 4.
12. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-30.5-101 to -110 (1982 & Supp. 1995).
13. UNIF. CONSERV. EASEMENT ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 173 (1996). The U.L.A. edition reported
that 16 states and the District of Columbia had adopted this act. Id.
14. Id. § 2(a) at 173.
15. Id. at 174. Section 4(2) provides, "A conservation easement is valid even though: ... (2)
it can be or has been assigned to another holder." Id. at 179.
16. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 61-62, 253-54 (4th ed. 1992).
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accept this argument. If there are parties able to bargain over ending land
restrictions, that ought to end any need for judicial intervention. If the need is
great enough, legislatures will respond. Eminent domain is available. Any
greater judicial intervention will destabilize the conservation easement. Securi-
ty of property rights in conservation easements is as much in the public inter-
est as any other. If judges with Paul Harvey's mindset persuade themselves
that conservation easements are uniquely evil interests, they will be tempted to
undo them and try to confine the rule to conservation easements. But the genie
of remaking property won't be so easily confined. Judges with other attitudes
will apply "public interest" reasoning elsewhere. True, lawyers will be busy.
Too busy.
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How does God reward or punish us after death?
After death God either makes us happy in Heaven, or punishes us in
Purgatory or Hell, according to our deeds.
What is Hell?
Hell is the place of everlasting suffering.
What is Purgatory?
Purgatory is a place of punishment, where the souls of the just suffer
after death, until they are entirely purified.
What is Heaven?
Heaven is a place of everlasting happiness for those who have loved
God and served God in this life.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Choosing between purgatory and hell is easy. I argue in this article that
contract may offer sexual marginorities2 a legal purgatory, where they suffer
until they are sufficiently purified to enter the heavenly realm of public rights
(or until the law is purified of anti-gay bias). By sexual marginority I mean
groups generally associated with the gay rights movement (gay men, lesbians,
1. THE BALTIMORE CATECHISM No. 1, Lessons 174-78 (1930) (footnote omitted). I am
grateful to Mary Becker for bringing this source to my attention.
2. Marginority is a cross between marginality (which all women and people of color collec-
tively experience) and minority (which describes gay people as well as particular racial or ethnic
groups, but not straight women). The term marginority also corrects the inaccuracy of the phrases
"women and gays," and "women and Blacks," which suggest that there are neither lesbians nor
African-American women, and certainly not African-American lesbians. Depending on context, it
can also include other disadvantaged groups, such as children. I discuss children as marginorities
to the extent that I discuss the movement of child sexual abuse regulation in my model. For fur-
ther discussion of relations between the categories of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, see Fran-
cisco X. Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex,"




bisexuals, and transgendered people) and sometimes heterosexual women or
children. My main point is that contractual purgatory is not everything, but it's
not nothing, either.3
I challenge the conventional wisdom that contracting is hazardous for the
health and wealth of people on the margins4 by asserting that sexual
marginorities may be a limited exception to the rule. Specifically, I explore
whether contract may benefit sexual marginorities by offering a purgatory be-
tween the hell of public condemnation and the heaven of public rights.
I began this project with a hunch that gay people may find an unexpected
source of rights in contract. I found, as expected, both practical and theoretical
benefits of gay-related contracts. Inspired by faculty discussions debating the
nature and existence of New Private Law, I expanded the scope of my inquiry
to test whether other sexual regulations might similarly pass through an inter-
mediate stage between public condemnation and publc rights. As expected, I
found a progression between prohibition and license for many sexual regula-
tions. This way station is most clearly contractual for gay people, in that gay
cohabitation and non-discrimination employment contracts fit the classical
definition of contract. While other regulations such as abortion and marital
rape also hover between public condemnation and public rights, the way sta-
tion for these regulations is less clearly contractual. Yet it often turns on con-
sent, which is of course also a crucial element of contract. My project thus is
more to suggest a general pattern than to announce that all sexual regulations
are contractualized at some point.
Toward this end I offer a model that describes how selected sexual regu-
lations progress between the public extremes of condemnation and rights,
sometimes stopping along the way in contract. This contractual way station
may grant rights to sexual marginorities that are unavailable under public law
because of majoritarian moral opposition. If so, contractual purgatory offers an
unexpected safe haven in contract law, unexpected because contract is widely
perceived as a tool for politically conservative ends.'
3. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DiscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAW
116 (1987) ("Law is not everything in this respect, but it is not nothing either.").
4. See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13
CREIGfrON L. REV. 441, 444 (1979) ("[Tjhe doctrine of freedom of contract... legitimizes the
natural tendency of the strong to prey on the weak .... ); Kellye Y. Testy, An Unlikely Resurrec-
tion, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 219, 222 (1995) (Feminists have critiqued contract analysis' reliance on
the bargain model of exchange which "presupposes norms of equality (of bargaining power) and
freedom (to choose whether to contract)" and "fuel[s] a market-based economy ... [by] encourag-
ing unadulterated self-interest and commodification.").
5. E.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996). Ann Estin de-
scribes the preference for private over collective decisionmaking as characteristic of economic
thought, and the law and economics school is widely perceived as politically conservative. Ann L.
Estin, Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U. Can. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 517, 541 (1995).
Law and economics analysis, of course, can also yield progressive results. See, e.g., Ian Ayres,
Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV.
817 (1991); Jennifer Hertz, Note, Physicians with AIDS: A Proposal for Efficient Disclosure, 59
U. On. L. REV. 749 (1992).
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In the descriptive part of this article, I explain how regulation of sodomy,
abortion, miscegenation, fornication, and cross-dressing fit into my model, and
suggest that regulations of child sexual abuse and marital rape traverse a pre-
dictable path in the opposite direction. Then I apply the model in some detail
to gay-related regulations, concluding that gay people are currently at multiple
places in the model, but generally in contractual purgatory.
Finally, after detailing the model and gay regulations' place in it, I
suggest that contractual purgatory may be both practically and theoretically
beneficial to gay people. It will not, however, benefit all marginorities. Het-
erosexual women, for example, already benefit from public rights such as
abortion. Practically speaking, they are able to obtain certain public rights,
such as freedom from employment discrimination. In contrast, gay people are
more likely to obtain modest contractual protections than they are expansive
public rights. As a theoretical matter, the gay community may also benefit
from using tools generally associated with the political right-wing, since doing
so destabilizes categories and thus opens up social spaces that were formerly
closed to gay people.
Another theoretical advantage of contractual purgatory for sexual
marginorities is that contract is an important element of the social construction
of legal personhood, so that enforcing gay-related contracts is an essential step
towards gay people becoming legal persons. Thus, contract serves a crucial
function in shepherding gay people from a position where they are socially
constructed as criminals to a place where they are constructed as full members
of society.
My theory also offers a new role for contract within progressive thought,
a somewhat counterintuitive proposal since contract has been roundly criticized
by progressive scholars. Critical Legal Theorists and Realists have attacked the
political underpinnings of contract on a number of grounds. Some claim con-
tract law is not as private as it claims to be, but is instead public because
elected or politically appointed judges decide which contracts are enforce-
able.6 This critique argues that private contracts are thus not truly private, but
mere reflections of majoritarian values as voiced through judges who represent
and implement class, race, and gender privilege.
A second critique of contract law challenges the legal fiction of consent in
a situation where one or more of the parties did not fully understand the na-
ture of the bargain, or were induced by economic or other inequality in bar-
gaining power to agree to a particular contract.7 A third progressive critique
6. See, e.g., Moris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553, 586 (1933)
("[Tlhe law of contract may be viewed as a subsidiary branch of public law, as a body of rules
according to which the sovereign power of the state will be exercised as between the parties to a
more or less voluntary transaction."); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract
Doctrine, 94 YALE LJ. 997, 1094, 1113 (1985) ("Doctrinal arguments cast in terms of public and
private, manifestation and intent, and form and substance ... encourage us to simplify in a way
that denies the complexity, and ambiguity, of human relationships.... [Tlhe world of contract
doctrine [is] ... one in which a comparatively few mediating devices are constantly deployed to
displace and defer the otherwise inevitable revelation that public cannot be separated from private,
or form from substance, or objective manifestation from subjective intent.").
7. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,
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of contract contends that contract favors "unadulterated self-interest and pure
calculation" over trust and community.' Generally, these critics claim that
contract replaces public rights with market rights.9
In contrast, scholars on the political right often champion contract,'
0
which in itself makes contract theory and doctrine suspect to those scholars
who focus on redistributive agendas as a means of benefitting have-nots. I
focus on how contractual purgatory benefits one marginority, arguing that gay-
related contracts can benefit gay people despite the trenchant critique of con-
tract offered by progressive theorists.
Contractual purgatory is of particular relevance to the New Private Law.
New Private Law is a label a group of faculty at the University of Denver has
coined to describe the recent trend in which government entities delegate their
functions to private entities by, for example, privatizing prisons and schools.
In this Symposium, Federico Cheever addresses conservation easements as
environmentally sensitive manifestations of New Private Law, and Roberto
Corrada and Katherine Stone explore some impacts of contractual arbitration
clauses on employment and labor contracts. Clayton Gillette explores the com-
petition between public and private provision of the same goods or services,
and Gary Peller suggests that privatizing education could yield unexpected and
progressive benefits. All of these papers, to a greater or lesser extent, focus on
contract.
I also address contractual issues, but in the context of sexual regulations. I
argue that at least for sexual marginorities, New Private Law might offer a
safe haven from the only other practical alternative: criminalization. Thus, at
least some marginorities might benefit from New Private Law, despite its
public presentation as a politically conservative tool to replace public rights
with market rights."
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1351-52 (1982) ("The 'free' 'private' market is really an artifact of
public violence."); Betty Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753, 764
(1981) ("[C]oercion, including legal coercion, lies at the heart of every bargain. Coercion is inher-
ent in each party's legally protected threat to withhold what is owned. The right to withhold cre-
ates the right to force submission to one's own terms."); see also Nancy Ehrenreich, The Coloni-
zation of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492, 498 (1993) (critiquing consent to caesarean sections as be-
ing "intimately tied to ideological structures" relating to race, class, and gender).
8. See, e.g., Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV.
561, 644-45 (1983).
9. Patricia Williams has challenged the dichotomy between public rights and contract rights
by pointing out that for some minorities the right to contract is an essential element of
personhood, given that their ancestors were the object of contract rather than contracting parties.
Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 408 (1987) ("I am still engaged in a struggle to set up transactions
at arms' length, as legitimately commercial, and to portray myself as a bargainer of separate
worth, distinct power, sufficient rights to manipulate commerce, rather than to be manipulated as
the object of commerce.").
10. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 53 (1995) (ar-
guing that voluntary exchange is one of six simple rules governing all law); CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 1 (1981).
11. Any refuge New Private Law might offer some marginorities contradicts the perception
of it as a tool of the right which will inevitably hurt the have-nots. This perception is often
grounded in concrete examples, such as Roberto Corrada's and Katherine Stone's prediction that
employees and union members will enjoy fewer rights under private than public processes.
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II. THE MODEL
In this model, public and private are separate spheres linked by a horseshoe
progression at one end of which is public condemnation (usually through
criminalization) and at the other, public rights. 2 Contract sits midway in the
trajectory between the two public extremes, with decriminalization between
contract and criminalization. The model also reflects the role of different
branches of government. The judiciary perches at the top, enforcing private
agreements, and the legislature 3 sits at either end of the model, legislating
morality through either public condemnation or public rights.
I COITACr
[ DECRIMNALZAT7ON I
PUBUC RIGHTS PUBIC CONDEMNATION
(CRIMINALIZATION)
Public condemnation takes its most obvious form in criminal statutes.
Contractualization is similarly straightforward, involving judicial enforcement
of obligations agreed to by private parties. 4 The category of public rights,
12. Another way to view my model is as an upside-down pendulum. The extremes are public
rights or condemnation, but regulations often pass through private contract on their way to either
extreme. Alan K. Chen, "Meet the New Boss...", 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1253, 1259 n.46 (1996).
13. I describe public rights as legislatively created because some, such as the right to be free
from some employment discrimination embodied in Title VH of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, are
legislatively created. While other public rights, such as reproductive freedom, are recognized by
courts if they are grounded in the Constitution, they can also be deemed legislative if the Con-
stitution is conceived as a super-statute. The Constitution is, in any case, more like the text of a
criminal statute than a contract between private parties, in that the Constitution and statutes are
both government-created documents, while a private contract is created by private parties.
14. While contracts such as cohabitation contracts are in contractual purgatory, other consen-
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however, is susceptible to many meanings. I use the term to include at least
three things: (1) constitutional protection from invidious discrimination and
protection of fundamental rights; (2) legislative protection from discrimination
on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, or other categories of invidious
discrimination; and (3) a privilege to take action without fear of punish-
ment. 5 While these public rights cover a broad range, they all reflect either
freedom from state interference with an activity or protection from invidious
discrimination. For example, there is a public right to marital rape where the
state does not criminalize it,'6 and a public right to be free from race
sual relations also fall within the way station. Consent (rather than offer, acceptance, and consider-
ation) is key to determining whether a regulated behavior is in the category of condemnation,
public rights, or the contractual way station. For example, marital rape was a public right when
the wife's consent was inferred from marriage vows. It has since been criminalized, but her con-
sent is often inferred despite considerable evidence to the contrary. Abortion is similarly in con-
tractual purgatory when a woman and her doctor can legally agree to terminate her pregnancy. But
both these regulations tip toward criminalization when moral condemnation of the activity makes
consent irrelevant.
15. The last meaning is illustrated by the progression of marital rape in my model. Until
recently, marital rape was an oxymoron because rape was defined as forcible sex with a person
not the defendant's wife. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 8 (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER &
KATHERINE B. SILBAUGH, A GtiDE TO AMERICA'S SEX LAWS 35-43 (1996). But it has since
progressed from a privilege toward a crime.
16. Under Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's jurisprudential scheme, my use of the term right here
may also mean privilege as I use it in my third example-to take action without fear of legal
liability. The first two examples (constitutional and legislative protections against discrimination)
are likely Hohfeldian rights because they confer an affirmative claim against another person. Hoh-
feld's privilege is an absence of duty to refrain. Under the marital rape exemption a husband has a
privilege to rape his wife, which means that he has no duty to refrain from raping his wife. See
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16 (1913), reprinted in WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS
APPLIED TO JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER ESSAYS 23 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1923).
Sometimes right and privilege can apply to the same sexual regulation. If Romer v. Evans,
116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), is read as granting gay people public rights through protection under the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, then they have both a privilege and a right. The
privilege is that gay people no longer have a duty to refrain from being or acting gay to escape
legal liabilities, and the right is that gay people have an affirmative claim against state entities
denying them equal protection of the law on the basis of sexual orientation.
Hohfeld described eight categories in analytical jurisprudence: (1) right (an affirmative
claim against another); (2) privilege ("one's freedom from the right or claim of another"); (3) no-
right ("absence of right"); (4) power (legal ability to alter legal relations); (5) liability (experienced
by the one whose legal relations are altered by power); (6) immunity ("exemption from legal pow-
er"); (7) disability (lacking power to alter someone's legal relations); and (8) duty (obligation).
Hohfeld's opposites and correlatives further illustrate the right/privilege relationship regarding
sexual regulations:
Hohfeld's jural opposites:
right privilege power immunity
no-right duty disability liability
Hohfeld's jural correlatives:
right privilege power immunity
duty no-right liability disability
The list above illustrates that where wives now have a right to be free from marital rape
(i.e., an affirmative claim against their husbands), they formerly had no-right under the marital
exemption (i.e., they could not bring a claim). As correlatives, the wife's right to claim marital
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discrimination under Title VII. These public rights represent a dramatic change
from prior law, a change which can be characterized as the transition of wom-
en and racial minorities from being legal objects to being legal subjects.
I mainly focus on contracts benefitting gay people, because gay people
seem to be moving from public condemnation toward contractual purgatory,
and thus provide a good example of movement within my model. Perhaps
because they are in transition, gay people find themselves in multiple places
on the continuum from criminalization to public rights. Sodomy is
criminalized in many states, 7 and yet contracts which benefit gay people are
enforced, sometimes even in states with sodomy laws.' 8 Moreover, some le-
gal landscapes show early signs of budding public rights for gay people such
as state or municipal legislation affording protection from sexual orientation
discrimination or granting domestic partnership benefits.
Two important and just-planted seeds of gay public rights are the Supreme
Court's recent invalidation of Colorado's anti-gay constitutional amendment in
Romer v. Evans 9 and Hawaii's recognition of same-sex marriages under the
Hawaii constitution in Baehr v. Miike.2" The generativity of Evans became
immediately apparent when the Court summarily vacated and remanded a
similar case to the Sixth Circuit (the Circuit had upheld Cincinnati's city char-
ter amendment which had denied protection against sexual orientation discrim-
ination).2' But the long term impact of Evans and Baehr is uncertain; a legal
or political backlash may keep gay people out of the heaven of public rights.
In terms of my model, the contested legal status of homosexuality is evidenced
by simultaneous criminalization, recognition through contract, and public right
status, sometimes all in the same jurisdiction.22
rape is paired with the husband's correlative duty to refrain from raping his wife. Similarly, the
opposite nature of privilege and duty is illustrated by the husband's privilege to rape his wife (the
absence of a duty to refrain) under the marital rape exemption and the opposite duty of a husband
to refrain from raping his wife when the marital rape exemption has been repealed. Finally, mari-
tal rape fits into the Hohfeldian correlative of privilege and no-right in that when the husband has
the privilege to rape his wife, the wife has no-right (i.e., she cannot make a legally recognized
claim of marital rape). In sum, under the marital rape exemption the husband has a privilege to
rape his wife and the wife has no-right (no claim). When the exemption is repealed the wife has a
right (claim) and the husband has a duty to refrain from non-consensual sex.
This overlap of right and privilege in my definition of public rights is intended to craft a
category which encompasses both freedom to and freedom from. To give another example, legal
protection of reproductive choices represents both the freedom from state interference and the
freedom to get an abortion.
17. Twenty-four states criminalize sodomy. Brenda S. Thornton, The New International
Jurisprudence on the Right to Privacy: A Head-On Collision with Bowers v. Hardwick, 58 ALB.
L. REv. 725, 726 n.2 (1995).
18. See, e.g., Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992) (enforcing lesbian cohabitation
contract and excluding all evidence of the relationship under the parol evidence rule).
19. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
20. No. 91-1394, 1996 Haw. Ct. App. LEXIS 138 (Dec. 3, 1996).
21. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996)
(granting certiorari, summarily vacating Sixth Circuit opinion, and remanding to Sixth Circuit for
consideration in light of Romer v. Evans).
22. Georgia is remarkable in its concurrent treatment of homosexuality as a crime, a contrac-
tual right, and a public right. It criminalizes sodomy, yet enforces same-sex cohabitation contracts.
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992);
Weekes v. Gay, 256 S.E.2d 901 (Ga. 1979). Georgia also affords protection against discrimination
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Contractual purgatory is important because it offers a resting place for gay
people, safe from public condemnation, while they wait to achieve public
rights. This safe harbor is particularly important since courts are rarely on the
cutting edge of social change. Perhaps judicial reluctance to create social
change (as compared to reflecting it) is due to the nature of law; it follows
precedent rather than cutting new paths."
While Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade seem to contradict
this point, in that they symbolize tremendous judicially-mandated strides for
African-Americans and women, these cases in fact were the product of
decades of litigation and public education efforts on racial segregation and
illegal abortion. More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans has
indicated a willingness to recognize some constitutional protection for gay
people, a dramatic shift from its position just a decade ago when it venomous-
ly upheld sodomy statutes as applied to gay people.24 Perhaps the past decade
has included sufficient social change in gay people's place in society that the
Court could more comfortably join the growing social consensus supporting
some gay rights in 1996 than it could go against the anti-gay consensus in
1986.
At first glance, contract may seem to be an unexpected refuge for sexual
marginorities. Decades of progressive scholarship have eloquently critiqued the
classical liberal foundations of contract,25 and classical liberalism's renais-
sance in the academy and in the courts is generally associated with political
conservatism. 2 6 Like Rasputin, the theory of voluntary exchange continues to
on the basis of sexual orientation in Atlanta and Fulton County. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FUND,
STATES, CITIES AND COUNTIES WHICH PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTA-
TION [hereinafter HRC LIST] (document on file with the author). But see City of Atlanta v.
McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1995) (holding that city grant of health insurance to domestic
partners of city employees was ultra vires). The contested status of gay people in Georgia is fur-
ther illustrated by Atlanta's passage of another domestic partnership ordinance in an attempt to
grant the benefits within the parameters dictated by the Georgia Supreme Court in McKinney.
Ronald Smothers, Atlanta Sued over Its Law on Benefits to the Unwed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
1996, at 25. Minnesota is another jurisdiction in which gay people are at multiple places in my
model: it has a state statute barring sexual orientation discrimination and a sodomy law. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996) (criminalizing "carnally knowing any person by
the anus or by or with the mouth"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (1996) (extending protection
from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment, real property transactions,
public accommodations, public services, education, credit, and business). And like Atlanta,
Minneapolis' domestic partnership benefits were ruled ultra vires in Lilly v. City of Minneapolis,
527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
23. Michael 1. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1933-34 (1995) (discussing the "myth of the Court as
'countermajoritarian hero'). I thank Clayton Gillette for bringing this point to my attention. For
further discussion of the Court's role in breaking new social ground, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
24. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
25. See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Jay M. Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIvE CRITIQUE 172 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Morton Horowitz, The Triumph of
Contract, in ALAN C. HUTCHISON, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 104 (1989); Mensch, supra note 7.
26. See EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 53 (1995) (suggesting voluntary exchange as one of six
simple rules for a complex world); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991) (upholding contractual arbitration clause regarding age discrimination claim); Federal De-
posit Ins. Corp. v. Culver, 640 F. Supp. 725 (D. Kan. 1986) (enforcing promissory note against an
unsophisticated debtor who did not understand what he was signing).
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live, despite the various allegedly fatal blows dealt it by Realists, Neo-Realists,
and Critical Legal Theorists.27 Richard Epstein is typical of conservative scho-
lars in championing voluntary contractual exchange as one of his six simple
rules for a complex world.2" Epstein skirts problems of differential power by
universalizing the "logic of mutual gain" and positing that contracting parties
are differently situated only in their purportedly natural variation in skill and
willingness to bear risks.29 Power differences are thus either inevitable or
matters of choice for Epstein and do not compromise the value of contract.
Without agreeing with Epstein's blithe acceptance of power differentials
between contracting parties, I posit here that while contract is not everything,
it's not nothing either.30 Specifically, contract may be a useful way station for
sexual regulations en route from public condemnation to public rights.
The way station model may also work for other sexual regulations. I have
tracked the progression of sodomy, abortion, miscegenation, fornication, and
cross-dressing from criminalization to public rights, sometimes stopping in
contractual purgatory. However, other sexual regulations, such as marital rape
and child sexual abuse, have progressed in the opposite direction: from public
rights to criminalized activities.3' Diagrammatically, these sexual progressions
look like this:
A nice illustration of the tension between classical and more Realist contract interpretation
is embodied in Judge Kozinski's defense of classical formalism in a case where he nevertheless
followed the Realism established in California law by Justice Traynor 20 years earlier. In Trident
Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988), Judge Kozinski reluctantly
allowed the parties to introduce parol evidence to the contract because he felt obliged to do so
under Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal.
1968). In Thomas Drayage, Justice Traynor had allowed the parties to introduce extrinsic evidence
to explain a contract term, reasoning that reliance on bare words on a page "is a remnant of a
primitive faith in the inherent potency and inherent meaning of words .... Words, however, do
not have absolute and constant referents." Id. at 644. In Trident Center, Judge Kozinski reluctantly
followed Thomas Drayage because a federal court is bound to follow state substantive law, but
roundly criticized it, stating that California has
turned its back on the notion that a contract can ever have a plain meaning discernible
by a court without resort to extrinsic evidence ... [so that] even when the transaction is
very sizeable, even if it involves only sophisticated parties, even if it was negotiated
with the aid of counsel, even if it results in contract language that is devoid of ambigu-
ity, costly and protracted litigation cannot be avoided if one party has a strong enough
motive for challenging the contract.
Trident Center, 847 F.2d at 568-69. For further discussion of the California parol evidence rule,
see Susan J. Martin, Yes, Judge Kozinski, There Is a Parol Evidence Rule in California-The
Lessons of a Pyrrhic Victory, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 1 (1995).
27. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
28. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 53. The rules are: (1) self ownership; (2) first possession; (3)
voluntary exchange; (4) protection against aggression; (5) limited privilege for cases of necessity;
and (6) compensated takings. Id.
29. Id. at 79.
30. See MACKINNON, supra note 3.
31. Space prevents me from addressing all sexual regulations. Among those I omit are those
governing pornography, prostitution, and nude dancing. These regulations may well fit into my
model. If social consensus recognizes a victim in prostitution, then the progressive move would be
to criminalize it. But if the only victim in prostitution is the moral climate, or if the victimization
of prostitutes is a function of criminalization, then the progressive move might be to contractualize










In comparing the progressions of various sexual regulations, it appears
that the direction in which the regulation is moving depends on whether the
crime has an identifiable victim. Defining progressive as a move from politi-
cally conservative to politically progressive, victimless crimes should go from
right to left in the model, while crimes with formerly legally invisible victims
(women and children) should go from left to right.32 For example, sodomy
32. Abortion presents a harder case given the uncertain status of the fetus and the possibility
of female victims. Anti-abortion laws were more likely to be enforced if a woman died, and thus
was a victim. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 349
(1993). This pattern suggests that as long as abortion is perceived as victimless, it will not be
criminalized. But, of course, anti-choice advocates would contend that the fetus is a full human
being, and thus a victim of abortion. Pro-choice advocates, in contrast, would contend that the
fetus is not fully human, or at least less human than the mother, and thus the fetus cannot be a
victim. Perhaps this uncertain status question is part of the reason that abortion is all over my
model. If there is no social consensus (let alone legal consensus) on whether abortion is a victim-
less crime, then abortion regulations would be expected to careen from public rights to public
condemnation, perhaps stopping at contract in between. The uncertain status of abortion may also
turn on whether being pro-choice is identified with a progressive position. While most people
would put pro-choice positions under a progressive umbrella, some disabled rights advocates argue
that terminating a pregnancy because of evidence that the child, if born, would suffer a disability,
is eugenic rather than progressive.
Also relevant to my model is the fact that decriminalization of victimless crimes is a mod-
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between consenting adults is a victimless crime, so a progressive trajectory
prefers individual autonomy33 over morality-based legislation and the arrow
should go from criminalization toward public rights. In contrast, where there is
an identifiable victim (as in marital rape and child sexual abuse) the pro-
gressive pattern is from public right to criminalization. In other words, the
progressive effect of the pattern is that victims get legal protection from abuse,
and that victimless crimes get reclassified as non-crimes or even public rights.
Under my model, the transition from criminalization to public rights may
include a stop at contract, particularly if the victimless quality of the crime is
contested. But, of course, the progression to contract will only benefit sexual
marginorities if the activity is currently criminalized, making the move to
contract an opportunity to contract around an otherwise hostile and immutable
rule. Mary Becker's discussion of differences between heterosexual and same-
sex cohabitation contracting nicely illustrates this point.34
Becker differentiates between gay and straight relationship contracts. She
explains how these couples are differently situated both in terms of the
partners' relation to one another and in terms of the couple's relation to the
government. In relation to one another, gay couples are more likely equal
because they share sexual identity and, particularly for lesbians, a normative
preference for equality within the relationship. In contrast, a heterosexual
couple by definition contains one man and one woman, so there is always a
gender-based power imbalance between the partners. Thus, Becker points out,
a heterosexual relationship contract is more likely tainted by unequal bargain-
ing power of the parties, since the man has more social power and is also
socialized to value individuality over the coupled unit. This heterosexual pow-
er imbalance is exacerbated, Becker notes, by female socialization to be giving
rather than autonomous, resulting in a situation where heterosexual relationship
contracts will likely benefit the more powerful (male) party at the expense of
the less powerful (female) party. This outcome is obviously not progressive.
Becker further discusses the relationship of the couple to the state. Hetero-
sexual couples, of course, are recognized through family law, and family law
rules often protect weaker parties in a marriage through provisions such as
temporary maintenance for a non-wage earning spouse. Gay couples, in
contrast, are legally invisible, if not criminalized. As a result, heterosexual
in contrast, laws did not distinguish between sins and crimes. Id. at 34.
33. Autonomy per se has no set political valence. Classical contract theory valorized
autonomy, as does liberational legal theory. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 53; Valdes, supra
note 2, at 10, 31 (identifying autonomy as a goal and using the term liberational to describe femi-
nist and critical race theories). Richard Posner has championed many of the contracts I advocate
here, indicating that both progressive and conservative/libertarian thinkers have good reason for
focussing on autonomy as a normative goal. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 265-66,
313 (1992). I thank Dan Farber for this insight.
34. Mary Becker, Problems with the Privatization of Heterosexuality, 73 DENV. U. L. REv.
1169 (1996). Penelope E. Bryan has contended in a similar vein that women obtain better out-
comes in lawyer-negotiated divorce settlements than in mediation. Penelope Bryan, Killing Us
Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BuFF. L. REv. 441, 445 (1992). If medi-
ation is seen as negotiating a contract, then Bryan's arguments suggest that heterosexual women
might suffer negative results in prenuptial contract negotiations for many of the same reasons that
they suffer more under mediation than litigation.
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relationship contracts are entered "in the shadow of family law rules"35 and
substantively tend to relieve the more powerful party of his obligations under
those family law rules. Becker also contends that gay relationship contracts,
unlike heterosexual ones, tend to promote equality between the parties rather
than serve the powerful party's interest at the expense of the weaker party. As
such, gay relationship contracts are progressive because they provide equality
where the law would enforce inequality, while heterosexual relationship
contracts are regressive because they chip away legal protections for weaker
parties.
But the fact that heterosexual relationship contracting is often regressive
does not impair my model's relevance. To the contrary, it illustrates the differ-
ence between a situation where contractual purgatory is progressive and one
where contractual purgatory is regressive. Contracting benefits sexual margin-
orities where the current rule is hostile. If, as in the case of heterosexual rela-
tionships, the public right benefits heterosexual women, then contract is re-
gressive rather than progressive. In sum, the move to contract often does not
benefit heterosexual women because it qualifies a friendly public right, but it
does benefit gay people, because it offers an opportunity to contract around a
hostile default rule of public condemnation.
While my focus is on progressions that benefit sexual marginorities, the
model is equally useful to understand changes in sexual regulations from a
conservative perspective. The Religious Right, for example, would likely pre-
fer that the arrows go in the opposite direction than they appear in my model.
For example, the Christian Coalition would prefer that abortion be
criminalized rather than considered a public right. But if reproductive choice is
too politically popular to criminalize, the Christian Coalition could push it to
contract as an intermediate measure. Implied conditions on abortion such as
funding limitations and waiting periods arguably make parts of reproductive
rights contractual, illustrating the efficacy of this strategy.36 Once they have
transformed a public right to a contractual one, the Christian Coalition could
then continue to whittle away at the contract right, hoping to sufficiently erode
the public view of it as an entitlement, thus making criminalization possible.
While my approach takes the opposite position as a normative matter (favoring
personal autonomy over morality-based legislation for victimless crimes), the
model works just as well if the Christian Coalition makes the normative
choice that victimless crimes should be criminalized to enforce majoritarian morality.
7
35. Becker, supra note 34, at 1174.
36. As in much of this article, I use contract loosely, rather than in the sense of mutual as-
sent supported by consideration. Limitations on abortion access (particularly those related to fund-
ing) contractualize public rights to reproductive choice by providing that only women who can
form a contract with a physician to perform the abortion have a right to one. Waiting periods and
other qualifications on the abortion right similarly require the woman to agree to particular condi-
tions in order to exercise her public right to abortion. In other words, the state provides many of
the terms of the agreement between the woman and her doctor. While this is not a classical con-
tract, it does reflect some conditions on the public right that could be characterized as limiting it
by adding terms. Consent is key to contract, and also to my model. As conditions on abortion
limit what a woman can (and cannot) agree to, abortion shifts away from a public right/privilege
and toward the moralized public condemnation where her consent is irrelevant. It remains decrimi-
nalized, but is a much weaker public right than it was before.
37. Perhaps the Christian Coalition already recognizes the utility of contractual purgatory to
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All conservatives, of course, do not take identical positions on contract as
applied to gay people. Judge Posner, for example, seems to approve of the
gradual replacement of marriage as status with cohabitation as contract.3" He
further proposes that domestic partnerships be available as an "intermediate
step" between the ban on gay marriage and full legal recognition of gay rela-
tionships. 9 Moreover, unlike Becker, Posner suggests that contracts actually
protect heterosexual women more than family law rules that allow no-fault
divorce.' Thus, my model works for both conservatives and progressives, but
it is important to keep in mind that not all conservatives (nor all progressives)
will want the arrows to go in the same direction.
All marginorities, of course, are not similarly situated in all ways. Be-
cause more established groups are more likely to enjoy public rights, contracts
may be most advantageous to the marginorities subject to more hostile public
rules. For example, gay people may benefit from contractual purgatory be-
cause gay relationships are more likely to be criminalized than enjoy any pub-
lic rights. On the other hand, heterosexual women would not benefit from
contractual purgatory because abortion is a public right, and, as Becker points
out, public rules governing heterosexual women often are more favorable than
a contract would be. If contract can be a safe haven for gay people, then it (or
parts of it) may present both strategic possibilities for subverting conservative
agendas, and also open a pragmatic route to attain some legal protections until
the general public is ready to recognize gay people's public rights.
There are two potential problems with my model: (1) it presupposes a
distinction between public and private; and (2) it contains a normative assump-
tion. The first problem turns on the public/private debate, which has raged for
decades without real resolution. Rhetorical and legal organization continue to
turn on a designation of spheres as either public or private, regardless of the
indeterminate border between the two."' My model, in turn, situates itself in
roll back public rights for sexual marginorities. If so, then it may have recognized that contract is
a particularly valuable tool if progressives are shy about using it for their own purposes. I thank
Julie Nice for this insight.
38. POSNER, supra note 33, at 264-65 ("'The groundwork has been laid for the replacement
of marriage by ... contractual cohabitation .... Today, spouses who want a really durable rela-
tionship must try to create one by contract or by informal commitments.'); see also Jane E.
Larson, The New Home Economics, 10 CoNsT. COMMENT. 443, 450-51 (1993) (describing how
Posner would replace marriage with contractual cohabitation and recognizing same-sex domestic
partnerships as consistent with Posner's bioeconomic theory of sexuality).
39. POSNER, supra note 33, at 313; Martha M. Ertman, Denying the Secret of Joy: A Cri-
tique of Posner's Theory of Sexuality, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1485, 1501 (1993) (describing how
Posner recommends domestic partnership as an "intermediate solution" to the problem of gay
people seeking marriage rights).
40. Judge Posner has contended that heterosexual women are better able to protect
themselves and their children from "abandonment by the child's father" under contract rather than
family law. POSNER, supra note 33, at 266.
41. For a discussion of the public/private distinction, see, e.g., Symposium, The Pub-
liclPrivate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1299 (1982); Cohen, supra note 6; Robert L. Hale,
Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POE. Scl. Q. 470 (1923); Fran-
ces Olsen, The Myth of State Non-Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835
(1985); Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983). For a recent progressive defense of the public/private distinction, see
Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the PubliclPrivate Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992).
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the context of the public and the private realms, since the discrete categories
of private purgatory, public rights, and public condemnation presuppose some
difference between public and private actors and rules. If public is the same as
private because the judicial branch of government enforces contracts, then
there is no public/private distinction between contract and either public con-
demnation or public rights. But the rhetoric of public condemnation and public
rights remains markedly different from the rhetoric of private law. Whether
the distinction is real or merely rhetorical, it has tremendous impact on actual
lives, and may also offer possibilities for increased legal recognition for some
marginorities.
The second issue, the normativity inherent in my model, is a function of
what I define as progressive. I focus on marginorities, and define progressive
to mean legal maneuvers that benefit the marginority. The reason for my pref-
erence for marginorities over majorities is simple: majorities are better able to
protect their interests through the political process. People on the margins, in
contrast, must either rely on the courts to protect them, or on the majority to
be sympathetic.42 As a result, I am more concerned with gay people's rights
to freedom from discrimination than with the Christian Coalition's contention
that its members feel oppressed when gay people have equal rights.
My preference is normative; I believe the marginalized group has a great-
er entitlement to equality than a majority group has to hegemony. But, as
noted above, my model works for conservatives as well as for progressives. A
conservative need only switch the direction of the arrows to return victimless
crimes to the public condemnation category, and return to husbands the enti-
tlement to rape their wives.
To summarize: my model suggests that contract offers marginorities a
private purgatory between public condemnation and public rights. If I am
right, then contract offers sexual marginorities some legal advantage. If sexual
marginorities find a home, however modest, in contract law, then contract
cannot be an exclusive tool of the political right. Indeed, because contract is
so often associated with conservatism, progressive appropriation of contract
offers unique opportunities for subversion and ultimate social change.
42. Kenneth Sherrill, The Political Power of Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals, PS: POLMCAL
SC. & POL. 469 (Sept. 1996) ("In electoral politics [gay and bisexual] voters must be dependent
on the support of heterosexuals in order to win elections."). Sherrill notes that while even New
York City does not have an electoral jurisdiction in which gay people are a majority, gay people
can still form critical masses in cities where they are sufficiently numerous and organized to bring
about favorable legislation. The literature on collective action similarly suggests that marginorities
may be politically successful where they are in high density because they can monitor themselves,
build coalitions, and avoid some free-riding by larger groups. Of course, the procedural advantages
of collective action in a small group may be outweighed if the marginority is more disadvantaged
by majority hostility than it is advantaged by the ease of action in a small group. Perhaps gay
people are more successful locally than nationally because the procedural benefits of being a small
group are present locally but not nationally. Moreover, gay people are difficult to organize be-
cause identifying the interest group members can be hard since gay people, unlike people of color
or many ethnic minorities, are generally not identifiable by sight or last name. Moreover, many
gay people continue to obscure their sexual orientation even from other gay people in order to
avoid discrimination. I thank Clayton Gillette for identifying the collective action benefits in being
a marginority.
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III. PROGRESSION OF SEXUAL REGULATIONS
In an effort to test my hypothesis that contract is a private purgatory be-
tween public condemnation and public rights, I will briefly sketch the histor-
ical regulation of selected sexual regulations, including sodomy, abortion,
miscegenation, fornication, cross-dressing, marital rape, and child sexual
abuse. These regulations have gone in both directions on the diagram: from
right to left (from criminalization toward public rights), and from left to right
(from public rights to criminalization). As I've said, the overarching progres-
sive pattern seems to be that victimless crimes go from right to left, and
crimes where the female and child victims were only recently recognized as
such go from left to right. But regardless of the starting point, contract is often




A. Salvation from Criminalization to Public Rights
1. Sodomy
Sodomy in some form has long been criminalized under both English and
American common law. 3 In upholding Georgia's criminal sodomy statute,
43. WAYNE C. BARTEE & ALICE F. BARTEE, LITIGATING MORALITY: AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT AND ITS ENGLISH ROOTS 31-37 (1992). In "ancient times," sodomy was punished by
ecclesiastical authorities, but was not a crime. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. I at 358 (1980).
Historian John Boswell suggests, however, that this criminalization is relatively recenL JOHN




the U.S. Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick explained that "sodomy was a
criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original
thirteen states when they ratified the Bill of Rights."'  While scholars contest
whether same-sex sexual conduct per se has been criminalized since colonial
times," the fact remains that the Supreme Court has upheld sodomy statutes
as applied to gay consensual sex. I have accordingly placed sodomy on the
criminal side of the diagram, based on Bowers. But I trace a dotted line be-
tween sodomy and contract to reflect some limited recognition of gay people's
private contractual rights. Some courts have enforced gay cohabitation con-
tracts and employment contracts forbidding sexual orientation discrimination.
But other courts have refused to enforce same-sex cohabitation contracts be-
cause of anti-gay sentiments,' and even where the courts have enforced
and 1300, homosexual activity passed from being completely legal in most of Europe to incurring
the death penalty in all but a few contemporary legal compilations."). American colonists enforced
criminal prohibitions on sodomy, executing at least five men for sodomy or buggery in the late
seventeenth century. JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY
OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 30 (1988).
44. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986). According to the Model Penal Code,
sodomy "was received by the American colonies as a common-law felony." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 213.2 cmt. 1 at 358.
45. Anne Goldstein has persuasively challenged the Bowers Court's reliance on the purport-
ed historical criminalization of same-sex sexual activity as justifying contemporary criminalization.
Anne B. Goldstein, Comment, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the
Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988). Goldstein points out the
flaws in the Court's interpretation of eighteenth and nineteenth century views of sodomy, arguing
that homosexuality (i.e., sexuality as something a person is rather than simply does) as we now
understand it did not exist prior to the late nineteenth century, so that before the "invention of
'homosexuality,' sexual touchings between men were determined to be licit or illicit according to
criteria that applied equally to heterosexual practices, such as the parts of the body involved, the
relative status of the parties, and whether the sexual drama conformed to sex role stereotypes." Id.
at 1088 (citing Arthur N. Gilbert, Conceptions of Homosexuality and Sodomy in Western History,
6 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 57, 61 (1981) (homosexuals not conceptualized as identifiable segment of
society until late nineteenth century); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: THE USE
OF PLEASURE: VOL. 2, at 220 (R. Hurley trans., 1985) (discussing ancient Greek position that
"masculine" partner should dominate "feminine" partner regardless of biological sex); Jean-Louis
Flandrin, Sex in Married Life in the Early Middle Ages, in WESTERN SEXUALITY: PRACTICE AND
PRECEPT IN PAST AND PRESENT TIMES 120-21 (P. Aries & A. Bejin ed., 1985) (discussing accept-
able sexual positions in fifteenth century Europe)). Historically then, until the 1870s, legal regula-
tion of sodomy proscribed particular conduct, regardless of whether it occurred between same-sex
or opposite-sex partners. It seems arguable, then, that criminalization of particular acts only if they
are done by same-sex partners may be only a decade old. Bowers may be both the first and the
highest legal authority allowing states to criminalize conduct by same-sex partners and protect the
very same conduct if performed by opposite-sex partners. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188. The Bowers
Court explained,
John and Mary Doe were also plaintiffs in this action .... The District Court held, how-
ever, that because they had neither sustained, nor were in immediate danger of sustain-
ing, any direct injury from the enforcement of the statute, they did not have proper
standing to maintain the action.... The only claim properly before the Court, therefore,
is Hardwick's challenge to the Georgia statute as applied to consensual homosexual
sodomy. We express no opinion on the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as ap-
plied to other acts of sodomy.
Id. at 188 n.2 (emphasis added). Shortly after deciding Bowers, the Court denied certiorari in a
case where the Oklahoma appellate court struck down a sodomy law as applied to a heterosexual
couple. Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 (1986).
Viewed as a decision redefining sodomy as an acceptable method of persecuting gay people, rath-
er than upholding sodomy statutes as applied to gay people, Bowers is judicial activism in the
extreme, rather than the banal recitation of millennia of moral teaching that it purports to be.
46. See, e.g., Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981); Seward v. Mentrup, 622
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same-sex cohabitation contracts, they often require that the contract look more
like a business arrangement than a heterosexual marriage contract.4'
2. Abortion
The history of American abortion regulation suggests a progression from
decriminalization to criminalization to public rights, and possibly back toward
contractual purgatory. The common law did not interfere with a woman who
chose to terminate her pregnancy before viability.' Abortion was thus essen-
tially decriminalized through the first half of the nineteenth century.49 There
were no criminal statutes prohibiting the procedure, and professional abortion-
ists widely advertised their services.5" Early abortion laws restricted access to
abortion after quickening, but were rarely enforced.5' Later abortion laws cri-
minalized all abortion, penalizing both the woman and the person performing
the abortion. 2 Thus, abortion moved from being decriminalized53 to being a
crime between the colonial era and the late nineteenth century.
Then, in 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a public right to pre-
viability abortion.54 Roe v. Wade, understood within my model, shows the
N.E.2d 756 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
47. See e.g., Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992) (enforcing contractual agreement
between former lovers and excluding all evidence of the relationship under the parol evidence
rule).
48. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132-36 & n.21 (1973); Brief of 250 American Historians as
Amici Curiae in Support of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania in Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Robert Casey, reprinted in part in MARY BECKER, CYNTHIA
GRANT BOWMAN & MORRISON TORREY, FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY
364 (1993) [hereinafter Historians' BrieA]. The Historians' brief was written by Jane Larson, Clyde
Spillinger, and Sylvia Law (complete copy of the Brief on file with the author).
Anti-choice briefs in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), argued
that common law, did, in fact, criminalize abortion. BARTEE & BARTEE, supra note 43, at 28.
49. "In the early nineteenth century, neither doctors, women, nor judges necessarily con-
demned [abortion] as long as [it was] performed within the early months of pregnancy .... Laws
enacted between 1820 and 1840 to regulate abortion retained the quickening doctrine and attempt-
ed to protect women from unwanted abortion, rather than to prosecute them." D'EMILIo & FREED-
MAN, supra note 43, at 65-66.
50. Historians' Brief, supra note 48, at 10. In 1871, New York had a population of less than
one million people, and supported 200 full-time abortionists (a figure which does not include doc-
tors who occasionally performed abortions). Moreover, midwives had been providing women herb-
al abortifacients in America for at least a century, and there were no significant efforts to restrict
abortion until the 1860s. But then the newly formed American Medical Association sought to gain
control over abortion by urging legislators to criminalize it. Id. at 10-11.
51. Id. at 12-13.
52. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 118 (1973) (citing numerous anti-abortion statutes,
including ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-211 (1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-29, 53-30 (1968);
IDAHO CODE § 18-601 (1948); IND. CODE § 35-1-58-1 (1971); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1191-
1196 (Vernon 1948)); see also D'EMtuo & FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 66 ("Between 1860 and
1890 ... 40 states and territories enacted anti-abortion statutes, many of which rejected the quick-
ening doctrine, placed limitations on advertisements, and helped transfer legal authority for abor-
tion from women to doctors.").
53. In the alternative, abortion was perhaps contractual if the professional abortionists and
midwives could enforce claims for payment for their services.
54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The confusing relationship between public and pri-
vate spheres is illustrated by the fact that the Court used a doctrinal constitutional penumbra with-
in the Bill of Rights to recognize a right to privacy. This right protected the decision whether to
carry a child to term from state intervention. I call this privacy right a public right because it is
based on the very public document of the Constitution and controls state action by requiring the
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rapid transition of abortion from a crime to a public right. In the two decades
since Roe, however, the Court has repeatedly qualified the extent to which
abortion is a public right.
One can read the numerous encroachments on the right, such as waiting
periods, parental consent, mandatory education on fetal development, and late-
term abortion bans as state supplied terms to abortion contracts which argu-
ably shift abortion away from a public right and back toward public condem-
nation." Perhaps pre-viability abortion's move back towards public condem-
nation is most apparent in the Court's repeated holdings that Congress can
constitutionally fund childbirth but need not fund abortion.56 Funding limita-
tions mean that a woman has a public right to a pre-viability abortion only if
she can pay for it.57 Adding funding restrictions to other state restrictions on
abortion, such as requiring parental notification or requiring that a patient
watch a fetal development video, further illustrates the contractualization of
abortion through imposition of conditions on the right.58 In other words, a
woman's public right to an abortion is conditional on her ability to contract to
have one performed. These limitations on the public right shifts abortion back
toward contract.
But even these conditions do not make abortion fully contractual. It would
be unlikely for a court to order specific performance of a premarital contract
clause mandating abortion in the event that the couple conceives.59 Even so,
pre-viability abortion is currently somewhere between a public right and a
crime in my model. As such, it hovers around contractual purgatory. Thus, the
trajectory of abortion regulation goes from being decriminalized, to
criminalization, to a public right, and in some cases, backtracks toward con-
tract.'
state to refrain from controlling reproductive decisions in the first trimester.
55. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding informed con-
sent requirements, 24-hour waiting period, parental consent provision, and reporting and record-
keeping requirements, but striking down spousal notification); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.
417 (1990) (upholding parental notification and waiting periods for minors); Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding restriction of public employees and facilities
for abortions); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (upholding second physician
requirement, second trimester hospitalization requirement, pathology report, and parental notifica-
tion); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding parental notification for unemancipated
minors seeking abortions); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980) (upholding funding restric-
tions on abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding ban on public funding of
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding funding restrictions on abortions).
56. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding the Department of Health and Human
Services' regulation prohibiting Title X projects' use of federal funds for abortion counseling, re-
ferral, or advocacy of abortion as a method of family planning); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980) (upholding state's refusal to fund medically necessary abortions while funding childbirth);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding state's refusal to fund non-therapeutic abortions
while funding childbirth).
57. In contractual terms, she must give consideration. I thank Nancy Ehrenreich for pointing
out this distinction to me.
58. Many of these restrictions may be seen as arguably contractual in that they allow the
state to impose limiting conditions such as parental notification on an abortion contract. I thank
Julie Nice for this insight.
59. 1 thank Clayton Gillette for this example.
60. For a discussion of Hohfeld's view of rights and privileges, see supra note 16. In
Hohfeldian terms, contractualized abortion may be viewed as a privilege (i.e., absence of duty to
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3. Miscegenation
Like abortion, miscegenation has progressed from decriminalization to
criminalization, with a rapid move to a public right in the late twentieth
century. But the uncontested nature of the conduct as victimless has kept it out
of contractual purgatory. Neither the common law nor English statutes banned
interracial marriage. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, as many
as thirty-eight states had anti-miscegenation statutes.6' Some states also pun-
ished interracial adultery and fornication more severely than adultery or forni-
cation between members of the same race.62
Just a few years before recognizing the public right to abortion in Roe v.
Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the public right to interracial mar-
riage in Loving v. Virginia.63 Loving provides perhaps the most explicit pub-
lic right language of all the sexual regulation cases. Chief Justice Warren
wrote for the Court:
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men. Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental
to our very existence and survival. To deny this fundamental freedom
on so insupportable a basis as ... racial classification[]. . . is surely
to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of
law.... Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry a
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be in-
fringed by the State.'
The clarity of the miscegenation issue, coupled with the Court's strong lan-
guage, may explain why Loving is the "definitive precedent for the equal
protection standard."65 While marriage is largely contractual, in that the
parties must have the capacity to form and must explicitly agree to the mar-
riage contract, it remains largely status-based. The status element of marriage
is perhaps best illustrated by the statutory and common law limitations on the
parties to a marriage contract: there must be one man and one woman, they
must not be related by birth or affinity, and neither one can be married al-
ready.' These status-oriented characteristics of marriage, coupled with the
refrain), but not a right (an affirmative claim whereby a woman can make the government pay for
exercising her reproductive decisions).
61. DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACIsM AND AMERICAN LAW 56 (1980); see also
D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 14 (noting that "interracial marriage ... seems to have
been tolerated during the early years of settlement" in the Chesapeake area in the early seven-
teenth century).
62. See e.g., Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding Alabama's more severe
criminal punishments for interracial fornication and adultery than intraracial fornication and adul-
tery on the grounds that the differential punishment was applied to both races), cited in BELL,
supra note 61, at 57. While colonial penalties were initially neutral as to race, Virginia in 1662
doubled fines for interracial sexual offenses such as fornication, adultery, and bastardy and banned
interracial marriage in 1691. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 34-35.
63. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). A few years earlier, the Court had struck down Florida's more severe
penalties for interracial cohabitation and adultery than for intraracial commission of these offenses.
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
64. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
65. BELL, supra note 61, at 65.
66. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 207(a), 9A U.L.A. 168 (1987),
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language of Loving v. Virginia, establish the current place of interracial cou-
pling on my model as a public right.
67
4. Fornication
Like sodomy, fornication has progressed from criminalization to regula-
tion by contract. It may, however, have progressed more towards being a pub-
lic right than sodomy. Cohabitation has long been criminalized as fornication,
but was criminalized at common law only if it became a nuisance." Like
sodomy, the prohibition stems from interpretations of the Bible, and was pros-
ecuted through ecclesiastical courts before the state assumed the responsibility.
Although England abandoned secular punishment for adultery and fornication
in the Restoration,' the Puritans reinstated the practice. 7' The trend is again
reversing, and many jurisdictions recently have relaxed or repealed criminal
punishments for adultery and fornication.7 Like abortion and sodomy laws,
criminal prohibitions of adultery and fornication were rarely enforced.72
When they were enforced, it was often for satellite purposes, such as ha-
prohibiting:
(1) a marriage entered into prior to the dissolution of an earlier marriage of one of the
parties; (2) a marriage between an ancestor and a descendant, or between a brother and
sister, whether the relationship is by the half of whole blood, or by adoption; (3) a mar-
riage between an uncle and a niece or between an aunt and a nephew, whether the rela-
tionship is by half or whole blood.
Typical of the cases denying same-sex couples the right to marry is Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974). Hawaii mandates that the state recognize same-sex marriage, but the case
is currently being appealed. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 Haw. Ct. App. LEXIS 138 (Dec.
3, 1996). The ruling is stayed pending appeal. Susan Essoyan & Bettina Boxall, Gay Marriages
on Hold While Ruling Is Appealed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1996, at A3.
67. I use public right in the sense of something the government will not interfere with. For a
discussion of how the marital rape exemption is a public right to rape since it prohibits the state
from interfering with the husband's decisions regarding marital sex, see infra part III.B.
68. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fornication at 430, 431; Kathryn J.
Humphrey, Note, The Right of Privacy: A Renewed Challenge to Laws Regulating Private Con-
sensual Behavior, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1067, 1069 (1979) ("Mere fornication was not indictable at
common law; it was the public nature of the act, constituting a nuisance, which brought it within
the common law's purview.").
69. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fornication (citing Geoffrey May,
Experiments in the Legal Control of Sex Expression, 39 YALE L.J. 219, 240-44 (1929)).
70. POSNER, supra note 33, at 60-61. Many colonies adopted the death penalty for adultery,
but it was rarely enforced. D'EMILO & FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 28. In the seventeenth cen-
tury, colonists vigorously enforced fornication laws. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 35.
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fornication at 430. A 1954 survey
indicated that 18 jurisdictions criminalized a single sexual act between unmarried persons, four
only by a fine. In most states only a continuous or "open and notorious" nonmarital relationship
was criminalized. Eleven states did not make fornication a crime and only 30 states criminalized
adultery, four only by a fine. id. at 430-31. For further discussion of the trend away from criminal
law imposing "a uniform standard of personal morals concerning intimate behavior," see William
V. Vetter, I.R.C. § 152(b)(5) and Victorian Morality in Contemporary Life, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 115, 125 (1995) (listing state statutes criminalizing cohabitation, adultery, and fornication, as
well as states with non-discrimination laws). According to FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 128, "In
modern California, fornication is not a crime at all; it has been relabeled and repackaged, and is, if
anything, an esteemed, accepted way of life." Friedman's description reflects the progression of
fornication in my model from crime toward public right.
72. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fornication at 435. The 1880 census
reveals that of 58,000 prisoners in the United States, only 161 were jailed for adultery, and 85 for
fornication. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 140.
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rassment of interracial couples.73 Because of abusive selective enforcement,
and reasoning that "private immorality should be beyond the reach of the
law," the Model Penal Code decriminalized fornication and adultery.7 4 Many
states have retained their fornication and adultery statutes.75 Retention of
these rarely enforced statutes, however, is far outweighed by judicial enforce-
ment of implied contract claims between cohabitants, beginning with Marvin
v. Marvin in 1976.76
Fornication, then, has progressed from criminalization to decriminaliza-
tion, and continues on to contract through enforcement of cohabitation con-
tracts. While some states, such as New Jersey, are extending some traditional
marital benefits to cohabitants, such as claims of emotional distress based on
seeing a loved one injured, the general rule remains that special rights come
only with marriage and cohabitants are not entitled to enjoy those rights.77
5. Cross-Dressing
Cross-dressing was initially criminalized and has progressed toward being
decriminalized. Its criminalization in the United States is a modem form of
English sumptuary laws intended to regulate what clothing a person could
wear based on her social class." The prohibition in its more recent incarna-
tion has been used to enforce gender norms. A number of municipal ordinanc-
es forbid cross-dressing.79 Like other sexual regulations, regulation of cross-
dressing has long been used to harass gay people for failing to dress in gen-
der-appropriate clothing.8" But the ordinances have been held unconstitutional
73. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fomication. Fornication laws in Min-
nesota and Illinois have also been used as justifications for refusing to enforce an ordinance re-
quiring non-discrimination on the basis of marital status against a landlord who refused to rent to
heterosexual cohabitors, Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990), refusing to enforce an im-
plied contract between heterosexual cohabitors, Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (111. 1979), and
for taking custody of children away from a parent in a heterosexual cohabiting relationship, Jarrett
v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1979); see also POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 15, at 98-99 (de-
scribing recent cases citing fornication statutes, including civil defamation and medical malpractice
actions).
74. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fornication at 436, 439; see also
Craig T. Pearson, Comment, The Right of Privacy and Other Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy
Statutes, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 811, 846 (1984) ("It may be shown that the law is discriminatory as
applied, since sodomy statutes are most often enforced against homosexuals."); Note, The Right of
Privacy: A Renewed Challenge to Laws Regulating Private Consensual Behavior, 25 WAYNE L.
REV. 1067, 1070 (1979) (noting that sodomy laws are selectively enforced against gay people);
see also Amicus Curiae Brief Filed by Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Louisiana v.
Baxley, 633 So. 2d 142 (La. 1994) (state admits selectively enforcing sodomy statute against gay
people), published in 21 FOPDHAM URB. L.J. 1012, 1046 (1995) (describing selective enforcement
of facially neutral crime against nature statute).
75. Maureen E. Markey, The Price of Landlord's "Free" Exercise of Religion: Tenant's
Right to Discrimination-Free Housing and Privacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J 699, 752 (1995)
(noting that fornication is still a crime in approximately one-fourth of the states); see also Vetter,
supra note 71, at 115 nn.2-7 (listing fornication, adultery, cohabitation, and sodomy statutes).
76. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
77. For a discussion of the limited rights cohabitants enjoy in relation to one another, see
infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
78. MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS: CROSS-DRESSING AND CULTURAL ANXIETY 17
(1992).
79. Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1551, 1564 & n.85 (1993).
80. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggrega-
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as applied to transsexuals, individuals in transition from one sex to another."'
However, transsexuals do not enjoy full public rights, as they remain unpro-
tected by Title VII. 2
Cross-dressing seems less likely than homosexuality to play itself out in a
contractual arrangement. Transgendered individuals, however, are as likely to
be employed as gay people, and thus are candidates for protection in contrac-
tual purgatory where employment contracts can protect them from discrimina-
tion on the basis of failure to adhere to gender norms. As Mary Anne Case,
Katherine Franke, and Francisco Valdes have argued, gender discrimination
should be, but often is not, actionable under employment discrimination
law. 3 One would expect contractual pro(ection to fill this gap in statutory
and constitutional employment discrimination law. But, despite the mini-explo-
sion of queer theory that uses cross-dressing as a theoretical tool to
deconstruct gender, 4 transgendered people are rarely protected by non-
discrimination clauses.
6. Summary: The Trend Seems Progressive
The brief historical analysis above suggests that the pattern of develop-
ment for sodomy, abortion, miscegenation, fornication, and cross-dressing
from public condemnation toward public rights (including the move from
criminalization to contract) is progressive. The core of its progressiveness is
that victimless crimes become decriminalized, contractualized, or even public
rights. This is progressive because it reserves the strong arm of the state to
punish crimes with identifiable victims and leaves personal moral judgments to
tion of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 63 n.257 (1995) (describing how butch lesbians
were arrested in the 1950s if they were not wearing at least three pieces of female clothing) (citing
LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS 185 (1991); ELIZABETH L. KENNEDY &
MADELINE D. DAVIS, BOOTS OF LEATHER, SUPPERS OF GOLD 180 (1993); Cain, supra note 79, at
1564 & n.85).
81. Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (cross-dressing ordinance unconstitu-
tional as applied to individuals undergoing therapy for sex-reassignment surgery); City of Chicago
v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 525 (I11. 978) (convictions reversed because "[t]here is no evidence
... that cross-dressing, when done as part of a preoperative therapy program or otherwise, is, in
and of itself, harmful to society"); see Franke, supra note 80, at 66-69 (discussing City of Colum-
bus v. Zanders, No. 74AP-88 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1974) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file);
City of Cincinnati v. Adams, 330 N.E.2d 463 (Ohio Mun. CL 1974); City of Columbus v. Rogers,
324 N.E.2d 563 (Ohio 1975) (illustrating legal investment in maintaining gender differences
through sumptuary laws)).
82. Desantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that discharge
of male nursery school teacher for wearing earring not violative of Title VII); Ulane v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that discharge does not constitute Title VII
sex discrimination when pilot changed from being a man to being a woman). Nor is gender dys-
phoria protected as a disability under Washington law. Doe v. The Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531
(Wash. 1993) (employee's gender dysphoria nota "handicap" under Washington law).
83. Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Ef-
feminate Man in the Law of Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995) (proposing that
gender and sex be disaggregated to protect against gender discrimination); Franke, supra note 80;
Valdes, supra note 2.
84. See, e.g., JuDrrl BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990) [hereinafter BUTLER, TROUBLE]; JU-
DITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATrER (1993) [hereinafter BUrLER, BODIES]; Case, supra note 83;
Franke, supra note 80; Valdes, supra note 2; Note, Patriarchy Is Such a Drag: The Strategic
Possibilities of a Postmodern Account of Gender, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1973 (1995).
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the individuals involved. But other sexual regulations, such as marital rape and
child sexual abuse, move in the opposite direction: the progressive trajectory is
from public right to public condemnation (with contract again being a progres-
sive step).
B. Damnation from Public Rights to Criminalization
The victimless crimes (sodomy, abortion, miscegenation, fornication, and
cross-dressing) tend to move from right to left in my model-from criminali-
zation toward public rights. But other sexual regulations, such as marital rape
and child sexual abuse, move in the opposite direction-from public rights to
criminalization. One way to see moves in both directions as progressive is to
recognize that criminalization of victimless crimes can be justified only by
moral arguments, and personal autonomy trumps contested moral grounds in a
progressive scheme. 5 Victims of marital rape and child sexual abuse, howev-
er, were .virtually invisible legally until the 1970s and 1980s, so the progres-
sive move for this conduct is from a perpetrator's public right to abuse toward
criminalization.
1. Marital Rape
Rape was traditionally defined as non-consensual sexual intercourse, by
force, with a woman other than the defendant's wife. 6 The marital rape
exemption thus conferred on married men the public right to rape87 their
wives with impunity until the exemption was widely repealed in response to
feminist activism. The absolute version of the marital rape exemption no
85. In the 1950s the Wolfenden Report, prepared for the British Parliament as a result of
pressure by the Church of England's Moral Welfare Council, reached a similar conclusion. The
Report recommended that British law retain criminal punishment for public gay sex, and gay sex
with minors, but repeal prohibitions on private consensual same-sex sexual activity between
adults. The Report reasoned, "We do not think that it is proper for the law to concern itself with
what a man does in private unless it can be shown to be so contrary to the public good that the
law ought to intervene in its function as the guardian of that public good." COMMrIrEE ON HOMO-
SEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTIUTON, THE WOLFENDEN REPORT 42-43 (1963). The Report fur-
ther reasoned that moral "revulsion" for homosexuality as "unnatural, sinful or disgusting" was
insufficient justification for criminalizing consensual adult gay sex: "Many people feel this revul-
sion .... But moral conviction or instinctive feeling, however strong, is not a valid basis for
overriding the individual's privacy and for bringing within the gambit of the criminal law private
sexual behavior of this kind." Id. at 44.
86. ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 8. Another way to view the movement of marital rape from
public right to crime is through the doctrine of implied consent. Marital rape was not criminalized
until recently because the wife was deemed to have impliedly consented to all sexual relations
with her husband when they exchanged vows. See, e.g., Louisiana v, Haines, 51 La 731, 732
(1899) ("[T]he husband of a woman cannot himself be guilty of an actual rape upon his wife, on
account of the matrimonial consent which she has given, and which she cannot retract."). Fem-
inists, however, have successfully argued that the marriage vow is not a blanket consent. This
changed perception of marriage vows enabled a wife to claim her husband raped her because on
that particular instance she refused sexual relations. So the progressive move in marital rape law is
to reinstate lack of consent as an element of the offense, rather than imply consent from the
victim's status as wife.
87. For a discussion of the marital rape exemption under Hohfeld, see supra note 16. I be-
lieve the exemption is a privilege for the husband and no-right for the wife, while removing the
exemption creates a right on the part of the wife and a duty on the part of the husband.
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longer exists,8 but many of the reformed statutes retain lower punishments
for marital rape. Moreover, some states have added cohabitants and former
spouses to the group of men benefitting from the remains of the marital
exemption."' Given the difficulty of proving lack of consent when the defen-
dant is the victim's spouse, 90 the current state of marital rape law seems to
fall somewhere between public condemnation and contract.9' In sum, marital
rape has progressed from being a public right to somewhere between contract
and public condemnation.
2. Child Sexual Abuse
Sexual intercourse with children has long been criminal, but only expan-
sion of the offense to include other sexual contact and evidentiary reforms
have made prosecutions feasible in many cases.9 2 At common law, child sex-
88. By 1990, no state had an absolute marital rape exemption, but 35 states had special re-
quirements in marital rape prosecutions, such as aggravated force or non-cohabitation. By 1991,
25 states had limitations on offenders, and by 1994, 24 states abolished any form of marital rape
exemption. However, at least 13 states continue to give preferential treatment to spousal defen-
dants. Lisa R. Eskow, Note, The Ultimate Weapon? Demythologizing Spousal Rape and
Reconceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REV. 677, 682 (1996); see also BECKER Er AL.,
supra note 48, at 241 (citing Helaine Olen, The Law: Most States Now Ban Marital Rape, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1991, at 7) (describing how by 1991 every state except North Carolina and Okla-
homa had repealed their marital rape exemptions).
89. BECKER ET AL., supra note 48, at 241.
90. Id. at 242. Professors Becker, Bowman, and Torrey describe problems in obtaining a
conviction in one of the first marital rape cases under South Carolina law. A husband
fd]ragged [his wife] by the throat into a bedroom, tied her hands and legs with rope and
a belt, put duct tape on her eyes and mouth, and dressed her in stockings and a garter
belt. He then had intercourse with her, sexually assaulted her with foreign objects, and
threatened her with a knife. ... The jury saw this transpire because the husband had
made a 30 minute video tape of the event ....
Id. at 241-42.
The jury acquitted, apparently believing the husband's defense that the sex was consensual.
The judge permitted the wife's former husband to testify that she allowed him to tie her up and
enjoyed violent sex, but excluded testimony from the husband's former wife establishing that he
assaulted and raped her, too. Additional facts which the jury apparently disregarded included the
fact that the couple had agreed to separate the night before and the husband "did not untie his
wife when he left the house so she had to struggle to get loose before she ran naked to a
neighbor's house for help." Id.
91. If marital rape were to explicitly stop at contract, it might take the form of evidentiary
issues related to contract. Perhaps a husband would need evidence of consent in written form, akin
to the statute of frauds.
92. See Karla-Dee Clark, Note, Innocent Victims and Blind Justice: Children's Rights to Be
Free from Child Sexual Abuse, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 214, 223 (1990). The prior lack of
emphasis on child sexual abuse stemmed from the historical view that children were considered
proprietary interests. JEFFREY J. HAUGAARD & N. DICKON REPPUCCI, THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF
CHILDREN 1 (1988). According to the Roman law concept of patria potestas, the father had abso-
lute power over his children. Id. Though the Judeo-Christian tradition did not condone child sexu-
al abuse, it endorsed the idea that parents had possessory rights over their children. MARY
DEYOUNG, THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF CHILDREN 103 (1982). For example, according to
Talmudic law, sexual intercourse with a girl over three years old was not a crime as long as the
child's father consented. Id. The American colonial tradition inherited the notion that the father
was legally entitled to control the family. Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part 1:
Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293, 300 (1972).
This principle was weakly tempered by the Roman law concept of parens patriae, which allowed
the State to assert the fights of children who were incapable of asserting their own rights.
HAUGAARD & REPPUCCI, supra, at 2. However, the State's right to intervene in the family had to
19961 1131
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ual abuse by strangers fell into three offenses: seduction, statutory rape, and
sodomy.93 Until the late nineteenth century, statutory rape law only protected
girls under ten years of age.94 But many instances of child sexual abuse went
unreported and unprosecuted both because of limited notions of sexual abuse
and the mistaken belief that child sexual abuse was an exclusively extra-
familial occurrence.
95
Incest was not criminalized at common law, leaving enforcement of the
social prohibition to ecclesiastical courts." Some colonial statutes outlawed
incest,97 but many states did not pass anti-incest statutes until the mid-nine-
teenth century. 9s Even these statutes, however, were not calculated to protect
victims of incest. Instead, their main purposes were to prevent inbreeding and
uphold the legitimate exercise of patriarchal authority within the family.99 To
be balanced against family sanctity and the right of privacy. Id.
93. The Model Penal Code commentary on sexual assault points out that "[tihe common law
made no special provision for indecent sexual contact but covered such conduct as a form of as-
sault and battery." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.4 commentary at 398; JOEL P. BISHOP, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW §§ 1159-1164, at 1088 (describing carnal knowledge of a consent-
ing girl between 10 and 12 as a common law misdemeanor and of a girl under 10 "probably" a
felony), and §§ 1172-1174 (describing how both a boy and a man could be indicted for sodomy
under common law) (4th ed. 1868).
94. Jane E. Larson, Even a Worm Will Turn at Last: Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth Cen-
tury America, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN -, 3. (forthcoming 1996-97) (citing 75 C.J.S. Rape § 13
(1952)) (draft on file with the author). Contemporary rape statutes remain underenforced. Michelle
Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 N.W. J.L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15 (1994).
95. Clark, supra note 92, at 222-23. But some colonies criminalized incest, an offense that
included consensual sex and marriage between relatives; the colony of New Haven made incest a
capital offense, but the Massachusetts Bay Colony did noL ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRAN-
NY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 24-25 (1987).
96. Peter Bardaglio, An Outrage upon Nature: Incest and the Law in the Nineteenth-Century
South, in IN JOY AND SORROW: WOMEN FAMILY AND MARRIAGE IN THE VICTORIAN SOUTH,
1830-1900, at 32, 34 (Carol Bleser ed., 1991) (stating that "common law ... traditionally did not
recognize incest as a crime and left its regulation to church authorities" and referring to the "new
anti-incest statutes" in the nineteenth century South). Ecclesiastical courts could annul consanguin-
eous marriages, excommunicate the parties, and declare offspring illegitimate. Id. at 35.
97. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 18; PLECK, supra note 95, at 24-25 ("The
Bible called for capital punishment for those who committed incest, but the English law did not.
The Colony of New Haven followed the Bible and made incest a capital offense; the Colony of
Massachusetts Bay copied English law.").
98. Bardaglio, supra note 96, at 39 ("By the mid-nineteenth century, most Southern states
had laws on the books making incest either a felony or high misdemeanor."); see also Laura F.
Edwards, 'If I Had Not Been As Strong As I Am': African-American and Poor White Women's
Legal Claims in Post-Emancipation North Carolina 8 (presented at Annual Meeting of the Ameri-
can Society for Legal History, Richmond, Virginia, Oct. 1996) (describing how North Carolina did
not criminalize incest until 1879) (copy on file with the author).
99. Bardaglio, supra note 96, at 39 ("The main objective in the anti-incest legislation was to
prohibit matrimony and inbreeding between near kin, not to protect women or children from sexu-
al abuse."). Bardaglio notes:
In general, the impact of incestuous assault on women and children was only a second-
ary consideration, if that, in antebellum decisions. Sexual abuse appeared to disturb
Southern judges primarily because it undermined the family as an effective institution of
social control. More specifically, sexual abuse exposed the coercion that underlay the




serve these purposes, early incest laws only punished intercourse' °° Southern
judges reinforced the narrowly drafted statutes by strictly construing them and
punishing only those defendants who used physical force to assault their rela-
tives.' A consenting victim was treated as an accomplice, which Peter
Bardaglio has described as "a legal fiction that allowed judges to express their
disapproval of incest while restricting convictions for the crime mainly to
those indisputable instances of assault which exposed the coercion inherent in
the exercise of patriarchal authority and which thus called into question its
legitimacy."'' 2 Thus, men generally had a public right to considerable sexual
access to children in their families until the late nineteenth century, and even
then protecting the child victims was not the motivation behind criminal prohi-
bitions of incest.
By the early nineteenth century, state statutes began in earnest to
criminalize child sexual abuse, but prosecution remained difficult due to evi-
dentiary problems related to the victim's testimony and statutes of limita-
tions."' Consequently, reform legislation beginning in the early 1980s fo-
cused on altering evidentiary rules to facilitate child sexual abuse prosecu-
tions."' While child sexual abuse now seems to fall squarely in the public
100. Id. at 39.
101. Id. at 49 (explaining that Southern judges often required physical force to convict but
Northern judges were more willing to recognize psychological coercion).
102. Id. at 51 (concluding that "[diespite the judicial rhetoric of outrage, then, the reality was
that during the nineteenth century, the sexual access of men to women and children in their family
remained largely unchallenged").
103. Timothy J. McCarvill & James M. Steinberg, Note, Have We Gone Far Enough? Chil-
dren Who Are Sexually Abused and the Judicial and Legislative Means of Prosecuting the Abuser,
8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 339, 339 (1992). Often a child will not or cannot testify against
the alleged perpetrator. See Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two
Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 806-07 (1985) [hereinafter Legislative Innova-
tions] (describing how children are often incompetent to testify, unable to recall specific events,
and may be frightened by the courtroom experience).
104. Legislative Innovations, supra note 103, at 808-09, 811, 813; see also Josephine Bulkley,
Introduction: Background and Overview of Child Sexual Abuse, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 5, 7 (1985)
(describing how, in 1982, only Kansas and Washington had statutory hearsay exceptions dealing
with child-victim testimony and how in 1981, only four states' statutes allowed videotaped testi-
mony in child sexual abuse cases). Other legislative reform allowed expert testimony, physical
separation of the victim and the accused in the courtroom, and extension of statutes of limitations
for civil and criminal prosecution of child sexual abuse. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION, PAPERS FROM A NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE OF LEGAL REFORMS IN CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE CASES (1985) (discussing emerging legal issues, trends, and recent reforms in the area of
child sexual abuse). The current focus on child sexual abuse has expanded to the international
arena, addressing such issues as the sex tourism trade involving children. See, e.g., Patricia D.
Levan, Note & Comment, Curtailing Thailand's Child Prostitution Through an International Con-
science, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L, & POL'Y 869 (1994). In 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1988), which funded programs to prevent and
treat child abuse. Terese L. Fitzpatrick, Note, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: Shallow Words for the
Falsely Accused in a Criminal Prosecution for Child Sexual Abuse, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV.
175, 178-79 (1991). To be eligible for funding, the statute required states to pass mandatory re-
porting laws dealing with child abuse. JESSE A. GOLDNER, CHILD ABUSE NEGLECT AND THE LAW
39 n.3 (1979). In 1976, the Child Abuse and Neglect Project of the States' Education Commission
proposed model legislation conforming to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. Howev-
er, the model legislation left to state courts and legislatures the task of defining sexual abuse. Id.
at 47. In 1986, Congress criminalized sexual abuse of children by enacting the Sexual Abuse Act,
18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1986).
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condemnation category, its regulation is not uncontroversial. Accused perpetra-
tors have successfully sued therapists who have testified on behalf of victims,
claiming that the therapists planted abuse memories in the accusers'
minds."' And while commentators argue persuasively that such liability is
contrary to the interests of all but the perpetrator,"° other commentators
question whether the evidentiary changes improperly preference the victim's
interest over the accused's constitutional rights. 7
In sum, child sexual abuse follows a similar trajectory as that of marital
rape. While sexual intercourse with children has been criminalized since the
colonial era, the criminalization left many children unprotected from assault,
so that only recent understandings of child sexual abuse and amendments to
evidentiary rules have facilitated serious prosecutions."°a This brief history
suggests that, like marital rape, child sexual abuse has gone from left to right
in the diagram, directly from a public right to public condemnation. The rea-
son this trajectory is progressive is that, as with marital rape, children who
were previously invisible as victims of sexual abuse are now legally recog-
nized as victims.
3. Summary: The Trend Also Seems Progressive
The trend from public rights toward criminalization seems progressive in
the cases of marital rape and child sexual abuse. Fornication, for example,
seems to harm only society generally (if anyone), and therefore is a victimless
crime. Thus it has moved from right to left on the diagram, as legal mecha-
nisms have begun to favor individual autonomy over collective morality. But
child sexual abuse has moved from left to right in the diagram, because recent
expansion of the definition of sexual abuse and evidentiary reforms made the
(female and child) victims legally visible.
Political progressives see both directions as appropriate, because both
increase protection for persons who need it: sexual marginorities and children.
Heterosexual women and children need protection from abuse by family mem-
bers, while sexual marginorities need protection from state imposition of a
majoritarian morality. Political conservatives, however, would likely prefer a
movement in the opposite direction, toward public regulation of morality and
state enforcement of paternal rights in the traditional family."° While my
105. Cynthia G. Bowman & Elizabeth Mertz, A Dangerous Direction: Legal Intervention in
Sexual-Abuse and Survivor Therapy, 109 HARv. L. REV. 549 (1996).
106. Id. at 551.
107. See, e.g., Danielle Goblirsch, Balancing the Rights of Child Sexual Abuse Victims as
Witnesses and the Constitutional Rights of Defendants: Has the Iowa Legislature Gone Too Far to
Protect the Child Victim?, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 227 (1993).
108. Social recognition that children are sexually abused in significant numbers had to predate
the evidentiary accommodation. In 1953 Kinsey found that one out of four girls and one out of
ten boys were sexually assaulted before the age of eighteen. See CHRISTOPHER BAGLEY &
KATHLEEN KING, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 32 (1990). Both the Civil Rights and women's move-
ments of the 1950s and 1960s contributed to the social and political climate that led to prosecu-
tions of child sexual abuse. Id. at 33. The deliberate speed with which American culture recog-
nized child abuse is reflected by the fact that the ASPCA was formed shortly before the American
Society for the Prevention Cruelty to Children. Thomas, supra note 92, at 307-08 (describing how
the ASPCA formed eight years before the ASPCC).
109. Colorado recently considered the Parental Rights Amendment, a ballot initiative which
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model is descriptive, it also reflects a normative judgement that personal
autonomy should trump majoritarian morality where there is no identifiable
victim.
IV. QUEER NATION: THE MODEL AS APPLIED TO GAY PEOPLE
Having set out the model as it applies to various sexual regulations, I now
apply it to one area in some detail. The way the law regulates gay people
nicely illustrates how one group can be at multiple places in my model, but
generally closer to contractual purgatory than the public extremes (condemna-
tion and rights).
A. Crimes of Passion: Public Condemnation of Homosexuality
Almost half of the states criminalize sodomy. And as a result of Bowers
v. Hardwick, there is nothing unconstitutional about criminalizing the conduct
of gay people, while refusing to criminalize the same conduct when performed
by heterosexual sex partners."0 In the military, gay service members are sub-
ject to court martial and imprisonment for identifying themselves as gay.'"
Moreover, facially neutral criminal statutes against fornication, vagrancy, and
public indecency are often enforced against gay people."' In addition, city
ordinances that criminalize cross-dressing have long been applied to harass
and prosecute gay people." 3
While the legitimacy of criminalizing homosexuality is hotly contest-
ed," 4 and criminal sodomy statutes are rarely enforced to punish consensual
would have effectively exchanged at least parts of children's public right to be free from child
abuse for parents' public rights to discipline their children as they saw fit. The proposed Amend-
ment provided: "All persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which
may be reckoned the right of ... parents to direct and control the upbringing, education, values,
and discipline of their children." Michelle D. Johnston, Hidden Agenda in Amend. 17?, DENY.
POST, Nov. 3, 1996, at Al. The constitutional amendment, however, did not pass. Michelle D.
Johnston, Of the People Faces Hearing on Election Law, DENy. POST, Nov. 14, 1996, at B I (not-
ing that proposed amendment was defeated, 58% to 42%).
110. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986).
111. RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW 93 (1992) (describing an investigation of women
Marines suspected of lesbianism at Parris Island in 1986 through 1988, which involved question-
ing almost half of the 246 women at the training facility, discharging 27 women, and penalizing 3
women with prison sentences, forfeitures, reductions in rank, and dishonorable discharges).
112. See, e.g., People v. Hale, 168 N.E.2d 518 (N.Y. 1960) (vagrancy law applies equally to
"loitering pimps and prostitutes... and loitering homosexuals"); Shannon Minter, Note, Sodomy
and Public Morality Offenses Under U.S. Immigration Law Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity,
26 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 771, 772 (1993).
113, See, e.g., People v. Gillespi, 204 N.E.2d 211 (N.Y. 1964) (defendants convicted under
vagrancy statute for cross-dressing); People v. Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834 (App. Div. 1968),
affd, 260 N.E.2d 871 (1970) (male youth convicted of vagrancy for dressing as female in subway
station). Both vagrancy and cross-dressing statutes have often been used to harass gay people.
GARBER, supra note 78, at 32; KENNEDY & DAVIS, supra note 80, at 180 & n.29 (relating that
Buffalo, New York police in the 1950s arrested and threatened to arrest lesbians socializing in
bars or on the street if the women had on less than three pieces of women's clothing).
114. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAw: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION 81-84
(1991); Thomas Coleman, Jr., Disordered Liberty: Judicial Restrictions on the Rights to Privacy
and Equality in Bowers v. Hardwick and Baker v. Wade, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 81 (1986)
David 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 CONTENTS 215 (1986-87);
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adult conduct, the fact that gay conduct remains criminal in so much of the
country has tremendous significance for the legal life of gay people. Gay par-
ents have lost custody of their children, and qualified people have been ex-
cluded from military service or employment, at least in part due to sodomy
laws." 5 Moreover, the symbolic power of criminalizing gay conduct serves
to quell arguments for contractual or public rights to employment or housing
opportunities, marriage, or political participation.
The pervasive effects of Bowers v. Hardwick are further evidenced in
Justice Scalia's assertion in his dissenting opinion in Romer v. Evans: "If it is
constitutionally permissible for a state to make homosexual conduct criminal,
surely it is constitutionally permissible for a state to enact other laws merely
disfavoring homosexual conduct."" 6 While Justice Scalia's opinion did not
prevail, and the Court struck down Amendment 2 as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause,"7 his blustery dissent illustrates one danger of sodomy
laws: the existence of sodomy laws somewhere might justify any discriminato-
ry treatment of gay people anywhere, as long as the actions were leveled at
gay people as gay people." 8 Had Scalia's argument persuaded a majority of
the Court, Amendment 2 would have had a staggering legal effect.
Under Scalia's reasoning, not only would Amendment 2 arguably have
prevented Colorado state courts from recognizing a claim (even a purely pri-
Goldstein, supra note 45; Janet Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After
Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993); David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy
and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800 (1986); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy,
102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 747-70 (1989); Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by
Personal Predilection, 54 U. C. L. REV. 648 (1987); Mitchell L. Peart, Note, Chipping Away at
Bowers v. Hardwick: Making the Best of an Unfortunate Decision, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 154 (1988);
Yvonne Tharpes, Comment, Bowers v. Hardwick and the Legitimization of Homophobia in Ameri-
ca, 30 How. L.J. 537 (1987); Joseph R. Thornton, Note, Bowers v. Hardwick: An Incomplete
Constitutional Analysis, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1100 (1987).
115. Note, Patriarchy Is Such a Drag, supra note 84, at 1985-86 (describing how sodomy
laws contribute to gay parents losing custody of their children, gay employees losing their jobs,
and foreclose strict scrutiny under equal protection doctrine). It must be remembered, however,
that actual enforcement of sodomy laws waxes and wanes. In Chicago in 1908, for example, po-
lice made 73 felony arrests for the "crime against nature," while in 1909 they made only 31 such
arrests. Similarly, the number of appellate cases on same-sex sexuality increased between 1870
and 1900, and continued to increase in the fast half of the twentieth century. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 32, at 344.
116. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1630 (1996) (Scalia, I., dissenting); see also Lyle
Denniston, Scalia Takes Charge in Gay Rights Case, AM. LAW., Dec. 1995, at 106 (describing
how Justice Scalia "worked so hard to argue [Colorado Assistant Attorney General Timothy
Tymkovich's] case for him that the lawyer nearly became a bystander. Scalia then argued that
since Bowers has upheld the criminalizing of homosexual conduct, then states surely could take
action short of that, as Colorado had done in 'denying special protection' for the same kind of
conduct") Id. at 107.
117. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
118. Scalia's reasoning, of course, does not interpret Amendment 2 to prevent granting an
African-American gay person protection from racial discrimination. But Scalia's interpretation
would prevent African-American gay people from seeking protection from discrimination as gay
people. In other words, if a police officer refused to assist a gay African-American man, saying,
"No way, I hate gays," that would be permissible conduct under Scalia's reading of Amendment
2, whereas it would not be permissible for the same police officer to refuse help, saying, "No way.
I hate Blacks." But the fact remains that Amendment 2 singles out one class of citizens for special
second-class status. The tremendous impact of Amendment 2 was the targeting of this characteris-
tic as one that is not a basis for protection.
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vate contractual one)" 9 of discrimination brought by a gay person, but even
more oppressive regulations would have been justified. Thus Romer v. Evans
is a landmark case not only for constitutional jurisprudence, but also for doc-
umenting gay people's progress from public condemnation toward public
rights. While Evans did not overrule Bowers v. Hardwick,' it may be inter-
preted to mandate that gay people have access to a level playing field as they
seek public rights. As such, Evans is a tentative move in the direction of gay
public rights, and further protects gay presence in the contractual way station.
B. Contracts: Where Like Minds Meet
Despite widespread criminalization, gay people enjoy private, contract-
based protection of their relationships with lovers and employers. Ruthann
Robson divides gay relationship contracts into three categories: (1) estate plan-
ning tools such as wills, trusts, and powers of attorney; (2) cohabitation con-
tracts; and (3) quasi-marriage contracts through domestic partnership legisla-
tion. 2 1 I focus on the second category-cohabitation contracts-and briefly
address employment contracts which protect against sexual orientation discrim-
ination. While only a small corner of the universe of gay-related contracts,
these two examples address some variety of gay-positive contracting in that
they cover voluntary exchanges for both love and money.
1. Contracts for Love: Cohabitation
Cohabitation contracts between same-sex partners tend to be enforced
where the parties structure their agreement like a business arrangement. They
are less likely to be enforced, however, when they mirror traditional marriage.
119. An example of a purely private contract would be an employment contract with non-
discrimination or domestic partnership policies. While this contract seems enforceable under
Amendment 2, a court could conceivably refuse to enforce it (or a gay cohabitation contract) by
seeing recognition of the contract as enforcement as a "policy whereby homosexual ... orienta-
tion ... entitlles] [a] person... to claim ... protected status or... discrimination," as forbidden
by Amendment 2. The full text of Amendment 2 provides:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the
State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies,
political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orien-
tation, conduct, practices, or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota prefer-
ences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall
be in all respects self-executing.
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996); Sue Chrisman, Commentary, Evans v. Romer: An
"Old" Right Comes Out, 72 DENy. U. L. REv. 519 (1995).
Thus, a broad interpretation of Amendment 2 might have forbidden Colorado Courts from
enforcing private contracts not to discriminate on the basis of gay sexual orientation. If so, my
contract arguments would have been eviscerated in Colorado, since no court could have enforced
gay cohabitation or employment contracts that bar sexual orientation discrimination.
120. The majority opinion does not cite Bowers, which is one of only two or three gay rights
cases ever heard by the United States Supreme Court.
121. Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbi-
an Legal Theory, 63 TEMP. L. REv. 511, 520 (1990). Arguably, the municipal nature of a domes-
tic partnership ordinance makes contracts arising from it more like public right than a purely pri-
vate transaction.
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An Ohio court, for example, refused to award any remedy regarding assets
accumulated over nine years by a lesbian couple, reasoning that one partner's
belief that the relationship resembled a marriage was insufficient reason for
recovery.'22 Similarly, the California Court of Appeals refused to enforce an
implied cohabitation agreement between two men where the plaintiff referred
to himself as having been the other man's lover, reasoning that the meretri-
cious elements of the contract could not be severed from its business as-
pects.
123
But courts are more likely to enforce implied contracts couched in busi-
ness terms.2 4 A California court enforced an oral cohabitation contract be-
tween two men despite sexual elements to the contract because there were also
business elements. The court explained its reason for awarding damages only
for the business-related services:
[Wihere services provided by the complaining homosexual partner
were limited to "lover, companion, homemaker, travelling companion,
housekeeper and cook" . . . plaintiff's rendition of sex and other ser-
vices naturally flowing from sexual cohabitation was an inseparable
part of the consideration for the so-called cohabitation agreement .
... In contrast, [plaintiff here] ... itemizes services contracted for as
companion, chauffeur, bodyguard, secretary, partner, and business
counsellor. These, except for companion, are significantly different
from those household duties normally attendant to non-business co-
habitation and are those for which monetary compensation ordinarily
would be anticipated.'25
This language suggests that the best way to maximize the likelihood of judicial
enforcement of gay couples' cohabitation contracts is to expressly formulate
them as business agreements, omitting any mention of the parties' relation-
122. Seward v. Mentrup, 622 N.E.2d 756, 758 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) ("lAppellee never
promised... that appellant would be reimbursed for improvements to appellee's residence. Ap-
pellant assumed that she would be entitled to a division of the improvements' value simply be-
cause she viewed the parties' relationship as similar to a marriage.... In the absence of a mar-
riage contract or other agreement, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to appellee
on appellant's breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims.").
123. Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding there was no severable
portion of a gay cohabitation contract supported by independent consideration).
124. See, e.g., Bramkett v. Selman, 597 S.W.2d 80 (Ark. 1980) (imposing constructive trust
based on lesbian couple's oral cohabitation agreement); Weekes v. Gay, 256 S.E.2d 901, 904 (Ga.
1979) (imposing implied trust regarding assets of gay male couple because "the evidence was
inconclusive as to the exact nature of the relationship"); Small v. Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1982) (reversing summary judgment so plaintiff could pursue partnership claims regarding
lesbian relationship).
125. Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 410 (Ct. App. 1988) (distinguishing Jones v.
Daly). But artist Robert Rauschenberg's former lover and business partner was allowed to pursue
his oral contractual claim after their 22-year relationship ended, and the court held it irrelevant
whether the services were personal or commercial, as long as they were not exclusively sexual.
Van Brunt v. Rauschenberg, 799 F. Supp. 1467, 1471 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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ship,12 6 since courts have shown more willingness to enforce contracts aris-
ing out of a love affair if it is structured like a business affair.
a. Express Cohabitation Contracts
The cases above involve claims arising out of implied rather than express
contracts. Many gay couples have entered written cohabitation contracts, and
courts have occasionally enforced them. Even in Georgia, which enforces its
sodomy law more aggressively than most states, 2 7 a same-sex cohabitation
contract has been enforced.' Enforcement, however, is less than a contrac-
tual slam dunk for gay people. Like implied cohabitation contracts, express
cohabitation contracts are more likely to be enforced if they are structured like
a business relationship and are silent about the love relationship.
In Crooke v. Gilden, the Georgia Supreme Court enforced a lesbian co-
habitation contract over one partner's objections that the contract should not be
enforced because it was based on "immoral or illegal" consideration. 29 The
court excluded evidence of the partners' lesbian relationship, reasoning that the
parol evidence rule barred admission of evidence varying an integrated
contract.3 Crooke thus reveals contractual purgatory as a place where many
gay people can take refuge only if they go there in disguise. "' Only if the
partners' agreement does not reference their romantic relationship--as long as
they are willing to be closeted-will it be enforced as a contract.3 2 But con-
tractual purgatory is perhaps a haven where the alternative is damnation to
criminalization, or no recovery at all.
126. See Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992) (enforcing contractual agreement be-
tween former lovers and excluding all evidence of the nature of the relationship through the parol
evidence rule); see also HAYDEN CURRY & DENIS CLIFFORD, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND
GAY COUPLES 2:1 (5th ed. 1989) ("[I]f a contract states (or even implies) that a promise was
made in exchange for sexual services, the contract won't be enforced. So don't make any
references to sexuality; identify yourselves as 'partners,' not 'lovers.' The less cute you are the
better.").
127. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir.
1995) (relying on sodomy statute to fire assistant attorney general for celebrating Jewish marriage
ceremony with same-sex partner).
128. Crooke, 414 S.E.2d at 645. I would likely not have found this case had Mary Becker not
called my attention to it. Because it does not mention the parties' relationship or discuss the con-
tract as a cohabitation contract, it likely would be buried in generic contract key numbers. The
Georgia Supreme Court masqueraded a gay cohabitation contract as an ordinary commercial con-
tract in order to enforce it, but in doing so the court also obscured the value of the case as prece-
dent by making it difficult to find and thus difficult to cite in subsequent cases.
129. Id.
130. The cohabitation contract at issue included an integration clause: "This Agreement sets
forth the entire agreement between the partners with regard to the subject matter hereof." Id. at
646.
131. The partner opposing enforcement, of course, did not want to benefit from contractual
purgatory, in that she resisted judicial enforcement of the contract. She did perhaps benefit from
the relationship if it was enhanced by the agreement reached in the cohabitation contract, or she
may have benefitted as a gay person but not as an individual property holder.
132. This concern about enforcing contracts based on meretricious consideration underlies
even Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976), the landmark case recognizing cohabitation
contract claims. Contract enforcement, then, does not necessarily benefit gay people generally
because it demands closetedness.
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Moreover, the court in Crooke may have ignored the nature of the parties'
relationship merely as a matter of formalism. If in fact everyone knew that
Crooke and Gilden had been lovers and that the contract arose out of that
relationship, then perhaps the court's legal blinders in the name of formalism
are not entirely destructive to a gay rights agenda. Viewed as such, gay cohab-
itation cases may be essential to gay rights litigation, in that the major battle-
front of gay people's lives is achieving legal recognition of their relationships.
But the power of self-identification as gay is absolutely central to virtually
every effort to obtain legal protection for gay people. For example, President
Clinton's compromise "Don't Ask/Don't Tell" exclusion of gay people in the
military was received as being as equally oppressive as the old blanket exclu-
sion. In other words, most gay people deem it less than full recovery when
they can enjoy a benefit only if they remain silent about the fact that they are
gay.
Even this modest victory, however, may be vitiated by practical consider-
ations. The importance of a contractual way station is questionable if almost
nobody stops there. Like heterosexuals, most gay couples cohabit without any
explicit statement of their intentions regarding financial arrangements upon
dissolution. This is why we have default marriage rules: most people do not
bother to contract at all, let alone contract around the default. But maybe even
rarely used cohabitation contracts benefit gay people. First, they are better than
nothing, because they create the possibility of legal recognition. Second, if
some couples are contracting and courts are enforcing the contracts, perhaps
more couples will enter contracts in order to avoid inefficient ex post disputes.
The fact that few gay couples explicitly contract or bring claims based on
contract shows one useful aspect of contractual purgatory: just as society may
get used to gay couples by increased exposure through courts enforcing gay
cohabitation contracts, gay people themselves might increasingly claim the
social space of couplehood if more couples entered contracts and courts en-
forced those contracts. These acclimations may in turn lead society to grant
gay people public rights.
In sum, cohabitation contracts provide some protection and recognition for
relationships that would otherwise be socially and legally invisible. Perhaps
this contractual purgatory is a way station that precedes recognition of gay
marriage as a public right.3 The modest claims of contractual purgatory
(given the low numbers of people that expressly contract) may be bolstered if
implied contracts are added to the machinery that delivers gay people to con-
tractual purgatory. But whereas Crooke was based on legal formalities of the
parol evidence rule, implied contracts do not rest on classical formalism.
133. Perhaps the public right of marriage will be made more contractual. Jeffrey Stake has
argued that privatization arguments are so strong that they suggest substituting mandatory prenup-
tial agreements for the state-mandated marriage contract. Jeffrey E. Stake, Mandatory Planning for
Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397 (1992). Epstein and other proponents of New Private Law would
also likely prefer that parties be held to terms they actually negotiated and agreed to, rather than
default rules supplied by the state. As Katherine Franke pointed out to me, marriage may not be a
progressive step for gay people. Thus perhaps contract is more progressive than marriage for both
gay and heterosexual partners.
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b. Implied Cohabitation Contracts
Courts have recognized implied cohabitation contracts for at least twenty
years.'34 Contracts can be implied-in-fact or implied-in-law. An implied-in-
fact contract is similar to an express contract in that the parties intended to
reach an enforceable agreement but failed to expressly say so.' Contracts
implied-in-law, however, do not require the classical contractual meeting of
the minds. While implied-in-fact contracts are justified by contractual consent,
implied-in-law contracts are justified to prevent unjust enrichment.'36
If contractual purgatory is run by classical contractarians rather than Legal
Realists, only the implied-in-fact cohabitation contract delivers travelers to the
way station. Generally, while classical contract theory does not always require
that contracts be written to be enforceable, they must still be grounded in
mutual intent of the parties to contract. Implied-in-law contracts, however, do
not require mutual assent, and thus seem to breach Epstein's simple rule of
voluntary exchange.'37 Of course, tort-like theories of unjust enrichment
might masquerade as contract. But if entry to contractual purgatory requires
classical contract identity papers, quasi-contracts might not earn one admit-
tance.
If contractual purgatory only embraces implied-in-fact contracts, then
perhaps few people will enter it, resulting in a limited legal effect of the way
station. Like heterosexuals, most gay couples succumb to the power of inertia
and rely on good faith and continuity rather than negotiate express promises
for property distribution in the event that they break up. As a result, contracts
implied-in-law might be the most common claims of partners seeking judicial
remedies. Claimants could mitigate this effect, however, by producing evi-
dence of a contract even absent express agreement. Some companies, universi-
ties, and municipalities accord insurance and other benefits for employees'
domestic partners.'38 Because the forms the domestic partners fill out aver
that the partners cohabit, share finances and support, and intend to do so
indefinitely, the domestic partnership benefit application form may itself be-
come the grounds for an implied contract.'39 Because the partner signing the
134. The landmark implied cohabitation contract case is Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106
(Cal. 1976).
135. See, e.g., ARTHuR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 18, at 41 & n.42 (1963). Carol
S. Bruch presented a paper comparing judicial enforcement of heterosexual and gay implied co-
habitation contracts at the Joint Session of the Contracts and Gay and Lesbian Issues Sections,
AALS, San Antonio, Tex., Jan. 5, 1996. She concluded that courts are equally reluctant to enforce
same-sex and opposite-sex implied cohabitation contract claims. The paper is not published.
136. Id.
137. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 53.
138. At the 1996 AALS Joint Session of the Contracts and Gay and Lesbian Issues Sections
in San Antonio, Tex., San Francisco practitioner Paul Wotman described a number of his implied
cohabitation contract cases, and many of his clients fell into the implied-in-law category. Wotman
suggested using domestic partnership forms as evidence of a cohabitation contract.
139. Domestic partnership eligibility often resembles that for heterosexual marriage. Usually
the parties must be eighteen, capable of contractual consent, not closely related, and not in a mar-
riage or domestic partnership already. They also frequently require the partners to state that they
are in a committed relationship and share basic living expenses. Berkeley requires the partners to
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form is likely a wage earner, and thus likely economically independent, the
domestic partnership form may provide a non-wage earning partner evidence
necessary to sustain an implied-in-fact contract claim."4 Thus, more gay
people may enter contractual purgatory even if a cursory glance at their situa-
tion suggests that they do not have any contract claim. As social rituals such
as applying for domestic partnership benefits embrace gay people, legal evi-
dence accumulates. This evidence may well create a contract even where the
parties did not precisely agree on the nature of the agreement. If implied con-
tracts continue to gain recognition, gay people will move more firmly into
contractual purgatory, and thus further toward public rights.
2. Contracts for Money: Employment
Having discussed contracts for love, I now turn to contracts for money.
The most common gay-oriented contract for money is an employer or univer-
sity's contractual protection against sexual orientation discrimination and/or
provision of domestic partnership benefits.
Domestic partnership and non-discrimination contractual protections arise
in universities and other workplaces. The employer or educational institution
agrees not to discriminate against gay people in employment or education,
and/or agrees to extend benefits enjoyed by employees' or students' heterosex-
ual partners to same-sex partners. 4 '
The University of Denver, for example, recently established domestic
partnership benefits, three years after it adopted a non-discrimination policy.
As with other contractual protections, the fate of this purely private contractual
benefit turned on the validity of Amendment 2. If Amendment 2 had become
law, it would have foreclosed any state entity in Colorado enacting or enforc-
ing any ordinance, regulation, statute, or policy that protected against discrimi-
nation on the basis of homosexuality. 42 Thus while private contractual rights
state their intention to remain in the partnership indefinitely. Minneapolis requires that partners
state they are "committed to one another to the same extent as married persons are to each other."
Note, Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analy-
sis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1192-94 (1992).
140. If the Statute of Frauds applies, it requires a writing signed by the person against whom
the contract will be enforced. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 134-135; JOHN D.
CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 19-31 (3d ed. 1987).
141. The Association of American Law Schools, for example, requires accredited law schools
not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. Since membership in the AALS is voluntary,
this rule is more akin to a contract than a regulation or statute. As such, it fits squarely into con-
tractual purgatory in my model. See Roberto L. Corrada, Of Heterosexism, National Security, and
Federal Preemption: Addressing the Legal Obstacles to a Free Debate About Military Recruitment
at Our Nation's Law Schools, 29 HOUSTON L. REV. 301 (1992).
142. For the text of Amendment 2, see supra note 119. Amendment 2 does not prohibit het-
erosexuals from seeking a remedy from discrimination on the basis of heterosexual orientation.
Denver, Boulder, and Telluride have ordinances that forbid discrimination on the basis of "sexual
orientation." Thus, if it had been upheld by the United States Supreme Court, Amendment 2
would have prevented existing ordinances in Denver, Boulder, and Telluride from being enforced
to deter anti-gay discrimination, but would have allowed them to be enforced to deter anti-het-
erosexual discrimination. Thus, under Amendment 2, the sole use of the ordinances would be to
allow people with power (heterosexuals) to harass gay people, the very people intended to be pro-
tected by the ordinances.
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would have been literally all that gay people could have relied on in Colorado
when they were treated unfairly based on their sexual orientation, 43 courts
might have interpreted Amendment 2 broadly to prohibit state courts from en-
forcing even these entirely private contracts according protections against sex-
ual orientation discrimination or granting domestic partnership benefits. Thus,
some forms of public condemnation can foreclose contractual purgatory as an
option.
At least one court has enforced a sexual orientation non-discrimination
clause.'" In Tumeo v. University of Alaska, a university refused to extend
health benefits to employees' same-sex partners, despite a university policy not
to discriminate on the basis of marital status.'45 While the actual holding of
Tumeo may be based on a state statute prohibiting marital status discrimina-
tion, the court explicitly discussed the non-discrimination contract language,
and invoked contract law to aid its analysis."4 The end result of Tumeo was
that a non-discrimination contract was partially responsible for equalizing
compensation between gay and married heterosexual employees by mandating
that the university could not discriminate between the two classes by granting
one group's partners health benefits and denying that benefit to the other
group.
Tumeo has added significance for contractual purgatory. The Tumeo court
distinguished cases where courts refused to enforce sexual orientation/marital
status non-discrimination clauses'47 on the grounds that those cases involved
143. The text of Amendment 2 is broad enough that a court could conclude a court is barred
from recognizing a purely private, contractual claim because Amendment 2 prohibits any state
entity from recognizing claims of discrimination against gay people.
144. Tumeo v. University of Alaska, No. 4FA-94-43 Civ., 1995 WL 238359 (Alaska Super.
1995) (holding university's health plan violates Board of Regents' policies against marital status
discrimination by refusing to extend health insurance benefits to employees' same-sex partners).
Tumeo is an example of contractual purgatory, of course, only if the Board of Regents' policy
against marital status discrimination is a contract, rather than a regulation akin to a statute. The
Vermont Labor Relations Board also enforced a sexual orientation non-discrimination policy,
forcing the University of Vermont to extend domestic partnership benefits to faculty members on
the same basis that it extended benefits to partners of married employees. Grievance of B.M., S.S.,
C.H. and J.R., No. 92-32 (Vt. Lab. Rel. Bd. June 4, 1993) (copy on file with the author). An
Oregon trial court has similarly ordered the state to grant benefits to gay couples under state con-
stitutional and statutory prohibitions of sex discrimination. The decision, however, is being ap-
pealed and the parties do not expect a final resolution until 1998. Domestic Partners: Oregon
Attorney General to Appeal Ruling on Benefits to Same Sex Partners, 1996 DAILY LAB. REP. 171
d9 (Sept. 4, 1996).
However, other tribunals have refused to accord employees domestic partnership benefits
on the basis of a sexual orientation and/or marital status non-discrimination clause in a union
contract. In re Michigan State Univ., 104 Lab. Arb. 516 (1995) (declining to extend domestic
partnership benefits based on union and management's prior negotiations); In re Kent State Univ.,
103 Lab. Arb. 338 (1994) (holding that faculty member was not discriminated against on the basis
of sexual orientation by university refusing to extend domestic partnership benefits despite sexual
orientation non-discrimination clause in collective bargaining agreement).
145. Tumeo, 1995 WL 238359, at *4. The Board of Regents' Regulation provided in relevant
part, "The University of Alaska does not engage in impermissible discrimination.... The Uni-
versity of Alaska makes its programs and activities available without discrimination on the basis
of ... marital status." ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) also prohibited marital status discrimina-
tion. Id.
146. Tumeo, 1995 WL 238359, at *3 ("[Tihis appeal involves questions of contract law,
constitutional law, and statutory interpretation.") (emphasis added).
147. Id. at *8 (citing Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct.
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conflicting statutes that had to be harmonized so as not to nullify either stat-
ute. But if a gay employee's claim is based on contract rather than statute,
then the court can recognize a gay-related contract benefit without nullifying a
statute.
A specific case illustrates how contract may sometimes be better for gay
people then public rules. Ross v. Denver Department of Health and Hospi-
tals'" involved one ordinance providing medical leave to care for family
members and another barring sexual orientation discrimination. Had Mary
Ross been able to assert a contractual rather than an ordinance-based non-dis-
crimination provision (in other words, a private rule instead of a public rule),
then perhaps the Colorado Court of Appeals might have granted her medical
leave to care for her ailing life partner by construing the contract clause to
provide more protection since a contract can define spouse without reference
to state law. As it was, the court was left to construe two public rules consis-
tently, and chose to nullify the non-discrimination provision in order to en-
force the definition of family in the sick leave provision.
A non-discrimination clause in a contract, however, cannot guarantee
judicial enforcement. In Rovira v. AT&T, a federal district court upheld
AT&T's denial of ERISA death benefits to a lesbian employee's partner.49
Although AT&T's personnel policies forbade sexual orientation and marital
status discrimination, the court concluded that AT&T could discriminate on
this basis in according benefits since the ERISA plan did not incorporate the
non-discrimination policies."s While this invocation is confusing given the
court's finding that the ERISA plan was a "contract between private par-
ties"'"' for benefits and AT&T contracted not to discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation or marital status, it also illustrates the way that public rules
often operate to the detriment of gay couples. But while courts may find some
public or contract rule to nullify a contract benefitting gay employees, the pos-
sibility of contractual protections still outweighs the current state of near cer-
tainty of lack of public rules protecting gay people.
The above examples of gay cohabitation contracts and employ-
ment/education contracts illustrate that contracts for both love and money can
serve a progressive agenda for gay people. These examples illustrate that when
the government default rule is hostile to gay people, any opportunity to con-
tract around that rule is advantageous. As long as the contract is not against
public policy, judges generally do not second-guess the contractual intentions
of two or more consenting adults.
App. 1992) (refusing to grant benefits to same-sex partner because non-discrimination statute
harmonized with statute defining spouse as legally married to the employee)).
148. 883 P.2d 516, 518 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
149. 817 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
150. Rovira, 817 F. Supp. at 1071.




Having discussed gay people's place in both public condemnation and
contractual purgatory, I will now address the extent to which gay people have
public rights. I have already defined public rights as including constitutional or
statutory protections against discrimination and freedom to take certain actions
without fear of penalty." 2 Public rights can also be defined as "one's affir-
mative claim against another."'' 3 Either way, gay people enjoy almost no
public rights to be free from discrimination.
When the issue of gay rights comes up for public debate, gay people gen-
erally lose. In 1993, for example, President Clinton initiated a national debate
on the military's ban on gays instead of keeping his campaign promise to
simply lift the ban. The end result of the debate was, in effect, a substantially
similar ban on gay people in the military, popularly known as Don't Ask/
Don't Tell. 54 Along the way gay people had to stomach virulent homopho-
bia every day in the press, as person after person articulated his or her venom-
ous sentiments against gay people.' This vitriolic national debate about gay
people in the military illustrated that gays are far from having public rights.
But there are occasional pockets of potential at state, local, and, to a lesser
extent, federal levels. Below I outline several vehicles for public rights, and
analyze their current efficacy for gay people.
1. Gay Marriage
Hawaii courts have recently recognized gay marriage, but the recognition
is currently stayed pending appeal.' 56 Before Hawaii took this action, Utah
led the charge to limit the effect of Hawaii's action by refusing to recognize
same sex marriages performed in another state;'57 Colorado, Illinois, South
152. See discussion supra in part 11.
153. Walter W. Cook, introduction to HOHFELD, supra note 16, at 7-8. Under Hohfeld's anal-
ysis, gay people generally have "no-right," i.e., the absence of a right. Hohfeld picked the term to
resemble "nobody" and "nothing," which seems to capture the legal status of gay people as unde-
serving of protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Under Hohfeld's
analysis, those who discriminate against gay people are accorded a privilege to do so. Gay
people's no-right and heterosexuals' privilege are Hohfeldian correlatives, since they are opposite
sides of the same coin. Id. at 5. For a further discussion of Hohfeld's analysis in relation to my
model, see supra note 16.
154. John Lancaster, Final Rules on Gays Set, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1993, at AI (rules out-
lining revised ban on gay people in the military suggests marching in a gay rights parade by itself
is likely not grounds for investigation, but two men holding hands off-duty is grounds for investi-
gation). But recent evidence suggests that the Don't Ask/Don't Tell ban on gays in the military
has resulted in more, rather than fewer, discharges and investigations for being gay. Philip
Shenon, Armed Forces Still Question Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1996, at I (prosecutions
up 17% under the Don't Ask/Don't Tell policy). President Clinton similarly aligned himself with
anti-gay Republicans by publicly promising to sign the Defense of Marriage Act the same week
the Supreme Court decided Romer v. Evans. Todd S. Purdum, President Would Sign Legislation
Striking at Homosexual Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1996, at AI.
155. See Shenon, supra note 154.
156. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 Haw. Ct. App. LEXIS 138 (Dec. 3, 1996) (ruling
that equal protection clause of Hawaii constitution requires state to allow same-sex marriage).
Essoyan & Boxall, supra note 66, at A3.
157. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1995) (marriages between persons of the same sex declared
prohibited and void); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4 (1995) ("A marriage solemnized in any other
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Dakota, and many other states have either passed similar legislation or consid-
ered doing so.' Congress and President Clinton similarly acted preemptive-
ly to limit the effect of Hawaii's action by enacting the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA). Under DOMA, federal law only recognizes opposite-sex mar-
riages, and no state need recognize a same-sex marriage under the Constitu-
tion's Full Faith and Credit Clause.'59
But even if some states redefine marriage in an attempt to avoid recogniz-
ing same-sex marriages performed in Hawaii, the single act of a single state
recognizing same-sex marriage could catapult gay people into the realm of
public rights in numerous states, since at least some states will likely recog-
nize Hawaiian gay marriages. The numerous statutory rights attendant on
marriage illustrate the social and legal impact of recognizing gay marriage
anywhere. These benefits include intestacy rights; workers' compensation and
unemployment benefits; maintenance, child support, visitation and property
distribution upon relationship dissolution; evidentiary privileges; and joint
filing for bankruptcy." ° Moreover, courts recognize common law claims,
such as loss of consortium and wrongful death, only for married heterosexu-
als. 6 ' Thus, Hawaii's recognition of same-sex marriages could be a major
public rights victory for gay people. But until the Hawaii litigation is resolved,
gay people remain in contractual purgatory for most purposes.
country, state, or territory, if valid where solemnized, is valid here, unless it is a marriage: (1) that
would be prohibited or declared void in this state under 30-1-2(1) [bigamy].... (3) [either party
under 14 years of age] .... or (5) [both persons are the same sex]."); see also David W. Dunlap,
Some States Trying to Stop Gay Marriages Before They Start, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at A18
("Utah legislators voted overwhelmingly this month to deny recognition to marriages performed
elsewhere that do not conform to Utah law. This would include same-sex unions.").
158. See, e.g., David W. Dunlap, Foes of Gay Marriage Foiled in California Senate, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 6, 1996, at A24 (noting that 35 states have considered anti-gay marriage legislation)
[hereinafter Dunlap, Foes]; David W. Dunlap, Fearing a Toehold for Gay Marriages, Conserva-
tives Rush to Bar the Door, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1996, at A13 (noting that 19 states have consid-
ered anti-gay marriage legislation, including Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Wash-
ington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming and that the states where anti-gay marriage measures became
law include Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah). While the Colorado legislature passed an anti-gay
marriage bill, Governor Romer vetoed it, reaffirming in the same breath that "marriage 'should be
reserved for the union of a man and a woman."' Thomas Frank, Same Sex Ban Vetoed: Romer
Strives to Find Some Middle Ground, DENV. POST, Mar. 26, 1996, at Al. Undeterred, the Colora-
do legislature re-introduced a similar measure as this article was going into publication. Michelle
D. Johnston, Gay-Marriage Ban Ok'd, DENV. POST, Feb. 14, 1997, at IB, 3B.
159. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
160. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIB-
ERTY TO CIVIIZED COMMrrMENT 66-70 (1996) (listing practical benefits of marriage for gay cou-
ples). Additionally, a heterosexual couple may jointly file for bankruptcy relief, but a same-sex
couple may not. In re Allen, 186 B.R. 769 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995).
161. But see Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994) (recognizing negligent infliction of
emotional distress for cohabitant of the injured person). However, no state recognizes loss of con-
sortium for unmarried couples. Alexander J. Drago & Dean M. Monti, Expanding the Family:
Testing the Limits of Tort Liability, 61 DEF. CouNs. J. 232, 239 n. 18 (1994) (citing federal district
courts recognizing loss of consortium claims for unmarried couples, but noting that the state
courts in which the federal courts sat subsequently refused to allow consortium claims regarding
unmarried couples); see also GEORGE CHRISTIE & JAMES E. MEEKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 766 (1990); PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 552 (1994).
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2. Non-Discrimination and Domestic Partnership Legislation
Another public right is statutory freedom from invidious discrimination. A
handful of states afford some public rights to be free from some forms of
sexual orientation discrimination. As of February 1996, nine states and the
District of Columbia had statutory protections against discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. 62 But these protections are often interpreted nar-
rowly: classified ads are not a "public accommodation" for gay people; 63 re-
fusal to accord gay couples insurance on the same basis as heterosexual cou-
ples is marital status rather than sexual orientation discrimination;" and
marriage remains an exclusively heterosexual privilege even in jurisdictions
with civil rights laws protecting gay people for some purposes. 65
Some cities and municipalities also protect sexual marginorities against
discrimination and/or extend benefits to the domestic partners of city employ-
ees. At least 163 cities and counties have accorded public rights to gay people
through ordinances prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination."6 Similarly,
three states and 52 municipalities, school districts, or other government entities
recognize domestic partnerships and extend some benefits. 67 These ordinanc-
162. HRC LIST, supra note 22. The states are: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. In addition, at least eight states
have executive orders protecting state employees from sexual orientation discrimination. Stephanie
L. Grauerholz, Comment, Colorado's Amendment 2 Defeated: The Emergence of a Fundamental
Right to Participate in the Political Process, 44 DEPAuL L. REV. 841, 855 (1995).
163. Hatheway v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 873 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990). Apparently, newspaper advertising is not a public accommodation for gays, but is a public
accommodation for labor unions. In contrast to Hatheway, a union survived a newspaper's motion
to dismiss the union's complaint that the newspaper violated the public accommodation statute by
refusing to publish its advertisements. The newspaper had argued that the newspaper was not a
public accommodation. Local Painters Union Local 802 v. Madison Newspapers, Inc., No. 3165
(Equal Opportunities Comm'n, Madison, Wis. file closed Dec. 24, 1987). However, the issue was
never conclusively determined because the parties settled out of court. P. Cameron Devore &
Robert D. Sack, Advertising and Commercial Speech, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW 1996, at 545
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-
3980, 1996). In 1995, the Supreme Court similarly struck down Massachusetts' application of its
public accommodations statute to allow the organizers of a St. Patrick's Day parade to exclude
gay Irish marchers. Thus at least two state's public accommodations laws have been explicitly
applied to exclude gay people. Id. at 547 (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisex-
ual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995)).
164. Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992); Beaty
v. Truck Ins. Exch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (Ct. App. 1992). The Court in Beaty reasoned:
[T]here is nothing arbitrary about defendant's issuance of joint umbrella policies only to
married persons. Given the legal unity of interest and the shared responsibilities atten-
dant upon a marriage, an insurer could reasonably conclude there is no significant risk in
covering both an insured and his or her spouse.... With regard to unmarried couples of
whatever sexual orientation, an insurer could conclude the relationship lacks the assur-
ance of permanence necessary to assess with confidence the risks insured against in a
joint umbrella policy.
Id. at 598-99.
165. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 320 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding mar-
riage license bureau's refusal to issue marriage license to same-sex couples does not violate the
District of Columbia's Human Rights Act). Marriage will not be exclusively heterosexual if the
Hawaii Supreme Court upholds the lower court's recognition of gay marriage in Baehr v. Miike,
No. 91-1394, 1996 Haw. Ct. App. LEXIS 138 (Dec. 3, 1996).
166. HRC LIST, supra note 22.
167. Smothers, supra note 22, at 25.
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es have been enforced to remedy a restaurant's refusing to seat a lesbian cou-
ple"r and a health club's terminating a gay man's membership."6 But the
very same ordinance that prohibited discrimination in health club membership
did not prevent Big Brothers, Inc. from asking prospective big brothers about
their sexual orientation, and outing any gay prospective big brothers to all
prospective little brothers and their mothers.
17
1
Ordinances recognizing gay rights also face preemption challenges. Sever-
al courts have found that municipal protections for gay people are preempted
by state law. Thus, if a state has no statute banning sexual orientation discrim-
ination, enforcement of any local ordinance can be barred because the state
civil rights statute may be deemed to occupy the field and prevent protection
against sexual orientation discrimination by its silence.' Or the
municipality's action according domestic partnership benefits might be found
to be ultra vires and in conflict with state statutes.' The same preemption
arguments levelled against local ordinances can perhaps be aimed at state
laws, leaving only federal protections against anti-gay discrimination. But no
federal law protects gay people against discrimination.7 7 At the end of the
day, gay people have slim public rights through state statutes and municipal
ordinances, leaving contract as the only practical alternative vehicle for obtain-
ing legal relief until the Supreme Court decided Romer v. Evans.
168. Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1984).
169. Blanding v. Sport & Health Club, Inc., 373 N.W.2d 784 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
170. Big Brothers, Inc. v. Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights, 284 N.W.2d 823, 827, 828
(Minn. 1979) (requiring Big Brothers, Inc. to inform mothers of sexual orientation of all prospec-
tive big brothers would unduly burden mothers by forcing them to determine relevance of sexual
orientation).
171. See, e.g., Delaney v. Superior Fast Freight, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 38 (Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that legislature expressed its intent to exclude local regulation from the field of fair
housing and employment regulation); Under 21 v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 1985)
(holding that Mayor of New York City was preempted from issuing an executive order banning
sexual orientation discrimination by city contractors because the state legislature did not ban sexu-
al orientation discrimination); Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-
Eighties, 10 DAYTON L. REV. 459, 481 (1985).
172. See City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1995) (invalidating domestic
partnership benefits to city employees as ultra vires); Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d
107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that city exceeded its authority in authorizing reimbursement
to city employees for health care insurance costs for same-sex domestic partners). Atlanta's City
Council recently passed domestic partnership benefits again, in an effort to grant the benefits in
compliance with McKinney. As before, opponents have challenged the action. Smothers, supra
note 22, at 25. But Denver's domestic partnership ordinance recently survived a taxpayer chal-
lenge similar to those in Minneapolis and Atlanta. Howard Pankratz, Denver's Gay Benefits Stand,
DENV. POST, Dec. 20, 1996, at 1.
173. Rivera, supra note 171, at 465 (gay people not protected by Title VII). But gay people
do have some limited protection from discrimination in federal employment. Id. at 483. President
Clinton did not sign a government-wide Executive Order prohibiting sexual orientation discrimina-
tion in federal employment as he promised during his first campaign. Instead such policies are
being implemented on an agency-by-agency basis. Al Kamen, The Federal Page, WASH. POST,
Jan. 24, 1994. at A15.
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3. Taking the Anti-Gay Initiative
Anti-gay initiatives were the strongest weapon for opposing gay public
rights until Evans. They are sodomy laws with bite, particularly in relation to
my model. Even if sodomy laws are on the books, they are rarely enforced.
But an initiative such as Colorado's Amendment 2, which provided no state
entity could accord protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation, would have barred gay people from any real civil rights in a far more
comprehensive way than sodomy laws. If Amendment 2 had gone into effect,
Colorado could have enforced any statute solely against gay people, without
any fear of liability for sexual orientation discrimination. The Denver Public
Library could deny library cards to any gay person. Public schools could ban
gay students from attending. Police could ticket only owners of cars with rain-
bow flag stickers'74 for traffic violations. Finally, any efforts to contract
around the anti-gay default rule might not have been enforceable.'
Romer v. Evans may put to rest the anti-gay initiative movement, at least
measures such as Amendment 2 that impose on gay people alone the burden
of getting protections against discrimination through the state constitution.
Evans is remarkable for at least two things. First, it states that Colorado can-
not classify gay people "to make them unequal to everyone else."'76 Second,
it provides that animosity against gay people is not a legitimate state purpose
under the Equal Protection Clause.'77 After Evans, defenders of anti-gay
measures from the military ban to anti-gay-marriage statutes will likely have
to explain how their laws are motivated by an interest other than anti-gay
animosity.
But even after Evans, the journey for gay public rights is decidedly uphill.
When gay rights came to a popular vote in Colorado, Amendment 2 passed.
Americans feel more negative toward gay people than toward any other group
save illegal immigrants.' But not every state's voters have accepted the in-
vitation to impose state-wide legal disabilities on gay people: Oregon and
Maine narrowly defeated such measures in recent years,'79 and proponents in
174. The rainbow flag is a symbol of affiliation with the gay rights movement.
175. In a jurisdiction that does not protect gay people against discrimination, of course, all of
these acts might be permissible. And Amendment 2, had it become law, may well have precluded
Colorado courts from enforcing any gay-friendly terms in contracts, even contracts between pri-
vate parties. See supra note 119.
176. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996).
177. Id.
178. Sherrill, supra, note 42, at 469, 470 (documenting National Election Study data based on
a zero score for most extreme cold feelings, 50 for neither cold nor warm, and 100 for extremely
warm feelings). The data indicate that in 1994, 28.2% of Americans felt absolutely cold toward
gay people, 51.4% felt generally cold toward them, with a mean "temperature" of 35.7. Id. In
contrast, 24% of Americans' temperature with reference to illegal immigrants was zero, with a
mean temperature of 32.3. Id. In contrast, Americans felt warm toward Christian fundamentalists:
only 6.2% gave them a zero, and only 28.4% felt more cold than warm toward them. Id. Sherrill
contends that the only indicator for a jurisdiction passing gay rights legislation is gay bars per
capita, suggesting that only where gays concentrate can they hope for public rights. Id. at 472.
179. David W. Dunlap, Gay Politicians and Issues Win Major Victories, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 1995, at 34 ("A ballot initiative in Maine that would have denied civil rights protections to
homosexuals was rejected, 53 to 47 percent .... Similar measures were rejected last year in Ore-
gon and Idaho, by narrower margins.").
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Washington and Nevada have failed to get sufficient signatures to place an
anti-gay initiative on the ballot.8 0 However, voters may be more reluctant to
vote for gay rights than against measures to limit gay rights. 8' Many edi-
torial responses to Evans favored Scalia's vitriolic dissent, suggesting that
numerous voters disagree with the majority decision in Evans.'82 Romer v.
Evans' invalidation of Amendment 2 is a crucial step in gay people's progress
toward public rights under my model, but will not prevent anti-gay groups
from proposing new initiatives and other anti-gay measures.8 3 At this point,
Evans stands most clearly for the simultaneously modest and radical proposi-
tion that gay people may not be relegated to second class citizenship as a mat-
ter of law. Future cases will determine whether Evans is to sexual orientation
discrimination what Brown v. Board of Education"4 was to racial discrim-
ination.
4. Conclusion: Inchoate Public Rights
In short, gay people are generally somewhere between public condemna-
tion and contractual purgatory in my model, and in all three places on the
diagram in some jurisdictions such as Georgia.'85 They exist on the margins
180. Joni Baiter, The Son of 608? Please Spare Us, SEATTLE TIMEs, June 14, 1994, at BI
("Backers of two anti-gay-rights initiatives announced they couldn't collect enough signatures to
qualify for the ballot."); Maria L. La Ganga, Anti-Gay Initiative Fails to Make Nevada Ballot,
L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1994, at A3 (reporting that an anti-gay initiative failed to get sufficient sig-
natures to gain a place on ballot); see also Bettina Boxall, Despite Losing in '92, an Oregon
Group Is Backing a Revised Measure to Ban Laws Protecting Homosexuals, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7,
1994, at A14 (anti-gay initiative failed in Oregon in 1992 and Idaho Attorney General issued
opinion that similar anti-gay initiative in Idaho was unconstitutional).
181. "Of the 67 anti-gay initiatives since 1972, 76% have resulted in losses for gay rights
supporters. Of the 11 initiatives seeking to expand gay rights, 90% have resulted in losses for sup-
porters of gay rights." Donald P. Haider-Markel & Kenneth J. Meier, Legislative Victory,
Electoral Uncertainty: Explaining Outcomes in the Battles of Lesbian and Gay Rights, POL'Y
STUD. J. (forthcoming Dec. 1996).
182. See, e.g., George F. Will, Terminal Silliness, WASH. POST, May 22, 1996, at A21 (de-
scribing Amendment 2 as the resistance of heterosexual Coloradans "provoked by the aggressive
and successful campaigns of homosexuals and bisexuals for state and local laws protecting them
against discrimination" and agreeing with Scalia's description of Amendment 2 as a "modest at-
tempt ... to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minor-
ity").
183. Anti-gay activists in Idaho intended to put a measure on their November 1996 ballot,
which would have been similar to Colorado's Amendment 2. The organizers, however, were un-
able to obtain enough signatures to place it on the ballot. Perhaps their failure was due in part to
the Idaho Attorney General's opinion that the measure would be unconstitutional. Boxall, supra
note 180, at A]4.
184. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
185. Georgia's Attorney General recently fired an attorney for having a same-sex Jewish
wedding, Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 1995), reh'g granted, 78 F.3d 499 (1996)
(First Amendment intimate association claims remanded to be determined under strict scrutiny test
and intimate expression claim under.compelling interest test), yet Atlanta protects gay people from
discrimination. While Atlanta was recently enjoined from extending health benefits to partners of
unmarried city employees, City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 545 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1995), it recently
passed a similar measure in an attempt to grant domestic partnership benefits and comply with
McKinney. Lewis Becker, Recognition of Domestic Partnerships by Governmental Entities and
Private Employers, I NAT'L J. SEX. ORIENT. L. 1 (1996); Smothers, supra note 22, at 25. Finally,
Georgia has enforced same-sex cohabitation contracts, both express and implied. See Crooke v.
Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992); Weekes v. Gay, 256 S.E.2d 901 (Ga. 1979).
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of contract to the extent that enforcement of a cohabitation contract may
require disguising the parties' entire relationship as a business affair to avoid
public policy problems and potential conflict with sodomy laws." 6 But
Evans is perhaps the most major move toward public rights gay people have
ever enjoyed, and makes equal protection for gay people a possibility under
the Constitution. Progress and setbacks occur so quickly, though, that gay
rights may be fully demoted to public condemnation or catapulted to public
rights in a single court decision.
Perhaps gay people have generally fared better under contractual than
public rights due to principles underlying judicial interpretation of contracts as
opposed to interpretation of legislation. On the margins, judges are arguably
more free to examine moral considerations when interpreting legislation than
when interpreting contracts, since statutory interpretation involves one branch
of government interpreting the work of another branch. Courts have been, after
all, in the business of reviewing legislation for potential constitutional viola-
tions since Marbury v. Madison.'87 Judicial interpretation of contracts, in
contrast, is often informed by a hands-off rhetoric. Judges are supposed to
enforce voluntary agreements of private parties (absent extreme circumstances
such as lack of capacity or duress), regardless of whether they view the agree-
ment as good, bad, or indifferent. The fact that gay cohabitation contracts are
sometimes enforced, even in states with sodomy laws, is striking in compari-
son with judicial and legislative resistance to interpret non-discrimination
statutes as granting gay public rights such as marriage.
Doubtless many judges enforce only the so-called plain language of stat-
utes, and others delve into the intentions behind integrated contracts. 8 But
at least some courts have given broad effect to what they deem to be legisla-
tive intent, particularly when doing so yields a socially popular result. 9 Two
186. Sodomy laws are not ubiquitous; some states have invalidated sodomy statutes under
their state constitutions. See, e.g., People v. Onfre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (N.Y. 1980) (striking down
New York sodomy law as violative of state and federal constitutions). Since Bowers v. Hardwick,
at least three states have struck down their sodomy laws under the state constitution. LESBIANS,
GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 153 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993) (listing Michigan, Kentucky,
and Texas as states that struck down their sodomy laws post-Bowers).
187. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). But some courts and commentators urge judges to restrict themselves
to the so-called plain meaning of a statute rather than interpreting its terms on any moral beliefs
held by the judges. The feasibility of identifying plain meaning has in tum been questioned by
other commentators.
188. Compare, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442
P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968) ("If words had absolute and constant referents, it might be possible to
discover contractual intention in the words themselves and in the manner in which they were ar-
ranged. Words, however, do not have absolute and constant referents.") with Trident Ct. v. Con-
necticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying, "reluctantly," the Thomas
Drayage rule despite the court's preference for enforcing the plain language of the contract).
189. Patterns of statutory and contract interpretation are essentially empirical, and a full sur-
vey is beyond the scope of this article. However, several opinions by Judge Easterbrook, known
for his political conservatism, suggest that even a self-described textualist may be willing to mas-
sage a statute on occasion to achieve a particular result but strictly enforce the language of a com-
mercial contract. In Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Foster, Judge Easterbrook broadly inter-
preted regulations determining eligibility for benefits in order to deny benefits to a disabled work-
er whose pneumoconiosis was not the sole cause of his disability. Freeman United Coal Mining
Co. v. Foster, 30 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1994). To reach this result, Judge Easterbrook quoted from
another one of his opinions:
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cases suggest this pattern, one from the nineteenth century concerning a statute
barring testimony against whites, and a recent one interpreting a non-discrim-
ination statute.
First, the racial case. George Hall was convicted of murder based on the
testimony of Chinese witnesses." Hall appealed, arguing that the testimony
was inadmissible under a California statute barring the testimony of anyone
"black," "Mulatto," or "Indian" against whites. The California Supreme Court
agreed with Hall, reasoning that the legislature intended the statute to bar tes-
timony of Chinese witnesses, since Columbus had mistaken Indians for Asians
upon his arrival in North America."' The court further asserted that the stat-
ute was intended to "shield [whites] from the testimony of the degraded and
demoralized caste[s]," and that allowing Chinese people to testify would lead
to full civil fights, which would be disastrous given Chinese people's "preju-
dice ... mendacity .. inferior[ity], and . . . incapa[city for] progress or
intellectual development."' 92 While extreme in its racism, People v. Hall also
illustrates my more mundane point that judges are sometimes willing to use
considerable poetic license in statutory interpretation when popular sentiment
mandates a particular result.'
The extent of public fights for unmarried couples is perhaps as intense a
social concern now as Chinese people were to white Californians in the 1850s.
Statutes have meanings, sometimes even "plain" ones, but these do not spring directly
from the page. Words are arbitrary signs, having meaning only to the extent writers and
readers share an understanding .... Language in general, and legislation in particular, is
a social enterprise to which both speakers and listeners contribute, drawing on back-
ground understandings and the structure and circumstances of the utterance. Slicing a
statute into phrases while ignoring their contents ... is a formula for disaster.
Id. at 838 (quoting Hermann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1992)).
In Hermann, Judge Easterbrook denied a former employee insurance coverage under ERISA,
explicitly "massaging" the statute to account for congressional errors due to hasty drafting, while
in the same breath denying that he based the decision on legislative history. Hermann, 978 F.2d at
982. These cases show that even judges known for textualism can be quite liberal in interpreting a
law or regulation in order to give effect to what they believe is an underlying statutory purpose.
But in Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990),
Judge Easterbrook enforced the language of a loan agreement, reasoning that "[flirms that have
negotiated contracts are entitled to enforce them to the letter, even to the great discomfort of their
trading partners, without being mulcted for lack of 'good faith,"' and "knowledge that literal en-
forcement means some mismatch between the parties' expectations and the outcome does not
imply a general duty of 'kindness' in performance, or a judicial oversight into whether a party had
'good cause' to act as it did. Parties to a contract are not each others' fiduciaries." Id. at 1357.
For further discussion of Judge Easterbrook's revitalization in Kham of a classical approach to
contracts which disregards the Uniform Commercial Code's approach to contracts, see Dennis M.
Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOwA L. REV.
503 (1991).
190. People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854).
191. Hall, 4 Cal. at 400 ("When Columbus first landed upon the shores of this continent,...
he imagined ... that the Island of San Salvador was one of those Islands of the Chinese Sea...
near... India... [and] he gave to the Islanders the name of Indians .... From that time, down
to a very recent period, the American Indians and the Mongolian, or Asiatic, were regarded as the
same type of the human species."); PATRICIA N. LIMERICK, TmE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE
UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN WEST 261-62 (1987).
192. Hall, 4 Cal. at 403, 405.
193. LIMERICK, supra note 191, at 259-69 (describing white antipathy to Chinese, Japanese,
and other people of color in the nineteenth century American West).
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In Cooper v. French, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted a statute pro-
hibiting marital status discrimination to only protect people who are married,
not unmarried cohabitants.' 9 The court reasoned that a landlord could refuse
to rent an apartment to an unmarried heterosexual couple on religious grounds
because the statutory intent was to discourage fornication and protect marriage
rather than protect unmarried couples from discrimination.
By reading the non-discrimination statute in the shadow of an antiquated
fornication statute, the court gave legal effect to its view that cohabitation
"corrodes the institutions which have sustained our civilization, namely, mar-
riage and family life."'95 The Minnesota Supreme Court's passionate defense
of the traditional family suggests that even without a fornication statute the
court would have found a way to interpret the non-discrimination statute to
allow marital status discrimination. Both People v. Hall and Cooper v. French
suggest that, at least when interpreting statutes governing incendiary issues
like race relations and sex, courts may skirt statutory plain language and resort
to broad readings of legislative intent in order to reach a result favoring
majoritarian morality. 96
Perhaps there is something about contract doctrine or rhetoric that makes
it easier to protect gay people as a matter of contract than it is to protect them
with public rights. The following section suggests some possible reasons why
194. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
195. Id. at 8. The court explained (without citing any authority) why it found the state's argu-
ment "astonishing" since cohabitation causes numerous social ills:
There are certain moral values and institutions that have served western civilization well
for eons .... Before abandoning fundamental values and institutions, we must pause
and take stock of our present social order: millions of drug abusers; rampant child
abuse; a rising underclass without marketable job skills; children roaming the streets;
children with only one parent or no parent at all; and children growing up with no one
to guide them in developing any set of values. How can we expect anything else when
the state itself contributes, by arguments of this kind, to further erosion of fundamental
institutions that have formed the foundation of our civilization for centuries?
Id. at 11. With language like this, it is hard to imagine how any statute could be drafted in such a
way that the Minnesota Supreme Court would recognize the rights of unmarried cohabitors against
discrimination.
196. A third case involves an issue less socially dramatic than race or sex. Instead, it involves
a promissory note signed by a borrower who did not understand what he was signing. In FDIC v.
Culver, 640 F. Supp. 725 (D. Kan. 1986), a federal court in Kansas enforced a promissory note
against a farmer who signed it when it was blank and thought it was only a receipt for $30,000
that a bank had loaned him through the man managing his farm. By the time the FDIC tried to
enforce the note, it had been filled in for $50,000, and the FDIC claimed a right to enforce it as a
holder in due course because the circumstances of Culver signing the note did not amount to fraud
in factum. U.C.C. § 3-305 defines fraud in factum as the lender's misrepresentations inducing the
borrower to sign "with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of [the
instrument's] character or knowledge," and the Official Comment to § 3-305 includes being
"tricked into signing a note in the belief that it is merely a receipt" as fraud in factum, which
would defeat a holder in due course's claim. However, rather than apply the plain language of
U.C.C. § 3-305 and its Comment, the court followed an 1884 case where an essentially illiterate
farmer was liable under a note despite fraud that would certainly amount to fraud in factum under
the U.C.C. Culver is relevant for our purposes here because it demonstrates judicial willingness to
disregard the plain language of a statute (here one meant to protect a debtor from liability on a
note obtained by fraud in factum) in order to enforce the plain language of a contract. In doing so,
the court arguably demonstrates a greater willingness to disregard statutory language than contrac-
tual language.
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gay people have often fared better under contract than public rights, and posits
the theoretical implications of those successes.
V. CONTRACTUAL PURGATORY'S SUBVERSIVE POTENTIAL: How GILDEN
MAY STILL BE GOLD
The subversive potential of my model is both practical and theoretical. As
a practical matter, contractual purgatory offers gay people a means to the de-
sired end of legal protections for four reasons: (1) contractual rights may be an
incremental step to achieving public rights; (2) it is generally easier to con-
vince a smaller group to protect an unpopular minority; (3) contract rhetoric
often skirts majoritarian morality; and (4) contractual purgatory may habituate
heterosexuals to the notion of gay rights, setting the stage for public rights for
gay people.
On the theoretical side, contractual purgatory is subversive for two rea-
sons: (1) it contributes to the social construction of gay people as persons
because the ability to contract is a crucial component of legal personhood; and
(2) it destabilizes hierarchical categories when progressives use a conservative
tool to accomplish progressive ends. Both practical and theoretical implications
of contractual purgatory are discussed below.
A point to consider prior to discussing the advantages of contractual pur-
gatory is the general question of whether it benefits sexual marginorities more
than it harms them. On the one hand, contract validates closeting when judges
enforce only those cohabitation contracts that are structured to mask the
parties' relationship. On the other hand, though, contractual purgatory may be
either the best gay people can expect for the moment, or an essential step in
the process of obtaining public rights. The optimism of my proposal turns on
whether one believes public rights are a realistic expectation. 7 If so, con-
tractual purgatory is just crumbs. If not, the contractual way station is better
than criminal hell. I address both of these implications, suggesting that even if
Romer v. Evans and Baehr v. Miike suggest the possibility of public rights for
gay people, contractual purgatory offers an essential and immediate benefit for
gay people in that it establishes a crucial foundation to their legal personhood
by recognizing their contracts.
A. Practical Implications of Contractual Purgatory
1. The (Half) Loaf You Save May Be Your Own 9 s
Contract may not always be as dangerous for have-nots as is commonly
thought. Instead, it may offer a happy medium between the extremes of public
197. Mary Becker apparently is more optimistic than I am. She suggests in her comments to
this paper that gay people will win marriage rights, at which time contractual rights will not only
pale in comparison, but will actually disserve have-nots in their relationships if contracts are used
the way they are now to contract around family law rules protecting weaker parties. Becker, supra
note 34.
198. 1 purloined this heading from a bread truck in Seattle. A sign on the truck admonished
other drivers to "drive carefully, for the loaf you save may be your own."
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condemnation and public rights. Of course, contractual purgatory only benefits
those who would otherwise suffer public condemnation. If gay people are
closer to the right side of my diagram (criminalization) than the left (public
rights), contract may have particular pull under queer theory. If, however,
Romer v. Evans and Baehr v. Miike signal the dawn of public rights for gays,
then perhaps the best strategy is to seek public rights directly instead of set-
tling for the private way station.
But contract may have some advantages even if Evans and Baehr do ulti-
mately lead to gay public rights. Contract may benefit marginorities in some
circumstances.'" Kellye Testy draws on the work of Ruthann Robson to sug-
gest that lesbians can contract around hostile public rules through relationship-
oriented contracts.2" While Testy defends contract doctrines such as promis-
sory estoppel and unjust enrichment as consistent with feminism,"0 ' I would
embrace contract a step beyond the equitable contract doctrines she discusses.
In a homophobic society, perhaps the rigidity of classical contract theory can
sometimes benefit gay people, contrary to the general belief that classical
contract theory tends to benefit people with power at the expense of those on
the margins. In Crooke v. Gilden, for example, the plaintiff prevailed on her
express cohabitation contract claims only because the parol evidence rule ex-
cluded evidence of the lesbian relationship from judicial consideration.2 2
The victory is sweet when closeted relief is compared to the only alternative:
no relief. Testy correctly observed that "[clontract has no essence-it is a
social construct and will mutate based on its time, place and users.""2 3 Since
I am skeptical about gay people obtaining meaningful public rights soon, con-
tract seems to be a workable alternative, particularly if the only other option is
public condemnation.
That, of course, is not to say that contract is the best alternative. Certainly
the plaintiff in Crooke v. Gilden paid a price by obscuring her relationship
from judicial view in order to recover.2" But perhaps that price is out-
weighed by the actual recovery. Perhaps Gilden should have the option of
disguising (and enforcing) her relationship if her only other option is to
stomach societal refusal to acknowledge any part of that relationship except to
single it out for criminal attention.0 5 This remains true even if it results in
199. See, e.g., Mary Becker, Four Feminist Theoretical Approaches and the Double Bind of
Surrogacy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 303 (1993) (applying four feminist approaches to the problem
of surrogacy contracts and concluding, "there are advantages and disadvantages both to nonen-
forcement and specific enforcement" of surrogacy contracts); Testy, supra note 4, at 229-30 (sug-
gesting that contract may be a tool to counteract patriarchy).
200. Testy, supra note 4, at 225-27 (citing Robson & Valentine, supra note 121).
201. Id. at 228-29 (discussing confluence of feminist theory and relational and communitarian
interpretations of contract propounded by scholars such as Ian MacNeil).
202. Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992).
203. Testy, supra note 4, at 229.
204. Mark Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereo-
types, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 595-96 (1992)
(discussing the costs of concealing gay sexual orientation to self-esteem, mental health, and com-
munity building).
205. See id. at 571 ("Gay men and lesbians are tolerable only if they keep their secret.");
"Society tolerates gay men and lesbians so long as they carefully hide their sexual orientation." Id.
at 583; and "If gay people lead clandestine lives, others need not admit they know of them or
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accommodation and perpetuation of institutional homophobia. As illustrated in
the recent movie Babe, a pig faced with either visiting the slaughterhouse or
functionally disguising himself as a border collie feels fortunate to avoid the
axe by any means necessary.2" While Babe's action may be scant solace to
the pigs that do end up at the slaughterhouse, at least Babe escaped this fate.
Moreover, Babe's sheepherding disguise may transform others' conceptions of
which animals can do sheepdogs' work.
2. Safety in (Small) Numbers
The second practical advantage of contractual purgatory turns on the fact
that majoritarian morality is the major obstacle to gay rights. Contracts provide
a serviceable tool for counteracting majoritarian morality because by definition
only the contracting parties and the court need to agree to create a legal rule.
This aspect of contract makes it a particularly attractive tool for marginorities
because by definition they are few in number and/or politically weak. As a
result, marginorities are often too marginalized to obtain public benefits from
the legislature or courts.0 7 Certainly judicial enforcement of gay cohabitation
contracts may be hindered by homophobia if a judge views the contract as
meretricious or against public policy.28 But contract doctrines such as the
parol evidence rule may keep out evidence that the parties are lovers, thus
skirting public policy concerns." 9 Contract rhetoric that a judge should en-
approve of them. The extravagant demand inherent in public acknowledgement of a gay sexual
orientation is forcing onlookers to take sides." Id. at 590 (internal quotes omitted).
206. As Alan Chen pointed out to me, Babe does not explicitly choose between these two op-
tions. Instead, he affiliates with the sheepdogs because one is kind to him in a maternal way, and
he only discovers late in the movie that pigs' sole purpose is to feed people. But I read Babe's
initial choice as being in line with barnyard hierarchy. A sheep is also kind to Babe early on, but
he chooses instead to model himself after the more socially powerful border collies. Moreover, he
does seem to have a sense from the beginning that being a working animal is more prestigious.
Babe's role as ingenue is central to the film's message; the duck who tries to function as a rooster
to avoid the chopping block falls and must leave the farm. Only Babe, who passes as a sheepdog
in innocent imitation successfully inverts the barnyard hierarchy to show that a pig can do a
sheepdog's work. In short, Babe redefines the identities of both pig and sheepdog.
207. It may be easier for some rights to be obtained through the courts than through the legis-
lature. Heterosexual marriages are statutorily recognized. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104
(1987) ("A marriage between a man and a woman licensed, solemnized, and registered as provid-
ed in this part 1 is valid in this state."). However, judicial intervention was required to extend the
public right of marriage to interracial couples in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and to
people delinquent in their child support obligations in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
Hawaii is the first state to recognize same-sex marriage, based on a state constitutional challenge.
Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 Haw. Ct. App. LEXIS 138 (Dec. 3, 1996). Even if Hawaii's
Supreme Court affirms and recognizes same-sex marriage, other states likely will not recognize
those unions under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. The antici-
pated grounds for the anti-gay states' refusal is that a number of states have the right to decline to
give full faith and credit to other state's judgments if doing so would violate the recognizing
state's public policy. The 24 states that have statutes criminalizing sodomy have ready-made
grounds for determining that same-sex marriage is contrary to their public policy. And several
states have already indicated their unwillingness to recognize same-sex marriages performed in
Hawaii. See supra notes 157-58. Congress and President Clinton have given federal statutory
support to these arguments through the Defense of Marriage Act. See supra note 159.
208. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (describing Jones v. Daly, in which a Cali-
fornia court found that no part of a same-sex cohabitation contract could be severed from the
overall meretricious nature of the contract).
209. See Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992).
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force the parties' actual intent regardless of the judge's subjective view of the
moral valence of their intent further protects gay people who seek to fill statu-
tory gaps through contract. Contract may not be everything gay people have
wished for, but it beats getting nothing or jail time.
The number of federal, state, and local protections for gay people nicely
illustrates that it may be easier for gay people to obtain protection from small
rather than large groups. No federal law protects gay people from sexual
orientation discrimination.2 ' In contrast, nine states and the District of
Columbia protect against sexual orientation discrimination."' Moreover, 163
municipalities have ordinances protecting gay people from discrimination.2 2
Finally, at least 350 companies and universities contractually protect their
employees or students from discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion."'
These numbers are of course partially a function of the fact that there is
only one federal government, only 50 states, many more than 163 municipali-
ties, and many, many more than 350 companies and universities in the United
States. But the Human Rights Campaign data regarding numbers of companies
with non-discrimination clauses is underinclusive. It does not, for example, list
the University of Denver, which has granted protection against sexual orienta-
tion discrimination since 1992, as all accredited American law schools are re-
quired to do.2 4
Of course the smallness of the group does not guarantee that gay people
will succeed in their arguments. If the judge or corporate president is an anti-
210. But see Rivera, supra note 171 (discussing limited protection from sexual orientation
discrimination enjoyed by federal employees). Moreover, in 1995, President Clinton issued Execu-
tive Order 12968 (Aug. 2, 1995), adding sexual orientation to the list of prohibited grounds for
denying a security clearance. John J. Ross, The Employment Law Year in Review, in 25TH
ANNUAL INSTrrtJTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 67 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. H4-5237, 1996). Recently 49 United States Senators in a Republican-controlled Con-
gress voted in favor of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which, if passed, would
have added gay people to the list of groups protected against employment discrimination. But
ENDA did not pass, and the same day Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act, defining
marriage as the union between a man and woman and allowing states to refuse to recognize same-
sex unions. Eric Schmitt, Senators Reject Both Job-Bias Ban and Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1996, at Al.
211. HRC LIST, supra note 22.
212. Id.
213. Id. Jake Barnes pointed out that my statistics may not withstand strict scrutiny, and may
instead suggest that gay people are more likely to get rights from the states than elsewhere. An-
other way to think of the safety in small numbers rationale is that the least common denominator
may get smaller the larger a group gets. Suppose Americans have 13 possible characteristics,
labelled A-M. City residents may have A-M in common, state residents have only A-F in com-
mon, while Americans as a whole only have A-C in common. Thus cities may protect rights asso-
ciated with A-M, states protect rights associated with A-F, and the federal government would
protect only rights associated with A-C.
214. The AALS requires law schools to not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in
order to maintain their accreditation. However, there may be some exception for religious schools
founded on discriminatory principles. If all accredited law schools contractually protect their em-
ployees and students from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, then at least 150 or
200 entities are added to the HRC list of 350. There are likely other omissions, both in business
and in education. For example, Coors Brewing Co. is not on the list, but accorded its employees
domestic partnership benefits in 1995. Editorial, Separate God and Caesar in Domestic Relations
Law, DENY. POST, Mar. 21, 1996, at B6.
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gay evangelical Christian, or someone like Justice Scalia, gay people have
little likelihood of obtaining any protection.2 5 But gay people are perhaps
better able to shop around for a receptive audience in contract than in legisla-
tion. If an employer refuses to extend contractual protection from sexual orien-
tation discrimination, for example, a lesbian employee could seek work with
another company that is willing to extend the protection. It seems likely that
the same lesbian will find it easier to shop around for another job in the same
area, thus changing only her job, than to move to another city or state when
her city council or state legislature refuses to accord her protection against
sexual orientation discrimination. This second move would require her to make
two major adjustments rather than just one (the job)--if she moved, she would
have to find both a new home and a new job. The financial and non-economic
burdens of changing cities or states seem to be greater than merely changing
jobs in most circumstances. Moreover, Americans cannot shop for a new fed-
eral government, other than by electing new representatives. The fact that
there is only one federal government, which accords almost no protection to
gay people, illustrates the importance of contractual protections where there
are few or no public federal rights.
The relative protections for gay people at the federal, state, municipal, and
corporate levels indicate that as a practical matter, gay people are more likely
to convince one small group which is accountable to another small group
(such as a university or corporation) to afford protection from sexual orienta-
tion discrimination than to obtain this protection from Congress (a fairly large
group answerable to a huge group). This same reasoning suggests that judges
who enforce gay-related contracts are easier to convince under the safety in
small numbers reasoning than legislatures, or even city councils. Thus contrac-
tual purgatory is both feasible and may be the only possible way for gay peo-
ple, a despised numerical minority, to obtain any legal protections.
3. Navigating Around Morality
The third practical advantage of contractual purgatory also turns on the
fact that any agenda for equal rights for gay people must skirt morality as well
as majoritarian sentiment, since most anti-gay arguments are largely or exclu-
sively morality-based. Thus a distinct advantage of contractual purgatory is
that it sidelines moral arguments cloaked as public policy. While some con-
tracts, including those based on meretricious consideration, are not enforceable
because of moral concerns, contracts are generally less susceptible to moral
rhetoric than legislation.
215. Speaking at the University of Colorado before Romer v. Evans was decided, Justice
Scalia told the audience that gay people are not constitutionally protected. Sue Anderson, Knight's
Claim of No Injured Parties Wrong, DENy. POST, Oct. 19, 1995, at B6 (referring to Scalia's "re-
cent" statement that "gays have no constitutional rights"); Robert A. Sirico, Scalia's Dissenting
Opinion, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1996, at A12 (describing Scalia's remarks at a Mississippi prayer
breakfast defending Christians counteracting secular humanism by being "fools for Christ's sake");
Scott McLarty, Letters to the Editor: What Worries Justice Scalia, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1996, at
A19 (expressing concern that Justice Scalia's admonition to graduates that they be "fools for




Perhaps resorting to contract because it sidelines moral rhetoric is giving
in too soon to the argument that gay relationships are somehow morally inferi-
or to heterosexual ones. Mary Becker persuasively argues in her comment to
this paper that gay relationships may in fact be morally superior to heterosexu-
al ones because heterosexual male objectification of women is immoral."6
While Becker's arguments carry considerable weight given the gender hierar-
chy in heterosexual relationships, I am less optimistic about winning that par-
ticular battle in my lifetime. Many conservatives see nothing immoral about
male entitlement to female sexuality, and in fact they likely think autonomous
sexuality itself is immoral, in total opposition to Becker's position. It is pre-
cisely because completely opposite positions can both be argued on moral
rhetoric that I find contract more tempting than moral arguments. Moreover, if
advocates for gay personhood argue on multiple fronts (moral, contractual, and
others), the multiple approaches themselves may increase the chances of suc-
cess.
Criminal penalties for victimless crimes are grounded only in morali-
ty,"1 7 as is opposition to gay marriage and other public rights for gay people.
The frequency of Biblical justifications offered by the Religious Right in favor
of anti-gay initiatives and other anti-gay efforts vividly illustrates that the only
imaginable objection to homosexuality is on moral grounds. A recent example
of morality-instigated fervor against gay rights is the recent rash of legislative
action attempting to stem any effect of same-sex marriages which might be
performed in Hawaii. At least 35 states considered and/or passed legislation
explicitly providing that only opposite-sex marriages will be recognized.2 8
Thus any method which rests on rhetoric other than moral rhetoric is well
suited to pursue gay interests.
Once morality is sidelined, gay people have a chance of obtaining some
legal recognition which similarly situated heterosexuals routinely enjoy. Classi-
cal contract rules such as the parol evidence rule provide one route around
moral rhetoric. These classical contract rules are particularly powerful because
they may counteract the majoritarian morality conservative judges otherwise
might be inclined to insert into a contract case.
Assuming judges who are politically conservative are likely to invoke
majoritarian morality to deny gay people rights,"9 and the parol evidence
216. Becker, supra note 34.
217. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fornication at 439 ("The Model
Penal Code takes the position that private immorality should be beyond the reach of the penal
law."); FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 10 ("Criminal justice tells us where the moral boundaries
are.").
218. Dunlap, supra note 158, at A24; Smothers, supra note 22, at 25 (16 states recently
passed legislation refusing to recognize same-sex marriage); see also William Eskridge, Credit Is
Due, NEW REPUBLIC, June 17, 1996, at 17 (describing how, in anticipation of Hawaii recognizing
same-sex marriage, "nine states-and counting-have adopted legislation to block their courts
from giving full faith and credit to Hawaii same-sex unions. The last time so many states declined
to recognize marriages performed elsewhere was the Southern refusal to accord full faith and
credit to different-race marriages."). Congress and President Clinton attempted to achieve the same
result by enacting the Defense of Marriage Act.
219. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, J., concurring) ("To
hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to
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rule is often popular among this brand of judges,22 ° the parol evidence rule
may counteract these judges' tendency to moralize. Thus, the very judges who
are inclined by personal moral feelings to deny gay rights may be the same
ones who would be swayed by classical contract doctrines such as the parol
evidence rule. As a result, gay people may paradoxically obtain legal
protections from conservative jurists, as long as the parties can cloak their
claims in conservative legal doctrine.
4. Tolerance on the Way to Support
An additional benefit to moderating the public extremes through contrac-
tual purgatory is that it might pave the way for future gay public rights. For
example, assuming that some judges recognize same-sex cohabitation con-
tracts, they will realize that the world continues to turn despite their recog-
nition. The greater heterosexual community may, in turn, see that an enforced
same-sex cohabitation contract does not bring on the destruction of western
civilization. In the terms of my model, enforcing gay cohabitation and non-
discrimination contracts will demonstrate that there is no inherent harm in
same-sex relationships, and since there is no victim, criminalization is not
justified. In time, perhaps these realizations will lead to the logical conclusion
that public rights can be accorded gay people without rending the fabric of
society.
Many years after these realizations occur, perhaps Congress will be will-
ing to enact gay rights legislation and judges be willing to enforce it without
qualifying it to accommodate invidious stereotypes.22" ' If the hands-off rheto-
ric of contract enables lawmakers to entertain the notion that gay people have
lives and loves which deserve legal recognition just as heterosexuals do, then
perhaps with time these same judges will recognize constitutional claims to
equal protection of gay people beyond merely granting a level playing field as
established in Romer v. Evans. And perhaps legislators will be more likely to
lift the bans on gay marriage, family, and military service.
Purgatory is generally conceived' as a place where sinful souls are purged
of sin in order to be fit for heaven. Viewed in this lens, contractual purgatory
may purge sexual marginorities of their sinfulness to prepare them for public
rights. But purgatory may be seen instead to purge the sinfulness of the law. If
the law is unjustifiably biased against sexual marginorities, then it should
spend some time in purgatory to cleanse itself of that sin. In time, then, the
cast aside a millennia of moral teaching."); Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (1996) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("Amendment 2 is designed to prevent piecemeal deterioration of the sexual morali-
ty favored by a majority of Coloradans, and is ... an appropriate means to that legitimate end.").
220. See e.g., Trident Center v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988),
and discussion of its approach to the parol evidence rule supra note 26. Perhaps the objective
label on classical contract rules appeals to conservative judges. As far as gay people are con-
cerned, it does not matter whether objectivity is possible if the label objective dampens judges'
willingness to impose their subjective moral judgments on parties.
221. See, e.g., Big Brother, Inc. v. Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights, 284 N.W.2d 823
(Minn. 1979) (refusing to enforce Minneapolis gay rights ordinance to prevent Big Brothers from
inquiring into prospective big brothers' sexual orientation and telling mothers of little brothers that
a prospective big brother is gay).
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law will be fit to recognize gay public rights.222 But contractual purgatory
may not be a heavenly solution.
A downside of contractual purgatory is that it might be permanent instead
of a way station. Catholic doctrine suggests that purgatory is a place souls go
to be purged of evil prior to passing on to heaven. But limbo is the place that
souls go permanently when they do not qualify for eternal salvation. Limbo is
perhaps better than eternal damnation, but it does not hold much hope for the
future.223 If my model of contractual purgatory is in fact contractual limbo,
then it is likely not worth much, particularly since Romer v. Evans and Baehr
v. Miike suggest the possibility that gay people may indeed achieve public
rights sometime in the near future. But until we can determine whether the
contractual way station is purgatory or limbo, it seems contractual purgatory is
something valuable to consider in the arsenal of arguments in favor of gay
rights.
It may even serve a movement's long term interests to spend some time
in contractual purgatory. The progressions of other sexual regulations suggest
that perhaps some sexual issues can be purged of controversial content by
spending some time in contractual purgatory rather than going directly from
public condemnation to public rights. Abortion, for example, is literally all
over the map on my model.
Abortion has progressed from being decriminalized, to being criminalized,
to being briefly a public right, and is now arguably inching toward contract
given restrictions on public funding. There are at least two explanations for
abortion's peripatetic status. Perhaps the lack of consensus about whether a
victim is implicated in abortion has sent it careening between public rights and
public condemnation. Or perhaps the contested status of the fetus is due to the
quick transition in 1973 when abortion went rapidly from being a crime to a
public right through Roe v. Wade.224 Certainly the Religious Right has accu-
mulated much of its vast war chest on moral rhetoric condemning abortion.
Anti-choice activists are raising arms against abortion providers and support-
ers, and anti-abortion legislation is regularly introduced at the state and federal
level. If Roe was supposed to be a quick fix to transform abortion from a
crime to a public right, perhaps the Roe backlash suggests that gay people may
be better served by seeking refuge in contractual purgatory rather than further
raising the crusader hackles of the Religious Right.
On the other hand, the Christian Right makes so much money on the basis
of its anti-gay maneuvers that it is unlikely that any intermediate step would
cool their ardor. But an intermediate step is not easy fodder for rhetoric and
fundraising. Perhaps granting contractual rights for gay people obscures the
222. 1 thank Julie Nice for this insight.
223. Sheryl Scheible-Wolf made this point in her comments on this article at the New Private
Law conference.
224. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has suggested that perhaps abortion should
have been accorded constitutional protection more gradually. Ruth B. Ginsberg, Some Thoughts on
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985) (Roe may have
encouraged anti-abortion measures by holding so broad a right to abortion).
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target, potentially frustrating the Right's crusade to maintain marriage and
family (not to mention military service) as exclusively heterosexual rights.
B. Theoretical Possibilities
Contractual purgatory may be theoretically subversive in addition to being
practical. Its subversive potential is twofold: (1) it may contribute to the social
construction of gay people as persons, and thus deserving of legal subjecthood
and equality; and (2) it may destabilize hierarchical categories of progressive
and conservative if conservative tools are used for progressive ends. If either
or both of these is true, then contractual purgatory furthers a progressive agen-
da by altering how society constructs gay identity and eroding hierarchy.
1. Constructing Personhood
Perhaps contract is essential to the social construction of personhood, and
thus contractual purgatory is not only useful as a pragmatic intermediate step
to gay people, but may be essential to constructing gay legal personhood.225
If a legal person is one who has both legal rights and duties,226 then gay peo-
ple are legal persons if they have both rights and duties. Certainly gay people
have the duties all other citizens have, including the obligation to pay taxes
and exercise reasonable care in their personal and business affairs. Gay people
also have additional duties, such as the duty to refrain from making sexual
proposals to heterosexuals. Failure to observe this duty has proved deadly for
some gay men, and their assailants have successfully mounted a so-called gay
panic defense. 27
Personhood, like many other things, is socially constructed rather than
natural. Supernatural beings, inanimate objects, and animals have at various
times under various legal regimes been treated as legal persons.228
225. Mary Becker and I focus on different aspects of legal personhood. Her commentary on
this article suggests that moral arguments do not always harm gay rights, but rather can further the
gay rights agenda by exposing the moral superiority of gay over heterosexual relationships. She
reasons that there are more autonomy-denying sexual relations in heterosexual relationships, and
since control over one's sexuality is moral and taking it away is immoral, gay relationships are
morally superior. This reasoning is not inconsistent with my argument, in that we both focus on
personhood.
I contend that personal autonomy should trump majoritarian morality, so that victimless
crimes should be decriminalized, contractualized, or made into public rights. Similarly, Becker
posits that sexual autonomy requires that one have respect for the personhood of a sexual partner.
If men do not respect the autonomy of their female partners, the men deny the women's autonomy
and personhood. I agree with her model, but I focus on another aspect of personhood: contracting.
Sexual autonomy and ability to contract are, of course, only two aspects of legal personhood.
226. JOHN C. GRAY, TIE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 27 (1983) ("The technical
legal meaning of a 'person' is a subject of legal rights and duties.").
227. For further discussion of the defense, see Joshua Dressier, When "Heterosexual" Men
Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the 'Reasonable
Man' Standard, 85 N.W. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995) (defending defense as applica-
ble to reasonable heterosexual men); Robert B. Misson, Note, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The
Homosexual Advance as Insufficient, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133 (1992) (critiquing the defense as "insti-
tutional homophobia").
228. GRAY, supra note 226, at 41-42, 45, 46-48 (describing how in Europe during the Middle
Ages, God and the saints were legal persons and animals were "summoned, arrested, and impris-
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Gender22 9 and sex23 are also socially constructed. Indeed, according to
Judith Butler, a person who refuses or fails to conform to sex and gender
identity is often treated as if he or she were not a person at all."' If gender
is defined in part as conduct intended to attract the opposite sex,232 then gay
people are likely to fall outside gender norms since they aim to attract the
same sex. As such, gay people are less likely to be deemed legal persons (or
less full legal persons than their heterosexual counterparts). Since states can
criminalize conduct by gay people that would be constitutionally protected
were they heterosexual,233 gay people are clearly less than full legal persons.
But opportunities to enforce gay-related contracts may contribute to the pro-
cess of developing gay people's legal personhood.
Marginorites' legal personhood is constructed in part through legislation
extending rights to them. African-Americans were not persons under American
law until the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution made them so. Simi-
larly, women were not constitutional persons entitled to vote until the 19th
Amendment allowed it. These crucial Amendments formed the cornerstones of
African-American and female legal personhood.
Federal and state statutes further developed African-American and female
personhood. Under U.S.C. § 1981, African-Americans have the same rights to
contract and own property as white people."3  Similarly, the Married
oned, had counsel assigned them for their defence, were defended, sometimes successfully, [and]
were sentenced and executed").
229. BUTLER, TROUBLE, supra note 84, at 25 ("Gender proves to be performative-that is
constituting the identity it is purported to be.... There is no gender identity behind the expres-
sions of gender, that identity is performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said
to be its results.").
230. Id. at 7 ("If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called
'sex' is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed perhaps it was always already gender, with the
consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all.").
Butier has further elaborated on this point:
When the sex/gender distinction is joined with a notion of radical linguistic
constructivism ... the "sex" which is referred to as prior to gender will itself be a pos-
tulation, a construction, offered within language, as that which is prior to language, prior
to construction.. . . If gender is the social construction of sex, and if there is no access
to this "sex" except by means of its construction, then it appears not only that sex is
absorbed by gender, but that "sex" becomes something like a fiction, perhaps a fantasy,
retroactively installed as a prelinguistic site to which there is no direct access.
BUTLER, BODIES, supra note 84, at 5; see also Franke, supra note 80, at 63 (observing that "sexu-
al identity ... must be understood not in deterministic, biological terms, but according to a set of
behavioral, performative norms").
231. BUtLER, TROUBLE, supra note 84, at 17 ("The very notion of 'the person' is called into
question by the cultural emergence of those 'incoherent' or 'discontinuous' gendered beings who
appear to be persons but who fail to conform to the gendered norms of cultural intelligibility by
which persons are defined."). In other words, one becomes a subject within sex and gender, when
one is sexed and gendered.
232. Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy" of Sex, in To-
WARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 163 (Rayna Reiter ed., 1975) ("Gender is not only an
identification with one sex; it also entails that sexual desire be directed toward the other sex.").
233. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (states may criminalize homosexual
sodomy) with Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (states may not interfere with unmarried
heterosexuals' practices regarding birth control).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) ("All persons ... shall have the same right ... to make and
enforce contracts... as is enjoyed by white citizens."). Contracts have been a double-edged
sword for African-Americans. Former slaves were kept in conditions resembling slavery under the
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Women's Property Acts allow married women to own property and make
contracts."' More recent statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,"3 provide that private parties
may not discriminate on the basis of race or sex in employment or in extend-
ing credit. These statutes illustrate that certain classes of human beings were
not legally full persons until the law made them so. Similarly, gay people are
not full legal persons because they lack many of the protections that everyone
else enjoys, such as the freedom to marry or to serve in the military. In this
sense full legal personhood would be a collection of public rights in my mod-
el.
This brief outline of the constitutional and statutory developments estab-
lishing African-American and female legal personhood suggests that one is not
necessarily born a legal person, but rather becomes one.237 Judith Butler has
suggested that gender is performative rather than essential: that drag reveals
femininity to be a social construct that can be performed by males or
females.23 Butler reasons that drag queens are biological men who perform
feminine gender, and in doing so destabilize the categories of male and female
by representing the feminine via a male body. She has further argued that sex,
terms of post-Civil War surety and peonage contracts. Julie A. Nice, Welfare Servitude, I GEO. J.
ON FIGHTING POVERTY 340, 351-53 (1994). But contracts between freedmen and their employers
both harmed and benefited newly free former slaves. On one hand the contracts gave "extremely
low or nonexistent" wages, allowed planters to interfere with employees' personal lives, allocated
all risk of loss to the employee, allowed the planter to fine the employee for offenses such as
"impudent" language, and mandated that the employee work for a full year. ERIC FONER, RECON-
STRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINIsHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 164-67 (1988). These harsh
terms were hardly freely chosen by the freed men, given the gross inequality in bargaining power
and the Freedmen's Bureaus agents threatening to arrest those who would not sign the contract or
leave the plantation. Id. at 165. However, some Bureau agents facilitated more favorable labor
contracts, and the very presence of the agents (and the Bureau) to oversee planter conduct made it
clear that the planter no longer exercised the absolute authority of a slave owner. Id. at 168. Thus,
while the ideology of freedom to freely enter contracts is not always (or even rarely) reflected in
material reality, the process of bargaining can confer legal personhood on one formerly a legal
object. I thank Katherine Franke for this insight.
235. See, e.g., 1848 U.S. Laws ch. 200 (1848) ("The real and personal property of any female
who may hereafter marry, and which she shall own at the time of marriage, and the rents, issues
and profits thereof, shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for his debts,
and shall continue her sole and separate property, as if she were a single female."). For further
discussion of the importance of the Married Women's Property Act for American women, see
BECKER ET AL., supra note 48, at 7-8; Richard H. Chused, History's Double Edge: A Comment on
Modernization of Marital Status, 82 GEo. LJ. 2213 (1994); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of
Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEo. LJ. 2127
(1994).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act); 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Equal Credit
Opportunity Act).
237. This point is literally true when one considers that children have fewer speech and due
process rights than adults. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)
(allowing schools the power to inculcate moral values by controlling students' speech on pregnan-
cy and divorce in school newspaper) to inculcate moral values); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Frazer, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (allowing school to discipline student for sexual innuendo in speech
to students); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (recognizing students' liberty interest in
procedure prior to corporal punishment but holding that after-the-fact tort remedy sufficed).
238. BUTLER, TROUBLE, supra note 84. Katherine Franke notes that performativity of gender
is constitutive rather than casual, in that most people do not look in the closet and decide what
gender they will be that day. Franke, supra note 82, at 50 n.21 1.
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as well as gender, is socially constructed.23 9 Mary Anne Case, Katherine
Franke, and Francisco Valdes have applied arguments based on the social
construction of sex and gender to the employment discrimination context,
arguing on various grounds that prohibitions of sex discrimination should also
encompass gender discrimination." While both Case and Franke propose
that the law recognize discrimination based on socially-constructed gender as
opposed to only biological sex, Case's analysis applies more directly to my
proposal of contract as an essential element of personhood.
Case reasons that if effeminate men and masculine women are protected
from employment discrimination, the social construction of femininity will
change. Specifically, Case contends that masculinity is valued more highly
than femininity because men are more likely to be masculine and men are val-
ued more than women. As a result, protecting effeminate men will lead to
protecting feminine women. My argument extends Case's reasoning to the
construction of personhood.
Just as Case argues that protecting effeminate men will be an incremental
move that ultimately benefits feminine women, I argue that enforcing gay-
related contracts is an incremental move that seems like crumbs in comparison
to public rights but will ultimately benefit gay people because it contributes to
the social construction of gay people as legal persons. In other words, it con-
tributes to their transformation from legal objects to legal subjects.
As gay people form cohabitation and gay-related employment contracts,
and as judges enforce them, the social construction of gayness may change.
Specifically, gay people may move along my model away from
criminalization, into contractual purgatory, and toward public rights. This
transition from legal object to legal subject is a 180-degree transition that may
require a mid-way stop to account for the extreme nature of the change. Under
this analysis, contractual purgatory is not merely the half loaf gay people must
settle for because they cannot afford a full one, but rather an essential step in
the social transformation from people who do not count to people who do.
2. Master Carpentry
The second theoretical implication of contractual purgatory inverts Audre
Lorde's famous quip that the master's house cannot be taken apart with the
master's tools.24 ' The film Babe again illustrates the potential power of con-
tractual purgatory.
One radical reading of Babe is that no animals should be food for people;
this interpretation suggests to children that there is something terribly wrong
with eating meat (particularly pork). Another radical reading of the film chal-
lenges barnyard hierarchy A ]a George Orwell24 2 to suggest that even the
239. BUTLER, TROUBLE, supra note 84, at 7.
240. Case, supra note 83; Franke, supra note 80; Valdes, supra note 2.
241. Nancy Ehrenreich makes a similar point in her commentary in this Symposium: The Pro-
gressive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 1235 (1996).
242. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (1946). The famous line, "All pigs are equal but some
pigs are more equal than others" satirizes the doublespeak of those simultaneously asserting power
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most lowly member of the barnyard may have untapped talents. Generalizing
this point leads to a generic rationale for equal opportunity under law: every
one has unique contributions to make and opening up the field to new con-
tenders will yield new methods of problem solving and perhaps better results.
Both readings are essentially anti-hierarchical, and as such seem to serve a
progressive agenda. Crooke v. Gilden yields numerous similar messages.
Just as Babe won the sheepherding competition against all odds, Gilden
won her case. As Babe escaped the slaughterhouse (and the social status of
proto-bacon), Gilden escaped the netherworld of social invisibility where an
ended romance is socially constructed as totally insignificant. Finally, Babe
showed the world that pigs (or at least this pig) can herd sheep better than
sheepdogs, using coping skills developed to get along with barnyard animals
who perceived him as dimwitted proto-pork. Similarly, Gilden might find that
her enforced business/relationship agreement shows the world that she can
carve out a place for her relationship to be socially (if incompletely) recog-
nized. In doing so, Gilden elevates the romance from total invisibility or con-
demnation to legal visibility where the partners' agreement-is enforced by the
judiciary.
On a more theoretical level, Babe makes apparent the injustices of barn-
yard hierarchy, while Crooke v. Gilden demonstrates the advisability of allo-
cating loss according to prior agreement in romance, just as is done in a com-
mercial context. In doing so, Crooke v. Gilden illuminates the underlying eco-
nomic arrangements in most romantic relationships, and may even lead some
heterosexuals to contract and thus protect themselves from sacrificing finance
to romance. In sum, judicial enforcement of same-sex cohabitation contracts
may well contribute to the reshaping of gayness from something criminal to-
ward something worthy of public rights, stopping at contract along the way.
Moreover, Gilden shows the advisability of relationship conracting just as
Babe developed new sheepherding techniques.
Adding Judith Butler to the BabelCrooke v. Gilden analysis yields yet
another level of theoretical significance to contractual purgatory. Butler has
applied her gender performativity theory to suggest that the people I call sexu-
al marginorities might subvert power dynamics by using the very tools that are
used against them.243 Inverting legal norms may thus further a feminist agen-
da by undermining the current social construction of power.2" By that
reasoning, gay people using contractual tools that have been widely assumed
to be the master's tools may chip away at the master's house.245 If most of
and claiming all are equal.
243. BUTLER, TROUBLE, supra note 84, at 45 ("There is only a taking up of the tools where
they lie, where the very 'taking up' is enabled by the tool lying there.") and 47 ("The critical task
[for feminism] is ... to locate strategies of subversive repetition enabled by those constructions
[of identity], to affirm the local possibilities of intervention through participating in precisely those
practices of repetition that constitute identity and, therefore, present the imminent possibility of
contesting them.").
244. See Note, Patriarchy Is Such a Drag, supra note 84, at 1973.
245. See Testy, supra note 4, at 230 (using the familiarstatement of Audre Lorde to suggest
that "perhaps it is only the master's tools that will dismantle the master's house. That is, perhaps
it is more effective to reconstruct contract rather than to pretend we can ignore or abandon this
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us assume only powerful people use contractual tools to get around hostile
default rules, and gay people are not generally powerful, then gay people
using contractual tools blurs the distinction between powerful people and less
powerful ones, or at least between each group's tools.
This subversion may counteract the dangers inherent in closeting oneself
to obtain contractual relief as Gilden did in Georgia. For perhaps Gilden will
be like Babe, the pig in collie's clothing, who will contribute to a transfor-
mation of the social construction of relationships from being understood as
purely emotional and romantic to being recognized as having pragmatic eco-
nomic elements as well." More ambitious is the additional possibility that
contractual recognition of sexual marginorities' lives might contribute to a
broadening of the definition of family from the heterosexual dyad with biolog-
ical offspring to multiple parties and various forms of roles and responsibili-
ties.
Finally, Gilden's use of business planning to protect her personal interests
destabilizes elements of hierarchy by obscuring the players through use of
each other's tools.247 Thus the dyads of left/right and commercial/personal
may be destabilized by contractual purgatory. In doing so, contractual purgato-
ry creates social space for redefining the categories, perhaps in a way that en-
hances marginorities' personhood. Contractual purgatory may further contrib-
ute to a reconceptualization of what contract means if the individualistic tool
becomes essential to the liberation struggle of groups of sexual
marginorities.2"
VI. CONCLUSION
Classical contract is apparently amenable to progressive uses, at least
regarding regulation of gay sexuality through the private purgatory of contract.
Since New Private Law is firmly grounded in a preference for private con-
tracts over public entitlements, gay-related contracts paradoxically serve the
interests of New Private Law despite its association with a right-wing political
agenda. Thus, New Private Law is apparently amenable to progressive uses, at
least regarding regulation of gay sexuality. It may provide gay people a way
station en route to public rights such as gay marriage. Or perhaps it is a re-
basic institution.").
246. Martha Fineman and Cynthia Starnes have both advocated a contractual or business
model of romantic relationships. See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER 20TH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (proposing business model for romantic
relationships and family definition by parent and child rather than marriage); Cynthia Starnes,
Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts
and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993) (proposing partnership buyout
model for marital dissolutions).
247. Of course Gilden wins at Crooke's expense. Both are lesbians and the contest between
them is largely zero-sum. However, Gilden wins visibility (partial though it may be) and some
measure of equity flowing from enforcing their previous agreement. Had she won, Crooke's gain
would have been completely individual, and as such is less likely to fit into a progressive agenda,
particularly when it would harm other gay people by ratifying majoritarian moral condemnation of
gays.
248. I thank Dan Farber for this insight.
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spite from the criminalization of sodomy laws. Either way, New Private Law
offers a way for gay people to contract around hostile public default rules
grounded in public moral condemnation of homosexuality. In other words, it
may offer sexual marginorities an opportunity to contract around the hostile
terms of the social contract.
Other sexual regulations seem also to fall into contractual purgatory, par-
ticularly when there is no public consensus on whether there is a victim of a
particular sexual activity. Abortion seems headed for the private way station,
and may slip back to criminalization. But miscegenation, which is widely seen
as a victimless offense, has remained a public right since it was established. If
sexual marginorities can prevail in characterizing their gay sexual orientation
as truly victimless, then perhaps their visit to the way station of contract will
be short-lived.
I have tried to show that sexual regulations often travel a trajectory be-
tween public extremes of condemnation and rights, sometimes finding a mid-
dle ground in contract. And for sexual marginorities, otherwise criminalized
and unlikely to obtain public rights in the near future, that private purgatory is
a strategic tool for exercising rights and escaping majoritarian moral condem-
nation. Theoretically, it may be essential to the construction of gay people as
subjects rather than objects, and also offer a means of using the master's own
tools to reshape power relations. In these circumstances, then, New Private
Law may serve progressive ends.
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"It is an ill wind that blows no good," my Irish great-grandmother would
have replied if asked whether the New Private Law is always and only conser-
vative. Martha Ertman explores a particularly intriguing aspect of this ques-
tion: the progressive potential of the New Private Law in enforcing lesbian
and gay cohabitation contracts at a time when every state denies legal validity
to lesbian and gay marriages, and many still criminalize sodomy. In Georgia,
for example, lesbian and gay marriages have no legal effect, and sodomy,
understood as all-and only-same-sex sexual intimacy, is a crime.' Yet the
Georgia Supreme Court has enforced a lesbian cohabitation contract in which
neither the majority nor the dissent mentioned either "lesbian" or "cohabita-
tion."2
Ertman describes this phenomenon in the context of a broader landscape
in which the legal system swings from public condemnation to privatization to
public rights and back again in regulating various kinds of sexual conduct. She
presents private ordering-legal enforcement of private contracts-as a "way
station" between the extremes of public condemnation (criminalization) and
public rights (constitutional or civil rights independent of contract).
My comments begin with Ertman's explanations of why this might be so.
Part I discusses Ertman's suggestion that this phenomenon (contract's serving
as a way station for lesbian and gay rights) indicates that contract is not, in
general, as conservative as is usually assumed. Part II addresses Ertman's
suggestion that contracts are such a way station because a court can enforce a
contract without indicating approval of it, thus providing "a route to skirting"
moral rhetoric.3
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Bryan, Shirley Evans, Connie Fleischer, Jacqueline Guynn, Ruth Halibey, Carol Jones, Kortney
Kloppe, Lyonette Louis-Jacques, Amy Mayer, Beth Mitchell, William Schwesig, and Charles Ten
Brink for research and other assistance. Research support was provided by the Jerome S. Weiss
Faculty Research Fund and the Jerome F. Kutak Faculty Fund.
1. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sod-
omy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993); Nan D.
Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531 (1992).
2. Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992).
3. Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, but
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My comments in Parts I and II are related: both concern the quality of
various sexual relationships. Part I explores differences between heterosexual
and same-sex relationships with respect to the ability of contract to be progres-
sive. I suggest that because a number of differences exist between bargaining
conditions for individuals involved in heterosexual relationships compared to
those in same-sex relationships, contract will generally not be progressive for
"have-nots" (mostly women) in heterosexual couples. Furthermore, the pro-
gressive potential that contract offers same-sex couples may be only tempo-
rary. Once we win the right to marry, our contracts may become more like
those of heterosexuals-waivers of rights by the economically weaker party.
Part II discusses what constitutes good or bad sexual relationships. I argue
that contract's avoidance of moral issues severely limits its progressive poten-
tial. We need to begin to think about the morality of various kinds of sexual
relationships. I propose, therefore, that we consider as one important factor the
extent to which the autonomy of the sexual object is denied. From this per-
spective, heterosexual relationships tend to be far more troubling than same-
sex relationships.
I. PROGRESSIVE CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
Professor Ertman asserts that contract may not (generally) be "as danger-
ous for have-nots as is commonly thought."4 Whether contract is dangerous
for have-nots depends on the relative power of the contracting parties vis-A-vis
each other in terms of countless factors: the parties' power, money, aggres-
siveness, negotiating skills, social expectations, and self-confidence, together
with their comfort level in bargaining in the particular situation, ability to
control terms, alternatives to the contract, and the extent to which each
"needs" the contract. Heterosexual have-nots (usually women) and same-sex
have-nots are in quite different positions with respect to these key factors. In
the discussion that follows I explore some of the reasons why cohabitation or
marital contracts are much less likely to be progressive for have-nots in het-
erosexual relationships than for lesbians and gay men.
A. Bargaining Differences Between Heterosexual and Same-Sex Couples
1. Heterosexual Male Entitlement
Heterosexual men begin the bargaining process from a better position than
either partner in a same-sex couple. Men are likely to be better bargainers in
heterosexual relationships because only they (and not their partners) expect to
enjoy those things heterosexual men generally enjoy in relationships with
women and wives. Gender does not differentiate one member of a same-sex
couple from the other the way it differentiates husband and wife. On a
systemic basis, differences or perceived differences between women and men
are social advantages for men and disadvantages for women. The husband is
Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1107 (1996).
4. Id. at 1150.
5. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAW
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likely to be older, taller, a higher wage earner, and raised to be assertive with
the expectation of male heterosexual privilege: he will be the primary
breadwinner and even if his wife works, she will be the primary caretaker of
their home, their children, and himself. He will have the right to her home-
making and sexual services.
Many wives share these understandings. Indeed, for a woman raised in a
society in which the role of sex in marriage is regarded as essential to the
fulfillment of women as women and men as men, even imagining a more
balanced relationship is difficult. Negotiating for it would sour many relation-
ships and, even if an equitable bargain were reached in the abstract, it would
be of little practical importance. Unless both partners are continuously willing
to fight their own and their partners' inevitable and frequent tendency to slip
into sex roles, their relationship will not be one of equality. Few men seem
genuinely interested in such relationships and few women have the stamina or
power to insist on such a relationship day after day.6
True, in same-sex couples, there may be many disparities: age, height,
beauty, wealth, etc. But these will not be as likely to consistently favor one
partner, and will not favor the one with a sense of heterosexual male entitle-
ment to his wife's services, since both are either men or women. Nor will the
other partner expect to play the role of wife to a "man" with this sense of
entitlement. Even in a same-sex relationship with a fair amount of role play-
ing, these points hold. Neither partner is likely to have the sense of entitlement
vis-A-vis the other which is associated with heterosexual male privilege. Nor
will either expect the other partner to find fulfillment in service to others as a
"wife" and the mother of a man's children. Lesbian couples are particularly
likely to be committed to equality and to ignore economic disparities in the
distribution of power within the relationship.7
2. Relative Commitment to Marriage and Children
Although marriage generally improves men's happiness more than
women's,8 women are socialized to place a higher value on committed inti-
mate relationships and children than men do. Women's greater dedication to
family life places women at a distinct disadvantage in bargaining over the
terms of any marital or cohabitation contract. Since women tend to want long-
32-45 (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 117-18
(1979).
6. See, e.g., ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVO-
LUTION AT HOME (1989) (discussing a study of couples with two working parents and children
under six). Hochschild finds that although many middle class couples maintain that they have an
equal relationship, in fact the women in these relationships do most of the work of the "second
shift," i.e., the work done at home, including child care. Women are more interested than men in
changing traditional roles but are unable to maintain sufficient pressure over time to force such
change.
7. PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX 53-
56 (1983).
8. Women are twice as likely to be depressed as men, and married women are more de-
pressed than single women or married men. Full-time homemakers are particularly likely to be
depressed. Hope Landrine, Depression and Stereotypes of Women: Preliminary Empirical Analyses
of the Gender-Role Hypothesis, 19 SEX ROLES 527, 528 (1988).
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term relationships and children more, women are likely to settle for less favor-
able contract terms than they would insist on were they no more interested
than men in such relationships and children.' Note that in most heterosexual
couples this disparity will weaken the woman, the partner already systemically
disadvantaged by the gender- and sex-linked differences discussed above.
In same-sex couples, there are either two women or two men, making it
less likely that one partner has been socialized more than the other to value
committed relationships and children more highly. Furthermore, any differ-
ences in commitment are more likely (than those in heterosexual couples) to
cut in different directions from each other (one partner may be more commit-
ted to the relationship; the other to children) or from other factors (who earns
more money), and in any event will not exacerbate the hierarchy created by
sex and gender.
3. Comfort Level with Contracting in this Situation
Overall and on average, men are likely to feel more entitled to bargain for
favorable terms than women because they are likely to be economically stron-
ger than their partners. Not only does our culture generally value wealth and
the wealthy more than other cultures, it also regards the ability to keep one's
earnings as an essential component of personal freedom. Thus, the higher
wage-earning partner-typically the man with all the other sex and gender
advantages that come with being a man in our culture-is more likely to feel
entitled to bargain for terms "protecting" his property, whereas his partner is
likely to feel that she has no equal right to economic protection should the
couple split up.
Women may also tend to be less effective bargainers because women, to a
greater degree than men (on the average), may define themselves as "giving
selves" rather than as "liberal selves."' As giving selves, many women de-
fine their wants in terms of others' needs rather than their own. To the extent
men are more likely (on average) to behave as autonomous liberal selves, men
will have an advantage in bargaining.
Some women are particularly ineffective bargainers in relationships with
men because of the lessons internalized as a result of unwanted sex, such as a
weakened sense of autonomy." For women in some multicultural and reli-
gious communities, the difficulty of bargaining for rights in a heterosexual re-
lationship may seem unimaginable given cultural traditions even more insistent
on female deference to male authority than in many secular or mainstream
communities.
9. VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 71-72 (1988).
10. Robin West contrasts the traditional liberal, selfish, rational, and independent self with
the "giving" self: "many women, much of the time, consent to transactions, changes, or situations
in the world so as to satisfy not their own desires or to maximize their own pleasure, but to maxi-
mize the pleasure and satiate the desires of others." Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's
Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Theory, 3 WiS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 93
(1987).
11. For a discussion of these harms, see infra note 25 and accompanying text.
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In contrast, in same-sex couples, one partner may earn more than the
other," but that partner will not as often also enjoy the gender- and sex-relat-
ed advantages as that of a man in a heterosexual couple. Finally, as discussed
in greater detail in Part II, unwanted sex is disproportionately a heterosexual
phenomenon; lesbians and gay men are therefore far less likely to have
internalized its lessons.
4. Alternatives to Contract
For heterosexual couples, there is an alternative to contract: family laws
will apply if they marry. The very availability of this alternative affects what
kind of contracts heterosexuals are likely to enter. For heterosexual couples
who marry, the alternative to contract is a set of state-made terms that tend to
give homemakers and caretakers some protection. In part because this level of
protection is legally imposed upon marriage (at least in the absence of a con-
tract to the contrary), the economically vulnerable partner may feel that asking
for more in a marital contract would be greedy and inappropriate or that bar-
gaining in this situation would be inconsistent with romance. And a cohabiting
heterosexual could have the option of marrying if they both agree that the
weaker party should have these protections. One would not, therefore, expect
many such couples to sign written agreements providing greater or equal pro-
tection for the homemaker.
Precisely because same-sex couples do not have the alternative of legally
recognized marriage and divorce protections, they are more likely (than hetero-
sexual couples) to bargain explicitly for formal contract terms to ensure pro-
tection of the more economically vulnerable party, including terms for the
sharing of resources upon separation or death. Given the alternative, such a
bargain is not looked at as inconsistent with love and romance but as motivat-
ed by such feelings. And in any bargaining, both partners are the same sex.
One partner does not have the advantage of belonging to the privileged sex
while the other suffers the disadvantages described above.
B. Differences in the Contracts of Heterosexual and Same-Sex Couples
Both anecdotal evidence and contracts described in litigated cases support
my conclusion that same-sex and heterosexual partnership contracts are likely
to be quite different in terms of their substantive provisions. 3 Among hetero-
sexual couples, generally only couples who are about to marry seek explicit
contracts. Most such contracts protect the economically stronger (and/or previ-
ously married) party and consist of waivers of rights that would otherwise
accrue to the economically weaker party with marriage. 4 In contrast, explicit
12. For most lesbian couples, this problem appears to be eliminated by the strong commit-
ment to equality regardless of economic power. See BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 7.
13. Compare, for example, Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992) (written cohabita-
tion contract between lesbians giving rights to economically weaker party) with Simeone v.
Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990) (written pre-marital contract consists of waiver of rights by
economically weaker party).
14. Sometimes the protection is primarily for the benefit of the economically stronger party's
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cohabitation contracts do occur between same-sex couples, and these are likely
to provide more favorable terms to the economically weaker party than that
party would otherwise obtain (given, of course, that a same-sex couple cannot
marry into the protections of divorce law).
Thus far, I have suggested that although Ertman is right in noting the
progressive potential of partnership contracts for same-sex couples, that same
progressive potential is absent in most heterosexual partnership contracts for
two reasons. First, for the many reasons described above, the two members of
a heterosexual couple are more likely than a same-sex couple to have unequal
bargaining power, giving the economically stronger party a great deal of con-
trol over the contract. Second, the two members of a heterosexual couple bar-
gain in the shadow of family law rules which apply to marriage (in the ab-
sence of a contract); whereas the same-sex couple bargains in the shadow of a
legal regime that gives no economic protection to either partner other than
claims based on economic contributions to property titled only in one person's
name. Thus, when same-sex couples fail to contract there is no court-ordered
sharing of resources under marriage-like rules. There are no applicable rules
other than the general presumption that property is owned by the title holder 5
and the assumption that if property has been acquired with economic contribu-
tions from both, both own some share of the property. 6 For these reasons,
enforcement of cohabitation/marital contracts is likely today to be generally
progressive for same-sex couples but regressive for heterosexual couples.
Although one could impose different rules on same-sex and heterosexual
couples, 7 such a line may well be effective only as long as same-sex couples
are denied the right to legal marriage. Once same-sex couples are allowed to
marry, they too will bargain in the shadow of rules that would give significant
protections to the economically weaker party. Same-sex contracts might then
look quite different, even though same-sex couples would continue to be mem-
bers of the same sex and thus avoid the systemic skewing of power in favor of
the partner born male.
In the short term, however, courts will not apply differential rules to
same-sex and heterosexual couples. Traditionally, courts have refused to en-
force all cohabitation contracts (because they are based in part on "meretri-
cious"'8 relationships), 9 as well as all contracts entered into during marriage
(since the couple was already married, there could be no consideration for
children by a previous marriage, ensuring that their inheritance will not go to a new spouse.
15. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979) (when unmarried heterosexuals split
up, property owned by the man not divided).
16. IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEST, PROBLEMS 818-23 (2d ed. 1991).
17. For example, one could hold that contracts between unmarried or married heterosexuals
had to be at least as generous to the economically weaker partner as family law rules on divorce
in order to be enforceable, whereas contracts between same-sex couples are presumptively en-
forceable absent evidence of unfairness, overreaching, etc.
18. "Of the nature of unlawful sexual connection." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 988 (6th ed.
1990).




such a contract)." Additionally, courts have applied a very high standard of
fairness to pre-marital contracts, refusing to enforce such contracts in many,
perhaps most, litigated cases.2 Today, courts have become much more will-
ing to enforce heterosexual contracts in each of these situations,22 and have
therefore become willing to enforce same-sex cohabitation contracts. Were it
not for the increased willingness of courts to enforce heterosexual contracts, I
doubt that there would be much chance of enforcing contracts in same-sex
cases. Thus, the regressive reality for heterosexual women comes with, indeed
makes possible, the progressive potential of the New Private Law for same-sex
couples.
True, as Ertman illustrates with the example of the New Private Law's
enforcement of same-sex cohabitation contracts, the New Private Law is not
always and only bad for have-nots. But her example involves contracts be-
tween have-nots of the same sex denied the right to marry. Overall, the force
of the New Private Law's enforcement of contracts in intimate relationships is
regressive, hurting many have-nots, chiefly heterosexual women. Also, when
same-sex couples do obtain the right to marry, whether our contracts will
continue to be progressive is unknown. On balance and over the long term, the
New Private Law probably does more harm than good from the perspective of
have-nots even in the area of cohabitation and marriage contracts.
Ertman discusses a second reason for the progressive potential of the New
Private Law in enforcing same-sex cohabitation contracts. Contract enforce-
ment (like free speech in constitutional law) gives decision makers the ability
to afford some legal protection to same-sex couples without necessarily "ap-
proving" of their "life style." Part II discusses the limits of such tactics and
suggests an alternative approach.
II. MORAL OBJECTIONS TO MALE HETEROSEXUALITY
Ertman is clearly right when she states that many heterosexuals are more
comfortable protecting lesbians and gay men when they can do so without
indicating approval of lesbian and gay relationships. Ertman herself, however,
would probably agree with me that we must ultimately address the "merits" of
lesbian and gay relationships if we are to achieve equal acceptance and re-
spect. I doubt that we will be able to obtain even formal legal equality without
talking about what is good about our relationships. To the extent that what
makes heterosexuals uncomfortable is a distaste for our sexual intimacy, the
feelings underlying opposition to lesbian and gay rights cannot be addressed
without talking about the merits of our relationships.23
20. Id. at 301-02.
21. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 676-82.
22. See CLARK, supra note 19, at 301-02; ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 676-82.
23. See, e.g., URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY & LESBI-
AN LIBERATION 191-95 (1995) (making a similar point, "[tlo win against the right wing, we have
to fight back on the sexual battleground, not run away"). Id. at 192. But see Mary A. Case, Cou-
ples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbi-
an and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643 (1993) (arguing that it is "coupling" ["copulation"] that
makes many uncomfortable with lesbian and gay fights and increased emphasis on either coupling
1996] 1175
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Many Americans believe that heterosexual relationships are morally supe-
rior to same-sex relationships and hence only the former are entitled to the
sanction and legitimation of state-recognized marriage. Demonizing homosexu-
al relationships and idealizing heterosexual relationships is one way in which
heterosexually-identified women and men project all that is harmful or trou-
bling in their own relationships onto another group, rather than facing and
addressing their own sexual immorality. In reality, many heterosexual relation-
ships are abusive. Many lack real emotional intimacy and mutually desired
physical intimacy. In this section, I discuss one important aspect of what
makes relationships "good" or "bad"-whether one of the partners is
objectified in an autonomy-denying manner. Along this metric, heterosexual
relationships in our culture are more troubling than same-sex relationships.
A. Objectification
To make this point, I begin with the word "objectification," often used but
seldom defined in contemporary discussions of sexuality. Literally,
"objectification" means treating another as a thing, an object, a means to one's
own ends. "Objectification" is not synonymous with any and all relationships
which serve a function in one's life, in which one "gets" something, such as
pleasure or entertainment or emotional or other support. Were this
objectification's meaning, it could do no work since all voluntary relationships
are rewarding in some way; we do not pick our friends out of the phone book
at random because of a commitment to absolute nondiscrimination and perfect
selfless disinterestedness. We pick our friends on the basis of our enjoyment
of their company, conversation, humor, etc. We get something out of volun-
tary relationships or we would not be in them.
To repeat, objectification occurs when the actor (the sexual subject) treats
another as a thing or sexual object rather than as the person she or he actually
is. In most sexual encounters, even the most objectifying, the object is not
literally regarded as a "thing," i.e., a non-person. The sexual actor would not
be as well satisfied with a blow-up plastic doll. It is important that the object
be a person, but not her own or his own independent autonomous person.
Instead, the object is a projection of the sexual actor's desires, wishes, and
fantasies onto another, so that the other (the object) is no longer an actual
person but only that person imagined by the sexual agent (the subject).
Not all sexual encounters are objectifying in this sense. In non-
objectifying encounters, both participants see the other as the individual she or
he is and the encounter affirms their actual personhood as well as remains
consistent with the feelings, needs, and desires of both. Non-objectifying en-
counters are likely to occur when people know each other and their encounter
is neither commercial nor involves rigid scripts.
I do not mean to suggest that any love or enjoyment of or pleasure in a
partner's body is necessarily objectifying. One can, I believe, give and receive
or copulation is therefore a strategic mistake).
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love physically without treating one's lover as someone she is not. And one
can appreciate another's body without denying their actual personhood and
regarding her or him as primarily a trophy. Indeed, one's love for another
person is likely to affect and heighten one's appreciation for the real physical
beauty of the beloved's body. We never (rarely?) love the beloved as though
she were only a mind or soul.
Non-objectifying encounters are, in themselves, moral goods and part of
what many want in a fulfilling life as a human person.24 The morality of an
objectifying sexual encounter depends on whether the objectifying sexuality is
autonomy-denying or autonomy-respecting. Let me explain.
Autonomy-respectful (objectifying) encounters are consistent with the
object's desires and wishes. For example, both a brief sexual encounter be-
tween strangers who interact for a short period of time and a rigidly scripted
S&M scenario are likely to be objectifying in that the object is not seen as the
person she or he is but as a projection of some kind. In both situations, how-
ever, this reality may be entirely consistent with the object's wishes and there-
fore autonomy-respecting.
In contrast, autonomy-denying encounters are inconsistent with the
object's desires in that the object would prefer to skip the sexual encounter
were it possible to do so cost-free. Autonomy-denying sexuality includes not
only rape, but also sexual harassment on the job or at school and other forms
of unwanted sex, i.e., sex inconsistent with what the object would choose were
there no costs associated with saying an effective "no."
1. Autonomy-Denying Encounters
By unwanted consensual sex I mean sex that one participant would rather
avoid than experience. I do not mean necessarily to include every encounter in
which one partner is more interested in sexual intimacy than the other at the
beginning of the encounter. Such an encounter might or might not be
autonomy-denying unwanted sex, depending on whether one of the participants
would prefer to skip the encounter.
Unwanted consensual sex is likely to be dangerous to the personhood of
the uninterested participant, particularly when endured repeatedly, not just on
one night but night after night. When a man assumes that what he wants is
what she wants (much pornography insists that women desperately want to be
taken and abused in the way the pornography does), the sex is likely to be
autonomy-denying for the real woman, whose feelings and experiences are
irrelevant to what takes place. Most commercial sex would be in this category
since generally the sex worker would not engage in the sexual activity but for
the money.
In a recent essay, Robin West identifies four injuries to women's sense of
selfhood when they allow their bodies to be used by men in autonomy-denying
but consensual sex: (1) injury to their capacity for self assertion, for connect-
24. They may, however, pose moral problems because of particular circumstances, such as
breach of a committed monogamous relationship.
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ing their feelings and experiences into actions to increase their pleasure or
decrease their pain; (2) injury to their sense of themselves as subjects, becom-
ing instead giving selves (defined by others needs and wants) rather than
beings with their own legitimate needs and wants; (3) injury to their sense of
autonomy; and (4) injury to their sense of integrity when they lie and say that
they desired and enjoyed the experience."
We all endure, of course, many injuries along these lines in other con-
texts. For example, at work one might be obligated to be nice or even deferen-
tial to a powerful person who is actually a fool or worse. Denying the reality
of one's bodily desires (or lack thereof) is, however, often likely to be far
more damaging. A person who regards her own bodily experiences as irrele-
vant to whether she should consent to another's use of her body for his sexual
pleasure is more likely to internalize her own relative worthlessness (why else
would her feelings be irrelevant to his use of her body) than the wage worker
who consciously chooses to be obsequious to a boss.
The harm of repeatedly agreeing to such sex is likely to be exacerbated
for women by our culture's attitude toward women's sexuality and women
who have sex. The harm of unwanted consensual sex is likely to be far worse
for a woman in this position than for a man (e.g., a female versus a male
prostitute) because our culture tends to regard women as degraded by sex, a
feeling that is partcularly likely to be internalized by a woman who agrees to
another's use of her body for sexual activity she would rather skip (were it
cost-free effectively to say no). Women in abusive relationships often internal-
ize a sense that they are worthless when their partners use sexual and verbal
abuse. For example, abusers routinely call their sexual partners "whores" or
worse.
Studies of girls involved in sports support my belief that for a girl or a
woman in our culture, her sense of self-esteem and self-worth is likely to be
profoundly affected by her bodily experiences and the extent to which they
reflect her own agency. These studies consistently report that girls who play
team sports are more likely to avoid teenage pregnancy, graduate from high
25. In a recent essay, Robin West described these four harms:
First, they may sustain injuries to their capacities for self-assertion: the "psychic connec-
tion," so to speak, between pleasure, desire, motivation, and action is weakened or sev-
ered. Acting on the basis of our own felt pleasures and pains is an important component
of forging our own way in the world--f "asserting" our "selves." Consenting to
unpleasurable sex-acting in spite of displeasure-threatens that means of self assertion.
Second, women who consent to undesired sex may injure their sense of self-possession.
When we consent to undesired penetration of our physical bodies we have in a quite lit-
eral way constituted ourselves as what I have elsewhere called "giving selves"---selves
who cannot be violated, because they have been defined as (and define themselves as)
being "for others." Our bodies to that extent no longer belong to ourselves. Third, when
women consent to undesired and unpleasurable sex because of their felt or actual
dependency upon a partner's affection or economic status, they injure their sense of
autonomy: they have thereby neglected to take whatever steps would be requisite to
achieving the self-sustenance necessary to their independence. And fourth, to the extent
that these unpleasurable and undesired sexual acts are followed by contrary to fact
claims that they enjoyed the whole thing-what might be called "hedonic lies"---women
who engage in them do considerable damage to their sense of integrity.
Robin West, The Harms of Consensual Sex, 94 AM. PHIL. ASS'N NEWSLETrERs 52, 53 (1995).
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school, have higher levels of self-esteem, avoid abusive relationships, and be
healthier.16 These studies suggest that feeling that one is in control with re-
spect to one's own body is extremely important to the well-being of girls and
women in our culture.
2. Autonomy-Respecting Encounters
Objectification respectful of autonomy is not troubling in the same way
and may be entirely moral. Autonomy-respecting objectification occurs when a
person treats another as an object or thing but yet in a manner consistent with
the object's own wishes and desires. Such objectification can take a number of
forms. For example, autonomy-respecting objectification occurs when the
subject sees the other merely as "body parts" for the subject's use because the
object's desires are consistent with the subject's own. As a collection of useful
body parts, the other might be fungible with similar objects, and treated as an
object in the sense of fungibility, though the two meet with a common goal.
Similarly, controlled, consensual S&M can be objectifying because of the
script, which requires certain roles and forms of interaction based on those
roles. Such interaction is objectifying in that one actor treats the other, not as
the actual human being she is but as a mental abstraction, a fantasy, a role.
Such sex may, of course, be mutually desired and consistent with and respect-
ful of the autonomy of each.
In contrast, as noted earlier, non-objectifying sex is both mutually desired
and entirely consistent with the actual personhood of the partner, affirming the
partner as the person she is. I do not know whether non-objectifying sexual
interactions are necessarily morally problematic. It may be that for some peo-
ple, their best and most fulfilling life would include some objectifying sex or
only objectifying sex. My point is only that autonomy-denying sexuality is
morally problematic because of the harm it causes the sexual object, whereas
autonomy-respecting objectification and non-objectifying sexuality are not
inherently troubling on a moral level for this reason.
The three categories I have described are not firm and distinct. Partici-
pants in the same sexual encounter may have different understandings of what
kind of encounter occurred and may even be unsure how to classify an en-
counter. To the extent that women define themselves as "giving,"--as wanting
to give that which would otherwise be taken from them 2"-women will often
be unable to identify sex as wanted or unwanted because those concepts have
no meaning. In addition, each of these kinds of sexual interaction shades into
the others; the lines between them are not clear or sharp. These concerns do
26. See Joanne Korth, Survey: Image, Support Still Lag, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 23,
1994, at 2C; Nancy Lieberman-Cline, Sports Can Teach Women to Compete in the Workplace,
DALLAS MORN. NEWS, June 29, 1995, at 4B; Andrea Martin, As You Were Saying; Sports Help
Girls Grow Strong, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 4, 1996, at 26; Wendy Parker, Women's Notebook;
Just Overdo It: Sales Pitch to Girls Cites Sports' Real, Mythical Benefits, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Sept. 9, 1995, at 12D; Elizabeth Weil, Good Sports; It's Seen as an Offensive Move Against Self-
Esteem Problems, Depression and Drug Abuse, Great Reasons, the Experts Say, to Team Up Girls
and Athletics, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1996, at El.
27. West, supra note 10, at 96-97.
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not affect my analysis because I do not suggest that we adopt laws or policies
creating categories along these lines. My use of these categories, as will be
seen below, is quite limited.
B. Mapping Sexuality
Sexuality can be viewed as a continuum. At one end is rape, an extreme
form of autonomy-denying sex, during which the sexual actor is wholly indif-
ferent not only to the actual subjective desires and pleasures of the object but
even to the object's expressed desires. Regardless of what the subject feels
and says, the rapist is likely to see her only as a projection of his own desire,
whether it be that she really does or does not want "it." Unwanted sex, sex
which one would rather skip than endure, could one do so without costs,
comes next, then autonomy-respecting objectifying sex, and at the other
extreme, non-objectifying sex.
Place sex/sexual orientation groups (heterosexual men, heterosexual wom-
en, bisexual men, bisexual women, gay men, and lesbian women) along this
continuum. Heterosexual men are the group responsible for most autonomy-
denying sex in the United States today. Rape is the clearest evidence of such a
sexuality. And it is overwhelmingly men who rape, and they overwhelmingly
rape women. In the recent National Health and Social Life sex survey
(NHSLS), the authors report that whereas 21.6% of women report having been
forced to do something sexual by a man, 0.3% women report having been
forced by a woman, 1.3% of men report being forced by a woman, and 1.9%
of men report being forced by a man. 8 This is consistent with anecdotal re-
ports that, though some gay men are (like other men) quite promiscuous in
certain settings (such as bathhouses or the Ramble in Central Park), treating
strangers as sexual objects fungible one with the other, they are generally
respectful of each other's autonomy, hence the relatively low number of com-
plaints of rape on gay cruising grounds.29
Rape is not unheard of in the gay community. But it is far less common
than among heterosexuals. Indeed, the form of homosexual rape that comes
most readily to mind, prison rape, is also in most instances a "heterosexual"
male phenomenon in that the rapist is someone who, when out of prison, re-
gards himself and acts as a heterosexual male.
The more widespread form of autonomy-denying objectification-having
sex with someone who does not want it and whose feelings and desires are
irrelevant to the encounter-is also common for heterosexual men. Many
women in heterosexual relationships speak of having unwanted sex because it
is their obligation or duty or to avoid a partner's anger or resentment or be-
cause saying no is awkward or difficult." Often, heterosexual women want a
28. EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 336 (1994) (Table 9.7).
29. See RICHARD D. MOHR, GAY IDEAS: OUTING AND OTHER CONTROVERSIES 129-218
(1992).
30. See LILLIAN B. RUBIN, WORLDS OF PAIN: LIFE IN THE WORKING-CLASS FAMILY 148-53
(1976) [hereinafter RUBIN, WORLDS OF PAIN] (relating women's feelings about sex using a study
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cuddle or a hug but engage in genital sex to get it.3' Many women in het-
erosexual relationships fake orgasms.32 Many ordinary heterosexual women
have lots of unwanted sex. The phenomenon of unwanted sex does not seem
as widespread among lesbians and gay men, though there is doubtless some
unwanted sex in some of these relationships, particularly when economic and
other power differentials exist. But there are a number of reasons to think that
unwanted sex should occur less often than in heterosexual relationships.
Unwanted sex may be particularly low in lesbian relationships because
neither partner has been raised with a male sense of entitlement to sex from a
partner. For example, one study, describing a lesbian couple in which one
partner desired more genital sex than the other, reports that Sally, the person
who wanted more sex, said that "now I'm more discreet. I edit how much I
ask in order not to get rejected as much. Also, she sometimes says no, but
more often than not she says yes. But then I don't ask all the time."33 The
authors conclude: "If Sally were a traditional heterosexual man, she would not
hesitate to ask, because it would be both her right and her duty to do so. Nor
would she be so hurt when refused."34 Indeed, the problem many lesbians
discuss is not unwanted sex but the opposite: "bed death," i.e., too little sex
once the relationship is no longer novel. Most "experts" regard "bed death" as
related to the fact that both partners are women, raised in a culture in which
they are not expected to be sexual agents, and therefore uncomfortable initiat-
ing sex once the initial passion has diminished. Thus, the problem for lesbians
is likely to be too little sex (partners experiencing bed death do not tend to be
happy celibates), rather than unwanted sex.
of working class marriages). Rubin reports that
[o]nce in a while, a woman says: "I tell him straight I'm not in the mood, and he under-
stands." Mostly, however, women say: "I don't use excuses like headaches and things
like that. If my husband wants me, I'm his wife, and I do what he wants. It's my re-
sponsibility to give it to him when he needs it."
Id.; see also LILIAN B. RUBIN, EROTIC WARS: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION
72-73, 75, 93-95, 98-108, 110-12 (1990) [hereinafter RUBIN, EROTIC WARS]. Rubin also told the
story of a 39-year-old woman who had slept with a number of men while looking for a permanent
relationship and expressed regret:
Sex is supposed to mean something, and not just be this transitory activity. Most of the
time I wasn't really doing what I wanted to do. I'd have sex with someone because it
seemed like it was easier to go through with it and do it than it was to say no and get
out of the situation. Do you know what it feels like to wake up to some stranger from
the night before and think: "Oh God, why? What am I doing here?" The guy's happy,
he feels like a conqueror, and you feel humiliated because you know you'll probably
never hear from him.
Id. at 110.
31. BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 198 (telling the story of a wife who reports
that she initiates sex most of the time "because I am not always serious"). She explained that
"sometimes I just want to cuddle or kiss and I don't always mean, 'Keep going'..... Sometimes
he thinks I am initiating that and I am not. I just want to be close." Id.; see also RUBIN, EROTIC
WARS, supra note 30, at 73 (the gratification many teenage girls find in casual sex is "being
touched, held and hugged" and not orgasmic).
32. LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 28, at 116 (Table 3.7) (43.5% of men report that their
partner always had an orgasm, though only 28.6% of women reported always having an orgasm).
Compare the quite similar estimates when 75% of men reported that they always had an orgasm
and 78% of women reported that their partner always had an orgasm. Id.
33. BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 214.
34. Id. at 214-15.
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Also, women in lesbian relationships, like women in heterosexual relation-
ships, "prize nongenital physical contact-cuddling, touching, hugging" and
lesbians "are much more likely to consider these activities as ends in them-
selves, rather than as foreplay leading to genital sex. '35 Because both partners
in a lesbian relationship are likely to value non-genital touching as an end in
itself (rather than as always leading to genital sex), both are less likely (than
most men) to assume that any physical contact is an attempt to initiate genital
sex. This too may result in less unwanted sex.
For both lesbians and gay men, neither partner begins a relationship with
the understanding that because she and only she (or he and only he) has a
penis, sex is defined by and centered on his or her orgasms, nor does only one
partner have the advantage of a male wage while the other has the disadvan-
tage of being expected to be the primary caretaker or any of the other social
differences discussed in the first section of this essay. And since both are
women or men, one does not have the disadvantage vis-A-vis the other of
thinking that her sexuality is primarily for the pleasure of her (male) partner
rather than herself, a lesson drummed continuously into women by our culture.
Also, because both are men or women, they may be more likely to desire sex
at similar frequencies or for similar amounts of time and under similar circum-
stances.
To be sure, other differentials may be present and important in terms of
power dynamics in a particular relationship: age, wealth, athleticism, physical
endowments, or beauty-so that sex is primarily about satisfying the desires
and needs of the dominant partner (autonomy-denying) rather than mutually
desired and fulfilling. But in heterosexual relationships, there are more
socially-constructed power differentials systematically favoring one partner
than there are in same-sex relationships, as noted in the first section of this
essay.
Also, the double standard does not pose the problem for lesbians and gay
men that it does for women in heterosexual relationships, since both partici-
pants are of the same sex. Neither partner in a lesbian or gay relationship is as
likely as a heterosexual woman to be inhibited by the fear that their partner
will have a double standard regarding women who are too active or who initi-
ate too much as "bad," or usurping male prerogatives.36 This can be a major
problem for women's development as sexual agents, since it is difficult to
keep oneself in check one instant and to let go the next.
I have not been able to find any lesbian or gay discussions of the problem
of unwanted, autonomy-denying sex, though there are many books on lesbian
and gay sex and heterosexual women routinely describe such sex.37 I suspect,
therefore, that this is less of a problem for lesbians and gay men than for
heterosexual women, for the reasons just given. There is evidence of unwanted
35. Id. at 197.
36. For a discussion of male resentment of women who initiate too much or are specific
about their sexual desires, and women's resulting reluctance, see id. at 209-14; RUBIN, WORLDS
OF PAIN, supra note 30, at 142-44.
37. See supra notes 30-32.
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same-sex sexual harassment, particularly in employment settings, and sexual
harassment is the expression of an autonomy-denying sexuality. But even in
that context, most sexual harassment on the job is by heterosexual men.
In sum, of the three forms of autonomy-denying sexuality described
here-rape, sexual harassment on-the-job, and other unwanted sex-rape is
overwhelmingly a heterosexual male phenomenon, as is sexual harassment at
work." Unwanted sex also seems primarily a heterosexual male phenomenon,
though it doubtless occurs in all sorts of relationships.
In light of this reality, the claim of many heterosexuals to "deserve" pref-
erential treatment by the state in marriage because of their moral superiority
over same-sex couples is unwarranted, since such encounters are least likely to
be autonomy-respecting and hence good for the human personhood of both
participants. Talking about the morality of various kinds of sexual encounters
is, I think, necessary if the goodness of many lesbian and gay relationships is
to become visible and ultimately entitled to full legitimation by the state in
marriage.
CONCLUSION
In this essay, I have suggested that the progressive potential of the New
Private Law is limited. The New Private Law's willingness to enforce lesbian
and gay cohabitation contracts (a progressive change) is more than offset by
the increased willingness to enforce pre-marital and marital contracts for het-
erosexuals (a regressive change). I have also argued that legal recognition and
social respect for lesbian and gay relationships requires talking about what is
good and bad about sexual relationships.
In the final section of the paper, I suggested that the morality of sexual
encounters turns, not on the sex of participants, but on whether the encounter
is autonomy-respecting or autonomy-denying. I argued that autonomy-denying
sex includes not just rape and sexual harassment at work but also unwanted
sex, i.e., sex a participant would rather avoid than live through were it more
cost-effective to say "no." Autonomy-denying sex is primarily a heterosexual
male phenomenon. Demonizing all same-sex relationships and idealizing het-
erosexual relationships-including unwanted sex routinely experienced by
many ordinary women in marriage-is one way in which we fail even to iden-
tify immoral sex as such. Ultimately, we should work for legal rules and so-
cial policies that would minimize immoral, autonomy-denying sexual relation-
ships and give legal recognition and social respect to moral sexual relation-
ships.39 We must, therefore, address what is good and bad about sexual rela-
tionships whether heterosexual, gay, or lesbian.
38. The relatively low rates of same-sex sexual harassment on the job may, of course, be the
result of taboos against same-sex sexuality (and the subsequent closeting) rather than reflecting a
difference in the extent of objectification.
39. I am not suggesting that we should criminalize autonomy-denying objectification or that
we should adopt any rules using as legal categories the distinctions I have drawn in this paper
between autonomy-denying objectifying sex, autonomy-respectful objectifying sex, and non-
objectifying sex. We might, however, design rules to minimize autonomy-denying sex in other
ways, such as by giving homemakers and caretakers better economic protections at divorce.
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OPTING OUT OF PUBLIC PROVISION
CLAYTON P. GILLETTE*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CASE FOR OPTING OUT
There exist multiple sources to which we look for satisfaction of our
material wants or needs, that is for the allocation of resources. Rough classifi-
cation divides these sources into self-production, or the household; transactions
with strangers, or the market; provision (either contractual or donative) by
those outside a kinship group, but within a narrow community (such as a
church group or social club); and provision by government either with (as in
the case of services provided for user fees) or without (as in the case of goods
provided by general taxation) direct compensation.' Much legal regulation
deals with the proper mix of these sources of provision by creating incentives,
prohibitions, and mandates for one or more of these groups to provide a par-
ticular good or service. Legal rules that mandate2 or preclude3 government in-
volvement in production or that constrain market transactions or that allow
transactions in families4 that might be prohibited among strangers are essen-
tially mechanisms for allocating the resource allocation function itself among
these different institutions.
Recent years have seen substantial argument in favor of shifting to the
market provision and production functions previously undertaken by govern-
ment. The increased intensity of arguments for privatization in all its forms' is
* Perre Bowen Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. B.A., Amherst
College, 1972; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1985. Thanks to Saul Levmore, Bill
Stuntz, Fred Schauer, participants at the Symposium on the New Private Law at the University of
Denver Law School and at workshops at the University of Virginia School of Law, George Mason
University School of Law, and the Canadian Law and Economics Association.
1. See, e.g., PARTHA DASGUPTA, AN INQUIRY INTO WELL-BEING AND DESTITLTON 26
(1993).
2. See, for instance, the various state constitutional clauses that require the provision of a
system of public education. For a summary, see Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Di-
rections in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101 (1995).
3. For instance, the "public purpose" requirement prohibits governmental entities from
participating in enterprises that provide benefits to an insufficient proportion of the general public.
See, e.g., State ex rel. McLeod v. Riley, 278 S.E.2d 612, 616-17 (S.C. 1981).
4. Children may work in family businesses under circumstances that would not be permit-
ted if they were working outside the family. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(1), 212 (1994).
5. Privatization is a phrase that has been loosely applied to a myriad of arrangements that
shift government responsibilities to the marketplace. Only in its extreme form, however, does the
market entirely displace government. In more moderate forms, government retains some role in
the provision of the "privatized" good or service. For instance, government may specify the char-
acteristics of the good or service to be provided, such as where government contracts out for the
manufacture of goods that the government itself distributes; or, government may regulate and
retain the right to dismiss the private actor, such as where cities contract with private firms for
collection of garbage. For an examination of the range of privatization, see Ronald A. Cass, Pri-
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neither novel nor surprising. The economist Albert 0. Hirschman has docu-
mented the shifting preferences that people share for dependence on the public
and the private realms, as reliance on either generates disappointment and a
desire for change.6 In legal literature, the absence of a clear public/private
distinction has been the source of substantial commentary suggesting both that
government might engage in heretofore "private" activities and that markets
might invade the previously "public" realm.7 That any such transformation
would follow a long tradition of employing private entities to accomplish pub-
lic goals is evidenced by Hendrik Hartog's rich description of privately sup-
ported municipal developments in New York,8 and the Handlins' history of
the interplay of public/private cooperation to construct the infrastructure of
post-Revolutionary Massachusetts.9
In its most current incarnation, much of the debate about privatization
centers on the replacement of public provision of goods and services with
private markets." This part of the debate implicitly assumes that public and
private provision of services traditionally supplied by government are plausible
alternatives. That is to say that the good or service at issue has sufficient char-
acteristics of a public good that it may be appropriate for government to be
involved in its provision; but that the good also exhibits sufficient characteris-
tics of a private good that demand for it will not be significantly understated
and adequate numbers of providers will arise if government provision is re-
placed by market forces." Under these conditions, the relevant question be-
comes, which plausible source of a good or service will provide it in a manner
most consistent with a selected standard, e.g., which source will provide the
good most efficiently or most fairly?
Implicit in much of this debate is the assumption that private provision
displaces the need for government involvement in the same area, so that the
vatization: Politics, Law and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449 (1987).
6. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC
ACTION (1982).
7. See generally Symposium on the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289
(1982).
8. See, e.g., HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER (1983).
9. OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY F. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (rev. ed. 1969).
10. See, e.g., JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION (1989); Cass, supra note 5.
11. A public good is defined by two characteristics: it can be jointly consumed by more than
one person simultaneously (nonrivalness); and, once produced, no one can be excluded from en-
joying its benefits, even those who did not contribute to its production (nonexclusivity). Classic
examples include sunshine, knowledge, and national defense. Local public goods have these char-
acteristics within more limited geographic boundaries, e.g., mosquito spraying or paved streets.
Traditional public finance theory suggests that market forces will undersupply public goods be-
cause no one has an incentive to incur the costs related to their production, since no one has an
incentive to purchase them from the producer (because once produced and paid for by some other
party, the nonpayor can still enjoy the good's benefits). For that reason, government provision
(and collection of taxes to pay for the good) is traditionally seen as a solution to the problem of
public goods.
There is substantial literature on the substitutability of markets for government in the pro-
duction of goods with public goods characteristics. See, e.g., ANTHONY DE JASAY, SOCIAL CON-
TRACT, FREE RIDE: A STUDY OF THE PUBLIC GOODS PROBLEM (1989); Ronald Coase, The Light-
house in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974).
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two sources of provision are acceptable substitutes for each other. Thus, pri-
vatization has typically taken the form of selling governmental assets to pri-
vate firms or replacement of a government provider with a private- one, either
through government abandonment of the service or through competitive bid-
ding between public and private providers. Examples include, for the first
case, governmental sales of airlines, forests, or communications facilities, and,
for the second case, government contracting for fire services or prison opera-
tions and competitive bidding for public defenders and ambulance services."
Frequently, some governmental involvement continues even after transition to
the private firm. But in such cases, the governmental role is to regulate or
cooperate with the private entity, rather than to compete with it.
In this article I examine a different element of "privatization" that does
not involve government displacement by the private sector. Instead, my con-
cern is with goods or services that are simultaneously offered by both the
public and private sectors. What characterizes the difference in providers is
that they offer different levels of the same service. Initially, the very existence
of competition between private and public provision would seem anomalous.
The fact that government provides a kind and level of service, typically paid
for by tax revenues collected from the citizenry at large, is presumed to serve
as a response to unmet demand from its constituents. But if that is the case,
then why should a critical mass of residents (sufficient to support a private
provider) desire to expend additional resources for a different level and kind
of service, especially where (as in the case of services financed through gener-
al taxation) 3 they must still pay for the publicly provided services of which
they do not partake? Nevertheless, the fact that we can easily call to mind
examples in which residents have opted out of the service level offered by
government-through the use of private schools, private security guards, or
privatized mail delivery-suggests that this apparent anomaly occurs with
substantial frequency. The source of the apparent anomaly may lie in any of
several conditions. First, those who seek additional services may prefer that
any of government provide the level that they personally desire, but a majority
of the electorate prefers the level that government actually provides. Second,
the government may provide a level of service that is inconsistent with the
preferences of a majority of constituents, but a discrete interest group has been
able to capture the decisionmaking process with respect to the level of that
service provided by government. Third, constituents might vary dramatically in
their preferences for the level of government provision of a service, so that a
majority agrees that the government should provide a level consistent with the
lowest common denominator, augmented by private supplementation in differ-
ent degrees for those who desire it. 4 Indeed, given the strong assumptions
12. See KIERON WALSH, PUBLIC SERVICES AND MARKET MECHANISMS 110-37 (1995); Jim
Flanagan & Susan Perkins, PubliclPrivate Competition in the City of Phoenix, Arizona, 11 GOV'T
FIN. REV. 7 (1995).
13. Simultaneous provision may be less puzzling in either of two situations. First, where the
public good or service is financed through user fees, so utilization of the services of one entity
does not require paying for the other, second, some jurisdictions credit payments made by constit-
uents to private providers for services that would otherwise be provided by public providers.
14. See Dennis Epple & Richard E. Romano, Public Provision of Private Goods, 104 J. POL.
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required to have perfectly harmonious preferences among the residents of a
jurisdiction (roughly the assumptions of perfect mobility, financial indepen-
dence, availability of diverse communities, and no externalities), 5 one would
anticipate that residents of the same community frequently will have divergent
demands for public services.
In each of these situations, the case for opting out of the governmentally
supplied level of service proceeds from the desire to achieve one's preferences
privately where one is unable to satisfy them through the political process. At
least initially, this desire seems perfectly benign. After all, the decisions of an
individual to select one level of service rather than another in the private mar-
ket causes little comment. The fact that I prefer eating in full-service restau-
rants to fast-food restaurants does not generate much criticism. It is thus ini-
tially puzzling that more is made of the fact when people, in selecting a differ-
ent level of service, choose a private provider that offers a different level
rather than a public one, such as in the choice to attend private schools or to
live in a residential association that has a gated or guarded entrance rather
than to rely on public schools for education or solely on the local police for
protection. 6 Seen simply as matters of contract between citizens and private
providers, these latter arrangements presumptively increase welfare; the fact
that a private party successfully offers the service (such as where a land devel-
oper attracts homeowners by creating a residential association with by-laws
that require more aesthetic regulation than local zoning laws) indicates that
there is a demand for that level that is not being met by governmental provi-
sion and that satisfaction of that demand is welfare enhancing, at least to the
immediate parties. 7
In these situations, residents may obtain desired services through private
"clubs," the members of which share production costs and can exclude non-
members who either do not desire the services offered by the club or whom
the club does not wish to serve. 8 Assume, for instance, a community in
which a minority of residents desires a swimming pool. Barring altruism and
substantial differences in the intensity of those who favor and oppose a public-
ly funded pool, democratic voting would not produce a swimming pool for
these individuals. Nevertheless, if the minority residents have the resources to
construct a pool, they may be able to create a swimming club open only to
members who have paid the "tax" in the form of dues sufficient to support the
ECON. 57 (1996) (indicating that a majority would prefer a regime of government provision with
market supplements to government-only or private-only provisions).
15. These are essentially the assumptions of the Tiebout model, under which government
expenditures would be optimally allocated. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expendi-
tures, 64 J. POL. EcON. 416 (1956).
16. These two examples illustrate that sometimes opting out of private provision is a com-
plete substitute for public, and sometimes private provision supplements the public. I explore the
implications of this distinction below.
17. Here I am assuming that when people contract for a level of service, they do so because
they believe that level is consistent with what is best for themselves, rather than out of some com-
mitment to the welfare of others. For a discussion of the possible lack of fit between preferences
and welfare, see Amartya Sen, Behavior and the Concept of Preference, 40 ECONOMICA 241
(1973).
18. See TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIvE ACTION 63 (1992).
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pool. Because nonpayors can be excluded from the pool, by means of an
entranceway at which membership cards must be shown, private providers
have incentives to make the pool available, notwithstanding that it has some of
the characteristics of a public good, i.e., it is nonrival to the extent that it
allows multiple swimmers to enjoy the facility simultaneously.' 9
While clubs typically offer goods and services that are not otherwise
governmentally provided, the same logic suggests that clubs can offer goods
that are provided by government, but at a level of service other than what the
potential club members desire. For instance, individuals with a taste for more
rapid snow removal on residential streets than the locality might offer (e.g.,
because the locality places a priority on clearing major thoroughfares rather
than residential areas) may live on privatized streets where abutters collective-
ly contract privately for early snow removal.' Indeed, government sometimes
encourages the formation of clubs to provide higher levels of service by au-
thorizing the creation of business improvement districts that are statutorily
enabled to collect "dues" from members, including involuntary members, and
use the proceeds for functions such as street improvements, landscaping,
signage, security, traffic safety devices, bicycle paths, and off-street parking
facilities.2' Where the club is able to achieve the preferences of its members,
at least without cost to nonmembers, there initially seems even less reason
(other than envy)22 to object to diffeiential provision than there is with re-
spect to services offered only by market mechanisms, since purchasing addi-
tional services does not necessarily disadvantage those who do not make simi-
lar purchases. In the case of private providers in traditional markets (as in my
restaurant example above), the potential consumer cannot obtain anything
without active involvement in a transaction. Where the private provider offers
only a different level of service, however, failure to enter into a transaction
means that the resident still receives the level of service provided by the gov-
ernment, at least with respect to those services funded through general taxa-
tion.23 The fact that failure to bargain does not deprive one of access to some
level of a service might be thought to reinforce the propriety of opting out.
Indeed, the positive social consequences of opting out may involve more
than satisfying the preferences of individuals. The claims that privatization will
save production costs is typically attributed to economies of scale or reduced
19. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 150-52 (1989).
20. 1 discuss the theory of clubs as a justification for strict construction of covenants in resi-
dential associations in Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CH. L.
REV. 1375, 1391 (1994).
21. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-25-1201 (Supp. 1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-4015
(1991); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1623 (Supp. 1996). On the collection of "dues" from unwilling
participants, see, e.g., Evans v. City of San Jose, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601 (Ct. App. 1992); Jensen v.
City & County of Denver, 806 P.2d 381 (Colo. 1991).
22. On envy, see JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SocIETY 252-63 (1989).
23. Services funded by user fees may require that residents actually request the service. But
other forms of exaction do not require affirmative action by residents. For instance, services paid
for through special assessmepts, such as some street paving, may be imposed even if the benefi-
ciary never uses the service, because the benefit accrues to the property assessed and not to the
individual payor. See, e.g., Owatonna v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 450 F.2d 87 (8th
Cir. 1971).
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agency costs in the private sector (resulting in part from better incentives to
monitor) as a function of the capacity of private owners to claim residual
profits of the firm. But any increased efficiency in private provision may be
attributable less to the nature of the provider (public or private) than to the
presence of competition.25 The simultaneous presence of public and private
providers of different levels of service may improve the performance of each,
since each has an interest in attracting customers of the other. Finally, opting
out should even return benefits to those who subscribe only to the background
levels of service, i.e., that level provided by government, since segregation by
demand for service allows the jurisdiction's residents to form homogeneous
groups that can avoid difficulties, such as cycling among voters, that are asso-
ciated with heterogeneous populations.26
These consequences might be thought to make any effort by private pro-
viders to offer goods and services that the government could, but has chosen
not to, make available to constituents relatively noncontroversial. Nevertheless,
it is just the cases .in which residents with different preferences have formed
clubs for local public goods that create controversy. The private institutions to
which people seeking to opt out have migrated are consistently under attack as
exclusionary and elitist, if not unconstitutional, and are accused of either dilut-
ing the level of services available to those who have not opted out or of in-
creasing costs to those others by making them bear a disproportionate burden
of serving those excluded from the club.27 These criticisms reflect two
24. See, e.g., DIETER 11os, PRIVATIZATION: A THEoRETICAL TREATMENT 33-50 (1991);
Michael Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public Housing,
75 CORNELL L. REv. 878 (1990).
25. See DONAHUE, supra note 10, at 67-68. Donahue contends that perusal of studies com-
paring the costs of private and public provision of the same service reveals that competition, rather
than public or private supply, is the best determinant of efficiency. See also Thomas E.
Borcherding et al., Comparing the Efficiency of Private and Public Production: A Survey of the
Evidence from Five Federal States, ZEITscHRIFr FUER NATIONALOKONOMIE [J. Econ.], Supp. 2,
127-56 (1982), where the authors conclude:
The literature seems to indicate that (a) private production is cheaper than production in
publicly owned and managed finms, and (b) given sufficient competition between public
and private producers (and no discriminative regulations and subsidies), the difference in
unit costs turns out to be insignificant. From this we may conclude that it is not so much
the difference in the transferability of ownership but the lack of competition which leads
to the often observed less efficient production in public firms.
Id. at 136.
These studies assume provision at equal levels by public and private entities. My concern is
less with efficient provision of a given level of service than with competition between public and
private about the level of service provided.
26. See MUELLER, supra note 19, at 393. It might be ideal, from the perspective of sorting
for service provision, if potential residents could signal their preferences in advance of moving to
jurisdictions or if jurisdictions could precommit to a level of service that would attract like-minded
residents. We would then see a better fit of residents and services that would minimize the costs
related to opting out. This is the intuition behind Boudreaux and Holcombe's view of residential
associations as "contractual governments" that reduce transaction costs of bargaining for a set of
public goods or for a set of procedural rules to determine which goods will be provided. See Don-
ald J. Boudreaux & Randall G. Holcombe, Government by Contract, 17 PUB. FIN. Q. 264 (1989);
Donald J. Boudreaux and Randall G. Holcombe, Contractual Governments in Theory and Practice
(1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
27. The primary target of the attack is often residential community associations. See, e.g.,
EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA (1994); Daniel A. Bell, Residential Community Associations: Corn-
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concerns. One concern is that certain characteristics of public provision are
themselves valuable, presumably by embodying a procedure that is not reflect-
ed in privatized decisionmaking.28 That criticism seems particularly telling
where the private alternative is selected by those who are unable to achieve
their preferences in the political market, rather than where private alternatives
simply reflect wide variations of preferences above a generally accepted mini-
mum. The other concern, which seems implicit in much of the criticism of
opting out, but that I hope to make more explicit and to examine more closely,
is that the practice imposes more tangible political costs on those who accept
only the background level of service. The extent of these costs may depend on
the motivations for opting out that I mentioned above. If, for instance, those
who opt out do so because political markets do not provide their preferred
level of service (either because they are outvoted or because the decisionmaki-
ng process has been captured), then opting out may reduce the chances of
forming a coalition that would change the background level. On the other
hand, if opting out is a response to variation in the demand for public goods,
those with relatively low and relatively high demand may seek to keep gov-
ernmental expenditures relatively low, in order to avoid subsidizing large num-
bers of individuals who favor different levels of service. In any of these cases,
the competitive benefits created by the availability of private options must be
balanced against the political costs that interfere with government provision at
a level consistent with resident preferences.
If we believed that the level of public goods provision was determined by
consideration of all relevant interests, then any concern that some residents
were dissatisfied would simply be the inevitable result of democratic
decisionmaking. In short, motivations for opting out would consistently fall
within the first, relatively benign, condition set forth above, i.e., individuals
would opt out because a majority of residents preferred a different level of
service. My present concern, therefore, is with the ways in which the mix of
public and private provision affects the composition of interests that are con-
sidered in decisionmaking about the level of provision for a public good. The
fact that the goods at issue share some "public goods" characteristics suggests
that they may be provided best when provided collectively.29 But those same
munity or Disunity?, 5 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 25 (Fall 1995); David J. Kennedy, Note, Resi-
dential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities, on Nonmem-
bers, 105 YALE L.J. 761 (1995). A related attack may be directed at business improvement dis-
tricts (BIDs). If these entities hire private security forces to remove "undesirables" from the area,
those who are removed will migrate to less hostile areas, i.e., those that have not or cannot create
BIDs, and these areas will have to bear a greater burden related to having a larger population of
"undesirables."
28. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Who Puts the Public in the Public Good?, 71 MARQ. L.
REV. 534, 548-50 (1988); Paul Starr, The Case for Skepticism, in PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTER-
NATIVES 25 (William T. Gormley, Jr. ed., 1991).
29. I am not suggesting that goods with "public" characteristics cannot be supplied by the
market. Indeed, there is much reason to suggest that private providers will produce public goods.
See, e.g., DE JASAY, supra note 11. But private provision means that the amount of the good pro-
vided will correspond to the interests of the private provider, which may deviate from the interests
of the public. Of course, as the next sentences of the text indicate, public providers may also sup-
ply goods in amounts that deviate from the interests of the public. My modest claim at this point
is that in at least some cases, the latter deviation will be smaller than the former.
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characteristics and the susceptibility to collective provision suggest that the
good or service will be available only when a political coalition forms to
signal public officials of the preferred service level, since traditional problems
of collective action deter the statement of individual preferences for public
goods. Political coalitions, however, notoriously misrepresent the public's
interest, in large part because joining or forming a coalition is itself a public
good.30 The consequence is that if those who opt out would otherwise join
competing coalitions that are more representative of the collective will, the
social costs of opting out may be considerable. In that case, those who disfa-
vor voluntary arrangements would not simply be acting out of envy; rather,
now they would realistically fear that those voluntary arrangements actually
conflict with the provision of services to those who remain.
There will, however, be situations in which opting out imposes no or
negligible costs on those who accept the background level of service. Thus,
wholesale condemnation or endorsement of opting out is inappropriate. My
concern here is to identify those characteristics of goods that would tend to
increase or decrease either the political costs or the competitive benefits of
opting out so that, with respect to any particular good or service, we could
determine more readily the desirability of opting out. Even if I were successful
at completing a typology of factors that tended towards increased political
costs or competitive benefits, I am not confident that it would provide a solu-
tion to the issue of opting out. As I discuss later in this article, one of the
concerns about opting out is that reducing homogeneity among services inher-
ently reduces the sense of community among residents of a jurisdiction. I am
less convinced of the force of this claim than some, but I credit it sufficiently
to conclude that weighing political costs and competitive benefits cannot be
looked at in isolation in determining the propriety of opting out.
Most of my examples focus on the area with which I am most familiar,
the provision of services by local governments. Nevertheless, the principles
that I suggest do or ought to inform the debate about private contracting
around public provision should remain the same regardless of the level of
government serving as the background provider. But the focus on local
government does pose one anomaly. One of the features that makes decentral-
ized government most attractive is its capacity to offer different packages of
goods and services and thus to appeal to the various preferences of different
actors who can, with relative ease, migrate to jurisdictions that offer the pack-
age that is most attractive. Opting out plays very much the same role, although
the mechanism for registering preferences is now through contracting with
private providers rather than through physical exit to another locality. Thus, to
the extent that we believe that opting out generates undesirable political costs,
we implicitly question the desirability of decentralization generally.3 Nev-
ertheless, there may be important distinctions between opting out contractually
and through physical exit. For instance, if our ultimate objective is the
30. See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 50-54 (1994).
31. For a critique of unfettered decentralization, see Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentraliza-
tion, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 253 (1993).
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maintenance of community, we may be less concerned about opting out
through physical exit to another community, notwithstanding the disruptive
effect that physical movement has on community continuity. When a resident
moves, the loss from membership in one community is offset by the gain in
membership to another. Opting out through contract while remaining a phys-
ical resident of the community does not necessarily produce the same offset-
ting benefit. Yet to the extent that any decentralized delivery of services pro-
duces other effects that I discuss herein, we may need to rethink the priority
that much of local government law scholarship gives to the value of smaller
governmental units.
A final introductory point relates to the nature of the public goods them-
selves. Governments provide an array of goods and services that range from
the essential to the convenient. Our reaction to opting out may reflect the
relative importance that we attribute to the service at issue, especially where
we face substantial uncertainty in trying to quantify or balance the competitive
benefits and political costs of opting out. In the face of such uncertainty, we
may be more willing, for example, to risk excess political costs in the provi-
sion of a municipal golf course than in the provision of public education.
Again, a typology of factors that tends towards increasing political costs or
competitive benefits, standing alone, seems inadequate to the ultimate task of
determining our reactions to opting out with respect to any particular service.
Nevertheless, I believe that trying to isolate factors that might be used in any
such typology will significantly advance our thinking about the issue and help
us understand our different reactions to individual pursuit of preferences in
different contexts.
II. GOVERNMENT PROVISION AS A DEFAULT
A. Majoritarian Defaults and Their Implications
There would be little reason for concern about opting out if we be-
lieved that government generally delivered service levels consistent with the
preferences of the majority of its constituents. If that were the case, then those
who opt out are presumably idiosyncratic. Allowing opting out under these
circumstances would appear, at least initially, to evince neither capture of the
decisionmaking process nor the imposition of substantial political costs on
those who accept the background level. Instead, opting out would only repre-
sent the inevitable dissatisfaction with government provision that some would
feel, given that governmental decisions are made in gross rather than through
highly tailored transactions with individual constituents.
Redistributional concerns aside, government appropriately intervenes in
market transactions to overcome obstacles that inhibit consumers from signal-
ing their preferences or that inhibit potential providers from meeting the sig-
naled demand. Governmental intervention to correct these market failures
typically does not take the form of individually dickered contracts. Instead,
general purpose governments" provide a package of goods and services to all
32. Special purpose governments, such as authorities and special districts may be even closer
19961 1193
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
constituents and exact payments in the form of taxes that are charged to indi-
viduals regardless of whether they utilize the proffered goods and services.
These same governments offer other services to all constituents, whether re-
quested or not, but impose charges or user fees only for the service utilized by
or made available to the payor.33 Whether the package offered is sufficiently
consistent with constituent needs is ideally determined by markets that trade in
votes rather than in dollars. Initial governmental involvement in these activi-
ties, however, seeks the same objective as market transactions-to provide
individuals the goods and services they desire at prices that reflect their cost.
Once we recognize that government cannot perfectly replicate the results
of private markets, permitting those who could attain greater satisfaction
through individualized transactions seems plausible. This is not to say that
market transactions perfectly meet all private wants. Transactions in private
markets are costly to construct. Suppliers and purchasers must seek each other
out and bargain over prices and risks. Reducing these costs is typically seen as
a benefit, even if the result is to constrain choice in individual transactions.
Thus, private markets offer ready-made goods designed to cater to the desires
of a substantial number of, but not all, potential purchasers. Those whose pref-
erences are not a precise "fit" with the off-the-rack selection would prefer the
slight misfit to incurring the costs of more individually tailored bargains. Thus,
clothing comes in predetermined sizes even though there are people who are
"somewhere between" a size 38 and a size 39. New automobiles come with a
pre-set array of features, or "standard options" that some buyers would prefer
not to purchase. Restaurants offer entrees accompanied by a previously estab-
lished set of side dishes. In each of these cases, it is possible for those who
desire a precise fit to bargain away from the off-the-rack selection. Clothes
can be custom made, automobile options can be ordered, restaurants may
substitute rice for potatoes on request. The party seeking the change, however,
must bargain for it, and frequently must incur additional costs involved in
meeting the request.3" In each case, then, the pre-determined selection consti-
tutes a default away from which the parties to the particular transaction can
contract. Each of these defaults is presumably set to appeal to a broad range
of potential consumers (hopefully a substantial majority), thus minimizing the
costs that would attach to highly stylized transactions.
to market transactions in that they provide only a single service, traditionally supported by user
fees rather than taxes. Government involvement in such activities may offer fewer advantages over
market transactions. See CLAYTON P. GiLLETrE, PUBLIC ATrHORITIES AND PRIVATE FSRMS AS
PROVIDERS OF PUBLIC GOODS, REASON FOUNDATION POLICY STUDY No. 180 (1994). Neverthe-
less, it is conceivable that governmental involvement in such activities effectively reduces transac-
tion costs (by providing a mechanism for collective production and payment for goods that would
otherwise require substantial organization among diffuse individuals, such as a toll bridge),
internalizes externalities, or solves the collective action problem that interferes with the supply of
goods that are nonexclusive and nonrival.
33. Some non-tax governmental exactions may be imposed on parties who do not or cannot
directly utilize the underlying service, on the theory that the benefit made available by the govern-
ment increases the value of the constituent's property and thus justifies governmental charges in
the form of cost recovery. See supra note 12.
34. Even then, we have all had the experience of finding a favorite product discontinued,
presumably because an inadequate number of others shared our tastes.
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To the extent that legal rules offer a means of allocating transactional
risks, analogous to the allocation of characteristics that are the focus of mass
marketed products, the same principles suggest that these rules should also
align with majoritarian preferences. As in product markets, legal default rules
seek to reduce transaction costs by conferring on parties allocations for which
they would presumably bargain if left to their own devices.35 While these de-
faults may not fit perfectly with personal preferences, the savings in negotia-
tions warrants acceptance of less than ideal terms for all parties. Thus, Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides background rules around which
the parties are free to negotiate, but that apply in the absence of any contrary
agreement.36 Default rules thus differ from mandatory rules, which parties
may not adjust even if they desire. In order to achieve this reduction in trans-
action costs, default rules must reflect the terms for which a majority (or at
least a plurality) of parties would bargain. Failure to generate majoritarian
rules means that there is some alternative rule (the one that would satisfy
majority preferences) that would reduce transaction costs even more than the
one reflected in the default.
Recall that-at least for tax-supported services such as police protection,
road paving, or admission to most public parks-governments offer a back-
ground level of service to all constituents without any additional bargain. It is
tempting to consider this level of service as equivalent to a default rule under
contract law. Once a community decides to offer a service, residents are enti-
tled to a certain level of that service simply by virtue of their membership in
that community. The background level of service thus may be thought to serve
the same function as preordained product characteristics or legal rules that ap-
ply to parties in a particular relationship who do not explicitly bargain for a
contrary legal outcome. Assuming, as suggested above, that individuals gravi-
tate toward jurisdictions that hold themselves out as offering a package of
goods and services, the package offered by any jurisdiction should be consis-
tent with the preferences of a significant percentage of that jurisdiction.
Whether or not such a conclusion is appropriate depends on whether those
who gravitate to a particular community do tend to have similar, if not identi-
cal interests; that is, if we believe that the Tiebout assumptions for the provi-
sions of local public goals work well enough to define in general terms the
sorting of residents among jurisdictions. The assumptions of that model sug-
gest that we should see substantial homogeneity in the preferences of residents
of any decentralized government." The smaller the jurisdiction, the more
35. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the
Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 588 (1977); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation
Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983).
Alternative explanations include forcing persons with superior information to reveal that informa-
tion to contracting parties. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). For a compendium and critique of
arguments about non-majoritarian default rules, see Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm
and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 389 (1993).
36. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-509(1)(a) (1990) (assigning risk of shipment loss).
37. Homogeneity, however, is not the only way of producing an equilibrium in which every-
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homogeneous the population of the jurisdiction would tend to be, and the
greater similarity we would expect to see in the preferences of residents.
Given the variety of services and service levels that any government might
provide, individuals with mobility will not want to gravitate to jurisdictions in
which they must pay for services that they neither enjoy nor desire. Thus, we
would expect that mobile individuals will tend to migrate to jurisdictions that
provide preferred services.3" The result is that jurisdictions will attract indi-
viduals who are relatively like-minded, at least with respect to governmental
services. In addition, we would then expect to see little in the way of opting
out because residents would presumptively be satisfied with the default level
of service.
Application of the contractual default model to governmental services
implies that, if the level of government provision were set to satisfy
majoritarian wants, no negative implications should be drawn from the fact
that some individuals within the jurisdiction opt for a different level of service.
If the analogy to default rules holds, parties who bargain out would be charac-
terized solely by the idiosyncratic nature of their preferences, not by any self-
ishness or the desire to impose costs on those who accept the background
level. Majoritarian rules in contract law or in designing mass-marketed prod-
ucts do not depend on any deontological underpinning for their currency.39
Bargaining out of default rules betokens (tautologically) only that those are the
rules selected by a majority, and the person seeking an alternative is not part
of that majority.' Far from reflecting some moral norm, default rules may be
irrational (such as where they are based on commonly shared biases or low-
probability events)4' or antisocial insofar as they impose costs on non-parties,
notwithstanding that they increase the wealth of the parties to the bargain
(imagine, for instance, a price-fixing default rule). Nor would opting out imply
the disruption of potential coalitions for change, since any such coalitions
would either be unnecessary (since the level of provision would be consistent
one prefers his or her community to all others. Susan Rose-Ackerman suggests how heterogeneous
populations could also produce an inefficient, but stable, equilibrium. For instance, in a universe
of two towns and ten people, five of whom are high demanders of public goods and five of whom
are low demanders, equilibrium could be reached either by sorting the high demanders and low
demanders in separate towns or by having two towns of five high and five low demanders, where
each town produces identical levels of public services. Any shift by a resident of one town to the
other town would make the resident better off (by tipping the voting balance) only at the cost of
making members of the new minority worse off. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Beyond Tiebout: Model-
ing the Political Economy of Local Government, in LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: THE
TiEBOuT MODEL AFrER TWEerY-FIVE YEARS 55, 58-59 (George R. Zodrow ed., 1983).
38. Endowment effects suggest that even among mobile residents, many will form preferenc-
es based on what is available to them where they currently reside. Thus, they will not gravitate to
a jurisdiction that would be more appealing if they had no prior preferences.
39. For a view that default rules ought to be rooted in concepts of fairness, see Steven J.
Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCI-
PLINARY L.J. 115 (1993). For a response, see Clayton P. Gillette, Cooperation and Convention in
Contractual Defaults, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY LJ. 167 (1993).
40. This may be weaker than is necessary. Default rules may also betoken efficiency if the
default arises out of repeated negotiations between similarly situated parties and the negotiations
tend to generate the same allocation of risks that is reflected in the rule.
41. See Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for
Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1990).
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with majoritarian preferences) or superfluous (since those dissatisfied with the
level of service provision could migrate to more hospitable jurisdictions).
Allowing persons to opt out of public provision, therefore, might be no
more momentous than allowing opting out of default rules in contract. Within
a jurisdiction, those who seek a level of service different from the background
level provided by government may, but again, must bargain for a different
level of service. Indeed, typically, that bargain must take place with a third
party. Governments rarely offer a menu of service levels from which residents
can select. To the contrary, once government provides a service to any constit-
uent, the legal doctrine of equal service provision presumptively obligates the
government to offer the same level of service to all residents.42 Provision of
differential levels of service within the same jurisdiction is typically seen as a
basis for complaint. As a matter of legal doctrine, the delivery of a higher
level of service to the wealthy side of town rather than to the poor side of
town is considered an inequity to be remedied, often by judicial intervention,
rather than an indication of disparate preferences.43 It is only the infrequent
case in which governments offer residents a choice among service levels. A
student in public school, for example, may decide whether to take courses
oriented toward college or vocational training. The set of cases expands if we
mean by different levels of "the same" service any governmental function in
which residents can choose how much to consume. Then, virtually any good
financed through user fees or service charges will qualify as differentially
provided. A municipal gas company will sell as much gas as any user wants,
so that one user may obtain 100 cubic feet while another purchases 200 cubic
feet (and pays twice as much). If the concern is qualitative rather than quanti-
tative, however, there does not appear to be any difference in demand between
the two users in that (assuming ability to pay) each has equal access to the
service.
Some financing mechanisms employed by government explicitly make
possible the satisfaction of dissimilar preferences among residents. Special
assessments or special benefit taxes, for instance, allow those who seek a level
of service different from what is otherwise offered to obtain that objective, as
long as they are willing to bear the relevant costs. Thus, street paving may be
generally unavailable from government, except on petition of a critical mass of
abutters who petition the city for the service and indicate their willingness to
pay for it." Distributional effects would follow where some, but not all,
42. Veach v. City of Phoenix, 427 P.2d 335, 336 (Ariz. 1967).
43. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Equality and Variety in the Delivery of Municipal Services,
100 HARV. L. REv. 946 (1987). For cases involving judicial intervention to address allegations of
unequal service provision, see Mlikotin v. City of Los Angeles, 643 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1981);
Reid Dev. Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 89 A.2d 667 (N.J. 1952). Such cases are also
brought on the basis of claims of racial, not wealth, discrimination. See Ammons v. Dade City,
783 F.2d 982 (11 th Cir. 1986). For an examination of unequal service provision within cities, see
Carl S. Shoup, Rules for Distributing a Free Government Service Among Areas of a City, 42
NAT'L TAX J. 103 (1989).
44. See, e.g., KENNErH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNrrED STATES (1985). Jackson indicates that certain services were made available differentially
within the same municipality:
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constituents lacked the resources to contract for their desired level of service.
But, since those effects will exist whether the source of inequality is a public
or private provider, their presence does not help us to determine the propriety
of opting out.
4
We see additional examples of menus at the federal level.' Postal servic-
es offer one rate for first class, another for overnight mail. An overnight visi-
tor to a national park may choose to sleep in a campground at one rate, and at
a governmentally operated (or franchised) hotel for another. But aside from
these rare cases of menus, constituents do not select among service levels
from governmental providers. One does not, for instance, receive a default
level of police services simply by virtue of paying local property taxes but
then receive an option to obtain an additional level of police protection on
payment of an additional sum. Thus, one who desires more of a service than is
offered generally must find a private provider. One who seeks more security
than is offered to citizens generally typically hires a private security guard or
resides behind private walls. One who seeks more religious training in educa-
tion typically hires private tutors or sends a child to parochial school rather
than pay additional fees to the public school system.
B. Background Service Levels as Majoritarian Defaults
My assumption to this point has been that the background level of service
can be considered as a majoritarian default rule, so that individual efforts to
opt out are idiosyncratic and confer negligible harm on others. If this assump-
tion is untrue, if the background level of service does not reflect majority
preferences within the jurisdiction, there may be substantial implications for
the propriety of allowing individuals to opt out of public provision. Those
implications, however, simultaneously cut in different directions. Opting out
might be considered more appropriate because it signals officials that they
have misread the popular will and creates opportunities for political entrepre-
neurs who are more attentive to the majority's preferences. Thus, opting out
would create competition that should generate efficiency gains. Opting out,
however, may be a second-best solution to the problem of official failure to
satisfy majority preferences. Direct political appeals by those who would oth-
erwise opt out, e.g., through the formation of political coalitions to alter the
level of provision, might be preferable to the relatively haphazard process of
Before the Civil War, streets were paved or widened when owners of a certain percent-
age (usually three-fourths) of the property facing the right-of-way petitioned the city to
do so. To finance such improvements, property-owners "abutting and directly affected"
paid special assessments. The municipal government played a limited role: the basic
decisions as to when and how to pave were made by private individuals.
Id. at 131.
45. Interestingly, special assessment funding appears to have declined as a basis for munici-
pal improvements. See Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation:
Special Assessments in Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (1983).
46. We would expect to see a more centralized level of government offering more menus,
since its constituency should have a more varied set of preferences than a decentralized govern-
ment. Of course, these varied preferences might be handled by allowing constituents to opt out of
the service level set by the centralized government.
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signaling dissatisfaction and hoping that a political entrepreneur receives and
acts on the signal. Thus, opting out may be less appropriate if it reduces the
impact of individuals who are willing to lobby for the level of services that
the majority prefers.
In light of these effects, it is necessary to consider whether background
levels can be treated as simple default rules that imply majoritarian prefer-
ences. Given the assumptions of the Tiebout model, it would seem paradoxical
for the background level of service offered by a government not to reflect the
preferences of a majority of constituents."' I have referred above to one plau-
sible reason why this result may occur. Given the public goods nature of the
services with which I am concerned, and the public goods nature of the lobby-
ing efforts that will be employed to indicate levels of services to political
officials, one would expect that dominant interest groups would successfully
seek idiosyncratic levels of their preferred services.
There exists, however, a more robust explanation of why the default rule
model does not easily fit the delivery of municipal services. That explanation
concerns the inability to provide a background level to any stable majority
view. This inability stems from two sources. First, note that contractual default
rules allocate risks between parties in a manner that is likely to be binary in
nature. Risk of loss is typically allocated to buyer or to seller; battles of forms
will either generate binding contracts or they will not. Loss sharing rules are
exceptional. One consequence of this binary choice is that a majority of parties
is likely to prefer one allocation to the other. Any given government service,
however, can typically be provided on a continuum, rather than in a binary
manner. Even where the level of service provided by government corresponds
to the preferences of the median voter,' there is no reason to believe that the
median voter is likely to represent the views of a majority, or even those of a
substantial plurality. Instead, the median voter reflects only that point that can
attract more support than any other position in a winner-take-all contest. The
fact that others will "go along" with a median position in order to avoid shifts
to even more disfavored positions, however, does not entail that the median
voter represents the first choice of a majority of the relevant constituents.
Nevertheless, taken in combination with the Tiebout theory, which suggests
that local governments will attract a population with homogeneous preferences,
a proposition for which there is at least some empirical support,49 there is a
47. For survey evidence that individuals choose places of residence for reasons other than
the available services of this proposition, inconsistent with the Tiebout model, see David P.
Varady, Determinants of Residential Mobility Decisions, APAJ, June 1983, at 184.
48. The premise of the median voter principle is
simply an observation that a decisive coalition in a one-person one-vote democracy
consists of the median voter plus all voters either to the left or to the right of that voter.
For example, the conservative must start from the right and reach far enough to the left
to bring in the median voter. The liberal starts from the left and must reach far enough
to the fight to bring in the same voter. The election then becomes a fight for that median
voter.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation History as Politics or Markets, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 549, 554
(1995). For an assumption that local government service provision shifts with the identity of the
median voter, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Market Models of Local Government: Exit, Voting, and
the Market, 6 J. URB. ECON. 319, 329 (1979)
49. See Edward M. Gramlich & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Micro Estimates of Public Spending
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greater possibility that the median voter will represent something close to a
majority view.
The second impediment to providing services consistent with the prefer-
ences of a stable majority arises from the fact that public budgets tend to be
multidimensional, so that different pieces of the budget pie can be increased or
decreased while retaining the same total expenditure. Reference to the prefer-
ences of the median voter might make sense if the level of each governmental
service were decided independently. Under that condition, residents are likely
to have single-peaked preferences with respect to individual goods and servic-
es. Voters in general-purpose governments, ° however, register their prefer-
ences on a package of public goods and services simultaneously since they
vote for officials, not for individual goods and services.5 A voter in a local
election who is satisfied with the locality's level of education, garbage collec-
tion, and snow removal might vote to re-elect local officials, even if the voter
was dissatisfied with the level of local cable television regulation. The fact
that services must be voted on as a package means that officials will be unable
to disaggregate from voting results those service levels that satisfy a majority
of voters from those that do not. Indeed, the same process reduces the chance
that any package will appeal to a majority, since small tradeoffs among
different services could shift preferences or produce cycling among packages.
For instance, a majority formed by advocacy of one level of spending on a
package of police services, welfare services, and educational services could be
displaced by another majority that traded more welfare services for fewer
educational services. As a result, there is unlikely to be a stable majority that
prefers any particular package, even if there exist majorities with respect to
individual services.52
Of course, even where is simultaneous voting on multidimensional issues,
there are substitutes for voting that allow officials to hear complaints or praise
about the level of provision with respect to particular services. Direct com-
plaint, or "voice" in the vernacular,53 provides an alternative opportunity for
voters to inform political leaders that their decisions deviate from constituent
preferences. We rely on these political substitutes for voting when we speak of
political coalitions that can make their preferences known. But there is no
reason to believe that these alternatives will reflect majoritarian or widespread
interests. Indeed, just the opposite is true. Given the characteristics of the
public goods that government is providing, those in the majority are most
Demand Functions and Tests of the Tiebout and Median-Voter Hypotheses, 90 J. POL. ECON. 536
(1982). Gramlich and Rubinfeld find support for the median-voter hypothesis in the substantial
number of survey respondents who want no change in the overall level of local public spending.
While these results are consistent with the median-voter hypothesis, they do not demonstrate that
voters want no change in spending for any individual service. In addition, endowment effects may
skew the responses.
50. Single-purpose governments, such as authorities and special districts, may be more ap-
propriate for the median-voter analysis.
51. See James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Conduct of Rep-
resentative Government, in JAMES D. GWARTNEY & RICHARD E. WAGNER, PUBLIC CHOICE AND
CONsTrrtrrONAL ECONOMICS 10 (1988).
52. See DENNIS MUELLER, CONSTrruTIONAL DEMOCRACY 199-21 (1996).
53. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
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likely to be able to free ride on the efforts of others. Thus, one would antici-
pate that complaints and praise would issue from those who suffered or en-
joyed the most salient consequences from the level of provision and who were
least able to rely on others to represent their interests. For instance, debates
concerning levels of educational funding may be dominated by teacher groups
and administrators who want to maximize budgets. As long as the level of
service demanded by those with idiosyncratic preferences is not so costly as to
disrupt the entire package on which all constituents vote, officials have incen-
tives to satisfy the preferences of these idiosyncratic interests. Doing so gains
officials the support of those with intense interests, without alienating the
support of those still relatively satisfied with the overall package of goods and
services. The necessary result is that where the level of each service within the
package is decided simultaneously, the level of any given service is even less
likely to reflect the interests of the median voter or of the majority.
These consequences are likely to be exacerbated in some ways, but dimin-
ished in others, when we move from decentralized to more centralized govern-
ments. Madisonian theory suggests that we are more likely to see competition
among interest groups at centralized levels, where entrepreneurial leaders are
more likely to arise and the chances of finding enough interested parties to
create an effective coalition is enhanced. Decentralized decisionmaking, on the
contrary, is more likely to be dominated by a monopolistic interest group.
Thus, we might expect decisionmaking at the centralized level on any one
issue would be more consistent with the views of the median voter, though
still not consistent with the desires of a majority. At the same time, the vari-
ance of interests within the nation is likely to be greater than the variance of
interests within any given community in the nation, again assuming that the
Tiebout model accurately predicts relative homogeneity within localities. Thus,
where discrete interest groups do not face competition at the centralized level,
we might expect that the level of public goods that are centrally provided will
be less likely to reflect the interests of the median voter. National defense, for
instance, is traditionally viewed as a public good whose supply is properly
determined at a centralized level. Nevertheless, Boston residents would want
more expenditures on naval defense than Omaha residents. But if Omaha resi-
dents do not see naval expenditures as a direct tradeoff for other expenditures
they would prefer, e.g., agricultural subsidies, they may not coalesce to defeat
what, from a national perspective, is an overexpenditure on naval defense.
The result is that we are unlikely to see expenditures that reflect the pref-
erences of the median voter on issues where there are substantial variations in
preferences for the service and in intensity for different quantities (or qualities)
of the service. Instead, we would expect the default level of service to reflect
the preferences of a discrete, yet dominant minority. Then the analogy be-
tween opting out of default rules in contract and opting out of public provision
dissolves. Whereas in contract law opting out is the signal of idiosyncratic
behavior, opting out with respect to publicly provided services may actually be
the preference of a substantial majority.
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C. The Use and Costs of Opting Out as a Signal
What should we infer about the propriety of opting out if we conclude
that the background level of service does not reflect majoritarian preferences?
First, the lack of fit between the background level of service and majoritarian
preferences suggests that opting out is even more appropriate in these circum-
stances, because-as I discuss below-opting out cannot be opposed on the ar-
gument that doing so removes one from the core of the community. Second, it
plausibly emits a more highly tailored signal than the opaque signals of elec-
toral markets, clouded by multidimensional choices, that there is constituent
dissatisfaction with the background level of service. Thus, the objection to the
analogy between contract default rules and public service levels may turn out
not to be an objection to opting out, but instead a basis of support for the
practice.
If the above is true, then it might tell an optimistic story about opting out,
since it provides reasons to believe that opting out plays a productive role,
providing competition that obligates the government provider to be attentive to
the demands of its constituents, without imposing significant political costs in
the form of diluting coalitions or commonalities. Indeed, where opting out is
available, the signal to officials may be effective even where those who exer-
cise the option constitute a small minority, since the resulting signal would be
that the current level of provision is acceptable to most residents.
Nevertheless, the signal emitted by opting out itself contains some
opaqueness. Opting out may have limited reliability as a signal because the
decision to select a level of service other than the background level may re-
flect dissatisfaction with one feature of the service, and that feature may vary
for different parties. Those who opt for private schools rather than public may
not be concerned that the budget for education is inadequate. Rather, one
group may believe that too much of it is spent on programs for the disadvan-
taged or on teachers' salaries and not enough on football teams or on pro-
grams for the gifted. Others who opt out of the same system may do so be-
cause insufficient time is dedicated to religious education or to traditional
reading programs. Similarly, residents may be satisfied with the level of
spending on police services but believe that not enough of the police budget is
spent on foot patrols. The difficulty is that officials cannot easily distill the
reasons why different people opt out and thus have little basis for translating
the act of opting out into a signal of a specific source of dissatisfaction.
Whether we want to employ this signaling device, therefore, may depend on
whether we believe that there exist offsetting costs and whether we can define
discrete instances when those costs would be outweighed by the benefits of
opting out.
These limitations on the value of opting out must be considered when
weighing the benefits of the practice against the costs that private options may
impose. If the net result of opting out is to threaten the coalition for shifts in
service levels, then we might want to encourage alternative means of register-
ing complaint that retain the political participation of potential emigrants. If,
for instance, those likely to opt out would otherwise be most likely to monitor
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public officials or to become political entrepreneurs for the preferred service
level, we might want them to remain customers of the public provider. At
least, that would be the case if we thought that, once they opt out, these indi-
viduals will have a less intense interest in monitoring the conduct of officials.
That seems to be a reasonable assumption. Monitoring is a costly activity, so
that we would imagine the task would be undertaken by those who had the
most to lose should public officials misbehave (i.e., behave in ways that are
inconsistent with the interests of the monitors). To the extent that they reflect
the preferences of others, use of voice options by this group means that they
would presumptively "raise all boats" when increasing services for themselves.
But once potential monitors are no longer receiving publicly available benefits,
they have little incentive to ensure that the background level is consistent with
public preferences.
The political costs of opting out are more likely to materialize if dissatis-
fied constituents have independent reasons to favor exit over voice. Where the
background level of service is determined by capture of the local decision-
making process rather than majority preferences (or even median voters),
effective exercise of voice requires creation of countervailing interest groups.
This effort, however, necessarily suffers from traditional collective action
problems that reduce the likelihood that any complainer will be successful.
Indeed, the very presence of an exit option deters membership in potential
coalitions because the cooperation of others cannot be assured. Thus, opting
out may be a less costly option than voice. Even if exit is more costly than
voice (because it requires contracting with a private party for a privatized
substitute), a dissatisfied resident may choose the former because exit also
increases the certainty of obtaining the desired good. The existence of the
alternative market eliminates the need to rely on the participation of others to
obtain the desired level of service, so that the expected value of investing in
costly exit may be higher than the expected value of investing in voice."4
If we want to induce those capable of exiting to remain within or to join a
coalition for changing the background level, we may pursue either (or a com-
bination) of two strategies. First, we could raise the costs of exit, up to the
point of prohibition. Assume, for instance, that we believe that public transpor-
tation is inadequate, but that those who can afford cars will not lobby for
better mass transit (even though better mass transit might reduce congestion on
the roads), and without their participation we would not expect efforts for
better public transportation to be successful. If private cars were banned in the
central city, however, we would anticipate that former drivers would join the
lobbying effort for better public transportation.
We rarely explicitly employ this strategy of prohibiting opting out. Even
where we mandate participation in a collective enterprise, the obligation typi-
cally requires a minimum contribution, but does not preclude additional
54. The increased certainty that exit provides for achieving a desired good is discussed in
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 53, at 37-39; see also Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The
Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 137
(1996).
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contributions, even though supplements return more personal than collective
benefit. I may augment my Social Security payments with contributions to
retirement plans, I may volunteer for more military service than is required, or
I may purchase more automobile insurance than the statutory requirement.
Opting out, however, can be deterred without being prohibited. When
trying to decide which level of government should provide a good or service,
it is commonplace to note that centralized provision makes it more difficult to
avoid making contributions by physical exit. Thus, redistributive services are
perhaps best provided by more centralized governments, so that those from
whom wealth is redistributed cannot readily emigrate to less redistributive
jurisdictions." This sentiment, for instance, may underlie much of the recent
school finance litigation that seeks state funding rather than local funding for
education. One may imagine an analogue in raising the costs to opting out
privately. If we believe that there is independent value in avoiding opting out,
then it may be possible to restructure the provision of services in a manner
that takes that value into account. Centralizing the provision of services, for
instance, could conceivably raise barriers to entry for privatized suppliers who
were unable to compete on a centralized scale, although they might easily
offer decentralized competition in smaller jurisdictions. Alternatively, central-
ized jurisdictions might regulate private entities or permit local jurisdictions to
do so in a manner that provided governmental monopolies free from antitrust
liability.56 The creation of such a monopoly would have the desired effect of
making it more difficult for dissatisfied constituents to select a provider who
offers a preferred level of service. Continuing the vocabulary from an earlier
part of this article, we can look at the increased exit costs as an effective
means of transforming the background service level from a default rule into an
immutable rule. But lest we conclude that immutable rules are an unequivocal
benefit, recall these same constraints will necessarily impose the costs of
noncompetitiveness and inability of some residents to attain their preferences.
Alternatively, we could lower the costs of remaining within the coalition
by offering informal "bribes" to those most likely to opt out. As a doctrinal
matter, the equal service provision doctrine makes explicit bribes difficult. But
implicit bribes may exist in the form of establishing priorities for serving
individuals who have substantial influence over governmentally provided
goods and services consistent with the interests of those who might otherwise
exit. This influence may exist either with respect to political officials or with
respect to like-minded residents who would not want to lose the support of
those who might otherwise opt out. In either case, those with the capacity to
opt out will be able to exercise disproportionate influence even though they
55. See, e.g., Helen F. Ladd & Fred C. Doolittle, Which Level of Government Should Assist
the Poor?, 35 NAT'L TAX J. 323 (1982).
56. On the scope of municipal antitrust immunity, see City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985);
Einer R. Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667, 672-76 (1991); Glen
0. Robinson, The Sherman Act as a Home Rule Charter: Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, 2 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 131 (1983).
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have little capacity to organize or to generate collective political action. 7 Of-
ficials have incentives to provide desired services to these individuals in order
to avoid their exit, a result that would reduce the tax base and require either
additional taxation or reduction of services, either of which would continue the
spiral of exit by shifting additional mobile residents to the margin between
living within that jurisdiction and their next preferred residence.58
Our reaction to opting out, therefore, may depend on whether we think
that public officials tend to be influenced more by the preferences of the elec-
toral majority or by those of a rent-paying minority. Perhaps perversely, the
more we think that public officials respond to the interests of their constitu-
ents, the more confident we should be in allowing those with other preferences
to opt for private provision. Where public officials are attentive to the interests
of their constituents, there is less need for retaining political coalitions that
might contest the status quo. Hence, in those situations, the costs of opting out
are less likely to outweigh the competitive benefits and the increased utility of
satisfying individual preferences. But the discussion to this point also suggests
that certain characteristics of the public provider may affect the propriety of
opting out. Political costs will tend to be less in small jurisdictions, if those
jurisdictions contain constituents with relatively homogeneous tastes for public
goods and services, that is, if the Tiebout assumptions work fairly well. In
such a case, the range of constituent preferences is likely to be smaller, as is
the possibility that the level of service provided deviates substantially from the
level widely preferred. If that is the case, then it is likely that those individuals
who do opt out have preferences that deviate only marginally from the back-
ground level, and the political costs related to opting out should therefore be
small. If, however, the small jurisdiction is not composed of residents with
homogeneous preferences, the inference from opting out is more complicated.
It may reveal the traditional Madisonian concern about factions dominating in
small areas. Alternatively, substantial opting out may reveal that residents are
in agreement that the government should provide a level of service that re-
flects the lowest common denominator preferred by all residents, while addi-
tional increments are purchased privately.
Homogeneity, moreover, does not unambiguously support liberal opting
out. Public goods that have significant distributional effects may require more
stringent measures to keep coalitions together, and allowing individuals to
satisfy more tailored and homogeneous preferences may interfere with the
ability to provide public goods to others. In these situations, the political costs
of allowing opting out may be significant, notwithstanding that constraints on
exit eliminate the benefits of competition. In the next Section, therefore, I
concentrate on the characteristics of specific goods and services to determine
the factors that favor and disfavor opting out of the background level of ser-
vice.
57. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 48, at 77.
58. See David F. Bradford & Harry H. Kelejian, An Econometric Model of the Flight to the
Suburbs, 81 J. POL. ECON. 566 (1973).
1996l 1205
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
III. OPTING OUT AND EXTERNAL EFFECTS
A. The Imposition of Substantive Costs
To this point, I have been alluding to the possibility that opting out could
impose costs on those who continue to accept the background level of a ser-
vice. I have suggested that these costs frequently take a political form in that
opting out alters the mix of opinions that are heard by political officials who
make decisions about the level of service to provide to constituents. In this
Section, I identify different types of costs and the conditions under which they
would arise. The result is to afford a more complex, but more thorough means
of determining whether allowing or discouraging opting out is a socially desir-
able strategy in a particular situation.
There are two senses in which the decision by some members of the com-
munity to opt out of the background level of service provision may adversely
affect others in the collective. First, the level of service selected by those who
opt out may impose explicit and direct costs on those who remain and whose
interests are not considered in the decision to opt out. Think, for instance, of a
university that uses its own disciplinary system for sanctioning students rather
than turning students who violate public laws over to local authorities for
prosecution.59 The punishment meted out by college officials in such circum-
stances is typically less than we would expect from public prosecution of the
same offense. Indeed, given that college officials will not have the power of
the state to deprive defendants of liberty or substantial property, it is axiomatic
that private punishment will result in less severe sanctions.' The reasons for
the decision to use in-house sanctions exclusively may be relatively benign.
College officials may believe that publicity of the punishment within the col-
lege community means that the official sanction will be augmented by com-
munal shaming that has a more serious effect on the malefactor than prosecu-
tion within the larger society.6 Or officials may be motivated by more
malign motives, such as the desire to avoid adverse publicity for the institution
(e.g., as a place where crimes occur or where there is rampant drug or alcohol
use) or to protect members of an athletic team.62 Regardless of motive, how-
ever, the private decision to prosecute within the small community threatens to
disserve the interests of the larger society. For instance, to the extent that the
violator engages in recidivism that would have been forestalled by public pros-
ecution and incarceration, and to the extent that recidivism takes place outside
the college community, the private system may punish insufficiently. These
effects are essentially the same as would occur in any system of private
59. See Nina Bernstein, With Colleges Holding Court, Discretion Vies with Fairness, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 1996, at A].
60. Of course, the college could both impose internal sanctions and turn the offender over
for public prosecution. Public prosecution may be favored by alleged offenders insofar as it enti-
tles them to procedural protections that may be unavailable privately.
61. On the efficacy of shaming as a punitive measure, see Daniel Kahan, What Do Alterna-
tive Sanctions Mean?, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 563 (1996). It appears to be the case, however, that
frequently those who bring the offense to light are the ones who suffer communal shame. See
Bernstein, supra note 59.
62. See, e.g., Michael Farber, Coach and Jury, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 25, 1995, at 31.
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justice, since such systems leave punishment decisions in the hands of those
who typically have personal motivations that lead them to impose too little or
too much punishment compared to the social ideal.63 Similarly, a privatized
security force hired by a business improvement district may deter crime in that
district, but possibly only by shifting the location of misbehavior and thus in-
creasing crime elsewhere.
The second sense in which opting out may impose costs on others, the
imposition of political costs with which I am primarily concerned, is different
in nature from these more substantive externalities. The political costs affect
the procedures by which officials set the background level of a particular ser-
vice. Thus, the ultimate decision in these cases continues to be made by rep-
resentatives of constituents. The issue is whether opting out by some residents
alters the decision made by those representatives.
B. Opting Out of Political Participation
There are several ways in which those who opt out may change the roles
they play in public debate about the background level of service. I alluded
above to the possibility that those who serve as superior monitors of official
misbehavior might be less interested in fulfilling that function once they pri-
vately contract out of the background level of service. But the more serious
claim is that those who opt out will not simply be passive about the service
level for those who remain, but will react with animosity or selfishness to
restrict the background level of service. The suspicion is that if those who
seek a higher level of service must pay for it, they will fail to support the
background level of which they do not take advantage.
It is worthwhile to consider these claims separately, as they raise signifi-
cantly different issues. The first claim is addressed to the willingness of those
who opt out to exclude themselves from the affairs of the larger community.
The claim is reminiscent of deTocqueville's assertion that democracies foster
individualism, defined as "a calm and considered feeling which disposes each
citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the
circle of family and friends; with this little society formed to his taste, he
gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself." Thus, detractors of
residential associations claim that individuals who live within private groups
are likely to suffer a diminished sense of civic responsibility.65 But the claim
63. This is not to say that social mechanisms of justice consistently impose punishments that
correspond to the social ideal. The incentives of litigants and their attorneys often cause what from
a social perspective appears to be underinvestment or overinvestment in litigation. But failure to
implement perfectly a system designed to reflect all social interests is different in kind from pri-
vate enforcement mechanisms that are not designed in the first instance to reflect the interests of
all those affected by criminal activity.
64. ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 506 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969).
65. See, e.g., MCKENZIE, supra note 27, at 141; Kennedy, supra note 27, at 777. But see
ROBERT J. DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS IN
AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 134-35 (1992) (concluding that "the evidence concerning [residential
associations'] impact on political participation is mixed," and that in some cases membership in
such an association increases participation in local politics).
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is somewhat ambiguous in its reach, and it has very different merit depending
on how one interprets it.
The most general form of this claim implies that those who opt for privat-
ized versions of public functions will withdraw from the public sphere gener-
ally. This form of the claim is the most problematic. Individuals who opt out
of background levels of service of residential street paving or safety protection
remain members of the larger polity for multiple other functions, including
schools, foreign policy, and federal income tax levels. That those who live in
gated communities thereby are less affected by and become less interested in
crime rates in other parts of the locality (and if they work, shop, or socialize
in those areas, even that assumption may be unjustified) does not entail that
they ignore civic concerns over zoning, state and federal legislative elections,
or ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Indeed, the fact that members of residential
associations share a community of interest suggests that they may become
more involved in civic affairs, because their common interests facilitate solu-
tions to collective action problems that would otherwise make efforts at civic
action improvident.
There are, however, narrower forms of the claim that may be more telling.
Detractors may be objecting that those who opt out are likely to form coali-
tions only to foster the narrow interests of the association's members rather
than for the common good. One would, in fact, be concerned that once mem-
bers of a privatized business improvement district had "taxed" themselves to
repair sidewalks and promote their stores (thus creating an advantage over
competitors) they would lobby against proposed tax expenditures by the locali-
ty to provide similar services to other commercial areas in the jurisdiction.
Similarly, those who send their children to private school may oppose addi-
tional public school funding. Any such objection is very different from the
claim that those who opt out will fail to exercise civic responsibility at all.
Opting out, however, does not necessarily generate conflict between those
who opt out and those who select the background level of service, nor does it
necessarily reflect conflict of an undesirable sort. Take first the latter point,
the possibility that any conflict may actually be desirable. Certainly, if the
choice of background rules is itself governed by dominant interests rather than
by majoritarian concerns, those who choose to opt out cannot readily be de-
scribed as excluding themselves from the community, since the background
level of services does not reflect the choice of the community in the first
place. Indeed, if we believe that public debate is already informed by en-
trenched interests, then the addition of another cohesive group may actually
generate more publicly interested decisionmaking. Assume, for instance, that
commercial developers are attempting to displace current zoning regulations to
permit more commercial development and face little opposition from residents
because of traditional obstacles to collective action. The increased capacity of
"privatized" residents to use their neighborhood association as a competing
interest group may actually increase the chances that anti-development voices
will be heard in the process. Thus, the political implications of opting out may
turn out to be political benefits rather than costs.
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Moreover, whether those who opt out will oppose public expenditures on
similar services depends on the relationship between the privately supplied
level of service and the publicly supplied background level. In some cases,
those who opt out of the background level of service purchase an additional
increment of service from a private provider; in other cases, opting out entails
complete displacement of the government provider. For instance, the members
of a business improvement district who contribute to a fund for private securi-
ty guards should still be willing to support a high level of police service, be-
cause they receive benefits from both public and private sources. Since these
merchants must pay all the direct costs of the incremental service, they would
presumably prefer that the basic service, supported by tax dollars, be optimal
in order to reduce their additional cost. (Although, a district comprising stores
that could afford private protection more readily than their competitors might
oppose public financing in order to give themselves a competitive advantage
by offering a safe shopping area.) I may believe that police services are ade-
quate to provide my business with sufficient protection during daytime hours,
so that I only have to hire private guards during evening hours; but I might
object to reduction in police budgets because that would cause me to hire
private guards during daytime hours as well. Similarly, those who send their
children to public schools but who hire tutors to augment their children's edu-
cation might become more concerned about the level of public education,
since they would prefer to save the tutoring costs and not want to incur the
still higher costs of private school. The fact that individuals seek higher levels
of service in these cases, therefore, does not suggest that they will attempt to
undermine or abandon political coalitions that seek to deliver socially optimal
levels of the desired service.
In other situations, however, the higher level of service cannot be pur-
chased in increments above the basic level. Opting out in these cases sub-
sumes provision of the background level as well as the desired increment.
Those who send their children to private schools in search of a more religious
education than the locality provides, for instance, may be less willing to sup-
port public schools because their children receive all their formal education,
not just a marginal amount, from private schools. In this situation those who
opt out may not simply fail to support the level of the background service that
is preferred by those who do not opt out, but may actively encourage govern-
ments to underinvest in impure public goods for which there are reasonable
club or private substitutes. This is the situation represented by the merchants
who opt out by repairing their own sidewalks and then lobby to reduce their
tax outlay for the background level of service that they do not utilize, and that
may actually compete with their privatized benefits.
Indeed, legal doctrine may exacerbate the problem by giving those with
the capacity to opt for higher levels of service incentives to constrain
governmentally provided services at artificially low levels. Given obligations
of equal service provision, providing amenities to the wealthy requires officials
to provide those same amenities to all within the jurisdiction. It is unlikely that
increased police protection, parks, or school budgets could be offered only to
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those willing and able to pay for them.' Once offered throughout the juris-
diction, however, these same amenities are likely to attract more poor house-
holds.67 Any such shift in population will, in turn, increase the costs of sup-
plying both the new services and other welfare services that require
redistributive taxation from the relatively wealthy, again triggering the spiral
of exit by the relatively wealthy, who are most capable of exercising that op-
tion. Those who are capable of contracting for club goods may attempt to
avoid this spiral, without formal violation of the equal service doctrine, by
lobbying for relatively low levels of public service, augmented by privately
provided services for those who can contract for them.
Even in these cases, however, there exist countervailing incentives that
might deter both officials and those who could opt out from artificially limit-
ing the scope of public services. From the perspective of officials, reducing
local expenditures is inconsistent with explanations of bureaucratic behavior
that contend budget-maximizing bureaucrats spend larger sums of money than
an informed majority would prefer;' publicly interested officials might want
to avoid disparities in the provision of services; officials may have particular
programmatic concerns that require service delivery that is inconsistent with
the preferences of those who opt out (e.g., officials who want to support work-
ing mothers may sponsor municipal day-care centers notwithstanding that
constituents capable of opting for private services are unlikely to use them);
officials concerned about personal advancement may be attentive to accusa-
tions that they provided low levels of service in their current office; and offi-
cials faced with the possibility of competition from private providers might
prefer to raise the level of service to all in order to disguise inefficiencies that
would be apparent in a competitive environment.
Similarly, residents who are able to opt out might prefer to pay for bene-
fits that they do not enjoy, either out of altruism or to avoid reductions in
property values, which are likely to reflect the quality of services. This latter
phenomenon is plausible where even the wealthy have limited mobility, such
as where the relevant jurisdiction is large or where wealth is tied to the partic-
ular jurisdiction (through jobs or proximity to kinship groups). In this situa-
tion, even if conditions otherwise favor imposing political costs, e.g., even
where the higher level of service subsumes the background level, those who
opt out have incentives to be concerned with the service available to others.
Those who send their children to private schools (or who do not have
66. With respect to some services, however, it appears that localities may offer differential
services, depending on residents' willingness to pay, even if that willingness reflects ability to pay
or creates other divisions, such as racial ones. For instance, in Hadnott v. City of Prattville, 309 F.
Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970), a locality was deemed not to have violated any constitutional equal
protection obligation when it failed to pave streets unless abutters agreed to pay for the im-
provement through special assessments. The result of the local policy was that 3% percent of the
city's white residents lived along unpaved streets, compared to approximately 35% of the black
residents.
67. See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equity,
92 HARV. L. REv. 1662, 1723 (1979).
68. See WILLIAM A. NisKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIvE GOVERNMENT
(1971).
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children), for instance, may support public schools because the value of the
public education system is capitalized into the value of their homes.69 These
homeowners cannot be certain that their purchasers will share their preferenc-
es; hence, if they believe that educational quality is an important factor in
housing prices, they have reason to support educational expenditures of which
they do not take direct advantage.
Political costs may be exacerbated where opting out adversely affects the
feasibility of providing the background level preferred by those who remain.
Under these circumstances, those who opt out are not merely exercising dis-
proportionate political influence in opposing public provision of public goods.
Instead, the very act of opting out may render public provision of the good in-
feasible, because opting out eliminates certain economies that make collective
provision attractive. Municipal facilities frequently have elements of
"publicness" because they require substantial capital outlays. But these same
characteristics frequently mean that the goods are in the nature of step goods
that cannot be provided in small increments but only in large, expensive doses
(half a bridge is as useless as no bridge). Opting out may create a situation
where public provision is abandoned because there remain an insufficient
number of people to make investment in the next step worthwhile, notwith-
standing that provision would have been appropriate if all residents participat-
ed. For instance, charges for the service may be based on costs to those who
actually use it, and if departure by some residents does not reduce the fixed
costs made by the jurisdiction (e.g., one garbage truck must be purchased for a
city of 1000 households whether all residents have governmental garbage
collection or only one does), then those who opt out may increase per capita
costs to those who accept the background level.
It is equally plausible, however, that opting out could reduce costs for
those who remain. This result would occur when the publicly provided good is
subject to congestion, but congestion (which would require provision of addi-
tional increments of the good) is avoided because some residents select private
providers of substitute goods. Assume, for instance, that no families within a
locality sent their children to private schools. It might be necessary to con-
struct and staff additional public schools in order to avoid overcrowding. If the
capital expense incurred to meet congestion increases the pro rata cost to each
resident, then the fact that opting out eliminates the need for the new facility
can return a benefit to those who use public facilities.
The indefinite consequences of opting out on the costs for those who
remain can be illustrated by the following example. Assume that a municipal
swimming pool can comfortably accommodate 100 persons, that the swimming
pool costs $1000 to construct and operate, and that it makes no sense to con-
struct a second smaller swimming pool if there are fewer than 100 potential
users per pool, perhaps because future population growth is expected to mate-
rialize within the useful life of the pool. If there are 150 swimmers in the
community, two swimming pools will be necessary, with the cost to be shared
69. See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on
Property Values: A Reply and Yet Further Results, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1004 (1973).
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by 150 swimmers. Thus, each swimmer will have to pay $2000/150, or $13.33
towards the pools. Now, assume that we again have 150 swimmers within the
jurisdiction, but 50 swimmers join a private pool club (they may, for instance,
be willing to pay for less crowding, longer hours of operation, status, etc.).
There is now no current need for the second pool, so that each of the remain-
ing "municipal" swimmers needs only pay only $1000/100, or $10 toward the
pool.
Unfortunately, this argument may also work in the opposite direction.
Assume that the residents value the pool at $15 as long as no more than 100
people use it, but at no more than $9 if between 100 and 150 use it. Now
assume that if all 150 swimmers use the municipal pool, the municipality will
construct a second pool, so that each swimmer pays $13.33. If only 110 swim-
mers use the pool, the municipality may find it more appropriate to tolerate
congestion than to construct a new pool. (Under these conditions, the 110
swimmers would have to pay $18.18 for two pools, in excess of what they
would be willing to pay.) If 40 swimmers opt for the private pool, the 110
remaining swimmers would have to pay $9.09, an amount in excess of what
they would be willing to pay for the congested pool. Hence, some swimmers
will be unable to use the pool at a price they are willing to pay, even though
they would have been willing to pay for a less congested pool.7"
Ex ante, there is no reason to believe that opting out is more likely to
reduce the capital expenditure to a manageable amount (the first case) than it
is to frustrate the ability to make the service available at a price that would be
affordable if all participated (the second case). None of this is to say that re-
strictions on mandatory participation would not reduce the utility to those who
would like to opt out but could not. It is only to say that the marginal effect of
opting out is difficult to calculate ex ante.
But let us take as given that those who opt out and thereby do not take
advantage of the background level of service subsequently fail to support that
level. Does it follow either that the background level will be inefficient (in
that those who would have been subsidized by the payments made by those
who opt out gain more than the defectors lose) or that any inefficiency favors
redistributional goals? One can tell a more complicated story about the cross
subsidies inherent in the decision to opt out without any offset for the pay-
ments made in respect of the foregone service." If the background level of
service is financed through compulsory taxation that those who opt out cannot
escape (such as residents who pay taxes to support public schools even while
sending their children to private schools), then wealth is being redistributed.
70. For another example, assume that there are three members of a society, all of whom
desire garbage to be collected. Two of the members would value weekly garbage collection if they
did not have to pay more than $4 per week for it. The third member would be willing to spend at
least $4 for weekly garbage collection, but also values twice-a-week garbage collection and is
willing to pay $12 per week for it. Weekly garbage collection costs $9, and twice-a-week garbage
collection costs $12. If permitted, the third member will contract for twice-a-week garbage collec-
tion. The result is that the first two members will not get weekly garbage collection at all, since
they will be unable to obtain it at a cost that they are willing to spend on it.
71. See Gillette, supra note 20, at 1393.
1212 [Vol. 73:4
OPTING OUT OF PUBLIC PROVISION
Assume, for instance, that property tax payments are used to pay for snow
plowing of all city streets. Individuals may live on private streets in part be-
cause they can contract with private snow plowers for speedier service than
the locality is able to provide to residential neighborhoods. Taxes paid by
those individuals, however, are used to plow public streets. Once the owners
of the privatized streets emerge from their enclave and drive on the plowed
public streets, they are obtaining the benefit of their tax payments. Neverthe-
less, the locality would have had to plow their residential streets out of tax
payments had the residents of the privatized area not done so themselves.
Hence, the fact that the locality did not have to plow those streets means that
(1) the total local outlay for snow plowing was less than it otherwise would
have been, a cost-reduction from which all local residents (not just the abutters
of the private streets) benefit; and (2) the residents of private streets are pay-
ing a greater share of the snow plowing budget than similarly situated resi-
dents of public streets. 72 This redistribution, however, does not necessarily
transfer wealth from wealthy to poor or from those who receive less utility
from a service to those who receive more. Again, local homogeneity suggests
that redistribution within the locality occurs within relatively narrow parame-
ters of wealth.
It is, of course, possible to avoid "double payments," either by rebating
tax payments to those who opt out," or by allowing opting out with respect
to services subsidized only by user fees (which those who opt out would not
pay, since they would not be using the public facility). But in the absence of
such adjustments, double payments complicate the issue of whether opting out
redistributes wealth regressively.
C. Opting Out and Community
Although I have been attempting to distinguish between substantive
externalities and the procedural political costs generated by opting out, there is
one series of effects of the former that is worth additional attention. These
effects are perhaps best captured by the term "community" which some have
suggested is undermined by allowing individuals to opt out. Presumably the
concern is that individuals within a constituency obtain additional value out of
sharing the same public goods, and that value is diluted by allowing some
members of the community to reject or supplement communally provided
goods. For example, some of the literature on educational quality suggests that
the best predictor of educational quality is not financial inputs or class size,
but other variables, such as the quality of one's peers.74 If we believe that
those who are most likely to leave low-quality public schools for higher
72. See, e.g., DILGER, supra note 65, at 102.
73. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:67-23.2 to -23.8 (West 1992).
74. The early entry into this debate was the Coleman Report in 1966. See JAMES S.
COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966). The debate about the rela-
tionship between financial inputs and educational outputs has raged since. For a collection of the
sources and their conclusions, see Michael Heise, State Constitutional Litigation, Educational
Finance, and Legal Impact: An Empirical Analysis, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1735, 1747-49 (1995).
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quality private ones are individuals who would have been "better" peers of
those who remain, then opting out imposes real, but less measurable, costs.
Since, however, we do not expect all those who might contribute to educa-
tional equality to do so, i.e., we do not expect individuals to migrate to areas
where they might provide the greatest advantage to other students, there ap-
pears to be some special claim about the obligation of those who live within a
community to other residents of the same jurisdiction. Thus, many of the
concerns about opting out ultimately depend on the independent value of
maintaining equality within a defined community.
The value of community is rooted in a belief that differential service
breeds dissent and inequality, each of which may tear at the soul of the com-
munity that service provision fosters. The problem is exacerbated to the extent
that one obtains a differential level of service through arrangements with pri-
vate providers. Circumventing public provision arguably violates what it
means to be a member of the community, since the community is defined by
the services it provides to all. If we return to the rough categorization of
sources of provision with which I began, those who appeal to community seek
to identify the community more closely with kinship groups and to distance
the community from market and governmental transactions.
To the extent that one embraces the value of community, the delicate
balance of political costs and competitive benefits, or appeals to individual
preferences, are essentially irrelevant. The political costs inherent in opting out
are necessarily so great (political cohesion being the basis of the community)
that marginal gains in efficiency from competition are inevitably trumped. In
addition, satisfaction of individual preferences is presumably of less concern,
since the maintenance of community necessarily requires compromise of indi-
vidual desires. I cannot claim that this value is (or should be) unknown in
local government law. To the contrary, the desire to maintain a strong sense of
community can be used to explain a significant amount of local government
law." One may, for instance, think of this concern as underlying the doctrine
of equal service provision. 6
Nevertheless, the equal-service doctrine, and preferences for community
as embodied in current law generally, provide only limited support for the
proposition that intrajurisdictional variations in service cannot be tolerated.
With respect to many public goods, the mandate that service be provided
"equally" does not translate into equality of result, but only to formal equality
of opportunity. For instance, the doctrine applies to services that are financed
through user fees, but in that context the doctrine only requires that individuals
have an equal right to obtain the service on payment of the required fee. Since
some individuals will have a preference for more of the fee-based service than
others (those with gardens and swimming pools will use more publicly
75. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) (reasoning that desire to maintain stable
population and hence advance concept of community justifies property tax based on value of
home at time of acquisition rather than current market value).
76. See ROBERT L. LINEBERRY, EQUALITY AND URBAN POLICY 43-45 (1977); see also supra
text accompanying notes 42-43.
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supplied water than those without), the result will be different per capita usag-
es of the same service, albeit the payments made by each individual will re-
flect the amount of use. As long as opting out entails making payments for the
additional levels of service, and as long as all share the opportunity to opt out,
exercise of that option does not violate the equal service requirement even as
understood in communitarian accounts of local government. Hence, no greater
concern arises when inequality stems from privately provided services. Never-
theless, one might claim that governments, by selecting when to utilize user
fees, thereby choose appropriate levels of intrajurisdictional inequality. Private
decisions to opt out may transcend acceptable boundaries of inequality.
Constraints on opting out to foster community, however, are subject to a
broader attack. First, for those who advocate development of community, the
fact that club goods require the creation of voluntary associations could be
cause for support. That individuals share preferences for particular goods or
services does not require homogeneity in other aspects of their lives. Individu-
als who desire more religion in their lives and who thus opt out of public
schools for parochial education may find themselves in a subcommunity with
whom, but for this preference, they would share little social or political inter-
action. If I live in a neighborhood that is socially and economically homoge-
neous, but send my children to a church school that attracts children from
other neighborhoods, I may create a more complex series of relationships
(some in my geographic neighborhood and some in my religious community)
than would be the case if I sent my children to the public neighborhood
school. Clubs, therefore, may engender a level of interaction among communi-
ties not otherwise readily available.
Even without the formation of stronger intrajurisdictional bonds, however,
the appeal to community is not necessarily undermined by opting out, espe-
cially when the alternatives are considered. Opting out of the background level
of service offers a private contractual analogue to a more traditional
Tieboutian acquisition of the desired level of service through physical exit.
Thus, one who is generally satisfied with the package of services in the com-
munity, but dissatisfied with the level of a particular service, may pursue any
one of three strategies. She may remain in the community and accept a sub-
optimal level of service, or she may opt out with respect to the unsatisfactory
service, or she may exit the jurisdiction. Which option the individual chooses
depends on the private costs of each option. Physical exit may be relatively
costly, so that it is selected only when the service at issue is of substantial
importance. But if the individual is an outlier with respect to that service, then
both she and the community (of which she would thereby remain a part) might
be better off if she can opt out of that service alone. Assume, for instance, that
an individual shares the communal interest in most services, but has an idio-
syncratic preference for education. If the individual's concern about education
is sufficiently great that exit would be worthwhile, it is unclear that anyone is
better off when she exits the jurisdiction rather than contracts privately for
better education.
Perhaps out of awareness of the greater costs of physical exit, the legal
regime does not identify community with conformity, even where it encourag-
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es the former. Recall the situations that I noted above in which mandatory
participation is required, such as in areas of Social Security or automobile
insurance. It is plausible to think of these situations not simply as solutions to
common pool problems, but also as efforts to foster a sense of community by
requiring subsidies and avoiding catastrophic losses to any resident of the
jurisdiction. In all these cases, prohibitions on augmenting the basic require-
ment are possible. The consequence in each case, however, would be addition-
al dissatisfaction among those forced to participate at a personally undesirable
level. What we might infer from the combination of obligatory participation
with the possibility of opting for additional service, therefore, is that the
communitarian sentiment seeks to ensure a basic level for all constituents, but
does not, at least within a wide range, support a prohibition on opting out.
IV. CAN YOU OPT FOR LEss?
To this point, the examples I have used assumed that those who opt out
prefer a higher level of service than government otherwise provides. Presum-
ably, one would opt for less of a governmentally provided service only if
doing so generated some alternative good or service that was more valuable to
the individual than what had been surrendered. The fact that one is attaining a
net gain means that the definitional issue of what constitutes less, rather than
more, services is difficult to resolve. In addition, the concept of "service" is
sufficiently malleable to render the inquiry into "less" more sophistic than
sophisticated. When a residential subdivision prohibits leafletting, is it provid-
ing more services, in the form of regimentation and conformity not available
outside the gated walls, or less services, insofar as residents are denied restric-
tions on regulatory interference that would apply where governments are the
relevant actors? The definitional conundrum is not what interests me here;
rather I want, under the (perhaps unfortunate) rubric of "opting for less" than
a background level of service, to inquire into the propriety of private regula-
tions that cannot easily be administered by governmental bodies and that are
imposed with respect to services typically associated with government.
With respect to some services, opting for less simply means that persons
entitled to take advantage of services fail to do so, e.g., a failure to call the
police when a crime has been committed or to use as much electricity as the
municipal utility will provide. These forms of opting for less are trivial and
are not my concern here. But there is another sense in which opting for less
has significant import. One type of good or service the government provides is
a series of protections against the government itself, that is, an embodiment of
negative freedom. These protections typically take the form of rights that indi-
viduals have against governmental interference. But there may be occasions in
which individuals would like to make pre-commitments enforceable by gov-
ernment, or in which individuals prefer to have government act
paternalistically. Assume, for instance, that relatively poor individuals have
limited options about where to reside. They value the safety of wealthy sub-
urbs, but (private markets for housing being what they are) cannot afford
them. They may attempt to "privatize" security by purchasing strong locks,
carrying weapons in self-defense, or joining in collective security arrangements
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that range from watching each other's homes to private policing (e.g., the
"Guardian Angels"). But another alternative is to join an association of (con-
tract with) like-minded individuals to agree to a regimentation that is inconsis-
tent with our traditional concerns about protections from government. For
instance, residents within an apartment complex may be willing to require
identification cards for entrance or to abandon their rights to be free of search-
es and authorize random searches of the apartment for guns and drugs.
7
Would we think that this kind of "opting out" is appropriate?
Alternatively, think of Professor Katherine Van Wezel Stone's concerns
about private procedures that displace judicial adjudication with arbitration that
allegedly reduces workers' rights."8 The move to private arbitration of labor
disputes or disputes in other contexts typically entails fewer procedural safe-
guards than in full-fledged judicial proceedings. Presumably, those who agree
to arbitrate believe that what they gain in speed of dispute resolution, cost
savings, and avoidance of abusive discovery procedures outweighs what they
surrender in terms of traditional safeguards in governmentally administered
proceedings. Thus, opting out of background rights by selecting private dispute
resolution allows parties to attain their preferences.
The possibility of opting out of substantive or procedural "rights,"
however, may cause the same concerns as opting out for more services than
the background level provided by government. At least in some cases, we
create rights not out of paternalism or to codify a bargain that we think most
parties would prefer if left to their own devices. Instead, a right may be recog-
nized to reduce the costs that serve as obstacles to the creation of public
goods. Free speech, for instance, may be defended less as a benefit for the
speaker than as an inducement to generate the public good of information for
listeners. Where rights are rooted in public goods, failure to exercise a right
generates costs for others. An individual who agrees to waive the right to
speak freely may be acting autonomously, and thus in service of some objec-
tives of the First Amendment. But that same individual thereby deprives others
of information in abrogation of alternative objectives of that same concept.
Indeed, the desire to avoid disincentives against providing the public good of
information appears to lie behind doctrines such as "chilling effects" and toler-
ance for untruths that cannot easily withstand scrutiny on alternative justifica-
tions for free speech.
Perhaps this objection provides better support for Professor Stone's con-
cerns. One may be relatively untroubled by the reduction of workers' statutory
77. Cf Amitai Etzioni, Balancing Act; Don't Sacrifice the Common Good to Personal
"'Rights", Cin. TRIB., May 16, 1994, at 11. For a determination that warrantless searches for
weapons in an apartment complex operated by a public housing authority is presumptively uncon-
stitutional, see Pratt v. Chicago Housing Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 795-96 (N.D. Ill. 1994). More
than 5,000 residents of projects operated by the authority signed a petition in favor of warrantless
searches. See Pratt v. Chicago Housing Auth., 155 F.R.D. 177, 178 (N.D. Il1. 1994). For an argu-
ment that even governmental action is not unconstitutional in this context, see Steven Yarosh,
Comment, Operation Clean Sweep: Is the Chicago Housing Authority "Sweeping" Away the
Fourth Amendment?, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1103 (1992).
78. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:
The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).
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rights either if one believed that they resulted from competition in a working
political market between labor and management or that the ostensibly "defeat-
ed" had accepted arbitration as a trade-off for avoiding the costs inherent in
adjudication. But reduction of those rights is less acceptable if the failure to
exercise those rights deprives others, not parties to the bargain, of the benefits
that those rights were created to generate. Arbitration, for instance, eliminates
the public goods that adjudication confers on non-parties in the form of prece-
dents that provide notice of acceptable conduct and that ensure the similar
treatment of similar cases.79
Other instances of opting for less similarly threaten external benefits.
Think, for instance, of failures to assert rightful claims against sellers of defec-
tive products who are supposed to invest optimally in safety as a result of the
incentives of a negligence system, but who go underdeterred where potential
cases are unlitigated. The point here is not that these cases systematically
cause benefits to be forgone. There are, after all, offsetting correctives, such as
high jury awards in cases that are litigated and that thus help compensate for
the unlitigated cases. And in some cases, rights are intended to create highly
privatized benefits that may generate public goods when surrendered; for in-
stance, shopping mall owners may have the right to exclude solicitors and
leafletters, but may increase the availability of information when they choose
not to exercise that right."0 My point instead is that the category of cases in
which individuals opt for less is both far-ranging and susceptible to the same
analysis as more traditional cases of opting out insofar as each one ultimately
depends on the consequences of the act for those who could not participate in
the bargain.
Nevertheless, the balance of political costs and competitive benefits may
be more readily resolvable in cases of opting for less. It is unlikely that a
critical mass of those protected by a right will abandon it, so that the public
goods generated by rights are less likely to be foregone. Exercising fewer
rights than one possesses, therefore, poses less of a risk of a downward spiral
leading to a deterioration of the right itself. Thus, the signaling function of
exit might work here with less threat that the political advantages of collective
provision will be reduced.
V. CONCLUSION
Reactions to opting out tend to be somewhat visceral and to be derivative
of other values. Whether one believes that such mundane, but visible acts such
as living in a residential association, sending one's children to private school,
or forming a business improvement district are elitist or part of democratic
choice, frequently appears to reflect one's views of redistribution, community,
and the acceptable level of externalities imposed by individual conduct. I have
tried to show that there is more that we can say about this issue, and that the
79. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235 (1978); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
2619, 2622-23 (1995).
80. See WITOLD RYBCZYNSKI, CITY LiFE 209 (1995).
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complexities allow us to think in more precise terms about the propriety of
opting out of public provision in any particular context. Opting out always
signals some level of dissatisfaction with the status quo and may signal the
presence of a competitive alternative that may correct faulty political deci-
sions. Whether we should invite such signals depends on whether the process
of amplification improves on more opaque alternatives or generates intolerable
costs to political life. But even focusing on these factors fails to reveal the full
complexity of opting out. Our willingness to risk efficient provision, efficient
politics, or community, varies from service to service. Thus, some multi-
dimensional matrix would be necessary to weigh properly all the variables that
inform the propriety of opting out in a given context. My objective at the
moment is simply to overcome the view that our reactions are readily reduc-
ible to a single-minded embrace of the public or the private.

OPTING OUT OF PUBLIC PROVISION:
CONSTRAINTS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
ELAINE A. WELLE°
In his thought-provoking article, Professor Clayton Gillette draws an anal-
ogy between contractual default theory and opting out of public provision.'
This creative approach provides an interesting framework within which to
study the propriety of opting out of government services. Given the current
trend toward private governance and the controversial nature of this topic,
Gillette's article should prove to be only the beginning of an important dia-
logue on the propriety of opting out of public provision.
With his characteristic completeness, Gillette astutely anticipates a myriad
of possible concerns and directly addresses them. So, rather than laboriously
reviewing his analysis, I have chosen instead to build upon his framework and
identify issues that warrant further consideration and discussion. Specifically, I
explore the constraints on an individual's freedom to opt out. of certain
governmentally supplied services by drawing further analogies to contract law.
This article begins with a brief discussion of default theory and its appli-
cation in the public provision context. Various constraints on opting out of
public provision are then described, and the appropriateness of these restric-
tions is considered. The article also examines how the default level of services
is set and how opting out may alter the default level.
I. CONTRACTUAL DEFAULT THEORY AS APPLIED TO PUBLIC PROVISION
The default theory concept2 is deceivingly simple. Contractual default
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. B.A., University of
Colorado, 1977; M.B.A., University of Colorado, 1981; J.D., University of Arizona, 1986. This
article is a written version of comments prepared for a Symposium on The New Private Law:
Perspectives on the Current Trend Toward Private Governance, held at the University of Denver
College of Law on March 1-2, 1996. The author thanks Dean Dennis Lynch, the University of
Denver law faculty, and the editors of the Denver University Law Review for sponsoring the Sym-
posium and creating an environment conducive to a productive and stimulating exchange of ideas.
This article benefitted greatly from conversations with Eric Muller and from the comments of
participants at the Symposium. I would also like to thank Teresa Jensen and Federico Cheever
who took the time to comment on an earlier draft, and Marcia Peterson for her research assistance.
Research support for this project was provided by a grant from the George William Hopper Facul-
ty Research Fund.
1. Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1185 (1996).
2. While Gillette uses the contractual default model for his analogy, default rules are preva-
lent in other areas of the law that have contractual aspects, such as divorce law, the law of intesta-
cy, tort law, and property law. For example, under the law of intestacy, default rules fill any testa-
mentary gaps. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 n.10 (1989); W. David Slawson, The Futile
Search for Principles for Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY LJ. 29, 30 (1993).
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rules establish contract rights and obligations when an agreement is silent with
respect to certain topics. 3 Default rules often provide supplementary contract
terms when the parties have not agreed otherwise.4 The parties, however, are
free to opt out of these standard default provisions by private agreement if
they strike a different bargain.5 For example, if a contract by a merchant for
the sale of goods is silent with respect to warranties, a warranty of merchant-
ability is implied.6 The parties, however, may waive the warranty or opt for a
different provision by express agreement.7
Gillette proposes we view the level of goods and services the government
provides as a default or background level, since it is available to all residents
simply by virtue of their membership in the community s He argues individu-
als should be permitted to opt for a different level by privately contracting for
more, or possibly even opting for fewer,9 goods or services." Gillette sug-
gests the decision to select one level of service over another may simply re-
flect a desire to achieve individual preferences where that individual is unable
to satisfy his preferences through the political process." He submits allowing
individuals to opt out of public provision may be no more momentous than
opting out of the default rules under contract law. 2 Consequently, we should
not necessarily draw any negative inferences from the fact that some individu-
als may opt for a different level of service, 3 just as they may decide to opt
for a different contract term. Gillette concludes the propriety of opting out
should be determined by weighing the competitive benefits of opting out (effi-
ciency and satisfaction of individual preferences) against the costs of opting
out (in terms of political participation and effect on community). 4
However, even in the contract law context, default theory is not without
constraints and controversy. The freedom to contract itself is limited. For
example, some contracts are unenforceable on public policy grounds, such as
3. The term "default rules" became popular when Ian Ayres and Robert Germer used it in
their seminal article, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,
supra note 2. Ayres and Gertner noted that default rules also have been called "background, back-
stop, enabling, fallback, gap-filling, off-the-rack, opt-in, opt-out, preformulated, preset, presump-
tive, standby, standard-form and suppletory rules." Id. at 91 & n.25. For a small sampling of the
literature on contractual default theory, see Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual Consent,
3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 1 (1993).
4. Steven J. Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 115, 116 (1993).
5. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1994) ("The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied
by agreement .... ").
6. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1994).
7. Id.
8. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1195.
9. Id. at 1216-20.
10. Even though Gillette presents a balanced approach in his inquiry into the propriety of
opting out by addressing the various concerns voiced by Symposium participants, the article, taken
as a whole, generally supports the position that individuals should be free to opt out of public
provision. Implicit in his analysis is the assumption that one should be free to opt for a different
level of government services.
11. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1188.
12. Id. at 1196-97.
13. Id. at 1196.
14. Id. at 1192-93, 1219.
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contracts that restrain trade. 5 A number of these contractual constraints have
been cast as immutable rules applicable to all contracts that may not be varied
by private agreement.' 6 The duty to act in good faith, for instance, is an im-
mutable part of any contract. 7 The parties to a contract may not disclaim
their obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, or care.
8
In the contract law context, there is also debate as to how default rules
should be set. 9 Should default rules reflect what the parties would have
wanted? Should they be designed simply to foster economic efficiency or
preserve contractual relationships? Should default rules promote a certain re-
sult, such as encouraging parties to reveal information? Or should they reflect
communitarian values, such as fairness? This debate focuses on whether de-
fault rules should just describe contracting behavior or prescribe appropriate
rules.
While Gillette discusses the propriety of opting out of public provision, he
only briefly addresses the constraints on one's freedom to opt out of certain
governmentally supplied services." If we are going to apply default rule the-
ory in the public provision context, we must also consider whether there are,
and whether there should be, certain constraints and immutable rules. In addi-
tion, we must gain a better understanding of what the default or background
level of services reflects and consider what it should reflect.
II. CONSTRAINTS AND IMMUTABLE RULES
A. Constraints on Opting Out of Public Provision
Few will quarrel with the general proposition that an individual should be
free to purchase greater security protection or opt out of the public school
system for a private alternative. Nevertheless, there are clearly constraints on
15. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS ch. 5 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995); JOHN E.
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 98 (3d ed. 1990). Public policy grounds cited by courts
to justify nonenforcement include moral values (policies against impairment of family relation-
ships and against gambling), economic grounds (policies against restraint of trade and restraints on
alienation of property), and the need to protect government institutions (policies against improper-
ly influencing government officials). FARNSWORTH, supra, § 5.2, at 351.
16. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1994) (good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care may
not be disclaimed by agreement); U.C.C. § 1-105(2) (1994) (limits a party's right to choose appli-
cable law); U.C.C. § 1-204(1) (1994) (provision for disregarding a clause which fixes a time that
is unreasonable); U.C.C. § 2-718 (1994) (liquidated damages clauses are allowed only where the
amount involved is reasonable); U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1994) (consequential damages clauses may
not operate in an unconscionable manner).
17. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement.").
18. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1994) (providing that "the obligations of good faith, diligence, rea-
sonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement").
19. The following articles discuss the debate regarding how default rules should be set and
contain citations to the literature in the area: Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 89-95; Burton,
supra note 4, at 116-18; Slawson, supra note 2, at 33.
20. For example, in passing, Gillette suggests raising the cost of exit, up to the point of
prohibition, to transform the background service level from a default rule to an immutable rule,
but then notes that such constraints necessarily impose the costs of noncompetitiveness and result
in the inability of some residents to satisfy their individual preferences. Gillette, supra note 1, at
1204.
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an individual's freedom to opt out of public provision. At some point, the
arms and explosives you have stockpiled for increased security protection
endangers yourself and possibly others, so the government will step in.2 If
the private school system you and your neighbors have established endangers
your child either because it uses corporal punishment or because it does not
meet certain minimum standards, the government intervenes.22
The constraints on one's freedom to opt out of public provision are strik-
ingly similar to the constraints found in contract law. As previously noted,
contract law recognizes many important limitations on the freedom to contract.
Restrictions are placed on the right to contract by legislation and by public
policy.23 As examples, parties cannot create a binding contract to commit a
crime or to commit a tort on a third party.24 There are also certain immutable
rules that may not be varied by agreement, such as the duty to act in good
faith."
These contractual constraints and immutable rules are designed to protect
the parties to the contract26 or the parties outside the contract" from the so-
cially deleterious effects of unregulated contracting. These rules limit the
freedom to contract on the grounds that parties internal or external to the con-
tract cannot adequately protect themselves or others without government inter-
vention.
21. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-12-109 (1986 & Supp. 1995) (prohibits the possession
or control of an explosive or incendiary device); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-11 (1995) (prohibits
possession of explosives); Wyo. STAT. § 35-10-301 (1994) (prohibits storing explosive materials
in or near any residence); see also People v. Rowerdink, 756 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1988) (defendant
convicted of possessing incendiary devices); State v. Johnson, 417 N.W.2d 365 (N.D. 1987) (de-
fendant convicted of criminal possession of explosives).
22. Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Constitutional Value of Assimilation, 96 COLUM. L. REv.
87, 92 (1996) ("Parents cannot elect to send their children to a school which refuses to teach read-
ing or to a school which practices brutal corporal punishment."); see, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §
280.21 (West 1996) ("An employee of an accredited public school district, accredited nonpublic
school, or area education agency shall not inflict, or cause to be inflicted, corporal punishment
upon a student."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996) (sets forth compulso-
ry instruction standards, including curriculum areas and requirements for instructors); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 70, § 21-107 (West 1989) (authorizing a state board to set minimum standards for pri-
vate schools); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 161a(c) (1989 & Supp. 1995) ("No person employed by
or agent of a public or approved school shall inflict or cause to be inflicted corporal punishment
upon a pupil attending the school or the institution.").
23. See supra note 15.
24. RICHARD A. LORD, 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12:1, at 570 (4th ed. 1993).
25. See supra notes 16-18.
26. Several of the nonvariable provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code are intended to
prevent one party from taking undue advantage of another. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (1994) (pro-
tecting against unconscionable contracts); U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994) (protecting against bad faith).
27. Several Uniform Commercial Code provisions are designed to protect the interest of
third parties. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403 (1994) (protects good faith purchasers for value); U.C.C. §
2-702(3) (1994) (protects the rights of buyers in the ordinary course and other good faith purchas-
ers). Earlier drafts of U.C.C. § 1-102 provided that "[elxcept as otherwise provided by this Act the
rights and duties of a third party may not be adversely varied by an agreement to which he is not
a party or by which he is not otherwise bound." The subsection, however, was deleted reportedly
because it was deemed unnecessary. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, I UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 3-11, at 183 (4th ed. 1995).
28. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 88-89; Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the
Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983).
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This same rationale explains certain constraints on an individual's freedom
to opt out of public provision. In some situations, opting for more or less
government services may have socially detrimental effects. Government inter-
venes to protect the parties themselves or to protect third parties from the
possible consequences of an individual's actions. Intervention generally takes
the form of prohibitions or restrictions on an individual's ight to opt for a
different level of services.29
For example, one's freedom to opt out of public provision is constrained
by common law and by legislation. The term legislation is used here in the
broadest sense, to include not only constitutions and statutes but also adminis-
trative regulations and local ordinances. Such constraints can be federal, state,
or local. Assume, for instance, that your local government conducts a spraying
program in your town each summer to control the mosquito population. The
type of spray a local government may administer must comply with federal
regulations." Your local government is prohibited from using a pesticide that
would be harmful to humans or a pesticide that would harm a local endan-
gered species.3 If the approved form of pesticide fails to eliminate all the
pesky mosquitos in your yard, your individual ability to privately opt out and
use a more lethal spray or a larger dosage may be constrained by federal,
state, or even local regulations. Such constraints may be in part to protect you
from the harmful effects of such a spray, to protect your neighbors from the
29. This is not to say that it might not be better, from an economic perspective, to use finan-
cial penalties to discourage harm-producing behavior and financial rewards to encourage harm-
reducing behavior. Several commentators have observed that it is economically inefficient for
government to prohibit or restrict behavior. They have suggested that it would be better, on eco-
nomic grounds, for government to create market incentives to engage in socially desirable con-
duct, rather than to prohibit socially undesirable behavior. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Rich-
ard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regula-
tory State, 62 U. Cmn. L. REV. 1, 112-14 (1995).
30. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1994) ("[N]o person in any State may distribute or sell to any
person any pesticide that is not registered under this subchapter. To the extent necessary to pre-
vent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, the Administrator may by regulation limit
the distribution, sale, or use in any State of any pesticide that is not registered under this subchap-
ter .. ").
31. For instance, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service determined Bufo hem iophrys
baxteri (the "Wyoming toad") had virtually disappeared from all known sites, in part, due to the
use of certain herbicides and mosquito control techniques. The Service concluded that the Wyo-
ming toad was an endangered species and therefore protected under the federal Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973 (ESA). Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination That
Bufo Hemiophrys Baxteri (Wyoming Toad) is an Endangered Species, 49 Fed. Reg. 1992, 1992-
93 (1984). The ESA makes it unlawful for any person to harm an endangered species, unless the
Secretary of the Interior grants a permit allowing the activity under such terms as the Secretary
shall prescribe. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(19), 1538(a)(1),
1539(a)(1)(B) (1994) (the ESA prohibits "taking" of endangered species, defines "taking" to in-
clude "harm," and authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to grant permits for certain takings).
Compare Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407,
2409-10 (1995) (facial challenge to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service definition of
"harm," as part of the definition of "take," under the ESA; the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service definition of "harm" specifically includes habitat modification that results in disruption of
essential behavior patterns). Use of herbicides and mosquito control techniques that would harm
the Wyoming toad therefore are prohibited, unless a permit is obtained and the herbicides and
mosquito control techniques used comply with the terms of the permit.
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effects, and also possibly to protect the environment and endangered species
from your actions.
There also appear to be constraints in the public provision context analo-
gous to immutable rules. Immutable rules are mandatoryrequirements applica-
ble to all contracts which may not be altered by private agreement.32 These
rules often set minimum standards or basic requirements that apply to all con-
tracts, such as the obligation to act in good faith. In the public provision
context, there are standards and requirements applicable to all which are simi-
lar to immutable rules. As an example, compulsory education laws set mini-
mum standards that apply to all.33 A parent may decide to opt out of the pub-
lic school system for a private alternative, but may not decide to forgo his or
her child's education completely. Additionally, states often set minimum re-
quirements for all schools, both public and private, by specifying curriculum
areas, teacher certification standards, and the number of days or hours of
instruction.3" Another example is mandatory immunization programs. Many
states require school children to be immunized against certain communicable
diseases.3"
Clearly, there are numerous constraints on an individual's freedom to opt
out of public provision. Gillette, however, fails to address these constraints in
his analysis. Given the pervasiveness of such constraints, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to examine the propriety of opting out without first discussing the
limitations on opting out. For Gillette's analytical framework to prove useful,
we must either recognize and describe these limitations, or, at least, directly
address why such constraints are not necessary.
B. The Propriety of Constraints on Opting Out of Public Provision
These limitations on the freedom to opt out of public provision raise the
question: to what extent is government intrusion into private arrangements
justified? The law and economics movement has fought long and hard in the
contract law context to restrict the number and impact of governmentally im-
posed constraints and immutable rules. Yet even the most ardent supporters of
the law and economics movement recognize the need for certain limitations on
an individual's freedom to contract, such as when constraints are necessary to
32. See supra notes 16-18.
33. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (West 1993) (compulsory instruction); see also
Jon S. Lerner, Comment, Protecting Home Schooling Through the Casey Undue Burden Standard,
62 U. Cm. L. REv. 363, 370 (1995) ("[E]very state has enacted compulsory education laws, and
many additionally regulate curriculum content, teacher certification, and the number of hours and
days of instruction."); David M. Smolin, Comment, State Regulation of Private Education: Ohio
Law in the Shadow of the United States Supreme Court Decisions, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1003, 1013
(1986) (noting that "every state has a compulsory education law, and every state regulates private
education").
34. See supra notes 22 & 33.
35. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-673 (1993) (local health department shall provide for re-
quired immunization of pupils attending school at no cost); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-905 (Supp.
1995) (local health department shall provide, at public expense, required immunizations); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 232.032 (West Supp. 1996) (immunization shall be required for certain communica-
ble diseases and shall be available at no cost from local county health units).
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protect the interests of third parties.3 6 It is generally agreed that if individual
actions produce harm to others, government intervention is appropriate.37
Similarly, one can argue that constraints on the freedom to opt out of the
default level of services are warranted when such constraints protect the inter-
ests of third parties, including the general interests of society at large.
Most of the debate in the contract law area has focused on the propriety
of what have been termed "paternalistic" constraints.3" In general, any legal
rule that prohibits an action on the grounds that it would be contrary to the
actor's own welfare is considered paternalistic. Examples of contractual con-
straints that have been categorized as paternalistic include rules invalidating
agreements to waive the right to obtain a divorce or to file for bankruptcy
relief.39 An example of a paternalistic constraint in the public provision con-
text would be laws that make education compulsory.'
Gillette notes that, in the context of public provision, constraints impose
on society the cost of noncompetitiveness and result in the inability of resi-
dents to satisfy their personal preferences.4 But should economic consider-
ations and personal preferences be considered sovereign? Commentators, such
as Professor Daniel Farber, suggest that limited rationality, imperfect informa-
tion, and transaction costs limit the ability of individuals to protect them-
selves.42 The result is that an individual's ability to order his or her affairs
through voluntary transactions is limited and therefore government intervention
may be warranted in some situations.
In his seminal article, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, Profes-
sor Cass Sunstein criticizes the notion that existing private preferences should
determine what government can and should do.43 Sunstein concludes that,
even where private arrangements do not harm others, a wide variety of factors
may justify government intervention to overturn or counteract existing prefer-
ences. He suggests that there are distortions in a system based on individual
preferences, distortions analogous to the problem of market failure, and that
such distortions require collective action.
Sunstein identifies four basic categories where interference with private
preferences may be justified." First, sometimes the majority may have a col-
lective preference that differs from the choices of its individual members. The
public, acting through government, may wish to bind itself against its own
36. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT
LAw 253-54 (1979) (acknowledging that certain limits on the freedom to contract may promote
efficiency, reduce transaction costs, and facilitate voluntary transactions).
37. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. C. L. REv. 1129,
1130 (1986). Admittedly, in this era of relativism, it may be difficult to agree on what type of
"harm to others" is sufficient to justify legal intervention.
38. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT ch. 7
(1993); Kronman, supra note 28; Sunstein, supra note 37, at 1130.
39. See Kronman, supra note 28, at 764.
40. See supra notes 22 & 33.
41. See Gillette, supra note 1, at 1204.
42. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U. L.
REv. 303, 306 (1983).
43. See Sunstein, supra note 37.
44. Id. at 1138-68.
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misguided choices. The second category includes preferences that are the prod-
uct of legal rules or socialization. For instance, preferences may become dis-
torted by the absence of available opportunities or the existing distribution of
wealth and entitlements. In some circumstances, the endogenous character of
these preferences will justify intervention. The third category consists of pref-
erences that reflect motivational distortions, such as addictions, habits, and
myopic behavior. When there is such a problem, government intervention may
make the individual better off in terms of welfare and perhaps autonomy.
Finally, personal preferences are sometimes based on inadequate information,
including lack of knowledge or cognitive biases when dealing with low-proba-
bility events. When a decision is based on imperfect information, government
may either provide the information or ban the decision entirely.
Other commentators have defended the notion that government may con-
strain an individual's freedom to contract on various grounds, such as consid-
erations of economic efficiency45 and distributive justice,' the idea of per-
sonal integrity,4 and notions of sound judgment." The same concerns and
considerations appear equally applicable in the public provision context. Gov-
ernment intervention in the public provision context may be warranted to pro-
tect third parties, to secure collective preferences, to promote economic effi-
ciency and distributive goals, and to address the problems created by endoge-
nous preferences, motivational distortions, and inadequate information.
The formulation of a comprehensive theory to describe and evaluate the
various limitations on an individual's freedom to opt out of public provision is
well beyond the scope of this short article. My intent is to suggest that certain
constraints are warranted,49 and to indicate the need for a conceptual frame-
work to describe and evaluate these constraints before we can even begin to
45. In Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, Professor Anthony Kronman argues that cer-
tain contractual rules, such as nondisclmable warranties, are efficiency-enhancing adjuncts to the
fraud remedy that reduce transaction costs. Kronman, supra note 28, at 766-70.
46. Kronman suggests that prohibitions against waiver of contractual entitlements may pro-
mote distributive goals. For example, the nondisclaimable warranty of habitability promotes the
redistributive goal of providing minimally decent housing for all. Id. at 770-74.
47. Kronman contends that prohibitions against contracting away too large a part of one's
personal liberties protect against the threat such contractual provisions would pose to a promisor's
integrity or self-respect, especially in situations where the promisor's values could change dramati-
cally after entering into the contract. This explains, in part, prohibitions against agreements waiv-
ing the right to sue for divorce. Id. at 774-86.
48. Restrictions prohibiting enforcement of agreements entered into while the promisor's
reasoning may have been impaired, such as when the promisor is a minor, incompetent, or during
mandatory "cooling-off periods," have been justified as reflecting a respect for the notion of sound
judgment. Id. at 786-97.
49. This is not to suggest that government intervention is some form of panacea. I agree
with Pildes's and Sunstein's assessment that modem regulation suffers from "myopia, interest-
group pressure, draconian responses to sensationalist anecdotes, poor priority setting, and simple
confusion." Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 4. Government intervention is not without risk.
Government action does not necessarily make things better and the risks inherent in interfering
with individual preferences can be formidable. The risk of abuse is also significant. Nevertheless,
government intervention in some situations appears warranted. The solution is not to completely
reject the notion of intervention, but instead to consider regulatory reform, such as market incen-
tives rather than outright prohibitions. See supra note 29.
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assess the propriety of allowing individuals the unrestrained ability to opt out
of public provision.
III. THE DEFAULT LEVEL
A. The Default Level and What It Represents in the Public Provision Context
Gillette proposes we view the level of goods and services the government
provides to its constituents as a default or background level."0 He suggests
this default level serves the same function as contractual default rules in that it
applies to those who do not expressly bargain for a contrary outcome. But
how is the default level of goods and services determined and what does it
represent?
Obviously the package of goods and services the government provides is
determined in large part through the political process. Gillette observes that the
default level may not necessarily reflect the preferences of a majority of con-
stituents." Instead, the mix may reflect the preferences of the median voter
or the desires of a discrete, yet dominant, minority.52
As is clear to anyone who has complained about police protection, street
paving, snow removal, or mosquito control, the level of public services provid-
ed does not necessarily reflect consumer demand. One must remember, how-
ever, that government plays an allocative role.53 The default level reflects a
myriad of considerations and a variety of goals. Since unrestrained voluntary
market transactions do not always produce socially optimal results, the
government's role is also to correct market deficiencies, such as problems
created by externalities, distributional inequities, informational disabilities, and
free riders. As a result, the mix of goods and services provided reflects,
among other things, an allocation of resources, political compromise, regard
for external effects, distributional considerations, and other societal interests.
Allocation of resources. Only a finite amount of resources and a limited
amount of tax dollars are available for governmentally supplied services. Giv-
en these constraints, the government must allocate resources. Theoretically, the
government examines and prioritizes its constituents' wants and needs, and
then determines what and how much of each good and service to provide. In
theory at least, the government represents the interests of society at large. The
50. See Gillette, supra note I, at 1195.
51. Id. at 1199-1201. Gillette suggests that since any government service typically can be
provided on a continuum and individual services in the mix may be traded against each other, a
majority of constituents is unlikely to prefer any particular package, even though a majority might
prefer a certain level of an individual service. Id. at 1200-01.
52. See id. at 1199-1201. Public choice theory indicates the level of services provided by the
government will correspond to the preferences of the median voter. The median voter reflects the
position that can attract more support than any other position in an election. Id. Gillette hypothe-
sizes that on issues where a certain group of voters exhibit great intensity of interest, and other
voters appear less interested in the issue, the default level is more likely to reflect the preferences
of the interested minority. Id.
53. See CLAYTON P. GiLLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 37-55
(1994) (discussing government functions and collective action problems).
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mix of services the government provides constitutes an allocation, reflecting
social costs and benefits.
Political compromise. Compromise is inevitable. No one should be sur-
prised that the mix of governmentally provided services reflects majoritarian
preferences with respect to the level of some services, but also reflects the
desires of dominant minorities with respect to the level of other services. No
individual or group has all of its preferences satisfied.
External effects. In deciding whether and how much of a service to pro-
vide, the government takes into account external effects that individual self-
interested transacting parties may not consider. The default level reflects a
weighing of the positive and negative effects of services on parties and
nonparties. Implicit in the level of services provided are the legislative and
public policy constraints previously discussed.
Distributional considerations. The maintenance of a minimum or baseline
standard of living is also implicit in the mix. Government serves a
redistributive function.54 It limits variations in wealth, or at least insures that
the financially or physically disadvantaged do not fall below a given baseline.
Redistribution efforts take the form of nonfinancial rights and policies, such as
passage and enforcement of civil rights legislation. Redistribution efforts also
take the form of services and financial support, such as welfare payments,
social security disability benefits, and Medicaid which are funded by a pro-
gressive taxation scheme. In effect, government provides a social safety net
which is reflected in its allocation of goods and services.
Other societal interests. The default level also reflects notions of fairness,
equality, and social contract. For example, the common law doctrine of equal
service provision obligates the government to offer the same level of services
to all its constituents." It may not discriminate. The mix of governmentally
supplied goods and services includes the provision of basic services on an
equal basis to all constituents, such as public education and public health ser-
vices. The mix includes goods and services to which all are entitled regardless
of ability to pay.
B. The Effect of Opting Out of the Default Level in the Public Provision
Context
But what should the default level reflect? In the contract law context, a
central focus of recent scholarship has been a debate over the role and content
of contractual default rules.56 Commentators have questioned whether con-
tractual default rules should reflect what the majority of parties would have
54. Id. at 57.
55. See, e.g., Veach v. City of Phoenix, 427 P.2d 335 (Ariz. 1967); see also CHARLES M.
HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS, A REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOV-
ERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY
(1986); Clayton P. Gillette, Equality and Variety in the Delivery of Municipal Services, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 946 (1987) (reviewing Haar and Fessler's book, The Wrong Side of the Tracks, and offer-
ing theoretical bases to support the doctrine of equal service provision).
56. See supra note 19.
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wanted, principles of economic efficiency, communitarian values, or norms
implicit in the parties' relationship. The default level in the public provision
context appears susceptible to the same type of inquiry and critical analysis.
Should the default level in the context of public provision reflect majoritarian
preferences, simply correct market deficiencies, provide a social safety net, or
promote communitarian values? Without a greater understanding of what the
default level of services represents and without considering what it should re-
flect, it is difficult to assess the propriety of opting out of the default level.
Gillette suggests that if the default level of services does not reflect
majoritarian preferences, then opting for a different level of services might be
appropriate because opting out does not remove you from the core of the com-
munity and it may play a productive signaling role.57 On the other hand,
there are strong reasons not to allow individuals to bargain their way out of
the default level. If the default level reflects an allocation of resources, politi-
cal compromise, consideration of external effects, redistributive goals, and
other societal interests, opting out may disrupt what appears to be a very deli-
cate balance. Opting out may very well change the default level and what it
represents, without the benefit of public deliberation and debate.
Effect on the mix of goods and services provided. Unconstrained opting
out may alter the mix of governmentally supplied goods and services, thereby
changing the default level. For instance, if certain economies of scale are nec-
essary for the provision of a service, opting out may adversely affect the feasi-
bility of providing the default level preferred by those who remain." Opting
out may lead to a situation where public provision of a service is abandoned
because there remains an insufficient number of people to make the invest-
ment worthwhile or the increased per capita cost results in the service becom-
ing prohibitively expensive.
Political impact. As Gillette indicates, opting out may also impose politi-
cal costs by reducing the ability of those who remain to form effective coali-
tions to obtain public provision at the level they desire.59 Additionally, if
those who opt out of public provision must pay for the default level, they may
actively encourage reduced outlays for services they do not use or refuse to
support the default level.' Unconstrained opting out therefore may affect the
allocation of resources, the default level of services provided, the political
dynamics, and even undermine to some extent, collective provision.
57. See Gillette, supra note 1, at 1202-04.
58. Id. at 1211.
59. Id. at 1201-02.
60. Id. at 1207. For example, Daniel Bell observed:
Local government officials and even state legislatures are facing demands from [Resi-
dential Community Association (RCA)] members for tax reimbursements for the provi-
sion of local services such as snow and ice removal, street lighting, and the collection of
garbage. RCAs argue that since they pay for their own services through homeowner
associations, why should they pay property taxes for duplicating public services that
they do not need?
Daniel A. Bell, Residential Community Associations: Community or Disunity?, 5 REsPONSIVE
CoMMUNrrY 25, 34 (Fall 1995).
1996] 1231
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Social consequences. The default level currently serves as a social safety
net by providing certain basic services to all constituents. If opting out results
in a reduction in the level or availability of these basic services, then opting
out may tear at the social safety net and undermine redistributive goals.
Many current government services are a response to the needs of disad-
vantaged groups that were ignored by the private sector. If opting out results
in the elimination of certain public services, private providers may be unwill-
ing to render the services to some segments of society. Private firms have a
strong economic incentive to skim off the best clients and the most profitable
services.6 Opting out may leave those most in need of certain services with-
out private providers and therefore without services. As a result, opting out is
likely to have a disproportionate effect on the disadvantaged.
Gillette notes that in the public provision context the law only requires
equality of opportunity, not equality of result.62 Thus, if everyone is free to
opt out, the equal service requirement is not violated. As Gillette himself
pointed out in an earlier writing, this argument has the "quality of denying the
rich as well as the poor the right to sleep under bridges." '63 Since many public
services are now available to all regardless of the ability to pay, the disadvan-
taged will be most affected if public services are reduced. The disadvantaged
may find themselves with certain public services eliminated, with the right to
opt for more services, but with no ability to pay for such services and no
private providers. Hence, opting out provides a vehicle to grant the disadvan-
taged a meaningless right in exchange for a possible decrease in benefits.
Opting out also has the potential to create and magnify social division and
conflict. Individuals who pay for private services are likely to resent paying
for duplicate public services they do not need.' This resentment may result
in a decreased sense of loyalty and commitment to the larger community.'
We have already witnessed the trend that Robert Reich characterized as "the
secession of the successful."' The wealthy have begun to withdraw to resi-
dential communities that privately provide their own parks, streets, swimming
pools, and security guards, from which the public is excluded. Exclusive com-
munities and gated neighborhoods exacerbate the schism between the rich and
61. ROBERT J. DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS, RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS
IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 85 (1992) (citing as an example experiences under the Job Training
Partnership Act).
62. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1214.
63. Gillette, supra note 55, at 955. Gillette was paraphrasing a quote from Antole France's
Le Lys Rouge, "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich, as well as the poor, to sleep
under bridges, to beg in the streets .... " See id. at 955 n.26 (quoting A. France, Le Lys Rouge
(1894), also quoted in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
64. EvAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA, HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESI-
DENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 186 (1994); see also supra note 60.
65. Gillette counters that residents who are able to opt out might choose to pay for benefits
they do not enjoy either out of altruism or to protect property values. Gillette, supra note I, at
1209-11. William Schneider may have dealt with this type of argument best when addressing the
problems facing urban centers: "But isn't it 'in the national interest' to bail out the cities? The
suburbs have given their answer: walled communities." William Schneider, The Suburban Century
Begins, THE ATLANTIC, July 1992, at 33.
66. Robert Reich, Secession of the Successful, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 (Magazine),
at 42.
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the poor. As Gillette points out, these and other institutions that would be used
to effect opting out are consistently under attack as exclusionary, discrimina-
tory, and elitist. 67 A preoccupation with the virtues of competitive benefits
and individual autonomy may cause one to overlook other interests vital to our
well-being as a nation, such as fairness and decency.
Cause for Concern. Certain characteristics of public provision are them-
selves valuable, such as the process of public deliberation and debate. Implicit
in proposals such as Gillette's that champion unconstrained opting out is the
belief that private contract and personal preferences should be sovereign and
inviolable, therefore insulated from public review. Yet opting out of the de-
fault level has public consequences. It is more than simply a matter of private
contract and personal preference. Such private transactions have public effects:
effects on the parties to the contract, effects on third parties, and effects on the
community. As previously discussed, some individual preferences are objec-
tionable, such as when they harm third parties, when they interfere with col-
lective preferences, or when they are the product of cognitive distortions.'
Proposals that champion unconstrained opting out are attempting a sleight of
hand by dressing up something that is public as private, and then suggesting it
is sacred and outside the realm of public debate. Given the public effects of
opting out and the potential effect on the default level itself, these private
choices must continue to be subject to critical scrutiny, public debate, and
regulation, not canonized.
Gillette characterizes opting out as an alternative form of privatization.'
The danger of this form of privatization is that it does not require a conscious
public decision to shift government functions to private providers.' Privatiza-
tion occurs without public discussion, without consideration of other approach-
es, without analysis of the costs and benefits, without knowing the implica-
tions of the decision, and without government action. Opting out results in de
facto privatization as government functions are gradually transferred to private
providers. The default level of services is altered without public deliberation
and debate, despite possibly significant public consequences. Before we enthu-
siastically embrace the concept of opting out, we must collectively consider
the broader economic, political, and social implications.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Gillette's use of default rule theory in the public provision
context provides an excellent framework within which to examine the propri-
ety of opting out of public provision. By drawing further analogies to contract
law, I have attempted to build on his analysis and identify issues that warrant
67. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1190; see, e.g., MCKENZIE, supra note 64; Bell, supra note 60;
David J. Kennedy, Note, Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated
Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761 (1995).
68. See supra part ll.B.
69. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1187.
70. Cf MCKENZIE, supra note 64, at 180 (arguing community-interest developments consti-
tute de facto privatization undertaken without the benefit of public deliberation or debate).
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consideration and discussion. For example, the constraints on one's freedom to
opt out of public provision appear analogous to the limitations on one's free-
dom to contract. Many of these constraints on opting out may be defended on
the same grounds used to justify limitations on the freedom to contract. Unless
one is willing to blindly accept the virtues of unconstrained opting out, a more
sophisticated theoretical framework, which describes these constraints and
evaluates the propriety of such constraints, appears needed. In addition, paral-
lels are drawn between the default level in the public provision context and
contractual default rules. The role and content of contractual default rules have
been a focus of recent contract scholarship. The default level in the public
provision context appears susceptible to the same type of inquiry and analysis.
Since opting out may potentially alter the default level of services provided,
what the default level reflects and what it should reflect must be considered,
particularly in light of the possible economic, political, and social effects of
opting out.
Edmund Burke wrote, "The effect of liberty to individuals is that they
may do what they please; we ought to see what it will please them to do,
before we risk congratulations .. . ." We should heed Burke's warning. Be-
fore enthusiastically embracing the concept of unconstrained opting out of
public provision, we should first examine what individuals may desire to do
and then consider the consequences.
71. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 8 (J.G.A. Pocock ed.,
Hackett Publishing Co. 1987) (1790).
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THE PROGRESSIVE POTENTIAL IN PRIVATIZATION
NANCY EHRENREICH*
[T]he master's tools will never dismantle the master's house.
- Audre Lorde'




[T]he argument that the category of "sex" is the instrument or effect
of "sexism" or that "gender" only exists in the service of
heterosexism, does not entail that we ought never to make use of
such terms, as if such terms could only and always reconsolidate the
oppressive regimes of power by which they were spawned. On the
contrary, precisely because such terms have been produced and con-
strained within such regimes, they ought to be repeated in directions
that reverse and displace their originating aims.
- Judith Butler
I. INTRODUCTION: THE TURN TO THE PRIVATE
Antigovernment sentiment is running high in the United States today. The
Republican candidate for the presidency, Bob Dole, charged that President
Clinton is a big-government liberal speaking small-government rhetoric.
Clinton objected that he, like the Republicans, wants to limit the size of the
federal bureaucracy.4 When Newt Gingrich castigated the organizers of the
March for Children as offering the same old liberal solutions, Marion Wright
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., Yale Universi-
ty, 1974; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 1979; L.L.M., University of Virginia School
of Law, 1982. I would like to thank David Barnes, Roberto Corrada, and Martha Ertman for their
helpful comments. In addition, I am grateful to the participants in the University of Denver Sym-
posium on the New Private Law for their responses to an earlier version of this paper delivered at
the Symposium, and to my research assistant, Venkat Balasubramani.
1. Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER
OUTSIDER 112 (1984).
2. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 432 (1987).
3. JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 123 (1993).
4. Judy Keen, 'We will work together': Clinton Urges Lean, Not Mean, Government,
U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 25, 1995, at IA.
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Edelman responded that they merely want "just government," not big govern-
ment.5 No one says that more government is better; privatization is the pet
solution of the day.
Responding to the notion that governmental programs are top-heavy and
inefficient, many states and municipalities are experimenting with returning
traditional governmental functions to the private sphere. The profit motive and
market competition, it is said, will assure the quality of such programs. Thus,
private companies are trying their hand at running school systems,6 building
and administering prisons,' even meting out foreign aid.!
Governmental bureaucracy is said to be not only inefficient, but also unre-
sponsive to citizens' needs and concerns. Thus, as several of the papers in this
Symposium indicate, the turn to the private signals an attempt to increase
individual autonomy by allowing personal choices to determine the allocation
of governmental entitlements and obligations. For instance, Roberto Corrada
discusses the landmark case of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,9 in
which the Supreme Court allowed the meaning of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act to be determined in a private arbitration instead of in a court
of law." Federico Cheever describes a current trend in land conservation ef-
forts directed at convincing individuals to convey land and development rights
to private conservation trusts." Similarly, vouchers allowing parents to "vote
with their feet" are said to be the solution to the crisis in public education,
while private surrogacy contracts are touted as the appropriate approach to the
personal and policy dilemmas posed by infertility. Small government and
individual choice are the panaceas of the day.
Many progressives, accustomed to relying on the government to produce
social change, have viewed these developments with dismay. 2 To legal
scholars, the current tendency to seek solutions in the world of the free market
and the choices of private decisionmakers sounds frighteningly like a return to
the laissez-faire era of Lochner v. New York. 3 Abandoning individual citizens
to the whims of the most powerful private actors, privatization seems like an
abdication of the governmental role as protector of the less powerful and a
return to ruthless and unfettered competition. 4 Equating the common good
5. David G. Savage, Tens of Thousands Rally in Defense of Aid to Children, L.A. TIMES,
June 2, 1996, at Al.
6. See Bill Zlatos, Privatizing Schools Tests a Pittsburgh Suburb, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30,
1995, at B6.
7. See Matthew Purdy, In Jail Business: Nashville Company Leads Crowded Field, NY.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1996, at B4.
8. See Leslie Eaton, A Billion at Risk: Public Money Foots the Bills for 'Privatized' For-
eign Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1996, Al.
9. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
10. Roberto L. Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring Gilmer's Impact and
Legacy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1051 (1996).
11. Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and Con-
servation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1077 (1996).
12. See, e.g., Mimi Abramovitz, The Bottom Line is Society Loses: Health Care Privatiza-
tion, 245 NATION 410 (Oct. 17, 1987); Larry V. Amsel, Bad Medicine: Health Care Reform, 11
TIKKUN 1, 25 (Jan. 1996).
13. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
14. In reality, however, competition in the American economy was probably never corn-
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with the preferences of individual market actors, the turn to the private looks
like a return to classical liberal individualism and a rejection of any communi-
ty- or society-focused definition of the nation's goals.
Moreover, the emphasis that privatization proponents place on private
decisionmaking seems to represent a return to the reification of choice. It
ignores several decades of scholarship problematizing the notion that one can
objectively determine whether an individual has freely chosen to engage in
particular conduct, or whether particular governmental policies constitute an
interference with individual choice." In particular, it ignores numerous illus-
trations of the role that governmental power plays in constructing private
choices. 6
One recent critique of the reification of the concept of individual choice is
found in Katherine Van Wezel Stone's article for this Symposium issue, dis-
cussing contracts for employment. She provides the example of a salesperson
who accepts a job, unaware that the employee handbook contains a mandatory
arbitration provision. 7 Emphasizing the unequal bargaining power of the em-
ployee, Stone characterizes such provisions as modern "yellow dog contracts"
and concludes that they are "imposed on workers without even the illusion of
bargaining or consent."'" As her analysis shows, where the players in the pri-
vate sphere are not equal, the product of choices made within that sphere can-
not be assumed to protect the weaker parties as well as governmental regula-
tion would. To characterize such employment contracts as the repository of
employees' "true" preferences is to reify choice. Such reification, in turn, cre-
ates the impression that social inequality is the product of individual prefer-
ences, not social policy.
Despite the trenchancy of critiques like Stone's, however, both political
discourse and legal doctrine continue to treat choice as an unproblematic con-
cept, leading progressives to conclude that the privatization impulse is neces-
sarily conservative in substantive content. What I want to argue here, however,
is that this pessimistic assessment may be unjustified. That is, the move to the
private may not necessarily be always, in all contexts, a conservative political
move. Moreover, avoiding a reflexive negative reaction to privatization rheto-
ric might actually allow progressives to discover a subversive potential in
private solutions.
pletely unfettered. See Robert W. Gordon, The Elusive Transformation, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
137 (1994) (reviewing MORTON J. HOROWrTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-
1960).
15. See, e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809 (1935); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family,
18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985). The doctrinal conundrum that most starkly raises the problem
of determining whether government has interfered with private choice is the unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine, explored thoughtfully-but clearly not solved-in a previous Symposium issue of
the Denver University Law Review. Symposium, The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 72
DENy. U. L. REV. 854 (1995).
16. See, e.g., Louis J. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937).
17. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1017-18, 1033-34
(1996).
18. Id. at 1033-34.
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Thus, in Part II, I will argue that the traditional progressive critique of the
public/private dichotomy, while essentially correct, has been inadequate to the
task of providing workable tools for obtaining progressive political change. 9
In Part III, I will argue that it is, indeed, possible to use the master's tools to
dismantle the master's house-to accomplish progressive ends through privat-
ization.2" My argument will consist of the following points: first, whether a
move to the private is conservative depends on the nature of the public realm
that is being left behind. If public regulation of a particular arena disfavors a
particular oppressed group, privatization might constitute a progressive
move.
2'
Second, whether a scheme of private decisionmaking is conservative or
progressive depends upon the background rules and distribution of resources
that affect the choices individuals make under that scheme. If critical legal
scholars are right in their argument that private choices are themselves a prod-
uct of governmental power-that they merely constitute governmental regula-
tion by another name-then it should be possible to structure a choice-based
regulatory scheme that is progressive, rather than conservative.
Finally, like other legal constructs, the notions of the private sphere and
individual choice can be deployed to undermine the very power structures that
they have traditionally buttressed. Of course, feminists and scholars of color
have long (and persuasively) argued that rights claims can be used to benefit
minority groups, not just to justify their oppression. The same, I would argue,
goes for privatization claims, although for slightly different reasons. What I
want to suggest is that such claims can have a disruptive influence on the very
notion of what we mean by private and public. Rather than necessarily rein-
forcing the notion that there is a realm of private choice separate from govern-
mental action, certain types of unconventional privatization arguments might
actually have the effect of undermining the public/private dichotomy. Such
claims might actually draw attention to the constructedness of the concept of
individual choice, rather than reinforcing its reification. In short, the very
terms that to progressives have seemed the most dangerous-terms like auton-
omy, choice, and freedom-can actually be used to undermine the classic pub-
lic/private dichotomy they are often thought to support. By proposing so-called
private solutions, progressives might do more to disrupt traditional notions of
private freedom and individual choice than their direct assaults upon those
concepts have ever done.
II. TRADITIONAL LEFT SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE PRIVATE
The meat and potatoes of Critical Legal Studies scholarship has, of
course, been to deconstruct the public/private dichotomy of liberal legal
thought. While there is no need to rehearse the details of that deconstruction
here, it is worth briefly recounting the thrust of the CLS critique in order to
19. See infra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 31-70 and accompanying text.
21. 1 am indebted to both Alan Chen and Martha Ertman for this insight.
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highlight the concerns that motivate progressive reactions to privatization pro-
posals. Identifying the shortcomings of the CLS analysis will also lend support
to my argument that private approaches should not be seen as inevitably con-
servative.
In a wide variety of articles addressing a wide variety of contexts, critical
legal scholars and feminists have repeatedly and convincingly demonstrated
that the private sphere of individual freedom and choice that grounds much of
liberal legal analysis is an illusion.22 These critics have made two central
points:2 3 first, they maintain that choice is an indeterminate concept-that
whether an individual action seems to have been the result of an exercise of
free will depends on the values of the person answering the question. One
person's choice is another's coercion, and courts do not in fact determine
whether someone's autonomy was constrained, but rather what will count as
coercion and what will count as choice.
Second, and more importantly, they argue that the content of individual
choices-and, more broadly, individual preference structures themselves-are
the product of governmental structuring of the contexts in which choices are
made. Legal rules about who can marry and the nature of the marital relation
affect people's decisions to marry. Legal rules about the economy and how
it is structured affect people's preference structures and their decisions about
what marketplace behavior to engage in.2' The private, in other words, is a
function of the public.26
Thus, powerful private actors owe their power not only, or even principal-
ly, to their own success but rather to public policies. Those with economic
resources are wealthy not merely because of their innate abilities and drive but
also because the economic and legal systems benefit them. Even social, as
opposed to economic, policies have wealth effects.27 Thus, as Gary Peller ar-
gues in his article for this Symposium, to the extent that legal rules allow male
employers to sexually harass female employees without paying damages,2"
22. See generally Symposium, The PubliclPrivate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289
(1982).
23. For a similar description, see Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of
the Public/Private Distinction, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 322-24 (1993).
24. Olsen, supra note 15.
25. Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 387 (1981) (arguing that existing distribution of legal entitlements affects bargaining
behavior).
26. Robin West puts the point nicely:
[WIhen a legislature fails to act-fails to protect a citizen against violence, discrimina-
tion, or pollution-we cannot sensibly describe that as mere "inaction" in the face of a
prelegal status quo.... Rather, the status quo the legislature failed to change is itself a
product of legally created-hence state created-fights and obligations.
Robin L. West, The Constitution of Reasons, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1409, 1410 (1994) (citation omit-
ted) (reviewing CAss R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONsTrrIrION 1993).
27. "[P]rivate action is invariably and inevitably facilitated by, structured by, permitted by,
made possible by, no less than constrained by-the actions of states." Id. at 1412 (describing
Sunstein's argument); see Gary Peller, Public Imperialism and Private Resistance: Progressive
Possibilities and the New Private Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1001 (1996).
28. Existing legal remedies do not cover all incidents of harassment. Sexual harassment is
not considered a tort, and Title VII excludes workplaces with less than 15 employees. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). Moreover, despite the current availability of punitive damages in sexual
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those employers are enriched and their employees are impoverished. The em-
ployees must spend time and money to change jobs in order to avoid the ha-
rassment, while the employers save the money that they would otherwise have
to pay (in damage payments) for the privilege of harassing. Private power can,
in short, be seen as merely a delegation of governmental power to particular
private actors-as a creation of the public.
The importance of this deconstruction of the public/private dichotomy is
to demonstrate that government regulates even when it claims not to. If the
private sphere is itself a product of governmental power, then conduct that
initially seemed to flow from individual choice can be revealed to be the result
of governmental coercion. Thus, the thrust of the Critical Legal Studies argu-
ment has been that the public/private dichotomy merely obscures the operation
of governmental power, causing individuals to believe that their fates are of
their own choosing. It prevents people from seeing the broader society's re-
sponsibility for individual situations. Once this governmental role in the so-
called private has been revealed, of course, it then becomes possible to argue
for changes in the rules structures that created the individual choices-changes
designed to produce more equitable outcomes. Individuals cannot be blamed
for their purported choices, government has to take responsibility.
This deconstruction of the public/private dichotomy was a crucial step in
the progressive critique of modem legal analysis. It suffered, however, from
the same weaknesses that one might expect of any rigidly constructivist ac-
count. By suggesting that individual choices are merely the product of govern-
mental power, critical analysis precluded any notion of individual agency, any
role for the individual at all. Yet it belies many people's experience of their
lives to suggest they have no control whatsoever over even the most personal
choices, such as whom to have sex with or whom to marry. Even those who
accept the basic argument that individual choices are socially constructed often
see the need for a more dynamic, fluid account that somehow allows for the
possibility of individual agency and societal change.
Perhaps it is its constructivism that prevented Critical Legal Studies schol-
arship from producing the epiphany that many of us, in the first decade of its
existence, expected it to produce. Although it was not usually so explicitly
stated, I think that the implicit expectation was that, once the emperor was
revealed to have no clothes, the population would rise up in (figurative, if not
literal) revolt. Once the formerly invisible hand of government was seen in the
private fates of individuals, the citizenry would demand a fundamental restruc-
turing of society, including a radical redistribution of wealth. Once the notion
that government's role was to stay out of the private sphere was destroyed, a
substantive national conversation on how to set up our social and economic
arrangements could begin.
But it didn't happen. And perhaps one of the reasons that it didn't is that
it just isn't liberating to that many people to think that everything they do is
harassment cases, many attorneys will not take such cases if the only significant damages argu-
ment that the plaintiff could make is for punitives (e.g., if the amount of back pay lost is insignifi-
cant). See Corrada, supra note 10, at 1052.
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controlled by the government. Indeed, it is perhaps not surprising that, in such
an individualistic nation as the United States, even the notion that culture
constructs the individual is a very hard sell. In any event, whatever the reason,
the initial optimism produced by this scholarship has dissipated, and pro-
gressive scholars and activists are desperately in need of a new rhetoric, a way
to argue for progressive change that doesn't first require people to imagine
themselves as helpless victims of a monolithic and impersonal power structure.
I will argue below that inspiration for that new rhetoric can come from
two sources. First, feminists and critical race scholars have for many years
been articulating a more nuanced understanding of liberal discourse-an un-
derstanding that sees liberal legal constructs such as the public/private dichoto-
my as both enemy and friend, both tools of oppression and tools of revolt. 9
Second, post-structuralist thinkers such as Judith Butler have begun to explore
the subversive potential within existing discourses of power, the ways that
existing constructs and practices can be used in new ways that reveal the
constructedness and contingency of their meanings.3" Both of these bodies of
thought, which I view as complementary not conflicting, provide the basis for
my argument that advocating "private" solutions can sometimes be a progres-
sive thing to do.
III. USING THE MASTER'S TOOLS
Privatization is not necessarily any more or less conservative than govern-
mental control. First, if, as Dan Farber puts it, privatization is just "another
form of regulation,"'" then, like any regulation, it can be either conservative
or progressive in content. In this sense, my position is a logical extension of
the Critical Legal Studies argument that the private is really a product of pub-
lic power. If that is true, then why should progressives necessarily fear private
solutions any more than public solutions?" Second, whether a private solu-
tion is substantively progressive or conservative depends on the nature of the
particular private and public realms involved. If social and economic power is
evenly distributed in the private realm, a private solution can be progressive,
for it can increase individual autonomy. Concomitantly, if public regulation
29. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from
the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986); Williams, supra note 2, at 431.
30. See generally BUTLER, supra note 3; JUDITH P. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990);
Katherine Franke, Cunning Stunts: From Hegemony to Desire: A Review of Madonna's Sex, 20
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 549 (1994); Note, Patriarchy Is Such a Drag: The Strategic
Possibilities of a Postmodern Account of Gender, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1973 (1995).
31. Dan Farber, Whither Socialism?, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 1011, 1013 (1996). In this Part, I
will use the terms "privatization" and "regulation," as well as "private" and "public," as if they
have determinate and coherent meaning. In doing so, I do not mean to suggest that the CLS cri-
tique of the public/private dichotomy is incorrect, for I think it is valid. However, I believe that
citizens and lawmakers still perceive private and public approaches as distinct, and I would agree
that, at least formally (although not substantively), they are.
32. What progressives have feared in such solutions is the invisibility of the role played by
the government But the main thing that renders that invisibility so dangerous is the substantively
harmful content of the regulation-that is, the fact that conservative governmental conduct is ob-
scured. Of course, the obscuring of governmental regulation might be harmful no matter what the
content of that regulation, as I discuss infra, note 49 and accompanying text.
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has been particularly pernicious, privatizing might be a more progressive alter-
native. Third, just as public/private rhetoric has been used to make conserva-
tive governmental regulation seem like individual choice, so it can also be
used to make progressive regulation seem like private choice. And finally,
when privatization arguments are made by progressives, such arguments might
fundamentally alter the terms of the debate about the public and the private.
As I will explore further below, traditional conservative discourse arguably
contains within it a subversive potential that can be exploited by progressives.
Prevailing cultural categories (and the laws that reflect as well as produce
them) can be subverted through the creative use of private ordering.
A. Disguising Progressive Regulation as Private Choice
The thrust of the critique of the public/private dichotomy outlined in Part
II is that the distinction between public and private is incoherent. Since even
private choices are essentially the product of public structuring of the
decisionmaking context, even private conduct could really be said to represent
public policy. However, if this critique is true, if private ordering of individual
affairs is really just a less obvious form of governmental regulation, then pro-
gressives ought not to be particularly upset at the thought of private ap-
proaches to social problems per se. Like any regulatory programs, those ap-
proaches will either be progressive or not depending upon their substantive
content. And the substantive content of a private program need not necessarily
be conservative. Whether it is or not will depend, of course, both on the nature
of the private realm in which the program is being conducted and on the na-
ture of the alternative regulatory arrangements that prevailed under formal
governmental regulation.
Turning to the latter point first, the nature of pre-existing direct public
regulation will affect whether privatization seems progressive or regressive.33
To adopt Martha Ertman's metaphors, purgatory is a step up from hell and a
step down from heaven. 4 Thus, if the formal regulatory regime is relatively
benign, privatization will seem conservative; but if the formal regulatory re-
gime operates harshly against a particular group or groups, privatization might
seem a progressive move. For example, if it is illegal for gays and lesbians to
marry,35 then the privatization of marriage, allowing individuals to decide for
themselves whom to marry (through contract, for example), with no explicit
governmental sanctioning of the institution of marriage, is a progressive move
33. The nature of pre-existing indirect regulation-what I call the background rules-will
also affect the impact of privatization, as I discuss infra, notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
34. Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, but
Not Hell Either, 73 DENy. U. L. REv. 1107 (1996).
35. No state currently sanctions same-sex marriages. Moreover, in response to a Hawaii
court's recent holding that prohibiting same-sex unions violates the state constitution, Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 48 (Haw. 1993), many states are moving to adopt statutes denying full faith
and credit to gay marriages performed elsewhere. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 19-3-3.1 (1996); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1996); see also the Defense of Marriage Act, 104 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110
Stat. 2419 (1996) (federal statute defining the term "marriage" when used in federal programs to
exclude same-sex marriage and allowing states to refuse to give full faith and credit to such mar-
riages).
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for gays and lesbians.3 6 Moreover, such a move might actually be more likely
to be instituted than a formal change in marriage laws allowing same-sex cou-
ples to wed, for it would be less visible. In other words, it seems quite pos-
sible that some groups could fare better under formally private ordering than
under explicit governmental regulation, for governments are willing to do sub
rosa (through supposedly private arrangements) what they might not be willing
to do explicitly (through formal governmental rules or programs).
In comparing a private regulatory approach with a public one, it is neces-
sary to examine not only the substance of the original public stance toward the
conduct in question but also the nature of the context in which the private
ordering occurs. Gary Peller's article on public school reform illustrates the
progressive potential in private ordering. Professor Peller suggests that privat-
ization reforms-such as, for example, hiring private corporations to adminis-
ter schools-could actually result in institutions that are more responsive to
parental and community concerns than are the elitist and technocratic school
boards of today: "If 'pleasing the consumer' would mean not acting as if
parents and students represent impediments to the smooth running of schools,
this form of privatization might be a progressive improvement in the day to
day school life."37
What has made private ordering anathema to progressives is that such
ordering has constituted covert governmental preservation of existing social
inequalities. It is, in short, the inequality within the (governmentally-created)
private realm that has made deference to private decisionmaking problematic.
If women had viable economic options and power equal to men, progressives
might not be as concerned about their decisions to become surrogate moth-
ers,38 to accept employment in hazardous workplaces,39 or to forego abor-
tions.' It is only because they do not have such equality that their "right" to
make such choices has come to look like a state policy of oppression."' Thus,
the distribution of power and resources within the particular private context
will determine the impact of privatization.
36. Of course, privatization of marriage would not necessarily be a positive development for
everyone. For example, women in opposite-sex relationships might be pressured into marriage on
unfavorable terms by more powerful partners or parents. Also, I should emphasize that I am not
saying here that governmental power would really be absent under a purely contractual approach
to marriage; rather, I am merely saying that it would be exercised (towards some, at least) more
benignly---perhaps as a result of being less visible.
37. Peller, supra note 27, at 1007.
38. For articles expressing such concerns, see, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, Market Inalienability,
100 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1930-31 (1987); Norma J. Wikler, Society's Response to the New Re-
productive Technologies: The Feminist Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1043, 1049 (1986).
39. Cf Lucinda Finley, The Exclusion of Fertile Women from the Hazardous Workplace:
The Latest Example of Discriminatory Protective Policies, or a Legitimate, Neutral Response to
an Emerging Social Problem?, 16-1 (Proceedings of New York University Thirty-Eighth Confer-
ence on Labor, 1985) (critiquing company policies that prohibit fertile women from working
around hazardous substances); see also Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187,
198-99 (1991) (holding that Johnson Controls' "fetal protection policy" excluding women from
jobs requiring exposure to lead was discriminatory).
40. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade (1983), in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93-96 (1987) (criticizing the notion that poor women's lack of access to
abortions is a result of their own choices).
41. See generally Symposium: A Critique of Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363 (1984).
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And the unequal distribution of power discussed above is, of course, in
turn a function of the background rules that structure the decisionmaking that
occurs under the private approach. Depending on the nature of those back-
ground rules, the substantive impact of the regulation that is being (covertly)
imposed through private ordering can be either progressive or conservative.
For example, imagine that the tax code imposed upon all noncustodial par-
ents42 a "child tax" equivalent to half the amount of money that it costs to
raise a child to 22 years (perhaps including a college education), divided by 22
(to produce a per-year, per-parent cost of child-rearing). Imagine also that the
custodial parents, in turn, received a tax credit equivalent to the amount of
"child tax" that the other parent paid. Now, imagine that the noncustodial
parent (usually the father)43 were given the option of avoiding the tax; he
could do so simply by proving that he had paid the custodial parent (usually
the mother) an annual child support payment of whatever amount the two
parents could agree on (which we can assume would usually be substantially
less than the tax).' The substance of this program would seem to most to be
progressive; it works against parents who shirk their responsibilities and in
favor of the economic welfare of the young.
Now, some might object that this would obviously be a public program,
not a private one, because the government would be threatening citizens with a
tax payment; clearly government is acting here. But compare this program
with the conservation trust program described in Federico Cheever's article in
this Symposium. Professor Cheever discusses a governmental program which
essentially enables landowners to give their land to relatives when they die
without creating significant estate tax burdens on the heirs. The landowner
simply grants a "conservation easement" to a conservation trust, which allows
the intended beneficiaries to inherit and continue to use the land but gives the
trust a right to prevent them from developing it. This scheme is just as coer-
cive as my proposed child tax described above.45 The government creates the
42. I am assuming here that the parents would be either unmarried, legally separated, or
divorced. Court orders would not, of course, be involved where two married parents happened to
live apart.
43. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES No. 616, at 391 (1995) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
44. Of course, in any particular case, there is no guaranty that the private agreement reached
by the parents would not itself be the product of coercion. See Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us
Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 441 (1992). However, I
am willing to assume that such an agreement would provide more support to the woman than
many women get right now, since child support orders are notoriously unenforceable. See STATIS-
TICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 43 (reporting that, of the 5,326,000 custodial parents who were
supposed to receive child support payments in 1991, only 2,742,000 received the full amount due
to them). In fact, it is clearly the unenforceability of such orders, not their substantive content, that
would be the target of the child tax scheme that I am imagining. In short, the lesser alternative of
the two options available under the "child tax" program would still provide more support than
many women receive currently. This example thus provides another illustration of the point that
the nature of the prior context determines whether a particular move to privatization will seem
progressive or conservative.
45. Cheever, supra note 1i, at 1078-79, 1087-88. Professor Cheever emphasizes the public
nature of the conservation easement-the fact that many of its terms are dictated by the conserva-
tion trust authorizing statute-as evidence of the fact that the easement constitutes regulation, not
merely a private land transaction. Id. at 1091-92.
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conditions under which the conservation trust option looks appealing to the
landowner. When the alternative is hefty estate taxes that might force the
beneficiaries to sell the land, the donor will prefer the land trust. Here, as with
the child tax, the choice the individual makes (to covenant not to develop the
land or to pay the child support) is the product of a wish to avoid a
governmentally imposed tax burden. While presented as private choice, it is
really governmental regulation.
Note, also, how the conservation trust approach appears less coercive than
a more public alternative program might appear. The conservation trust system
could have been set up completely through environmental regulation. That is,
instead of allowing people to avoid taxes by conveying their property to con-
servation trusts, the government could have merely imposed an affirmative
obligation on certain categories of landowners not to develop their lands in
certain ways. But this approach would be much more politically controversial,
for it would make more visible the governmental hand in the conservation pro-
gram. It also might trigger allegations of a governmental taking.
In contrast, under the current structuring, the program appears voluntary
and non-coercive. Grantors likely experience their choice to enter into the
covenant with the conservation trust as a genuine choice, rather than as co-
erced conservation.' After all, theoretically, they can always choose not to
do it. Substantively, however, the program is far from voluntary. Since the
testator's family would often lose the land if the trust option was not used-it
would have to be sold to pay the estate taxes-the substantive effect of the
program is not much different from that of one which mandates the conserva-
tion. While the substance of the program is the same either way, the structur-
ing makes all the difference in how the program is perceived. Just as other le-
gal rules or governmental programs obscure conservative governmental poli-
cies as merely the exercise of private freedom, this program similarly disguis-
es pro-environment initiatives as individual choice. And, like the conservation
trust, the child tax proposed above serves as an example of how privatization
can be strategically used to further progressive ends. It suggests that, instead
of focusing on trying to reveal the wolf in sheep's clothing-the governmental
hand in supposedly private arrangements-progressives might benefit by trying
some disguises of their own.'
Indeed, because constructivist accounts are anathema in an individualist
culture like that of the United States, such privatization of progressive pro-
grams might insulate them from attack. Those subject to the programs might
46. Similarly, a statute prohibiting low-income women from obtaining abortions would prob-
ably be scandalous, while the Hyde Amendment, which has virtually the same effect, has not
drawn widespread public disapproval.
47. See Cheever, supra note 11, at 1090.
48. In making this point, I am not unaware of the fact that this disguise has often failed in
the past. That is, progressive governmental programs often tend to be seen as coercive of individu-
al will, while conservative programs often tend to be seen as merely effectuating private choices.
See generally Olsen, supra note 23, at 324; Olsen, supra note 15. Nevertheless, the conservation
trust program suggests that this is not always the case, and that private ordering might sometimes
be a preferable approach, especially perhaps where the governmental program is something that
politicians want to allow without seeming to support.
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experience their effects as the result of their own choices, just as some people
experience the effects of conservative programs as the product of their own
decisions. (For example, some low-income people blame themselves for their
poverty, rather than seeing it as at least partly produced by governmental
policy.) Because the notion of private freedom is very powerful, it might be
harder to argue that such freedom doesn't exist (i.e., that a person has been
coerced by government) than to argue that it does, even when the substantive
content of the regulation being obscured by such an argument is progressive.
Of course, if privatizing facilitates the view that one's conduct is freely
chosen instead of coerced, it might thereby further entrench the ideology of
choice that obscures the governmental hand in many conservative social pro-
grams. Since the illusion of choice is precisely what has prevented social crit-
ics on the left from successfully challenging the policy preferences underlying
such programs, privatizing progressive programs might thus reinforce the very
ideology that has sustained the conservative agenda. On the other hand, just as
social theorists are beginning to acknowledge the need to develop analyses that
are neither rigidly constructivist nor rigidly essentialist,49 legal thinkers may
need to be more nuanced in their consideration of the public/private dichotomy
as well. That is, a conceptualization of the impact of governmental programs
as somehow the products of both public policy and individual will might ulti-
mately prove more palatable to the individualist North American public, and
hence more successful as an ideological hook for progressive policies, than the
more unidimensional traditional deconstruction of the public/private dichoto-
my.
It is important, perhaps, to note here that I mean to present these ideas as
preliminary and tentative. In fact, even as I write them, I cringe. Am I merely
getting old, I ask myself? Have I lost my critical edge? Can I really be saying
that radical critiques are unsubtle? Thus, while I am convinced that the left
critique of the public/private dichotomy has not proven an effective rhetorical
tool in articulating a progressive agenda, I am uncertain of whether a return to
the private would in fact be a productive antidote to that situation. However,
as I will discuss further in the next subsection, I believe that it is nevertheless
useful to explore the possibility that, in fact, packaging policies as private
might actually legitimate left programs and delegitimate the right's reliance on
the rhetoric of choice. That is, the ultimate CLS goal of deconstruction of the
public/private dichotomy might, ironically, be more successfully pursued by
using that dichotomy, rather than by abandoning it.
49. Judith Butler writes:
Construction is not opposed to agency; it is the necessary scene of agency, the very
terms in which agency is articulated and becomes culturally intelligible. The critical task
for feminism is not to establish a point of view outside of constructed identities...
[but] to locate strategies of subversive repetition enabled by those constructions, to af-
firm the local possibilities of intervention through participating in precisely those prac-
tices of repetition that constitute identity and, therefore, present the imminent possibility
of contesting them.
BUTLER, supra note 30, at 147, quoted in Franke, supra note 30, at 562.
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B. Subverting Cultural Categories Through Private Ordering
Privatization might have a progressive impact not only by disguising pro-
gressive programs but also by subverting the cultural categories that give cre-
dence to choice-based conservative programs. Certain progressive scholars
have long recognized the subversive potential in mainstream legal rhetoric. For
example, both Patricia Williams and Elizabeth Schneider have argued that,
although rights language often obscures the political judgments behind judicial
outcomes, arguments based on rights can also produce a sense of group soli-
darity, legitimate a group's claims (in both the group's and others' eyes), and
sometimes extract concessions from a system that wants to perceive itself as
true to its ideals." For these and other authors representing subordinated
groups, mainstream legal discourse is a two-edged sword. The trick is to de-
ploy the discourse without falling prey to its seductive power-to use it with-
out fully believing it.
Post-structuralist theorists taking their lead from philosopher Judith Butler
have expanded these insights a step further, focusing their attention on the
particular ways in which individuals use existing cultural categories to disrupt
the interpretive frames that those very categories have established. In her anal-
ysis of what she calls "performativity," Butler emphasizes how the repetition
of cultural norms can either reinforce those norms or disrupt them, or do both
at the same time.5 By exaggeratedly complying with a cultural norm (or
"law," as Butler calls it), the actor actually draws attention to its contingency,
to the fact that it can be violated. 2 Thus, "where the behavioral conformity
of the subject is commanded, there might be produced the refusal of the law
in the form of the parodic inhabiting of conformity that subtly calls into ques-
tion the legitimacy of the command, a repetition of the law into hyperbole, a
rearticulation of the law against the authority of the one who delivers it."53
For example, in discussing Paris Is Burning, a documentary film on male
drag, Butler takes issue with the view expressed by some feminists "that drag
is offensive to women and that it is an imitation based in ridicule and degrada-
tion.' " Instead, Butler argues, the drag depicted in the film "simultaneously
appropriates and subverts racist, misogynist, and homophobic norms of oppres-
sion."55 On the one hand, to the extent that the Latino and African-American
men in the movie fantasize about becoming "real" women with homes in the
suburbs, and thus seem to perceive becoming female as an escape from pover-
ty and violence, they appropriate (without challenging) existing patriarchal
myths that ignore the harsh realities of the single-parenting lives of many
women of color. "On the other hand, insofar as black men who are queer can
become feminized by hegemonic straight culture, there is in the performative
50. Schneider, supra note 29; Williams, supra note 2, at 431.
51. BUTLER, supra note 3, at 128-32.
52. Id. at 137.
53. Id. at 122.
54. Id. at 126; see also bell hooks, Is Paris Burning?, Z MAGAzINE 61 (June 1991) (crit-
icizing some productions of gay male drag as misogynist).
55. BUTLER, supra note 3, at 128.
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dimension of the [drag] ball a significant reworking of that feminiza-
tion .... "56 It becomes, perhaps, something playful, flamboyant, joyful, and
confident, rather than a symbol of loss, absence, or failure. Such performative
behavior as the cross-dressing of drag queens points to the constructedness of
gender, and hence serves to disrupt (or "denaturalize," as Butler puts it) gen-
der categories. "This is not an appropriation of dominant culture in order to
remain subordinated by its terms, but an appropriation that seeks to make over
the terms of domination, a making over which is itself a kind of
agency ....,,57
Another example of the ways in which existing cultural categories can be
challenged through subversive repetition is suggested by lesbian pornography.
Authors like Susie Bright," who writes steamy stories about lesbian sex,
might seem to some to be merely reinforcing the objectification of women to
which feminists have long objected. 9 I would argue, however, that there is a
difference between Bright's essays and similar discussions of heterosexual sex
written by men. In fact, it seems to me that it is the very fact that Bright is
not a man that makes all the difference between her and, say, Henry Miller.
There is simply something inherently subversive about a lesbian openly and
enthusiastically proclaiming her feelings of sexual attraction towards other
women. To do so is not to internalize and reinforce the patriarchal habit of
reducing women to their bodies, for that reduction is intimately tied to a set of
gender understandings that reinforce and construct female inferiority to males.
Lesbian "objectification" of women cannot possibly be the same thing. Rather,
because it necessarily challenges the patriarchal imperative of heterosexuality,
it is subversive of the very discourse of objectification that it employs.'
In law as well as in pornography, then, it may be possible to deploy tradi-
tional discourse against itself. It may be possible (with all due respect to
56. Id. at 132.
57. Id. at 137.
58. SUSIE BRIGHT, SUSIE BRIGHT'S SEXUAL REALITY: A VIRTUAL SEX WORLD READER
(1992).
59. Bright has also been criticized for objectifying men. She writes that, when she and some
women friends had a "tea party" in which they were served by nude men, some invitees refused to
attend, arguing that a similar affair with the roles reversed would be seen as very disrespectful to
women. Id. at 51. To Bright, however, there is a huge difference between the two scenarios. Simi-
larly, same-sex marriage has been criticized by some in the gay community, on the grounds that it
constitutes capitulation to heterosexual norms. Others, however, see it as a radical effort to trans-
form the very concept of marriage.
60. For example, to the extent that the act of objectifying women is thought to be
paradigmatically male conduct-is conduct, in short, that defines and identifies a man as a
man-women's acts of objectifying other women necessarily destabilize this set of associations.
They suggest that not all people who objectify women are men, and, concomitantly, that not all
men need to objectify women-that such behavior is not required in order for a male to be a
"real" man. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theo-
ry, 95 U. COLO. L. REV. 304, 339 (1995) (arguing that "[glay or lesbian pomography that depicts
dominance relations associated with heterosexuality in non-heterosexual contexts may '[b]ring into
relief the utterly constructed status of the so-called heterosexual original' (quoting Susan E.
Keller, Viewing and Doing: Complicating Pornography's Meaning, 81 GEO. L.J. 2195, 2238
(1993) (quoting BUTLER, supra note 30, at 31) and that "Madonna's use of her body as a
'metafeminist prop' or her appropriation of the Marilyn Monroe look may expose widely accepted
images of female desirability as male-created constructs, which can be challenged through rear-
rangement, exaggeration, or parody by women." (citations omitted)).
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Audre Lorde) 61 to use the master's tools to dismantle the master's house.
Consider, for example, the impact of a program like the child tax discussed
above. In order to challenge it, conservatives would have to argue that it con-
stituted the coercive taking of individuals' property. They would have to chal-
lenge the choice to pay the child support (so as to avoid taxes) as not a choice
at all. Perhaps they would contend, for example, that the contexts in which
choices are made, and the background rules that affect individuals' interests,
influence the content of those choices. Perhaps they would find themselves
suggesting that choice is socially constructed, and that courts should be defin-
ing it less formalistically. It is unlikely that such arguments would be without
impact. The traditional liberal categories of thought, in which the private is
equated with individual freedom and the public is equated with governmental
regulation, would probably not survive unscathed in a world where both left
and right contended that choice is socially constructed.62 By using the very
constructs that have been their nemesis, progressives might most effectively
begin to unravel them.63
The case of Crooke v. Gilden,6M discussed by Martha Ertman in this
Symposium issue," provides another example of the subversive potential in
conventional legal structures. In that case, a lesbian succeeded in enforcing a
cohabitation contract against her former partner. However, the opinion in the
case gave no indication that the contract was between two lesbians,' treating
the two individuals as essentially arms' length transactors. Thus, while the
result of the case was substantively favorable to gays, providing a mechanism
they can use to enter into relationships that are formally precluded by marriage
prohibitions, the legal fiction employed to reach that result is more trouble-
some. The fact that the parties essentially had to remain closeted to obtain
judicial enforcement of their agreement makes Crooke initially seem like a
Pyrrhic victory, at best. Yet Professor Ertman's discussion of the case raises
provocative questions about whether, in fact, Crooke ought not instead to be
seen, if not as an unqualified step forward, at least as a mixed blessing.
Like the drag balls discussed by Butler, Crooke seems likely to have both
a reinforcing and a subversive effect on mainstream ideas about lesbians and
gays. On the one hand, it clearly conveys the message that homosexuality is
61. See the quote at the beginning of this article, supra note 1.
62. 1 owe this insight to an exchange I had with a former student, Rich Mitchell.
63. 1 am aware that, to some extent, progressive programs packaged as private already exist
(witness the conservation trust program), and yet liberal discourse remains intact. Frances Olsen
has, in fact, made a career of lucidly pointing out how governmental coercion of have-nots comes
to be seen as choice and governmental coercion of haves comes to be seen as coercion. Olsen,
supra note 15 (arguing that when a governmental program challenges existing power structures it
tends to be viewed as interference with the private sphere, but when it reinforces those structures
it is not so seen). In short, one should not underestimate the ability of our society to be blind to
its own contradictions. Nevertheless, I think that Butler is correct that we must look to those con-
tradictions as the locus of transformative potential as well.
64. 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992).
65. Ertman, supra note 34, at 1154-55.
66. One of the parties tried to bring in evidence of their relationship, but it was barred under
the parol evidence rule. Crooke, 414 S.E.2d at 646; see also MARY BECKER E-" AL., FEMINIST JU-
RISPRUDENCE 523 (1994).
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deviant and shameful, and that gay men and lesbians can only hope to obtain
legal rights by hiding their sexual orientation and invoking existing legal doc-
trines that would apply to straights as well. On the other hand, the case also
represents a concrete benefit for gays. As a result of Crooke and other similar
cases that might be decided in the future, same-sex couples will be able to
create binding legal obligations between themselves even in the absence of a
formal marriage. Crooke has found its way into legal casebooks' and gay
and lesbian newspapers, and will no doubt be widely known in the gay legal
community. Thus, it seems likely that, as a result of the case and others like it,
gay and lesbian partners will increasingly use contracts to structure their rela-
tionships, and will feel increasingly more certain of the enforceability of such
contracts. If that occurs, one can expect that same-sex partnerships will even-
tually come to look, in legal terms, very similar to formal legal marriages. The
closer that the legal structuring of such relationships comes to resemble mar-
riage, the more the prohibition on gay marriage will come to seem formalistic
and unreasonable. In time, then, cases like Crooke might actually lead to the
legalization of same-sex marriage.'
Moreover, once same-sex marriages become legal, the very idea of mar-
riage itself is likely to be transformed. Just as drag's deployment of traditional
gender conventions ultimately subverts the notion of gender, lesbian and gay
couples' following of traditional heterosexual marriage practices may ultimate-
ly transform the notion of family. In addition, because heterosexual norms un-
derlie so much of the content of gender roles,' same-sex marriages can be
expected to have a transformative impact on gender relations as well. Thus,
Crooke represents another example of how a formally private approach, in
which individual choices are allowed to structure interpersonal relationships
with no overt interference by the government, can actually have the ultimate
effect of producing progressive cultural change. °
IV. CONCLUSION
While the public/private dichotomy and the notion of choice have often
been used to justify governmental policies with conservative political slants,
there is no reason why privatization should necessarily always work against
67. See, e.g., BECKER E7 AL., supra note 66, at 523-24.
68. Martha Ertman develops some of these, and other, points in her thought-provoking dis-
cussion of Crooke, supra note 34, at 1164-66. But see Mary Becker, Problems with the Privatiza-
tion of Heterosexuality, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1169 (1996) (arguing that privatization is of limited
progressive value).
69. Much of the content of gender norms assumes that men and women are (and should be)
different. At least in part, that prescriptive difference seems tied to the assumption that women and
men are meant to form couples, and that the two members of the couple cannot (read: should not)
be the same.
70. Of course the positive impact of choice-based solutions in the gay and lesbian context
might be due, at least in part, to the relative equality that exists between the partners in gay and
lesbian relationships, given that they are between members of the same sex. See Becker, supra
note 68, at 1169-72. Private orderings between, for example, gay employees and their employers,
might not produce such salutary results. Nevertheless, Crooke still represents an interesting exam-
ple of how conventional constructs can be subverted when used in unconventional ways.
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progressive goals. Regulations clothed in privatization garb can be either con-
servative or progressive in content. Their substantive content will be deter-
mined by the ways in which the private regime structures individual choices,
including: the nature of the (direct) public regulatory scheme (if any) that the
private one is supplanting, the existing power relations that prevail in the pri-
vate sphere in which the choices are made, and the (indirect) background rules
that constrain the choices available to the individuals doing the choosing.
Privatization's progressive potential lies not only in the possibility that
private approaches might be structured to be substantively progressive, but
also in the rhetorical impact that might be produced when private solutions are
advocated by the left. When substantively progressive policies are structured
so as to appear to be merely the product of individual choices, they create
pressure on the right to challenge that appearance by arguing that the choices
were really constrained. When the right, as well as the left, is forced to con-
tend that choice is socially constructed, rather than solely a product of individ-
ual agency, a fissure in the rhetorical fabric of liberalism is created. Within
that fissure, it is just possible that progressives will be able to wedge the be-
ginning of a substantive, as opposed to formal, social as opposed to individu-
alist, public policy discourse.
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"MEET THE NEW Boss . . . "*
ALAN K. CHENt
As my colleagues and I met during the early stages of planning the
conference at which many of these papers were presented, the conversation
turned toward the possibilities of a burgeoning jurisprudential movement or
development loosely labeled "The New Private Law." The topic was derived
from a series of discussions about the emerging contemporary political move-
ment toward (or resurrection of) privatization, spurred in part by the 1994
congressional elections and the Republican Party's so-called "Contract With
America."' Perhaps, some argued, this political movement might reflect, or
could be said to be the antecedent to, a broader, parallel transformation in
jurisprudential thought.
Other topics were discussed, but with increasing enthusiasm, many of my
colleagues began to see a pattern emerge that, at least for me, was not evident.
As several of the contributors to this issue have acknowledged, the tendency to
alternate between public and private provision and regulation of public goods
(or some combination thereof) has enjoyed a long and cyclical history in our
legal and political culture.2 Being one of the more cynical (or perhaps least
imaginative) of the group, in the midst of an exchange on these issues I mut-
tered, "Meet the new boss, same as the old boss,"3 a familiar line from a song
* PETE TOWNSHEND, Won't Get Fooled Again, on WHO'S NEXT (Decca 1971).
t Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., Case Western Reserve
University, 1982; J.D., Stanford University Law School, 1985. Thanks to all of the participants
from other law schools who contributed so meaningfully to this Symposium: Mary Becker, Rick
Collins, Dan Farber, Clayton Gillette, Gary Peller, Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Elaine Welle, and
Sheryl Scheible-Wolf. Their creative and interesting ideas, both at the conference and in their
papers, helped me immensely in formulating and clarifying my own thoughts on the New Private
Law. I would especially like to thank my colleagues at the University of Denver, Fred Cheever,
Roberto Corrada, Nancy Ehrenreich, Martha Ertman, Dennis Lynch, Julie Nice, and Celia Taylor,
who conceived and put together a fascinating conference and symposium. Dean Lynch also de-
serves credit, along with the University of Denver College of Law, for the continuing support and
encouragement for the Denver University Law Review Symposium. Many of the aforementioned
also read and commented on a draft of this essay, as did David Barnes, George Martinez, Steve
Pepper, and Bob Weisberg. Faculty Services Librarian Diane Burkhardt, my assistant Leslie
Pagett, and research assistant Wendy Hess also helped me immeasurably in conducting research.
Finally, the symposium would not have been possible without the superior effort of Law Review
editors Sue Chrisman and Tracy Craige and their staff.
1. GOP's "Contract with America", STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Nov. 9, 1994, at
14A. The Republican Party's Contract With America symbolizes a political commitment to decen-
tralize power and to "end ... government that is too big, too intrusive and too easy with the
public's money." Id.
2. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 1185
(1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The
Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).
3. PETE TowNsHEND, Won't Get Fooled Again, on WHO'S NEXT (Decca 1971) [hereinafter
TowNsHEND, Won't Get Fooled Again]. Another possibility, of course, is that I am simply our
faculty's most dedicated fan of The Who.
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by the rock group, The Who. My comment was meant not to be flippant, but
to reflect my initial impression that the topic we were examining was a recy-
cled version or aspect of the public/private distinction, which has been
exhaustively and insightfully explored by adherents of existing jurisprudential
schools.
Over the course of several months, I began to understand more of what
my colleagues saw. The prospect of a new jurisprudential framework was
seductive. Yet I remained skeptical about what we were actually examining,
often invoking The Who's lyrics as shorthand for my doubt.
This essay raises a few challenges for the believers in the New Private
Law and questions what defining characteristics this new school of legal
thought might be said to bear. It draws in large part from the lyrics of Won't
Get Fooled Again, The Who's anthem of youthful dissatisfaction4 from which
I initially drew my cynical comments. The selection of this theme is not face-
tious (and only partly humorous).' That song has long sounded the tones of
disillusionment and was released at a time in our political culture when many
on the political left were soured by the unfulfilled, yet seductive, promises of
meaningful political change.6 Now, as substantial changes in the political cli-
mate toward the right have emerged, while those on the left simultaneously
begin to embrace context-specific forms of private governance, it seems appro-
priate to return to the wisdom the song's lyrics offer to intellectual inquiry
Its critical tone is surely appropriate for exploring, with some skepticism, a
symposium dedicated to the proposition that a new jurisprudential movement
is afoot.
To be sure, none of the papers published here unequivocally contends that
a new jurisprudential movement has arisen. Yet this important conceptual
question is implicit in the work produced here.' While each of the papers in
4. Cf. MICK JAGGER & KEITH RICHARD, Satisfaction, on OUT OF OUR HEADS (London
1965).
5. Cf. Jim Chen, But Cf ... Rock 'N' Roll Law School, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 315 (1995)
(assembling, in a humorous fashion, various rock lyrics to demonstrate their explanatory power
regarding multiple constitutional law doctrines).
6. See generally JOHN ORMAN, THE POLmCS OF ROCK MUSIC 160 (1984) (noting that Pete
Townshend's Won't Get Fooled Again "warned people not to follow the new revolutionary leaders
and the rhetoric of the movement because everyone got fooled by those leaders and gurus in the
1960's").
7. For a different view, see Chen, supra note 5, at 318 (arguing that "Pete Townshend
might be able to see for miles, but not when it comes to constitutional law") (footnotes omitted).
8. Our collective thought process is explained in somewhat more detail by Julie Nice. Julie
A. Nice, The New Private Law: An Introduction, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 993 (1996). Whether re-
cent trends toward privatization are described as a political trend, a legal development, or a juris-
prudential movement, it is incumbent upon those who identify it as "new" to describe exactly
what it is. In my view, it was at least implicit that a new school of legal thought could be associ-
ated with the various modes of private governance examined here. Indeed, our topic was self-
consciously modeled, at least in part, on the exploration of jurisprudential change surrounding the
New Public Law in the Michigan Law Review. See Symposium, The New Public Law, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 707 (1991). Martha Ertman and Roberto Corrada argue that there is at least a possibility
that the New Private Law is associated with a transformation in legal thought. Martha M. Ertman,
Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1107, 1161-67 (1996); Roberto L. Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring
Gilmer's Impact and Legacy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1051, 1055-65 (1996). Fred Cheever maintains
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this Symposium represents an important, creative contribution to the scholarly
literature and to the discourse on privatization, I argue in this essay that col-
lectively they do not represent and are not characterized by any new jurispru-
dential framework or perspective. Rather, they can easily be fit into existing
modes of legal thought and intellectual discourse. Drawing from some of these
papers, I explore three possibilities of how the New Private Law could con-
ceivably be characterized as a new jurisprudential movement, but conclude
that none of these characteristics makes the New Private Law new.
I. LINER NoTEs
A natural starting point for any serious inquiry along these lines should be
an examination of what constitutes a jurisprudential movement or school of
thought. While this is a daunting task whose scope far exceeds the ambition of
this essay, I must at least stake out some basic ground rules for my arguments.
Several identifying characteristics come to mind. First, we could charac-
terize a jurisprudential movement as an analytical tool or set of tools for the
comprehensive examination or critique of a system of law that contributes
meaningfully to our understanding of that system.9 Another necessary char-
acteristic of a new jurisprudential framework is that it should probably offer
some explanatory power, either as a descriptive or normative matter. 0 That
is, it should be useful in identifying in some systematic way why legal prob-
lems are, or should be, resolved in a particular manner. A jurisprudential
school must also offer a distinctive analytical approach to looking at legal
problems and differ in important respects from existing schools of thought."
Both traditional and contemporary schools of legal thought share these
basic characteristics. Early classical Formalist and Conceptualist traditions in
that in the conservation easements context, the unique blending of public and private mechanisms
of land use regulation creates some sort of "magic." Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private
Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled
Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (1996). Nancy Ehrenreich, however, limits her observa-
tions to the possibilities that a traditionally conservative tool might be used not only to achieve
progressive ends, but also to undermine conventional discourse about the social construction of
"choice," thus generating a more substantive public policy discourse. Nancy Ehrenreich, The Pro-
gressive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1235, 1251 (1996)
9. ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR. & NANCY LEVIT, JURISPRUDENCE: CONTEMPORARY READINGS,
PROBLEMS, AND NARRATIVES 6 (1995) ("Jurisprudence encompasses the study of a legal system's
scope, function, methodology, and guiding precepts. It considers the basic, general, universal and
theoretical ideas of law, as well as their underlying premises."); see also Gary Minda, The Juris-
prudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 0to ST. L.J. 599, 638 (1989) (describing the common
feature of Law and Economics, Critical Legal Studies, and Feminist Legal Theory as attempting to
develop a new theoretical approach that analyzes law "across the board"); Peter M. Shane, Struc-
ture, Relationship, Ideology, or, How Would We Know a "New Public Law" If We Saw It?, 89
MICH. L. REV. 837, 840-41 (1991) (arguing that one characteristic of a new jurisprudential move-
ment is that it be recognized as new from multiple perspectives). Minda describes Law and Eco-
nomics as "purport[ing] to offer a new theoretical framework for systematically describing and
reformulating adjudication and legal decisionmaking." See, e.g., Minda, supra at 604.
10. HAYMAN & LEVrT, supra note 9, at 6 (arguing that the "essential questions" of jurispru-
dence "can be of a positive or descriptive nature or of a suggestive or normative nature").
11. Id. at 7 (describing a "contemporary" school of jurisprudence as "one which can mean-
ingful be differentiated both from the schools that dominated an earlier age and from the other
schools of today").
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American legal thought sought to characterize law and adjudication in categor-
ical, quasi-scientific terms, promising that deductive reasoning from basic
principles would lead to determinate outcomes. 2 The hallmarks of this clas-
sical school were the embracing of formal logic to derive legal decisions from
broad, general principles or truths. 3 The Legal Realists reacted to the classi-
cal tradition, creating a distinct conceptual framework that questioned the exis-
tence of "right" answers to hard legal questions, undermined assumptions of
judicial objectivity, and called for the introduction of social science and other
sources of knowledge external to law to create a better understanding of
law. 4 The Realists also viewed law as an instrumental or utilitarian device,
an appropriate vehicle for social change. 5 Some of them sought to question
the fundamental dividing line between law and politics.
The Legal Process school, in turn, rejected many of the Realists' concep-
tions, looking back to a more hopeful vision of "neutral principles."' 6 Process
theorists emphasized the ideals of the legal decisionmaking process and the
confinement of legal institutions (courts, legislatures, agencies) to roles within
their competence, rather than normative outcomes. 7 As one description
offers:
The legal process synthesis was a brilliant achievement, for it tran-
scended the realist/formalist debate in a way that fit well with the
relativist theory of democracy. The scholars were able to marginalize
Lochner-style constitutional law as impermissible value-imposition by
unelected judges while simultaneously moving mainstream American
jurisprudence into the modern era by acknowledging and legitimating
the inescapably political character of the common law, statutory inter-
pretation, and administrative law. In short, legal process asserted the
illegitimacy of activist judicial review while asserting activism in
virtually all other institutional settings. 8
12. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Mod-
eration as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707, 711-12 & n.5 (1991) (providing a
slightly broader definition of formalism); Minda, supra note 9, at 633-34 (describing Realist reac-
tion to mechanical jurisprudence of the Formalist and Conceptualist schools). The descriptions of
jurisprudential schools in this section are necessarily abbreviated and incomplete, yet in providing
them I seek to capture some of the characteristics that allow us to view them as distinct.
13. HAYMAN & LEvrr, supra note 9, at 11-12.
14. See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1949); Karl N. Llewelyn,
A Realistic Jurisprudence--The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930).
15. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 688-89 (2d ed. 1985) ("Real-
ist judges and writers were openly instrumental; they asked: what use is this doctrine or rule?...
Law had to be a working social tool; and it had to be seen in that light.").
16. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1959) (arguing that the courts' interpretation of the Constitution must rest on
"reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is in-
volved"). The foremost Legal Process thinkers were, of course, Professors Hart and Sacks. HENRY
M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958).
17. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 12, at 746 (noting that the legal process school "celebrated
the neutrality of law"); Minda, supra note 9, at 642 ("A major tenet of [Legal Process] school was
to provide an objective 'process' determined by legitimate procedures and proper institutions for
resolving subjective questions of 'public policy."').
18. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 12, at 723.
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Three of the widely-acknowledged contemporary legal schools-Law and
Economics, Critical Legal Studies, and Feminist Jurisprudence-also offer
distinctive and different analytical approaches to the system of law. The Law
and Economics school, for example, can be viewed as a systematic approach
to describing or prescribing legal rulemaking as a means of achieving individ-
ual and social wealth maximization.'9 Through the lens of classical economic
theory, Law and Economics proponents seek to understand law as reliant on
the rational behavior of individuals to maximize their personal utility." The
aggregation of these preferences, in turn, is seen as maximizing societal wel-
fare." On this understanding, legal rules can be described or criticized with
reference to their success in promoting these economic objectives.
The Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, in contrast, has attempted to
develop "a totalistic critique of legal doctrine."22 CLS scholars focus on the
indeterminacy of legal doctrine and on the ways in which doctrine masks ideo-
logical forces that perpetuate hierarchical social structures.23 From this per-
spective, law and legal doctrine are viewed as obfuscating forces, hiding the
ideological and socially and historically contingent forces that truly underlie
law. 4 In pursuing this enterprise, CLS seeks to import perspectives from oth-
er disciplines, using "different nonlegal methodologies and insights.""
Feminist legal theorists, too, take critical perspectives, but examine law
and the legal system from the perspective of exposing its historically male
orientation. 6 On one account, the objective of Feminist Legal Theory "is to
explain how the law subordinates women by relying upon theoretical distinc-
tions which are both reified and ordered to favor male interests and values
over those of women. 27
While these modem jurisprudential movements are surely diverse, they
share the common feature of promoting comprehensive analytical or critical
approaches to law that are distinct from the Formalist, Realist, and Process
traditions.2"
Moreover, when groups of legal scholars have attempted to define a break
from the past toward a new jurisprudential vision, they have sought to identify
the characteristics or perspectives that mark the new "school's" territory.
19. Minda, supra note 9, at 605. The work of this movement, in a broad sense, is charac-
terized by Richard Posner's work. See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal
Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
20. HAYMAN & LEvrr, supra note 9, at 95.
21. Id. at 96.
22. Minda, supra note 9, at 614. See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LE-
GAL STUDIES 1-14 (1987); Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984); Symposium,
Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
23. See HAYMAN & LEVIT, supra note 9, at 213-14.
24. Id. at 214-15.
25. Minda, supra note 9, at 614; see also HAYMAN & LEVIT, supra note 9, at 215 (de-
scribing CLS as "a significantly interdisciplinary enterprise").
26. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 161-62, 237-
38 (1989).
27. Minda, supra note 9, at 625.
28. See Id. at 638-41.
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Several years ago, the Michigan Law Review published a symposium attempt-
ing to classify a new school labeled "The New Public Law." 9 While com-
mentators differed over the precise definition of New Public Law, the appella-
tion can be loosely defined as an amalgam of widely diverse post-Legal Pro-
cess scholarship advanced during the 1970s and 1980s, with a decided centrist
bent away from the ideologically polar Law and Economics and CLS move-
ments.
In their essay on the New Public Law, William Eskridge and Gary Peller
placed the New Public Law in the context of the intellectual history of Ameri-
can legal thought.3 0 Their contribution to the Michigan symposium described
three different accounts of the emergence of New Public Law scholarship.
From one view, the New Public Law could be seen as an improvement on or
refinement of the basic structures of the Legal Process tradition-a sort of
"new legal process."'" From this perspective, contemporary scholarship re-
fined Legal Process thought by shaping it to respond to new problems, to new
theories and information, and to the attacks from Law and Economics and the
CLS movement.32 It did so by engaging extralegal sources and other academ-
ic disciplines, such as civic republicanism, theology, feminism, hermeneutics,
pragmatism, and public choice theory.33
A second account of the New Public Law was the "conscious rejection of
the pluralist political features of legal process theory."34 On this view, the
New Public Law was a reaction to the concerns of an increasingly diverse
group among left-leaning scholars who viewed the legitimacy of law as relat-
ing to its normative content, considered law to be a powerful transformative
force that creates, more than it responds to, society, and understood the pro-
cess of law to be a practical, dialogic discourse that seeks to reconcile, rather
than to impose, public values.33
Finally, Eskridge and Peller argued that the New Public Law could be
viewed as a contemporary response to the critiques of Legal Process launched
by the Law and Economics movement on the right, and CLS on the left.36 In
this sense, it can be seen as a mediating force to reconcile the polarization of
academic discourse in the 1970s and 1980s.37
In that same symposium, Dan Farber and Phillip Frickey attempted to
characterize the New Public Law as a noteworthy departure from mainstream
legal theory. They maintained that "[o]ne of [the] most distinctive attributes
[of this school] ... is the much more careful and explicit attention granted to
political theory."38 The New Public Law scholarship, they maintained, can be
29. Supra note 8.
30. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 12.
31. Id. at 709-37.
32. Id. at 727.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 737.
35. Id. at 737-61.
36. Id. at 726-28.
37. Id. at 709.
38. Daniel A. Farber & Philip R. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common
Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 877 (1991).
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characterized by its attention to informing legal discourse by reference to two
distinct, but arguably adverse, political theories-public choice theory and neo-
republicanism. 9
Peter Shane played the skeptic's role in the New Public Law symposium,
thoughtfully articulating some important points about the essentially interpre-
tive nature of assessing paradigm shifts in legal thought." He identified sev-
eral reference points for the task of interpreting what is new. First, he claimed
that an initial task in assessing change is identifying an appropriate baseline
from which the law had moved." Second, Professor Shane proposed that
identifiable jurisprudential movements might entail "a theory of the state" that
differs from the theory of the state during the baseline period.42 A theory of
the state is a "widespread understanding of the relationship of the state to its
citizens, of official institutions to one another, or of the core purposes of gov-
ernment activity."43 While debatable, application of this standard allows for
distinction between long-term jurisprudential transformation and short-term
political shifts that may not have an enduring impact." Professor Shane ulti-
mately concluded that the New Public Law, while feeling new, represented
continuity rather than innovation. 5
Again, the common feature of these descriptions is that they attempted to
locate a potentially new movement in historical and political context and
define how it both inherits and departs from existing or recognized intellectual
traditions. In contrast, none of the work in this Symposium successfully
attempts to situate the New Private Law in this manner; moreover, it is diffi-
cult to infer comprehensive analytical approaches from the interesting doctrinal
issues generated by these articles.'
II. "THE CHANGE, IT HAD TO COME, WE KNEW IT ALL ALONG" 47
The New Private Law, as described to differing degrees in the essays in
this Symposium, is an attempt to describe the possibilities of, and concerns
with, new forms of private governance-i.e., of regulating and promoting the
conduct of individuals in the acquisition and distribution of public goods. '
Capturing the traditional rhetoric of the "market," the contemporary privatiza-
tion movement suggests that market-driven behavior may be preferable to
39. Id.
40. Shane, supra note 9, at 837-38.
41. Id. at 838-39.
42. Id. at 839-40.
43. Id. at 840.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 873-74.
46. It is noteworthy that throughout the historical shifts in broader legal thought, the pub-
lic/private distinction has enjoyed a dubious history. Indeed, one could invert Martha Ertman's
horseshoe arc from public rights to public condemnation to form a pendulum, symbolizing the
alternating visions of public and private spheres of governance as "good" or "bad" for left or
right. Ertman, supra note 8, at 1111. The private sphere was viewed as privileged under classical
legal thought, subordinate in Realist and Process theory, and indistinct from the public sphere in
the modern movements. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 12, at 717 & Table 1.
47. TOWNSHEND, Won't Get Fooled Again, supra note 3.
48. Where I refer to "public goods," I mean also to include public services and public rights.
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traditional distribution of scarce resources through the ordinary political, pro-
cess. Privileging individual autonomy and choice in particular contexts may
constitute a superior mode of delivering public goods and protecting them
from encroachment.
Of course, private governance can have many different meanings. An
earlier view of private law arose from the classical legal Formalist conception
of private economic ordering, symbolized both historically and conceptually by
the Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York.49 On this view, pri-
vate decisionmakers, governed by market forces, allocate resources free from
state intrusion, while public institutions represent a sort of backstop to protect
personal liberty only to the extent that the market has been distorted or altered
in some unnatural way.5" In this sense, private acquisition and allocation of
resources is privileged because contract and property rights are "natural" or
prepolitical.5"
This view reflected the Formalist conception of the public/private distinc-
tion, under which the private sphere could be conceptually separated from the
public because of this natural rights based conception of property and contract
as a fundamental liberty.52 Beginning with the Realists, however, legal ob-
servers attacked the sharp division between public and private spheres, noting
that all property-based rights were themselves the product of public choices
made by the state at an earlier time.53 This conception challenged the idea
that any right existed except by virtue of the state. Scholars from the CLS
movement took the critique further, arguing that not only was the pub-
lic/private distinction conceptually indefensible, but also that it was an obscur-
ing mechanism through which the state could permit individuals to believe that
their choices were private, when in fact all choices are the product of some
previous state action.54
What are the "new" forms of private governance that have emerged in late
twentieth century legal and political thought, and how do they differ from the
more traditional conceptions of private ordering described above? Three gener-
al models come to mind, each reflected to some degree by essays in this Sym-
posium.
55
49. 198 U.S. 45, 62 (1905) (holding that state law regulating wages and working conditions
of bakery employees constituted unconstitutional deprivation of due process of law by interfering
with liberty of contract).
50. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 12, at 711-12.
51. For a critical view of this understanding, see Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and
the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1697, 1718 (1984) (arguing that the theoretical basis
for the Lochner decision is undermined when one recognizes that the market status quo is itself
the product of previous governmental choices).
52. Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1299-1300 (1982) (describing natural rights regime under which indi-
vidual contractual and property rights are immune from state regulation).
53. See generally Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1351-52 (1982) (describing the collapse of the public/private distinc-
tion); see also Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1697, 1718.
54. Professor Ehrenreich summarizes this position in her essay. Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at
1239-40.
55. Cf. JoHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIzATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS
7-8 (1989) (establishing four models for the delivery of services, depending upon two vari-
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First, there is a contractual delegation model, under which a private group
maintains power by virtue of delegation from the state. An early and tradition-
al focus of privatization has been a system under which the government mere-
ly enters into a contract with a private business entity to perform a function
traditionally performed in the past exclusively, or predominantly, by the gov-
ernment.5 6 Under this model, the private actors are likely to take on the es-
sential attributes of the traditional state, but private entrepreneurship is said to
provide a better vehicle for delivery of traditionally government-provided
services. This model relies upon a faith in economic incentives to create and
benefit both private and public welfare. Two typical examples involve con-
tracting with private entities to operate schools or prisons, but there are count-
less others.
In the educational context, private entrepreneurs have undertaken a nation-
al movement to develop alternatives to public schools. The most high profile
of these endeavors, The Edison Project, has recently taken hold in some juris-
dictions.57 The federal government is, at the same time, encouraging state and
local governments to experiment with school privatization."s In the case of
correctional institutions, a common political response to the increasing costs
and problems associated with state-run prisons and jails has been to turn their
operation over to the private sector.59
Government agencies have a long tradition of contracting or subcontract-
ing out certain aspects of their public functions to the private sector. In both
the educational and correctional contexts, however, it is difficult to ascertain
what is exactly new about such approaches. The idea of privatizing schools, in
one form or another, has existed for as long as the public school system has
been a predominant societal presence.' And, of course, private schools have
always existed as alternatives to public school systems. Moreover, the
ables-who pays and who delivers; the four models are collective payment/public sector delivery;
collective payment/private sector delivery; individual payment/public sector delivery; individual
payment/private sector delivery).
56. The government may delegate a previously public function to a private entity in the form
of statutory authorization or contract, or some combination thereof. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §
17-1-104.4 (1996 Cum. Supp.) (authorizing state department of corrections to consider proposals
for provision of minimum security beds through contracts at facilities operated by nonstate enti-
ties); COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-1-202 (1996 Cum. Supp.) (authorizing state department of correc-
tions to entertain proposals from private contractors for construction and operation of prison facili-
ties).
57. Peter Applebome, Edison Project Getting Good Grades, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1996, at
A02 (describing Edison Project schools in four states).
58. A few years ago, Congress enacted the Goals 2000: Educate America Act, which includ-
ed a provision authorizing state educational agencies to use federal funds to support "activities
relating to the planning of, and evaluation of, projects under which local educational agencies or
schools contract with private management organizations to reform a school." Pub. L. No. 103-227,
§ 308(b)(2)(J), 108 Stat. 125 (1994) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 5888(b)(2)(J) (1996)).
59. See Symposium, Privatization of Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 813 (1987); Susan L. Kay,
The Implications of Prison Privatization on the Conduct of Prisoner Litigation Under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, 40 VAND. L. REV. 867 (1987); Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Prisons: An Analysis
of the State Action Requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 20
CONN. L. REV. 835 (1988); E.S. Savas, Privatization and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 889, 890-93
(1987) (reporting statistics on privatization of public services in the United States).
60. See ALEX MOLNAR, GIVING KIDS THE BusINEss: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 1-2, 9, 39 (1996).
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common rhetorical contentions that contemporary school privatization advo-
cates have asserted are remarkably similar to the school privatization argu-
ments that emerged at the beginning of this century.6' Similar rhetorical cho-
ruses are sounded in the private prison movement, which is also not a particu-
larly new idea.62 In that context, the increasing contractualization of prison
services has raised relatively mundane issues about agency principles, albeit
agency principles in the context of state action.63 Moreover, critics of the
privatization of traditional government services raise comparably conventional
critiques.'
Gary Peller's essay" reflects the New Private Law contractual delegation
model, which is somewhat analogous to the "public function" model of the
state action doctrine.' Professor Peller contends that there might exist in the
New Private Law movement a potential for a progressive vision that facilitates
the recapture of popular control over institutions such as schools now run by
elite, unresponsive bureaucrats.67 Under one privatization scheme, school dis-
tricts could subcontract out the administration of their school systems to pri-
vate corporations. Under this fairly conventional view, corporate entities might
be more responsive to parents and students than public school administrators
because the former must react to market concerns or go out of business.' A
more radical proposal would be to turn schools over to the private market.
Providing for "auctioning" of public schools to private community groups that
might advance their particularized interests or emphases could generate oppor-
tunities for institutions that would not, or perhaps could not, exist under the
traditional, top-down public management of education.' For example, in an
61. Id.
62. Ward M. McAfee, Tennesee's Private Prison Act of 1986: An Historical Perspective
with Special Attention to California's Experience, 40 VAND. L. REV. 851, 852 & n.6 (1987) (dis-
cussing nineteenth century experience of several states in allowing private companies to operate
state prisons).
63. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988) ("Contracting out prison medical care
does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those
in its custody, and it does not deprive the state's prisoners of the means to vindicate their Eighth
Amendment rights."). Perhaps it is overstating the case to contend that the issues are mundane, as
the Court continues to take cases to clarify these issues. See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct.
504 (1996) (order granting certiorari on whether employees of private corporations that operate
prisons under government contract are entitled to qualified immunity from constitutional tort
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
64. MOLNAR, supra note 60, at 178-79, 184 (arguing that private, profit-driven corporations
are not intended to further the public good).
65. See Gary Peller, Public Imperialism and Private Resistance: Progressive Possibilities of
the New Private Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1001 (1996).
66. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504-09 (1946) (holding that privately-owned
"company town" could not constitutionally invoke state trespass laws to interfere with religious
speech). But see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 351-53 (1974) (holding that pri-
vate utility company operating by virtue of government-created monopoly is not a state actor
obligated to comply with constitutional due process guarantees).
67. Peller, supra note 65, at 1005 ("American public schools by and large represent the para-
digm of alienating, unresponsive, often corrupt, inefficient, and culturally repressive social institu-
tions.").
68. Id. at 1007.
69. Id. at 1008.
1262 [Vol. 73:4
"MEET THE NEW BOSS...'
African-American community, commonly interested residents could band to-
gether to purchase and operate an Afro-centric school.7"
A second model of private governance might involve joint or cooperative
endeavors by public and private entities. In some circumstances, for example,
the state and private parties have expressly agreed to act jointly or are so
intertwined that the law may not view them as legally distinct.7 None of the
articles in this Symposium suggest a conventional joint enterprise or conspira-
cy model. Perhaps this should not be surprising, since the forms of New Pri-
vate Law explored here seem to value the formal separation of public and
private rather than their explicit merger.
Several pieces do, however, suggest a sort of hybrid enterprise model that
signals more than some sort of public/private cooperation. These hybrid pro-
posals envision a third model of privatization under which government may
create, through public law, a scheme that facilitates allocation and distribution
of public goods by a system of private individual transactions. In this catego-
ry, I place the work of Clayton Gillette, 2 Martha Ertman,73 and Fred
Cheever.74 Somewhat like the government encouragement/approval model of
state action," under this model the state is more of a background player that
consciously makes private transactions possible. The hybrid model suggests
that the concepts of public and private governance lie on a continuum, rather
than at two extreme poles.76
Clayton Gillette examines in great detail the notion that private individuals
and groups might be offered the opportunity to "opt out" of the public provi-
sion of many public goods.77 Using the analogy of contractual default rules,
he proposes that public decisions about the distribution of public goods may
serve as a background against which individuals might choose to opt for a
private supplier to either replace or supplement the state's delivery of that
good." In this manner, Professor Gillette envisions a system in which private
entities compete with, rather than replace, public institutions.79 He observes
that the selection of public or private delivery of various public goods
70. Professor Peller offered this example in his oral remarks at the New Private Law confer-
ence.
71. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-25 (1961) (holding
that privately-owned coffee shop in a publicly-owned building on publicly-owned land was so
closely intertwined with the public that it engaged in state action for purposes of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause). But see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-42 (1982) (private school that
receives 90% of its funding from government and is closely regulated is not state actor bound by
procedural due process clause).
72. Gillette, supra note 2.
73. Ertman, supra note 8.
74. Cheever, supra note 8.
75. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1948) (holding that private party's
enforcement in public courts of racially restrictive covenant was state action governed by the
equal protection clause).
76. See Kennedy, supra note 53, at 1352-53 (describing "continuumization" as one stage in
the decline of the public/private distinction).
77. Gillette, supra note 2.
78. Id. at 1188-92. He also suggests that some people might even choose to opt for less than
the default level of public goods. Id. at 1216-18.
79. Id. at 1187.
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implicates complex social choices and costs not accurately depicted by sim-
plistic rhetorical attacks that celebrate the public and demonize the private."
Professors Ertman and Cheever have contributed provocative articles ex-
ploring whether the New Private Law may suggest that progressive alterna-
tives to the advancement of public rights may be accomplished in a second-
best form through private ordering and enforcement of private contractual
choices about families and land use, respectively. Martha Ertman argues that if
the law (or politics) will not permit us to achieve full recognition of public
rights for, say, gay marriage, perhaps the New Private Law provides a "sub-
versive" doctrinal opportunity to accomplish politically progressive goals."
She proposes that a contractual model may promote individual choice for sex-
ual marginorities in the same way that traditional contract doctrine is said to
reify economic liberty.82 Fred Cheever's essay on conservation easements
offers similar possibilities for devotees of open space.83 He maintains that the
creation of an elaborate scheme of public incentives to encourage private land
transactions that constrain the development of land provides an opportunity to
accomplish environmental protection that public law does not.84 Both of their
proposals are set against the background of the state, as judicial enforcer of
private contractual obligations and, in Professor Cheever's case, as creator of
the "private" conservation easements interest.
The critical commentaries in this Symposium, in turn, track traditional
concerns about turning government functions over to the private sector. Profes-
sors Becker, Stone, and Welle, for example, sound the cautions of the old
boss. Their contributions to this Symposium reflect a profound skepticism
about the private realm. Mary Becker cautions that private contractual regimes
may not always be beneficial for have-nots, and that a more complete analysis
requires the examination of the relative power of the parties to whom the state
allocates the bargaining. 5 Katherine Van Wezel Stone's article highlights the
dangers of allocating dispute resolution in the labor and employment law con-
text to private arbitrators.86 She raises important concerns about undermining
and obscuring public rights under the private regime. Elaine Welle acutely
observes the necessity for consideration of broader public values in establish-
ing a baseline for a "default" level of public services as well as in setting
limits on Professor Gillette's proposal for opting out of public provision of
goods.87
80. Id. at 1193-1216.
81. Ertman, supra note 8, at 1144-53, 1156-58.
82. id. at 1109.
83. Cheever, supra note 8, at 1078-87.
84. Id. at 1086.
85. Mary Becker, Problems with the Privatization of Heterosexuality, 73 DENV. U. L. REV.
1169, 1173-75 (1996).
86. Stone, supra note 2, at 1036-43. As Professor Stone's piece underscores, at least you
could sue the old boss in a public and accountable forum.
87. Elaine A. Welle, Opting Out of Public Provision: Constraints and Policy Considerations,
73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1221, 1226-33 (1996).
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III. ". . . SAME AS THE OLD Boss[?]""s
Without acknowledging the existence of a distinct jurisprudential move-
ment, one can surely see something "new" in the papers described above. The
task of identifying a movement, however, must involve more. There must be
deliberation about what it is that makes the analysis new, and how it can be
distinguished from existing analytical frameworks.89
What is new about modem incarnations of private law? Is it the marriage
or partnership of the public and private, and if so, where is the "magic" of
which Fred Cheever speaks?' Is it new simply because it "feels" different?
Will New Private Law be the miracle cure9 for the postmodem blues?
The various authors' intriguing discussions of the possibilities of New
Private Law offer some insights into what might be "new." First, a common
feature of New Private Law seems to be a preference for decentralized, rela-
tively autonomous decisionmaking over issues that previously were the con-
ventional subject of public regulation and public discourse.92 The decentral-
ization of the New Private Law suggests a regime under which goods and re-
sources are allocated and protected in a highly atomistic manner, with "com-
munities" of decreasing size (and, presumably, increasing homogeneity). Thus,
these models each reflect a desire to reallocate power not only by privatizing
it, but also by decentralizing its exercise. Indeed, as I discuss below, it is not
clear to me which is the more important move, privatization or decentraliza-
tion.
Another connecting feature of the New Private Law is that it is manifested
in ways that reject the left's romanticization of government as the heroic pro-
tector of public rights and values.93 On this view, private governance may
offer the proponents of left-leaning social agendas an opportunity to promote
"public" values, rather than to undermine them. As a number of the papers ar-
gue, the "New" Private Law need not have a political valence.94
Finally, another element that one could draw from the New Private Law is
that it reflects a new understanding of private law as a liberating or
transformative concept that promotes progressive values in a subversive way.
On this understanding, the New Private Law operates as a tool through which
substantive policy goals can be reached; the newness is reflected in the use of
what might be considered to be the historically "conservative" mechanism of
88. TOWNSHEND, Won't Get Fooled Again, supra note 3.
89. See Shane, supra note 9, at 838-42 (describing factors to be considered in evaluating
new movements in legal thought).
90. Cheever, supra note 8, at 1078.
91. PETE TOWNSHEND, Miracle Cure, on TOMMY (Decca 1969).
92. Cheever, supra note 8, at 1085-86; Ertman, supra note 8, at 1156-58; Peller, supra note
65, at 1001-03.
93. Corrada, supra note 8, at 1056-57; Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 1236-37; Ertman, supra
note 8, at 1144-53; Peller, supra note 65, at 1002.
94. See, e.g., Corrada, supra note 8, at 1054-55. Nancy Ehrenreich discusses this point as
well, but not in the context of arguing that it is indicative of any broader change in legal thought.
Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 1242-48.
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privatization.95 In this manner, the very concept of private governance is it-
self transformed through its cooptation by the left.
In the following discussion, I address and critique each of these possibili-
ties.
A. "And a Shotgun Sings the Song"96
It could be that the New Private Law represents a different way of look-
ing at institutional power relationships. On this view, the allocation to the
private realm of not only the authority to create and define substantive inter-
ests, but also to carry out the procedures that give life to those interests, may
require a new way of looking at these quasi-legal institutions. Traditional un-
derstandings of the public and private, or even of their non-distinctness, may
not capture or reflect the underlying transformation of legal institutions that is
occurring.
When commentators speak of private forms of governance, they generally
mean the transfer of decisionmaking authority away from deliberative, theoret-
ically accountable public institutions toward private institutions or individuals.
This requires faith in the market, however defined, to encourage private prop-
erty and contractual agreements that advance the welfare of the individual
parties and, on some accounts, society itself. To a greater or lesser degree, ihe
New Private Law, as illustrated in various contexts, suggests that the tradition-
al realms of private transactional law offer superior mechanisms for achieving
socially desirable outcomes.
Under the New Private Law regime, then, private transactional choices
replace, in whole or part, governmental decisions. This conceptualization of
the New Private Law centers on the redistribution of power from government
to private lawmakers to allocate goods. It also requires the decentralization of
decisionmaking authority to autonomous "private" decisionmakers who act
through individualized "market" transactions. By definition, then, this angle on
the New Private Law requires a conceptual acceptance of at least some mean-
ingful difference between public and private realms of governance. I offer here
two general critiques of this aspect of the New Private Law as a jurispruden-
tial shift.
First, it seems that the New Private Law, as reflected in this Symposium;
could be better understood as a simple redistribution of existing power or a
shift toward shared power among existing institutions, both public and private.
To the extent this is an accurate characterization, it signals not a jurispruden-
tial transformation, but yet another move in the continual historical alternation
of public and private as the privileged sphere. Accordingly, it is difficult to
see how this differs from the old private law, the classical conception of pri-
vate rights as privileged that was one hallmark of Formalist legal thought.
Nothing distinguishes the New Private Law from "old" views of privileging
individual choice through private market ordering.97 If one considers the
95. Ertman, supra note 8, at 1165-67.
96. TowNsIIENo, Won't Get Fooled Again, supra note 3.
97. Brest, supra note 52, at 1299-1300 (describing natural rights regime under which indi-
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universe of authority to allocate public goods, that authority must be dis-
tributed among public actors, private actors, or some combination thereof. This
has always been, and always will be, the case. Moreover, it will remain so
even as the institutions themselves are blended or "married" in previously
unforeseen ways.98
That does not, however, alter the notion that the private law realm exists
only as a product of a public regime." The conception of contract and prop-
erty law as "private" has long been criticized. '°° One fundamental argument
that obliterates the distinction arises from the fact that private law enforcement
must come through the force of the state. The boundaries of "private" law are
governed largely by common law rules, which are themselves developed
through paradigmatic state agents, the courts. Moreover, the private realm of
society is inherently governed by broader public choices. One of the critical
aspects that forms the debate on the public/private distinction is the conception
of what limits, in a liberal state, may be placed on government interference
with "private" conduct.' °'
These arguments translate quite smoothly to the New Private Law as con-
ceived here. Professors Ertman and Cheever argue that private forms of gover-
nance may advance public goals in manners that avoid or, more precisely,
circumvent formal government institutions. Clever though it is, Professor
Ertman's model relies upon state involvement to a substantial degree. Private
ordering is only accomplished in a system that permits public enforcement of
these contractual arrangements.' 2 Unless there were some purely private en-
forcement mechanism, it is the coercive power of the state that makes possible
vidual contractual and property rights are immune from state regulation); Sunstein, supra note 51,
at 1701, 1717 (describing classical understanding of private economic ordering as presumptively
protected from state interference).
98. In examining whether the New Public Law was marked by changing relationships be-
tween public and private institutions, Peter Shane argued that despite increasing efforts toward
privatization, "no apparent change has occurred in legal understanding of the scope of either man-
datory or permissible private decisionmaking." Shane, supra note 9, at 844. Noting the elusive
dividing line between public and private, Professor Shane observed that even in an era of in-
creased private institutional roles in providing public goods and services, the governing legal
norms that private entities operate against were likely to be drawn from the state. Id.
99. Indeed, a purely private regime could be possible only if no state existed.
100. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty and The Basis of Contract, in LAW
AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 41, 69, 102 (1933); Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Suppos-
edly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sc. Q. 470 (1923); see also Kennedy, supra note 53, at 1351-
52 (describing Cohen's analysis as representing the collapse of the public/private distinction). Of
course, as Larry Alexander has observed in the state action context, to recognize that the distinc-
tion between public and private action is conceptually unhelpful is not to say that there are not
still unanswered normative questions about the constitutional limitations on private power. Larry
Alexander, The PubliclPrivate Distinction and Constitutional Limits on Private Power, 10 CONST.
COMMENT. 361, 364-66 (1993). Indeed, there are circumstances in which the public/private dis-
tinction is highly relevant to legal outcomes, even if not conceptually coherent.
101. See Robert H. Mnookin, The PubliclPrivate Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and
Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (1982).
102. Professor Ertman acknowledges the critique generated by the public/private distinction in
the contractual rights context, but contends that regardless of conceptual impossibilities, the dis-
tinction may have "tremendous impact on actual lives." Ertman, supra note 8, at 1120 (acknowl-
edging public/private distinction). This supports, to some extent, my observation that the New
Private Law represents a contemporary exercise in utilitarianism. See infra notes 139-46 and ac-
companying text.
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the benefits under the contract. Ultimately, then, the state must still recognize
the rights as enforceable. What is more, whether or not a judge decides to in-
voke the public policy exception to a contract designed to protect the choices
of autonomous sexual marginorities is also ultimately a public choice. I am
unconvinced that the imprimatur of the "private," through classical contract
doctrine, will necessarily supersede moral judgments in this context." 3 Ac-
cordingly, Professor Ertman's jurisprudential move is inherently subject to the
existence of public law as a promoter (through recognition of a public right)
or destroyer (through public policy exception refusals to enforce such con-
tracts) of her way station.
Professor Cheever's model, too, relies on a system of state enforced con-
tractual rights to empower his conservation easements scheme. Moreover, as
he concedes, this scheme is even more reliant on the state as the source of the
"private" right. His substantial reliance on statutory creation of the conserva-
tion easement interest and, more importantly, on a government-created'market
for open space lends great weight to the obliteration of the public and private,
not their "marriage."'0 4 Similarly, Professor Gillette's proposal requires a
collective public decision to enable opting out in the first instance while Pro-
fessor Peller's private school model relies on the state's authorization to sell
off public schools under legislatively controlled conditions.
Furthermore, it is interesting that both Roberto Corrada's and Dennis
Lynch's comments on Professor Stone's paper seem to be directed at the po-
tential social problems associated with allocation of labor and employment
disputes to private decisionmakers. The problem, they suggest, can be alleviat-
ed by adopting notions of due process, ensuring impartial decisionmaking
bodies, etc." 5 In other words, the problems can be addressed by making
these private institutions more like public ones! And how would that be
achieved? Presumably, this would occur through legislative action setting the
parameters of "private" labor arbitration.
Professor Corrada attempts a broader argument that the newness of the
New Private Law is reflected in that it "expressly mistrusts public fora and
seeks to enforce private law in private venues."'" He argues that this
disavowment not only of public law, but of public institutions to enforce pri-
vate law, is a noteworthy departure from the old (i.e., Lochner era) private
law. This account of the New Private Law does not, on reflection, offer any-
thing new. First, Professor Corrada ignores the fact that the private labor arbi-
tration model he explores is itself the product of public choice, federal arbitra-
tion law. Second, his attempt to distinguish the New Private Law with refer-
ence to the dispute resolution forum seems to be a nod to a conceptual distinc-
tion that has proved as unhelpful as the public/private distinction-the sub-
stance/procedure distinction. What is happening still represents a reallocation
103. Ertman, supra note 8, at 1158-59 (navigating around morality section).
104. Cheever, supra note 8, at 1091-92.
105. Corrada, supra note 8, at 1065-68; Dennis 0. Lynch, Conceptualizing Forum Selection
as a "Public Good": A Response to Professor Stone, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1071, 1072-76 (1996).
106. Corrada, supra note 8, at 1056.
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of existing power from public forums to private forums, and that reallocation
is always subject to change through the public law system. Indeed, the Federal
Arbitration Act even includes an exemption for employment agreements,
though that provision has sometimes been ignored.0 7
Moreover, the cautionary moves of the New Private Lawmakers reveal
that the real concerns here are the underlying social and political values that
are being pursued, and not the particular form of governance. While the pro-
ponents are willing to wade into the privatization waters, they are not willing
to dive in. Some of the authors, even the ones who subscribe to privatization
as a progressive tool, envision public law as a backstop against a private world
gone awry."'9 Professor Cheever's proposal, for example, includes an express
recognition that the state must always be in a position to reenter the picture
should the land use restrictions imposed by private ordering become obsolete,
outmoded, or no longer feasible."'9 Thus, the New Private Law contends that
while the public is not necessarily good for progressive interests, public law
should probably always exist to protect society from the potential evils of
private ordering. It is the outcome, rather than the nature of the forum, that is
most important."0
Once these issues are acknowledged, it seems that there is nothing
quintessentially private about the choices made under any of these proposals.
Both the rulemakers and the rule appliers are public. Each of the proposals
necessitates reliance on the coercive power of the state to accomplish these
goals directly, or at least to ensure that private actors facilitate their achieve-
ment.
Collectively these critiques fit within existing traditions of legal thought,
and reflect the fact that public and private realms of governance cannot, in the
end, be distinguished. They reveal the New Private Law more as private law
guided by the not-so-invisible hand of state-created regulation and constructs,
rather than as a new theoretical perspective or movement. Moreover, these
critiques are not new. Building upon the Realists, the CLS movement has
largely undermined the public/private distinction as a conceptual matter."'
The New Private Law has not resurrected the distinction.
A second foundational way of addressing the power relationships thesis is
to examine how it mirrors a long-standing traditional jurisprudential prob-
lem---countermajoritarian judicial review in a democratic society. In some
ways, the New Private Law may be viewed as the "New Judicial Review" and
107. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991) (refusing to ap-
ply § I of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994), which exempts employment con-
tracts). A final rebuttal of Professor Corrada's argument arises from the existence of the Gilmer
case itself. Surely it must be recognized that the actual enforcement of the private arbitral process
in that context came from a paradigmatic public institution, the Supreme Court.
108. Cheever, supra note 8, at 1101-02.
109. Id.
110. Cf. Mnookin, supra note 101, at 1435-36 (1982) (describing lawyer-economists' critique
of public/private distinction as contending that "in comparing alternative legal rules, the conse-
quences are what count, no matter what the 'sphere,").
111. For an excellent collection of CLS scholarship on this matter, see Symposium, The Pub-
liclPrivate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
1996] 1269
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
may therefore be viewed through the same analytical lens. The point of this
discussion is not to critique the New Private Law substantively, but to demon-
strate that the reallocation of institutional power it represents is subject to
ready examination using existing analytical tools.
The argument goes like this. The American constitutional scheme necessi-
tates a delicate balance of simultaneously facilitating majoritarian rule and
protecting minority rights. To accomplish this, it is sometimes necessary for a
politically independent legal institution-the courts-to disregard and override
the will of the majority in order to assure faith in basic constitutional
principles in a pluralistic society. But this presents an inherent conflict with
the concept of majority will and creates tensions in the institutional relation-
ship between the courts and the so-called political branches of government.
Hence, we are cursed with the "countermajoritarian difficulty.""'
Judicial review, in turn, is both celebrated and assailed for its
countermajoritarian elements."3 To its proponents, judicial review fulfills the
promise of a constitutional democracy by ensuring a mechanism to protect
against the excesses, and sometimes prejudices, of majoritarian will." 4 To its
critics, judicial review is anathema to democratic self-governance, and is the
product of arrogant, elitist decisionmakers, probably influenced by the leftist
academy, overriding populist sentiment on what are essentially political value
choices.' "'
The New Private Law, in comparison, establishes a landscape under which
private decisionmaking bodies take on the institutional role of the judiciary
under constitutional judicial review. Professor Ertman's model, for example,
consciously advocates that small family units will be able to accomplish what
the majority will not permit-legal recognition of alternative family structures
and sexual autonomy." 6 These private decisionmaking bodies can be said to
accomplish similar goals by protecting the rights or will of political minorities
in a manner that balances out public decisions about the allocation of public
goods in most circumstances.' But this makes private lawmakers similarly
"countermajoritarian," and implicates concerns about creating an atomistic
society under which the very concept of community decisions and "public
good" are subsumed by the decentralization of decisionmaking.
112. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (2d ed. 1986)
(describing tension between democratic rule and judicial review); see also JOHN H. ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 4-9 (1980).
113. Compare Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 287 (1983) (ar-
guing that judicial review guards against "the majority's worst excesses" and protects important
constitutional values associated with the rights of political minorities) with ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 6-8, 12, 16-17 (1990) (attacking
judicial review as undemocratic imposition of elitist values on the public). For an interesting cri-
tique of the conventional mode of thinking about judicial review, see Michael J. Klarman, Re-
thinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996).
114. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 113, at 287.
115. BORK, supra note 113, at 7 ("[T]he heresy of political judging is systemic. A great many
judges subscribe to it, a large number of left-wing activist groups promote it, many senators insist
upon it, and in the legal academy this heresy is dominant.").
116. Ertman, supra note 8, at 1156-58.
117. Gillette, supra note 2, at 1193-98.
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Moreover, the countermajoritarian element of privatization makes it vul-
nerable to the same attacks that are directed at activist judicial review, and
these concerns can surely be seen in the essays in this Symposium. First, the
New Private Law could be viewed as an elitist form of governance that cir-
cumvents "real" people. Professor Peller's model, for example, arguably pro-
motes opportunities, even in disadvantaged communities, for the intellectual
elite to counteract the dulling forces of public bureaucrats' decisionmaking
about schools. Professor Ertman's contractual model for sexual marginorities
is likely to be available to a class of marginorities that is relatively wealthy
and well educated, positioning them to take full advantage of a sophisticated
contractual regime. And Professor Cheever's model, which requires significant
wealth such that the tax advantages of conservation easements make sense and
access to legal counsel to structure such transactions is possible, can surely be
branded with the elitism label.
Furthermore, ideas of private governance could arguably lead to isolated,
insular, homogeneous communities (e.g., Peller's Afro-centric schools)." 8
While these private lawmakers may serve the ends of individual autonomy,
they also raise Madisonian concerns about insular decisionmaking, factional
control, and the deprivation of choice for others."9 These concerns exist,
moreover, whether these decisions are made in a town meeting, a corporate
board meeting, or a family meeting.
They also, in the privatization context, raise an additional concern not
present in the judicial review discourse. While federal courts are formally
insulated from the electoral process, they remain accountable to the public in
ways that private lawmakers do not. Accordingly, progressives who view pri-
vatization with optimism should be concerned about privatization, even on
their issues. For example, the relative autonomy for family structuring that
might permit sexual marginorities to protect and gain legal recognition for
their relationships may also mean the relative autonomy for parents to "direct
and control the upbringing, education, values and discipline of their chil-
dren"'2 ° to the exclusion of broader public concerns about matters such as
child abuse.
118. For a fascinating account of the contemporary cultural tendency of homogeneous groups
to form isolated communities, see FRANCES FrrZGERALD, CTES ON A HILL (1986).
119. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
120. Proposed Amendment 17 to the Colorado Constitution. In 1996, some Colorado voters
proposed Amendment 17 to the Colorado Constitution through the state initiative process. See
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(2). The amendment would have made parental control of issues such as
education and discipline an "inalienable" state constitutional right. Michelle D. Johnston, Hidden
Agenda in Amend. 17?, DENY. POST, Nov. 3, 1996, at AO1. Colorado voters defeated the measure
58% to 42%. Michelle D. Johnston, Of the People Faces Hearing on Election Law, DENV. POST,
Nov. 14, 1996, at BOI. As Professor Ertinan herself points out, child sexual abuse does not in-
volve victimless sexual activity, and therefore has moved from public right to criminalization,
consistent with the progressive trend she identifies. Ertman, supra note 8, at 1131-34. Protection
of such activity would accordingly not fit her model. Moreover, the comparison I draw may not
be entirely fair given the clearly unequal legal status of children in a bargaining context as well as
their lack of formal political power. Cf. EDDIE COCHRAN & JERRY CAPEHART, Summertime Blues,
[performed by The Who) on LIVE AT LEEDS (MCA 1970) ("Well I went to my congressman, He
said: 'I'd like to help you son, but you're too young to vote."').
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To the extent that we divorce private decisionmaking from majoritarian
public forces, we also insulate them from constitutional constraint, public
accountability, and public discourse. 2' If the public and private are treated
as formally different, those differences may obscure issues or background
principles that are more critical to assessing law and its outcomes.' I return
to the point about accountability and public discourse when I address the "sub-
versive" nature of the New Private Law below.
Like activist judicial interference with democratic choice, then, the move
toward privatization for progressive purposes can be seen as a reflection of
dissatisfaction with pluralistic decisionmaking. The criticism of public versus
private allocation of goods is likely to turn, as with assaults on activist judicial
review, on whose ox is being gored.'23 These critiques are not new, and to
some extent reflect a Realist acknowledgement of the subjective nature of
legal decisionmaking.
B. The Parting on the Right, Is Now a Parting on the Left"4
As illustrated through the articles in this Symposium, the New Private
Law does not explicitly draw on a particular political theory. Thus, another
manner in which the New Private Law could be said to be "new" is in its lack
of political valence. That is, depending on the context, new forms of private
governance may be used to advance objectives of any ideological color. The
political leanings of the New Private Law's advocates may vary, as with the
public/private distinction arguments, depending upon the policy outcomes
sought.
On this view, the New Private Law establishes an analytical framework
that challenges traditional conceptions of the privileging of private institutions.
Contemporary understanding suggests that protection of the private realm
advanced conservative agendas by protecting the status quo. 2 ' In contrast,
several of the commentators here argue that the newness of the New Private
Law is in the idea that private governance may possibly lead to progressive
outcomes.
121. Daniel A. Farber, Whither Socialism?, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1011, 1014-15 (1996).
122. Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358,
1361 (1982) (arguing that the public/private "rhetoric obscures rather than illuminates, and that the
social function of the public/private distinction is to repress aspirations for alternative political ar-
rangements").
123. See ELY, supra note 112, at I (observing that terms such as activism and self-restraint
are not indigenous to either interpretivist or noninterpretivist methodologies of constitutional inter-
pretation). Moreover, both liberal and conservative constitutional theorists sometimes seek to le-
gitimize their conceptions of judicial review with reference to external principles. See generally
George A. Martinez, The New Wittgensteinians and the End of Jurisprudence, 29 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 545, 556-57 (1996) (describing theoretical approaches of both Ronald Dworkin and Robert
Bork as bearing common characteristic of constraining constitutional inquiry by reference to ex-
ternal principles).
124. In keeping with making this essay reflect contemporary political transformation, the
original phrase has been reversed. The actual line is, "The parting on the left, is now a parting on
the right." TOwNSHEND, Won't Get Fooled Again, supra note 3.
125. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 12, at 712.
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Under the New Private Law, moreover, private is not inherently bad, and
public is not inherently good (or, at least, not inherently better). Professor
Peller sees in privatization new educational opportunities for traditionally
disempowered constituencies. 126 Professors Ertman and Cheever adopt pri-
vate contractual models for the achievement of what may be said to be left-
leaning substantive agendas-the securing of autonomy for victimless sexual
activity and alternative family structures and the preservation of open space,
respectively.'27 Roberto Corrada argues that there is no political valence to
the New Private Law, that the theoretical frameworks that it provides can be
used to the advantage of the left or the right. 2 Under this view, the pro-
gressive scholars of the New Private Law may have some sympathy for the
Devil' 29 -i.e., for the private ordering of goods. In contrast to these authors,
Professor Stone and, to a lesser extent Professor Welle, identify sound reasons
to be skeptical about private law and its ability to protect broader public inter-
ests. 3° Their essays capture the traditional concerns about private law as ob-
scuring or impairing rights, or at least having the strong potential to do so.
But surely the lack of a singular political ideology cannot be the source of
this jurisprudential movement's newness. Again, this is old boss stuff. A con-
ventional understanding of other recognized jurisprudential schools of legal
thought is that they provide similar "big tents" that accommodate radically
different political/ideological visions, yet share a common, unifying analytical
approach. For example, extreme differences as to normative outcomes exist
among Law and Economics scholars, depending upon how the particular
scholar assigns utility to various interests. The fact that Law and Economics
theory suggests that legal rules should be designed to further social utility or
wealth maximization, doesn't mean that uniformity exists about the definition
of wealth. 3' More progressive economic theorists could say, and have, that
the normative goals of legal rules should include the maximization of non-
financial utilities as well.'
Similarly, feminist theory also encompasses perspectives arguably as vari-
ant as the differing experiences of individual women.'33 As Gary Minda has
126. Peller, supra note 65, at 1008-09. In her thoughtful essay, Nancy Ehrenreich identifies
the "progressive" potential of privatization on a number of different levels. Ehrenreich, supra note
8, at 1240-51. She does not, however, contend that this potential might constitute an element of a
new jurisprudential movement.
127. Cheever, supra note 8, at 1087-92; Ertman, supra note 8, at 1137-44.
128. Corrada, supra note 8, at 1054-55.
129. MICK JAGGER & KEITH RICHARD, Sympathy for the Devil, on BEGGARS BANQUET (Lon-
don 1968).
130. Stone, supra note 2, at 1036-43; Welle, supra note 87, at 1225-29.
131. See, e.g., DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND
ECONOMICS 9 (1992) (explaining that gross domestic product may be too narrow a measure of
social well-being because it does not account for valued "goods" such as clean air, privacy, and
leisure time).
132. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Relaxing Traditional Economic Assumptions and
Values: Toward a New Multi-Disciplinary Discourse on Law, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 181 (1991).
Moreover, this reflects the highly utilitarian and pragmatic nature of law and economics theory.
See, e.g., David W. Barnes, Economics 2001: A Carpenter's Odyssey, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 197
(1991) (arguing that law and economics is a "hammer" that can be used to build any kind of
house).
133. Minda, supra note 9, at 624 (noting that "[like CLS, there may be no single 'feminist
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observed, "Today there are feminist legal scholars who could be characterized
as conservative, liberal-center, or left-radical."'' 3 4 Furthermore, New Public
Law scholarship represents a broad range of approaches to legal problems,
rather than a unified analytical construct. 35 Indeed, one of its defining char-
acteristics, to those who have identified it as a movement, is that it incorpo-
rates a multi-faceted analytical approach that encourages discourse among
traditionally opposed disciplines.'36
Finally, the fact that the New Private Law shares the characteristic of "no
inherent political valence" with recognized jurisprudential movements does not
itself make the New Private Law an independent perspective. While this may
be a characteristic of jurisprudential movements, it is certainly not a defining
characteristic.
Perhaps the confusion surrounding the argument that privatization can
serve progressive as well as conservative ends stems from a basic element of
the politics of privatization. During the 1980s, a political slogan often invoked
by political leaders on the left was that the increasingly conservative Republi-
can Party sought to "get government out of the boardroom, and into the bed-
room." 37 The point, of course, was that a political party whose rallying cry
was filled with small government rhetoric and the notion of reducing
government's role in the regulation of private business, was also made up of
people who endorsed state interference with private conduct in the personal
and social realm. A reverse criticism could naturally be employed to attack the
liberal/progressive politicians, who (arguably) desired the reverse.
It may well be that if the privatization movement has no political valence,
it is because directly competing visions of the (broadly defined) private do.
That is, conservative politicians wish to protect the private decisionmaking
realm of commercial and financial activities, while relatively progressive poli-
ticians wish to privilege private decisionmaking in the social and personal
realm. It should not be surprising, therefore, to come to understand that the
same vision of private ordering-reduction of government involvement and
allocation to transaction-oriented individuals-might protect either political
vision of privacy. 3 '
method' or 'feminist epistemology' which can be identified to characterize feminist legal theory").
134. Id.
135. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 12, at 784-87.
136. Id. at 787-90; Farber & Frickey, supra note 38, at 905-06.
137. The origins of this slogan have eluded me. For a useful general reference, see J. M.
Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1119, 1138 (1990)
("Conservatives have pressed for deregulation of business interests while simultaneously advocat-
ing regulation of reproductive interests. The systematic difference in conservative arguments re-
garding the sanctity of freedoms in the boardroom and the bedroom is a helpful insight into the
sources of traditional conservative ideology, just as the opposing orientations in liberal thought
allow us to understand its characteristic ideological features."). For a thoughtful discussion of the
same political dichotomy, see Mnookin, supra note 101, at 1430-34 (describing competing conser-
vative and liberal political visions of the private).
138. Admittedly, this observation does not translate as well to the work of Professors Cheever
and Peller, which does not emphasize the private realm for the purpose of protecting personal pri-
vacy.
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C. "You Can't Always Get What You Want, but...
You Just Might Find You Get What You Need"'39
Finally, the New Private Law could be said to be the possibility of
achieving progressive goals through subversive mechanisms, of transforming
legal thought by changing our fundamental understanding of legal institu-
tions-of, as has been said, using the master's tools to destroy the master's
house."4 But I take issue with this aspect of private law's newness as well.
First, the notion of using historically "conservative" tools to accomplish more
liberal agendas seems fundamentally more like an application of utilitarianism
than a new mode of legal thought. Second, the subversive nature of the New
Private Law resurrects for me concerns about the false obfuscation of the
public/private distinction and the nature of political and jurisprudential dis-
course.
As an illustration of the "subversive" potential of the New Private Law,
let us examine Professor Ertman's and Professor Cheever's innovative ap-
proaches to addressing critical social issues through alternative legal structures.
Martha Ertman argues that contractual freedom may offer liberty to sexual
marginorities who are otherwise unable to obtain public rights in the ordinary
political process. Her ideal, of course, would be a regime under which alter-
native family structures could be recognized and protected as a public right.
The functional aspect of her approach is in identifying a system under which
private ordering could achieve many, but not all, of the benefits the public
right would provide. Private ordering is, for her, a way station on the road to
full public recognition of rights. Or, stated differently, her proposal could be
characterized as a step-by-step approach to the ultimate "heaven" of public
rights.'
41
Fred Cheever's conservation easements proposal is similarly pragmatic. In
a world where political efforts to protect broader "public" rights compete with
the moneyed interests of land developers, a coherent plan for preservation of
open space may seem like an unattainable goal. Through the magic of conser-
vation easements and tax breaks, however, the state's role in ensuring envi-
ronmental protection becomes obscured. Even the participants think they are
pulling off something private!
42
These essays provide an interesting and insightful way to approach these
particular issues, but somehow do not rise to the level of new jurisprudential
theory. Rather, they suggest utilitarian structures that operate within the law to
accomplish identified social benefits. In other words, while Professors Ertman
139. MICK JAGGER & KEITH RICHARD, You Can't Always Get What You Want, on LET IT
BLEED (London 1969). For different legal interpretations of these lyrics, see Chen, supra note 5, at
321 n.67 (listing uses of this song in legal literature).
140. Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 1233 (citing Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never
Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER OUTrSIDER 112 (1984)); Ertman, supra note 8, at 1165
(same).
141. Cf. ROBERT PLANT & JIMMY PAGE, Stairway to Heaven, on (UNTITLED) (Atlantic 1971).
142. Cheever, supra note 8, at 1090-92. While this is consistent with Professor Cheever's
characterization of magic as "sleight of hand," id. at 1078, it also provides my arguments about
the utilitarian nature of the New Private Law with greater force.
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and Cheever offer creative and exciting scenarios for social change, their ap-
proaches reflect and apply a long-standing tradition in legal thought. Their
proposals are strongly reminiscent of the concept of legal functionalism,
43
which incorporates to some degree the idea that the legal system may be ex-
amined in light of its ability to adapt to changing social needs.'" Moreover,
the utilitarian elements of the New Private Law are strongly reminiscent of the
Realist tradition of law as a tool for social change. 45 Similarly, in his re-
marks, Dan Farber pointed out a connection between the New Private Law and
pragmatism."
Beyond the utilitarianism issue, the subversive potential of the New Pri-
vate Law, recognized by Martha Ertman, Nancy Ehrenreich, and Roberto
Corrada, is surely a fascinating element of the discussion. In their papers, they
maintain that it could be the notion that the left could coopt a traditionally
conservative tool that provides the new or unconventional jurisprudential per-
spective I have been seeking.'47 Through this lens, the law itself is trans-
formed by the radical and surreptitious subversion of the master's tools.
One wonders, however, about the ramifications of this subversiveness. For
the subversiveness my colleagues propose is not simply derived from the co-
opting of conservative rhetoric for leftist causes. The subversiveness they cele-
brate derives directly from the lack of public attention and accountability for
the policies generated by the New Private Law. While majoritarian moral
opposition might preclude recognition of a public right of gay marriage, clos-
eting the legal recognition of gay and lesbian relationships in the rhetoric of
contract evades that political problem. While developers' lobbyists may torpe-
do comprehensive federal land use regulation in the halls of Congress, the
New Private Lawyers will be carrying out similar, if disconnected, policies in
the halls of county recorders' offices.
These new rights will be recognized because hiding them in the private
realm will ensure that public objection to their existence or recognition will be
obscured. But this attraction to the subversive, as Katherine Van Wezel Stone
shows in the labor law context, may as easily result in the diminishment of
rights rather than their expansion. If the New Private Law has no political
valence, neither does the subversive achievement of atomistic private interests
outside of the public eye.
The subversiveness of New Private Law, moreover, may in the long run
be more of a concern for the left than for the right. Subversiveness in the
context of private governance means that no accountability will exist for pri-
vatized decisions affecting broader public interests." Public dialogue is like-
wise obscured if decisions on what collectively are important matters of public
143. See generally Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 75-81
(1984) (describing and critiquing strong legal functionalism tradition reflected in both Formalism
and Realism).
144. Id.
145. FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 688-89.
146. Farber, supra note 121, at 1012-13.
147. PETE TOwNSHEND, The Seeker, on MEATY, BEATY, BIG AND BOUNCY (Decca 1972).
148. This point is made quite nicely by Elaine Welle. Welle, supra note 87, at 1233.
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concern are made in decentralized private realms. Such obfuscation historically
has not been a positive element for the left.
What this means is that the New Private Law, like the old private law,
likely obscures the fundamental substantive decisions that most affect society
and misdirects attention toward the public or private institutions that imple-
ment those decisions. More to the point, whether or not subversiveness should
be valued, we can view the New Private Law through an old jurisprudential
lens.
Thus, the New Private Law is likely to raise concerns already reflected in
the existing legal thought on private law and the public/private distinction. It
will provoke continued discussion of what makes the public and private realms
different, and of the role of discourse and accountability in the contemporary
privatization movement. Furthermore, as Dan Farber points out, an important
element of exploring the New Private Law is identifying the background legal
principles against which it must operate, particularly regarding constitutional
law. 49 But all this was true of the old private law as well.
IV. "I'LL Tip MY HAT TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION, TAKE A Bow FOR THE
NEW REVOLUTION"'5 °
Before concluding, I must acknowledge that there exist sound critiques of
my own critique. I place these potential weaknesses in my own position in
three broad categories.
First, none of the papers here expressly takes on the role of constructing
the broader jurisprudential arguments I attempt to dismantle. Rather, I have set
up three rather weak straw persons in order to prove my point. A deeper, more
reflective examination of the New Private Law might reveal differences that I
have overlooked.
Moreover, there is a good reason for the absence of a sort of comprehen-
sive examination of the markers of New Private Law. One of the hallmarks of
the Denver University Law Review Symposia has been the examination of
broad problems of legal theory by contextualizing the examination.' By
disaggregating theory across various legal contexts, we have hoped that a more
satisfying comprehensive analysis can be produced or reconstructed. The con-
textual format of the Symposium does not lend itself to unifying approaches to
legal theory, although that is the ultimate goal. But that is not a response to
the lack of a unifying theory for New Private Law. If transformations occur
149. Farber, supra note 121, at 1014-15. Indeed, the examination is already beginning. See,
e.g., Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 1169 (1995).
150. TOWNSHEND, Won't Get Fooled Again, supra note 3.
151. 1 owe this particular idea to Julie Nice from conversations we have had about this Sym-
posium. For a description of the contextual format of the Denver University Law Review Sympo-
sium, see Julie A. Nice, Making Conditions Constitutional by Attaching Them to Welfare: The
Dangers of Selective Contextual Ignorance of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 72 DENV.
U. L. REv. 971, 971-72 (1995).
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within subsets of doctrine, they do not necessarily identify a movement, which
should be a way of approaching law universally across contexts. 152
Another possible limitation on my analysis is that it may simply be too
early to identify a distinct jurisprudential movement. It may be that the New
Private Law is not new yet, because the innovative ideas described in the
essays presented here are simply too new. That is, these ideas may be at the
forefront of a movement in legal thought that is still emerging. The New Pub-
lic Law Symposium had the luxury of looking back on a generation of schol-
arship. Perhaps my generation'53 of legal scholars, or the next, will one day
look back upon the scholarship of the next thirty years and discover that, in-
deed, this was the beginning of something. I remain skeptical that this will
occur, but surely cannot foreclose its possibility.
Finally, I am vulnerable to an argument that it may not be useful or
meaningful to attempt to identify entire "schools" of legal thought. One might
challenge the legitimacy of this enterprise, particularly in a postmodem world.
The idea of attempting to classify the legal theory underlying these essays into
a taxonomy of legal thought may be an ultimately fruitless task. Intellectual
thought cannot be so easily divided into neat categories, but discourse is part
of a "seamless web" of ideas that are continuously evolving.'54
Perhaps legal scholars would be expending their time and energy more
productively by examining trends and ideas in legal thought and how they
relate to broader schools, rather than worrying about whether they fit into a
new school. There are new aspects to the New Private Law essays, although
they build (as do all theories) on existing schools. It may be more useful to
draw from this work general theoretical assumptions that will help us better
understand the system of law.'55 Moreover, if a new strand of thought
emerges from New Private Law, it is possible in the course of its evolution
that its important ideas will be absorbed into existing schools.'56 Thus, I
must at least qualify my arguments to reflect the idea that transformation of
legal thought is an ongoing, evolutionary process.
152. Shane, supra note 9, at 840-41.
153. PETE TOWNSHEND, My Generation, on THE WHO SINGS MY GENERATION (Decca 1966).
Unlike the Who, however, we simply hope to get published before we get old. Cf id. ("I hope I
die before I get old.").
154. Professors Eskridge and Peller made a similar point in their discussion of the New Pub-
lic Law. They stated that perhaps a "more interesting inquiry" than examining whether a new
school existed, was how the trends it reflected related to the politicization of jurisprudence.
Eskridge & Peller, supra note 12, at 707, 761-90. They observed that the New Public Law move-
ment could be characterized as "an attempt to mediate the ideological polarization of legal dis-
course" and in that respect represented centrism as a sort of postmodem cultural form. Id. at 764,
787-90.
155. For example, rather than attempt to fit the New Private Law into a broader jurispruden-
tial framework, Nancy Ehrenreich takes a different approach. She argues that, even acknowledging
the validity of the conventional critique of the public/private distinction, contemporary privatiza-
tion reforms may peel away the veneer of that distinction by forcing the right to acknowledge that
private choice is ultimately the product of public decisionmaking. As such, new forms of private
governance may provoke the subversion of socially-constructed cultural categories in a manner
that encourages a more honest discourse about public policy. Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 1251.
156. Minda, supra note 9, at 599 (describing trend of new idea being incorporated into exist-
ing modes of legal thought).
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While all this may be true, I believe that it is surely also worthwhile to
attempt to fit these theories into an organized body of knowledge about broad-
er categories of legal thought. The same arguments could be made about the
well-recognized schools of legal thought, which themselves hardly represent a
monolithic or unitary vision of law even within the broader systemic views
that make them distinct.
I have been unable to identify the precise characteristics that differentiate
this movement in any significant way that would justify its designation as a
new jurisprudential school, and have been unable to infer this from the other
work in this issue. Long live law, be it public or private.'57 Karl Llewelyn,
meet Pete Townshend. As legal scholars, we must examine ideas with appro-
priate levels of critique and skepticism-the only way to ensure we Won't Get
Fooled Again.'8
157. Cf. PETE TOWNSHEND, Long Live Rock, on ODDS & SODS (MCA 1974) ("Long live
rock, be it dead or alive.").
158. TOWNSHEND, Won't Get Fooled Again, supra note 3.
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